Politics

1. Arrest of foreigner who trained human-rights lawyers 

Peter Dahlin, a Swedish who cofounded the China Urgent Action Working Group (中國緊急行動工作組) and organized training programmes by lawyers for rights defenders and helped to distribute practical guides on the Chinese legal system, was arrested on 02 January 2016 for endangering national security. He was put on the state broadcaster in which he publicly confessed his actions as ‘in clear violation of the law’ and apologized for hurting ‘the Chinese government and Chinese people’. On 26 January, he was reported as being deported from China. He was accused of establishing a NGO in Hong Kong named Joint Development Institute Limited (JDI) together with Wang Quangzhang (王全璋) a member from the Beijing’s Fengrui Law Firm (鋒銳律師事務所). The Fengrui Law Firm was targeted by the state in the massive rights lawyers’ crackdown in July 2015 (see a report here by Hong Kong Free Press), and some Fengrui’s members including Zhou Shifeng (周世鋒) and Wang Yu (王宇) were formally arrested for subversion of state power in early January after 6 months of secret detension.

• // State news agency Xinhua on Tuesday accused Dahlin of setting up the non-profit organisation – registered in Hong Kong under the name Joint Development Institute Limited – with Chinese rights lawyer Wang Quanzhang to carry out activities that “endanger state security”, including helping the teenage son of detained lawyer Wang Yu flee abroad. Xinhua reported that Dahlin and Wang Quanzhang, from Beijing Fengrui law firm, registered Joint Development Institute Limited (JDI) in Hong Kong in 2009 and suggested that they colluded in fuelling people’s grievances against the government. Wang and four colleagues from Fengrui have been detained since July amid an unprecedented crackdown on rights advocates. They were formally arrested this month on the charge of “subversion of state power”. Caster said Wang’s rights defence work at Fengrui had nothing to do with his group as Wang, although he remained a director at JDI, had minimal involvement from 2014, after he joined Fengrui. “It’s really false to make the connection between China Action and Fengrui, because there really is none,” he said. “Claiming Peter’s involvement … appears to be an attempt to compound the charges against those human rights lawyers.”// Source: SCMP, 20 January 2016.

Dahlin’s case is paralleled to the Chinese authority’s effort to bring foreign NGOs under control.

• //The detention also comes as China prepares to pass a new law to regulate foreign non-governmental organizations and their local partners. The law, which emanates from President Xi Jinping’s National Security Commission and was reportedly inspired by similar rules in Putin’s Russia, puts foreign aid groups under the supervision of the China’s vast security apparatus. According to Chinese authorities, the law aims to protect the “legitimate interests” of foreign NGOs while safeguarding China’s “national security and social stability.”// Source: Washington Post, 13 January 2016.

Analysis by Edward Wong: the arrest of Peter Dahlin has two effects: 1) it serves as a propaganda that aroused suspicions towards foreigners in China and 2) it aims to achieve a chilling effect to foreigners who want to work for NGOs in China in the future.

• //Though foreigners in China have long been forced to make back-room confessions when detained by the police, this recent string of televised self-criticism, under the hard-line rule of President Xi Jinping, has struck many people here as remarkable because of the manner in which the videos were used as Communist Party propaganda for an audience of hundreds of millions. For many, they evoked Mao-era public self-criticism sessions. There have been notable televised confessions by Chinese, too. Beyond continuing the historical pattern, what is the party aiming to accomplish with these videos? And are they effective?“This is a pageant, designed to demonstrate the party-state’s authority over individuals, pure and simple,” said Joshua Rosenzweig, a lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. “These cases are part of the leadership’s effort to take firmer control over spaces and actors in society that had grown too independent and critical under Hu Jintao,” Mr. Xi’s predecessor. […] “Such televised confessions are not following any due process to ensure that the persons concerned could be given any chance to have a fair trial,” said Patrick Poon, a researcher at Amnesty International. Mr. Dahlin’s confession, he said, was part of the party’s efforts to restrict the activities of foreign nongovernmental organizations and their Chinese partners.“By accusing a foreigner who works with an NGO of committing an ‘endangering national security’ offense, this will also give a chilling effect to foreigners who want to work for NGOs in China in the future,” he said. […] In the network’s segment on Mr. Dahlin, two of his detained Chinese associates denounced Mr. Dahlin and his organization using intensely hostile language, similar to the way family members and friends living during the Cultural Revolution were forced to criticize each other.“Now, I have deeply realized that this organization is a pioneer station or a bridgehead planted by anti-China organizations that want to place eyes inside China in order to understand social problems at the bottom of the society,” said one young associate identified in the video by his surname, Wang. “He simply wanted to manufacture incidents so that when the time is mature, he could subvert political power and our party leaders.” That language suggests that one goal of these videos involving foreigners is to stoke suspicion of outsiders — “black hands,” in party terms — and further fuel the China-versus-the-West mentality that Mr. Xi has been promoting.// Source: New York Times, 25 January 2016.

Economy

2. China’s GDP growth at 6.9% in the third quarter of 2015

The National Bureau of Statistics of China announced that China experienced 6.9% GDP growth quarterly. Some forecast the GDP growth in the last quarter of 2015 would go further down, confirming the economic slowdown. Some others doubt the accuracy of the published figure and regard it as over-reported. In addition, a number of growth targets set by the central government are not met. Yet, the service sector has for the first time contributed over 50% to the overall GDP.

• //The country had a GDP of 67.67 trillion yuan in 2015, the National Bureau of Statistics reported on January 19. The increase was broadly in line with the government’s target of about 7 percent. The economy grew 6.8 percent larger in the fourth quarter than it was in the same period of 2014, shy of the 6.9 percent average of predictions by 13 economists who were surveyed by Caixin. The growth rates of the first and second quarters of last year were 7 percent, the official data show. The figure for the third quarter was 6.9 percent. The statistics bureau said that the government’s focus in 2016 would be on « supply-side reforms. » The catchphrase, embraced by authorities at a key economic conference late last year, includes boosting the efficiency and competitiveness of the manufacture and service industries.// Source: Caixin, 19 January 2016.

• //內地2015年國內生產總值（GDP）錄67.67萬億元（人民幣．下同），按年增長6.9%，是25年來最低增速，雖較上年挫0.4個百分點，但仍符合中央去年初設定的「7%左右」增長目標，並與市場共識一致。其中去年第四季GDP按年增長6.8%，較第三季的6.9%進一步放緩；按季比較，第四季增長1.6%，亦低於第三季的1.8%增幅。按產業類別，去年服務業增速為8.3%，高於2014年的7.8%；工業增速放緩至6%，遜於2014年的7.3%，令服務業對GDP的貢獻首次超過50%。2015年消費對GDP增幅的貢獻達到4.6個百分點。不過，去年內地固定資產投資55.16萬億元，按年僅增10%，遠低於中央目標15% ；全國規模以上工業增加值按年增長6.1%，社會消費品零售總額按年升10.7%至30.09萬億元，同樣低於8%及13%的目標。此前國統局披露的年度消費物價指數（CPI）、進出口等數據，也低於中央預設目標。//Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, 20 January 2015.

The Editor-in-Chief Gerard Baker from the Wall Street Journal argued that China’s economic problem might be the single economic problem of the world. He further argued that the market is now worried about China’s capability to handle the economic reform, as the poor management of the financial and currency market it showed in 2015.

• //贝克表示，中国在过去25年显示出超凡的增速，但人们很担心中国正在经历的经济改革是否能够平稳过度，最近关于中国政府的担忧尤其多。“过去人们对中国政府是很有信心的，但随着看到政府在对待股市、汇率等经济问题中的举动，人们开始担心，中国政府是否真的有人们此前认为有的经济手腕。“中国可能是全世界面临的最大的单一经济问题，因此我们花了很多时间进行中国有关的报道。 ”贝克说。贝克认为2016年世界经济问题依然以中国为核心。他指出，中国曾在很长时间内维持11%-12%的高速增长，但2015年IMF报告显示中国增速下降至6.9%。因此未来几年中国经济增速有可能下降至6%。而且人们还怀疑相关数据的真实性，因此实际增长可能比这个数字更低。中国曾经是大宗商品重要的需求方，也是过去十年世界增长重要的贡献者。//Source: Caixin, 22 January 2016.

3. Massive outflow of capital from China

Since 2016, the financial reform did not make a good start, not only with the sudden cancellation of the circuit breaker mechanism, but the Chinese stock market and RMB experienced continued fall in value. Meanwhile, capital has been massively flown out of China. To defend the RMB currency value, the People’s Bank of China released foreign reserve in large quantity, making a drop in the reserve for the first time since 23 years ago. Yet, RMB continued to depreciate despite PBOC’s effort. Some argued the only option left for China is to impose capital control, but it would go against the trend of financial liberalization and RMB internationalization that earned RMB to be included in the basket of Special Drawing Right of International Monetary Fund.

• //China’s capital outflows jumped in December, with the estimated 2015 total reaching $1 trillion, underscoring the scale of the battle facing policy makers trying to hold up the yuan amid slower economic growth and slumping stocks. Outflows increased to $158.7 billion in December, the second-highest monthly outflow of the year after September’s $194.3 billion, according to estimates compiled by Bloomberg Intelligence. The total for the year soared more than seven times from $134.3 billion in the whole of 2014 to a record for Bloomberg Intelligence data dating back to 2006. […] Policy makers have been burning through reserves to reduce yuan volatility as the currency lost its status as a one-way bet on appreciation amid the slowest economic growth in a quarter century and an unexpected devaluation in August. The stockpile of reserves plunged $513 billion last year to $3.33 trillion, the first annual drop since 1992. Outflows spiked in September and December after currency policy changes caught markets by surprise, said Williams. China’s yuan policy has « a communication issue » and needs « better and more communication, » International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said last week.// Source: Bloomberg, 25 January 2016.

• //Given this continuing pressure, Chinese policymakers have few attractive options. Even with a $3.3tn stockpile, they cannot continue to run down foreign exchange reserves indefinitely, nor would the government countenance it. Raising interest rates to make domestic investments more attractive would be unlikely to slow outflows while worsening the already painful slowdown in the real economy. Letting the renminbi find its own level — while intellectually coherent — risks enormous market dislocation in the short term and would be a huge shock to the global economy. Few policymakers either within China or outside are likely to contemplate such a course. The only remaining option, as Japan’s central bank governor suggested last week, is to tighten capital controls until the pressure eases. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, despite maintaining it has no plans to reverse reforms, Beijing is already making it harder to remit money. This goes against the grain of recent liberalising measures, which last year helped China win the renminbi’s inclusion in the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights basket, alongside traditional reserve currencies. However, the IMF has become far more willing to accept the case for temporary capital controls since quantitative easing sparked huge flows of hot money into emerging markets. Capital controls are not a long-term solution but, at present, they are the correct step for Beijing to take in a very difficult situation. However, they will only work if China uses the breathing space to articulate a clear policy to rebalance its economy and liberalise its currency in the longer term — a process that will take many years.//Source: Financial Times, 25 January 2016.

Environment

4. Extremely cold weather hit Mainland China and Hong Kong

The extreme cold weather has broken records of lowest temperature in Mainland China. The freezing weather is expected not to persist though. The sudden freezing weather is believed to be a result of the atmospheric circulation supposedly near the North Pole called Polar Vortex.

• //Temperatures could reach or fall below historical lows in parts of Sichuan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Yunnan provinces on Monday, before it starts to return to normal levels for this time of year from Tuesday, meteorological officials said Cold wave brought heavy snow to Zhejiang province, causing a direct economic loss of 380 million yuan (HK$450 million), officials said. Temperature dropped to minus 20 degrees on Sunday – the lowest level on record since weather monitoring starts. In Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province, more than a dozen of fire hydrants cracked after being frozen as a result of the low temperatures on Sunday. […] Guangzhou, capital city of southern Guangdong province, experienced its first snow in 67 years on Sunday. Photos of exciting locals posing with mini snowmen gone viral on the Internet. Global warming has made extreme weather events more frequent, according to Tang Xu, an official with World Meteorological Organisation, Xinhua reported. The polar vortex around the North Pole becomes more active as a result of global warming, creating smaller vortex that moves south, and causing cold waves, Tang said, adding that El Nino has also made extreme weather events more frequent in recent years.// Source: SCMP, 25 January 2016.

Politics

1. Updates on Hong Kong publishers’ disappearance

The co-owners of the Causeway Bay Bookstore which mostly sells books critical of the Chinese authorities, Gui Minhai (桂民海) and Lee Bo (李波) appeared on state television. On 17 January 2016, Gui was shown on state television, claiming that he voluntarily returned to China from Thailand, out of the guilt for a crime he committed 12 years ago relating to a drink-driving car accident which killed a girl. He said on the televised ‘confession’ that he escaped China after receiving two-year suspended jail term in 2004. In the video he also said he did not want the Swedish government to intervene as he was fundamentally a Chinese citizen with roots in Mainland China. The authenticity of the said case appears doubtful to some observers.

• //Gui Minhai, the owner of the Hong Kong publisher Mighty Current who has been missing since October, appeared on Chinese state television last night (Jan. 17) and made a tearful confession—he had killed a 20-year-old college student while drunk driving in Ningbo, a city in southeastern Zhejiang province, in December of 2003. Gui’s friends and family have their doubts, and say his confession looks scripted and they still believe he was abducted. Gui’s daughter, Angela, who lives in the UK, told Reuters she could not confirm what he said, Gui’s wife, who is based in Germany, told Hong Kong-based digital publication The Initium that she was not aware of any accident, and a friend told the South China Morning Post he believes there was an accident but not that Gui turned himself in. […] China’s state media seems to acknowledge that the detention of Gui is about more than a car crash. Xinhua said Gui is also suspected of other crimes and is now under investigation, while the Global Times said his other crimes relate to his bookstore’s “malicious attack on mainland political systems.”//Source: Quartz, 18 January 2016.

• // It is unclear whether Gui may have been pressured by Chinese authorities. Neither Gui, nor the report, explained how he arrived in China from Thailand. There are also discrepancies over the spelling of the suspect’s name and his age. A CCTV article from 2005 mentioning the case gives Gui’s age as 46, though Gui – of Mighty Current – was born in 1964. He would have been 39 at the time of the incident. Televised “confessions” have become more common in recent years in China. In August 2015, a Chinese business reporter made an on-air “confession” after being detained over a stock market story he had written. Wang Xiaolu “admitted” to spreading false information and supposedly destabilising the stock market.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 17 January 2016.

A Hong Kong-based media reported that Lee Bo just met with his wife on 23 January 2016 with a photo as a proof. Lee also supplied a public letter to the media, urging the Hong Kong Police not to waste resources on his case as he voluntarily returned China to assist investigation, a week after the Hong Kong Police had requested the Guangdong Public Security Department to arrange a meeting with Lee. For Lee’s letter in English, please see here translated by SCMP.

The European Union, the United Kingdoms and Sweden have urged the Chinese authority to release more information on the whereabouts of the two Hong Kong publishers who are also European citizens (for details, see here). Meanwhile, those without foreign passports were still missing and little information can be found on the media.

2. Implication of the booksellers’ disappearance for publishers in Hong Kong

An outspoken writer Yu Jie voiced that the publisher which had scheduled to print his latest book “The Nightmare of Xi Jinping” (習近平的噩夢) got cold feet and refused to do so because they are under heavy pressure with the current chilling circumstance in the publishing sector in Hong Kong. Yu’s book needs to be published in Taiwan now.

• //「書稿完成後，我即與曾經出版《中國教父習近平》的開放出版社商量出版事宜，初步達成出版意向。在聖誕節前夕，我們完成了書稿編輯、封面設計等前期所有工作，預計元旦開機印刷。」「1月3日，開放出版社總編輯金鐘先生發來電郵告知：『香港政治書籍出版的困境，已成為國際關注的焦點。身陷其中的業者，遭到巨大驚恐壓力，無不趨吉避凶，以防成為下一個。我亦接到家人與朋友許多電話勸告。為此，我們再三斟酌，決定暫停大作的出版，以待未來。因未簽約，後續不複雜。但誠盼得到您之諒解。前此勉出《教父》，但今非昔比，愚亦無力承擔巨大後果。未能效終，深以為憾。』我充份理解出版方所遭遇的壓力與危險，在香港的歷史上，這種情形是前所未見的。」// Source: Ming Pao, 13 January 2016.

A chain bookstore PAGE ONE was reported no longer selling politically sensitive books in all branches in Hong Kong.

• //出售大陸政治禁書打出名堂的銅鑼灣書店，負責人股東疑似因「政治敏感」而被強行帶返內地，有報道指新加坡大型連鎖書店 PageOne 香港分店，全線停售「政治敏感」書籍，並未有向員工解釋詳情。以中共內幕為主題的「內地政治書籍」，向來是大陸遊客來港必買之品，貨品在 PageOne 書店銷情一直不錯。《蘋果日報》即時新聞今午報道，PageOne 香港全線分店均已停售「政治敏感」書籍。據一名機場分店員工表示，相關書籍早在「一兩個月前全線停售」，但公司未有交待具體原因。另一名市區分店職員又透露，停售書籍的安排，「即是李波銅鑼灣書店出售的，PageOne都不會賣」。//Source: The Stand News, 05 January 2016.

3. Policy Address’ Emphasis on “One Belt One Road” Initiatives

From one count, the words ‘One Belt One Road’ has appeared 40 times, only second to the words ‘the country’ (guojia) with 47 times (by Mingpao). The latest Policy Address did not receive much discussion. While the government officials defend the move for OBOR, the Editorial by the Hong Kong Economic Journal argued that the latest Policy Address was both too micro and macro, and the Current Affairs Commentator Howard Winn argued that in the latest Policy Address the significant local issues are largely missing but the national policy of “One Belt One Road” is heavily discussed although the policy is regarded as to strengthen China’s influence aboard but arguably of no significant value to Hong Kong.

• //Why would our chief executive give priority to such trivial things over much more pressing issues, like a universal retirement scheme and the long overdue abolition of the offsetting of long-service and severance payments against Mandatory Provident Fund contributions? To give Leung his due, he does deserve some credit for showing tender loving care for our elderly. The hard truth is, however, that the overwhelming majority of our senior citizens would be far more concerned about how the government is going to secure their livelihoods after retirement than extending the length of the green light signal or installing non-slip tiles in public toilets. In other words, Leung simply failed to get his priorities right in his latest Policy Address. […] The “One Belt, One Road” strategy proposed by President Xi Jinping may have become a global sensation on the diplomatic level, but as far as average Hongkongers are concerned, few if any would think it has anything to do with their lives at all.//Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, 15 January 2016.

• //The policy address should be an assessment of Hong Kong’s well being and the problems and opportunities it faces and how the government intends to tackle these issues over the next year. The difficulty for Chief Executive CY Leung is that an honest attempt at this opens a Pandora’s box. So rather than discuss issues which concern people such One Country, Two Systems, constitutional reform, changes to MPF, universal pension and so on, he ignored them. […] Instead of dealing with real issues of concern to people the centerpiece of the of the policy address, was Beijing’s bizarre Beijing “One Belt, One Road” initiative. CY Leung’s preoccupation with this project is baffling. Hong Kong already has significant trade links with South East Asia. As for the “Stans” in Northern Asia the prospects for trade and investment appear limited. As many people have observed this One Belt, One Road is a foreign policy initiative to carve out a sphere of influence for China. The Chief Executive’s alacrity in setting up an office and a committee to be chaired by him is ludicrous shoe-shining and of no particular interest or value to Hong Kong.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 18 January 2016.

Politics

1. Presidential Election

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen won and became the first female president in Taiwan. The Kuomintang has lost to DPP in the presidential election by large margin of votes. The KMT chairman Chu Li-luan (朱立倫) and several heavyweights including the vice-chairman Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌) and the KMT Premier Mao Chi-kuo (毛治國) have resigned from their posts. Reason for the loss of the KMT is manifold. It is argued that the Ma’s Administration with many policy blunders is one of them. Also, as exhibited in the court case of Wang Jinping’s party membership, the Kuomintang’s internal struggle was intense (see a report by the BCC Chinese edition here). The KMT was also unable to unify itself before the election as suggested by Guo Zheng-liang in December 2015 (see here for his article).

• // Ma has overseen a dramatic rapprochement with China since coming to power in 2008. Although Taiwan is self-ruling after it split with China following a civil war in 1949, it has never declared independence and Beijing still sees it as part of its territory awaiting reunification. The thaw culminated in a summit between Ma and Chinese President Xi Jinping in November. Yet despite more than 20 deals and a tourist boom, closer ties have exacerbated fears that China is eroding Taiwan’s sovereignty by making it economically dependent. Low salaries and high housing prices are also riling voters.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 16 January 2016.

The public discontent against Ma’s economic and social policies was already evident and alarming as reflected in the KMT’s electoral defeat in the 2014 local elections (also dubbed as the Nine-in-one election) on 29 November 2014, which was largely viewed as a prelude to the presidential election in 2016.

• //The DPP and its Green camp ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU Taiwan tuanjie lianmeng 台灣團結聯盟), mainly campaigned on the strength of local governance […] But it also surfed on the low approval rate of Ma and the KMT, rising social and economic inequality, and widespread anger over government corruption and housing prices. In the Blue camp, the high level of popular discontent toward the KMT administration and the way the country has been ruled, and the tepid results of its main policies, including its trumpeted cross-strait economic and political rapprochement, left the KMT candidates with few national or local policy achievements to run with. […] The main reproach of the electorate touches on the dismal economic situation of the majority, and especially of the younger generation, despite a nominal annual GDP growth of 2%-3% in recent years. Since Ma’s economic policies from the start of his first term in 2008 have focused on China and cross-strait integration, the poll results also carried a strong rejection of the government’s central economic program. The Sunflower Movement (taiyanghua yundong 太陽花運動 or 3-18 三一八movement),which prevented ratification of the CSSTA (Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement haixia liang’an fuwu maoyi xieyi 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議) signed in2013, was already a signal to the government that the majority of Taiwanese were not benefiting from closer relations with China and feared even more intrusion from and control by Chinese businesses and political interests in their lives and the nation’s economy, especially at the small and medium enterprise level. Economists and official audits have recognised that the ECFA cross-strait agreement (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement liang’an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi 兩岸經濟合作架構協議),the prelude to the CSSTA, has not brought much tangible GDP growth or benefit to most Taiwanese, and often the opposite. Tourist venues flooded with uncouth Chinese tour groups whose spending benefits mainly Hong Kong and Chinese tourism companies, compounded by illegal Chinese investment in residential real estate and overt pro-China propaganda by KMT-affiliated tycoons and Taishang 台商 (Taiwanese doing business in China), have provided a disastrous image of the very practical consequences of rapprochement with China.// Source: China Perspectives, Issue 1, 2015, pp.55-61.

Also, Lin Zhengxiu (林正修) observed that while the votes for the DPP have not increased much. There was a significant loss of supporters in the camp of the KMT. He argued that there are a number of setbacks of Ma Ying-jeou and his close allies in the governance of Taiwan.

• //全球景气低迷与网络造成的世代落差都是可见的外因。对手指责他过于亲中卖台，执政无力；而党内同志批评他决策封闭，引发“马王政争”。但如果以经贸推动两岸和解的路线是错误的，如何解释国际岛内皆对马习会高度评价？如果个性单纯决定命运，又如何解释马一生五次选举连战皆捷？败选是蓝营自我拷问的珍贵时刻，在前所未有的溃败前，马英九的支持者需要一个更彻底的解释。不只指向马个人的特质，也指向支持者的集体特质。正是这些特质的组合，纵容马英九与友人金溥聪的专擅独断，甚至于贻误了败选后的改革。[…] 马的律己与苦行，让他隔绝了纷争与丑闻，但其代价被严重低估。[…] 勤于业，荒于嬉”是儒学千年的教条，但在政治的自由搏击中，却是自我提升的障碍。如果一个经营者把自己的工种定位在低阶的血汗工厂，就几乎不可能生产出原创的精品。若一个本应致力战略运筹的政治工作者，让自己的时间精力全数被例行公事所充塞，就很难期待他对大事深谋远虑。马英九超荷的行程不是效率的表现，而是透支匮乏的病征。// Source: Financial Times (Chinese Edition), 25 January 2016.

The statistics about the presidential election corroborate Lin’s observation. In 2012, the KMT presidential candidate received 6.89 million votes, while the DPP presidential candidate got 6.09 million votes. The overall turnout rate was 74.38%. In 2016, the KMT candidate only got 3.81 million votes, and the DPP candidate had 6.89 million votes. The overall turnout rate was 66.27%. The figures show that the overall turnout rate has dropped by about 8%, the support for the KMT candidate diminished by a large extent, and the support for the DPP, together with the introduction of pro-DPP first-time voters, slightly increased. (For graphical illustration of the election results and statistics, please visit the website here prepared by United News Agency.)

The incident of Chou Tzu-yu (周子瑜) was said helpful for the electoral campaign of the DPP. Zhou is a Taiwan-born K pop star and she is recently banned from doing performances in Mainland China because she has held a national flag of Taiwan in one photo, a gesture being interpreted as supporting Taiwan’s independence in the eyes of some pro-Beijing critics. The impact of the incident on the presidential election can be reflected by a poll study which found that a proportion of teenagers decided to switch their voting preference after Chou’s case, and also by the fact that the president-elect Tsai also used this case in her victory speech.

• //The singer, 16-year-old Chou Tzu-yu was forced to apologize for holding the Taiwanese flag during an appearance on South Korean TV in November. The incident raised issues about Taiwan’s identity and its relationship with the mainland, which considers the island a breakaway province. It was widely speculated her management company forced her to make the apology, which came on Friday, to avoid upsetting mainlanders, a key market.// SCMP, 17 January 2016.

• //一個兩岸政策智庫的一項調查發現，受周子瑜事件影響，超過134萬名台灣青年決定參加上週末的選舉投票或改變他們的投票意向。兩岸政策協會秘書長洪耀南指，雖然整體投票率創下1996年以來最低的66%，蔡英文仍然獲得超過56%的選票，年輕選民的支持是關鍵原因。“不過，在這樣較低的比例下，蔡英文為什麼能夠得到超過689萬票？那是因為很多年輕人在周子瑜道歉之後，投給了蔡，取代了較年長的選民群體。”洪耀南稱，據他們的網絡調查，超過134萬年輕人表示，他們對台灣當地電視台重複播放周子瑜的道歉視頻感到非常憤怒。// Source: SCMP Chinese Edition, 18 January 2016.

 2. The Legislative Election

The DPP won the majority from the KMT, but short of a 75% supermajority to amend the Constitution. The KMT suffered heavily with seats reduced from 64 to 35, losing the parliamentary majority for the first time and taking up about 25% of the Legislative Yuan. The rise of the ‘Third Force’ in the Legislative Yuan after the Sunflower Movement in 2014 was noticeable. New Power Party (NPP, 時代力量), headed by legal scholar Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) and heavy metal vocalist Freddy Lim Chang-zuo (林昶佐), gained their way to the Parliament with three seats from district constituency and two seats from party distribution with 6.1 percent of national votes.

• //這次備受關注的第三勢力包含由黃國昌帶領的時代力量，以及范雲帶領的綠黨社會民主黨聯盟。事實上，兩黨原屬同一團體，但因是否向民進黨靠攏的想法不同而分裂。經過投、開票，已確定時代力量區域、不分區確定獲得5席，顯示該黨選擇的路線「貼近民進黨」，讓該黨知名度能快速竄起，得到民眾的關注。時代力量從一開始就主打「明星牌」，由在318學運獲得高知名度的黃國昌為首，加上閃靈主唱林昶佐、洪仲丘的姐姐洪慈庸、律師邱顯智等人，甫一組黨，關注度就極高。而時代力量也早早表態支持蔡英文，讓不少綠營支持者對該黨有初步認同，加上民進黨大力輔選，多名大老都前往地方陪同候選人掃街拜票，讓時代力量聲勢大好，也受到年輕族群歡迎。雖然選前受到民進黨強力固票，但在不少首投族、大學生等年輕族群的支持下，時代力量最後仍獲得極大勝利，除了原本就不被看好的林少馳，以及爭議較大的邱顯智外，另外3席新北、台北的區域立委全面拿下，加上政黨票破6.1%，預計可有5名立委前進國會，一舉成為國會第3大黨。然而，綠社盟一開始選擇了完全不同的一條路，雖以政策為主打，提出不少完整主張，但因從宣布參選開始，綠社盟的成員皆不願對是否支持民進黨總統候選人蔡英文表態，僅不斷強調「要視候選人政策是否符合黨的理念」，也因此，跟時代力量不同，綠社盟參選初期並無民進黨人士輔選，也讓該黨的聲勢一直提升不起來，民調數字持續低迷。// Source: 新頭殼, 16 January 2016.

3. Potential implications for Taiwan’s international relations after the two elections:

The majority support for the DPP in both Presidential and Legislative elections has allowed the DPP to govern Taiwan with less constraint. There are implications of the election result for both cross-strait relationship as well as economic development in Taiwan. The mainland authority sends out messages to warn against the potential of Taiwan’s independence after the election.

1. a) Diplomatic front: the DPP to maintain ‘status quo’ in cross-strait relationship

Shannon Tiezzi, The Managing Editor of the Diplomat:

• //The TAO (State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office) also reiterated that Beijing’s approach to Taiwan would not change due to the election results: “We will continue to hold fast to the ‘1992 Consensus’ and firmly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ splittist activities in whatever form.” The TAO added that Beijing was willing to strengthen exchanges and contact with any political party or group that “recognizes the two sides of the Taiwan Strait both belong to one China.” […] “The cross-strait issue was not a salient issue in the campaign and therefore was not the issue defining the election result,” he (Joseph Wu, the secretary-general of the Democratic Progressive Party) said. That interpretation fits with Tsai’s repeated assertions that she will maintain the “status quo” of cross-strait relations, rather than seeking to overturn Ma’s policies. However, there are changes in store for the cross-strait relationship. First, while Tsai has not outright renounced the “1992 Consensus,” she doesn’t seem keen to embrace it, either. Wu broached the issue in his remarks at CSIS. Rather than agreeing with the “1992 Consensus” as defined by the KMT and Beijing, Wu said, Tsai “advocates a return to the original spirit of ‘setting aside differences to seek common ground’ that formed the basis of the 1992 cross-strait meetings.”// Source: The Diplomat, 21 January 2016.

Wall Street Journal Correspondent William Kazer argued that Mainland China has a number of ways to pressure Taiwan. Diplomatic isolation is one, economic integration is another.

• //So far, Tsai has been able to keep in check the more stridently anti-China elements of her own party, but this reaction often is complicated by Beijing’s actions, such as the positioning of missiles aimed at the island, increasingly assertive policies in the South China Sea, continuing efforts to limit Taiwan’s participation in many technical level meetings of the World Health Organization, and opposition to Taiwan’s free trade agreement with Malaysia. […] China now accounts for about 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports, even as economic growth on the mainland slows. It is a key destination for investments from the island and is the primary source of Taiwan-bound tourists who take advantage of the hundreds of flights a week linking the two sides. The flip side of this integration is that it gives China considerable political leverage in Taiwan. Beijing has shown itself more than willing to apply pressure to companies operating in China. The fear of lost business is often enough to make corporate executives shy of even the most innocuous criticism of China. […] Tsai has said she wants to encourage investment and trade in other markets, such as Southeast Asia, to diversify the island’s economic ties and hopefully reduce some of the pressure Beijing can wield. But analysts noted that it will be hard to find substitutes for the huge China market in the near to medium term.// Source: China File, 21 January 2016.

1. b) Closer Taiwan-Japan relationship is anticipated for political and economic reasons

Back in October 2015, Shannon Tiezzi, The Managing Editor of the Diplomat:

• //Japan is a natural partner in this regard for both social and geopolitical reasons. A majority of Taiwanese have favorable opinions of Japan, and their regional interests are well aligned as well – both share a commitment to defending international law, democratic systems, and the U.S.-led alliance network in the Asia-Pacific. […] Joseph Wu, the DPP’s secretary-general, told The Diplomat via email that Japan is “Taiwan’s most important as well as the best friend in the region.” He said that Tsai’s trip “will form a very good foundation for the bilateral relations in the next few years.” “Taiwan needs to have a friendly international environment to develop its economy, and having friendly relations with Japan falls in this consideration,” Wu said. On the economic front, Tsai has repeatedly indicated that she believes Taiwan should attempt to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade network, which just negotiated a final deal this week. Both Japan and the United States are part of the TPP, and Tsai asked Japanese Diet members to help Taiwan eventually join as well.// Source: The Diplomat, 09 October 2015.

Editorial of United News Agency on the diplomatic options of the DPP:

• //民進黨還來不及開趴慶功，外國政要已前往敲門。日本交流協會會長大橋光夫及美國前副國務卿伯恩斯選後相繼拜會蔡英文，名為道賀，實則要確定蔡英文對兩國的外交路線與政策承諾，也試探她上台後的兩岸關係走向。[…] 蔡英文上台後，影響兩岸關係的最大變數，未必在國內政治，而是在國際議題上。蔡英文一向重國際、輕兩岸，主張從世界走向台灣，以擺脫對大陸的經濟依賴，這將使民進黨在對外政策上少了兩岸關係的這項籌碼，以致失衡傾側。民進黨執政後，為了要進入ＴＰＰ並與日本攜手南向，其政策走向極可能高度遷就美日。若蔡英文一味地迎合國際，而忽視國內民意，難保不會重蹈馬政府的覆轍，失去民意支持。亦即，未來衝擊民進黨民意支持度的因素，未必在兩岸，而在國際問題及其引發的經濟效應及心理感受上。可以預見，執政後的民進黨要面對一張巨大的網，那是由美國、日本、中國大陸及國內民意四方所交織而成的一張大網，這四股力量之間的拉扯、角力，將構成蔡英文的鉅大挑戰，若不審慎以對，將難以動彈。然而，構築這張巨網的始作俑者，其實正是民進黨自己，是它既要「維持現狀」又要「聯美日抗中」等思維不斷吐絲交纏的結果。// Source: United News Agency, 22 January 2016.