Shanghai environmental protest against paraxylene (PX) plant

1. // Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets of Shanghai this week, as protests against proposals to relocate a paraxylene (PX) plant to the city’s Jinshan district showed no signs of abating amid calls for a larger protest this weekend. Photos of Friday’s protest taken from above showed the crowd stretching two or three blocks, while others showed protesters carrying banners through the lamp-lit streets that read: « Give us back our Jinshan! Protect the environment! Stay away from pollution! » […] « This has been going on for five days now, and I am guessing that there are about 50,000 people here today, even more than yesterday, when there were about 40,000, » a Shanghai resident who declined to be named told RFA. // Source: RFA
2. The local government denies any plans to build a PX processing plant, at least in the near future. // The protest was held after the government decided to invite the public to review its latest plan for the chemical industrial zone’s expansion after some people had said online that there would be a paraxylene plant. But the environmental assessment report released online by the Shanghai Academy of Environmental Science, with the authorization of the management committee of the Shanghai Chemical Industry Park, showed that no PX program was included in its development plan before 2025. The district government released a letter to the public on Monday, reaffirming that there was no PX plant in the current plan and that there would not be any such program in the future. // Source: Shanghai Daily

18 died in Xinjiang attack, Uyghurs were blamed

1. At least 18 people were killed in Kashgar, Xinjiang when police responded to an attack by armed assailants. From Reuters: // The attack occurred on Monday, the station said, in a district of the southern city of Kashgar where tensions between Muslim Uighurs who call the region home and the national majority Han Chinese have led to bloodshed in recent years. Suspects killed several police officers with knives and bombs after speeding through a traffic checkpoint in a car in Kashgar’s Tahtakoruk district, the US-based Radio Free Asia said, citing Turghun Memet, an officer at a nearby police station. Armed police responded to the attack and killed 15 suspects “designated as terrorists”, Radio Free Asia cited Memet as saying. // Source: Reuters
2. Following a series of official moves to undermine and stigmatize religious practice in the predominantly Muslim region of Xinjiang, a Xinjiang local government is promoting a beer festival: // A county in the heavily Muslim southern part of China’s unruly region of Xinjiang has held a beer festival in the run-up to the holy month of Ramadan, the government said, in what an exiled group called an open provocation. Ramadan is a sensitive time in Xinjiang in China’s far west after an uptick in attacks over the past three years, in which hundreds have died, blamed by Beijing on Islamist militants. State media and Xinjiang government websites have published stories and official notices again this year demanding that Communist Party members, civil servants, students and teachers in particular do not observe Ramadan and do not fast. The beer festival happened in a village in Niya County in the deep south of Xinjiang, which is overwhelmingly populated by the Muslim Uighur people who call Xinjiang home. Muslims are not meant to consume alcohol, according to the Koran. The Niya government website said the « beer competition », which happened last Monday just before the start of Ramadan, was attended by more than 60 young farmers and herders. It showed pictures of women dancing in front of a stage and a line of men downing as much beer as they could in one minute. At least was wearing a traditional Uighur skull cap. « This beer competition was varied and entertaining, » the government said, noting that there were cash awards of up to 1,000 yuan ($161) for competition winners. // Source: Reuters

Hessler on why publish in China

1. // My colleague and friend Michael Meyer, who has written two books on China, including one, The Last Days of Old Beijing, that has been published on the mainland, has complained that journalists seem to avoid mentioning that foreign China specialists who work closely with their publishers are often able to include material in their books that otherwise isn’t available in China. “The focus in these articles is always on monetary, not intellectual, exchange, and on what has been cut, not what has been preserved,” he told me recently. His book is highly critical of the redevelopment of Beijing, and yet less than one page, total, was removed from the mainland edition. “More surprising than the three passages that were sliced was all the material that remained intact,” he says. […] Vogel’s book represented the first time that many key details about the Tiananmen Square massacre were published in China. I believe that it’s important to debate the compromises of authors like Vogel, but in the interest of fairness, the article should have mentioned that this was the first time certain sensitive historical material was published in the mainland. (Vogel says that he emphasized this detail in his interviews with Jacobs, and his mainland editors, as well as editors in Hong Kong, would have confirmed it.) […] Stories tend to emphasize money and the size of the Chinese market, without any comments from actual Chinese readers; the result is that we see the hordes rather than the individuals, who may in fact have a more sophisticated sense of the ways in which their government limits information. And foreign journalists seem to have little interest in hearing the reasons why some authors have chosen to publish in China. It’s an issue in which reputations are at stake, and criticism can be intense; after I wrote my essay in The New Yorker, one fellow author of a China book compared my decision to publish on the mainland to the abuse of captive labor in the United Arab Emirates. […] In general, there is a difference between China specialists and other foreign writers who sign a contract and don’t engage further. The media coverage rarely distinguishes between these groups—actually, most criticism tends to be leveled at China specialists, whereas those who don’t bother to check their books are invariably portrayed as innocent victims of the censors. […] In the end, there’s no long-distance solution to Chinese censorship. I have to accept the fact that if I choose not to publish a mainland version of Oracle Bones, the readership will be limited to a relatively small number of elite Chinese, many of whom are fluent in English or travel out of the country. My other books cover much less sensitive topics, and I’ve decided that the compromises are worthwhile. There’s a prominent note at the front of the books explaining that some material has been removed, and it directs readers to my website, where I’ve listed the deletions. […] By the same logic, no foreigner should teach in Chinese institutions, where materials and topics are restricted by the authorities, and which serve an important propaganda purpose in a country that sometimes imprisons scholars. No foreign language student should study in China, where he willingly enters such an environment and allows his fees to contribute to perpetuating the system. No academic exchanges, no government cultural programs, no Fulbright scholars, no NGO activity. All of these activities are politically circumscribed to some degree in China, and cutting them off would lead us to the intellectual equivalent of the Cuba policy, from which we are currently trying to extricate ourselves. // Source: ChinaFile
2. SCMP’s feature on mainland censorship

On ideology and repression

1. // New restrictions on freedom of thought at Chinese colleges – havens of relatively open expression – are taking hold. Scholars are experiencing an increasingly stifling academic environment. Professors, especially in law and the humanities, describe a loss of academic freedom. They speak of new prohibitions against teaching the concepts behind human rights law, or debates arising out of democratic « color revolutions » and the Arab Spring, to name a few, topics that would be found at most colleges around the world. […] Chen, the law professor that resigned, says that arranging academic guest seminars used to be relatively simple. But the number of steps for permission has increased and is being vetted by party bureaucrats. Scholars trying to attend conferences outside China, including Hong Kong, must now obtain formal approvals from the university. // Source: CS Monitor
2. On Foreign Affairs, Lynette Ong discusses whether the government’s harsh crackdown could crack the regime: // Chinese President Xi Jinping is leading one of the most vigorous campaigns against corruption and dissent since the Mao era. In fact, it appears that his campaign has extended as far as Canada; Beijing is attempting to extradite the Vancouver-based businessman Mo Yeung (Michael) Ching for alleged corrupt business dealings in the mid-1990s. Ching is the son of Cheng Weigao, a senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official who was charged with corruption in 2003. Some view these campaigns as the key to restoring the CCP’s strength and legitimacy. Others predict that they will be destabilizing because of the scale, opaqueness, and intensity—by attacking both “tigers” and “flies” (that is, high- and low-level officials), Xi is striking at the core of the patronage networks that hold the political system together, weakening the party from within. And by tightening the reins on public discourse through an increasingly centralized censorship apparatus, Xi is further diminishing his party’s legitimacy. […] Further, Xi’s campaign is deconstructing the very system that binds the CCP together. In an authoritarian system like China’s, the system’s foundational stability comes not from popularly elected officials but from patronage networks. Autocrats garner support by promising to share spoils with their followers, a practice that holds the political insiders together. Undermining this system is thus highly disruptive to the party’s grip on power. What’s more, publicly humiliating ousted officials creates an “emperor’s new clothes” moment—it reveals the party’s ugly backside to the people and elicits disgust, not trust. // Source: Foreign Affairs

China and US accuse each other on human rights record

1. One day after US published an annual human rights report in which China is criticized for clamping down on dissidents and ethnic minorities, China’s State Council Information Office attacks the US’s human rights record. // In a lengthy report carried by the official Xinhua news agency, the information office of the State Council, or cabinet, said the United States “violated human rights in other countries in a more brazen manner, and was given more ‘red cards’ in the international human rights field”. […] The Chinese report, which was mostly compiled from U.S. media articles, said “racial discrimination has been a chronic problem in the United States human rights record”, adding that the United States suppressed the voting rights of minorities. “In 2014, multiple cases of arbitrary police killing of African-Americans have sparked huge waves of protests, casting doubts on the racial ‘equality’ in the United States and giving rise to racial hatred factors,” the report said. The report also criticized the United States for conducting surveillance on world leaders and civilians and for allowing a few interest groups to influence the government’s decision-making. // Source: Reuters
2. // China has issued annual scorecards on human rights in the U.S. since the late 1990s, typically within days of the State Department’s yearly rights reports. According to Washington’s latest appraisal, “repression and coercion were routine” against civil and political rights advocates in China while “discrimination against minorities remained widespread,” as authorities continue to place tight curbs on freedom of speech, assembly and religious practice, among other civil liberties. The two reports bookended the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, where top officials parleyed for 2 ½ days on cybersecurity, maritime tensions and bilateral economic ties. Clashes on these issues have strained U.S.-China ties over the past year, though officials from both governments said they hope the latest talks could soothe discord ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.S. in September. China’s human rights record is a longstanding bugbear in bilateral relations, though officials and rights advocates in the U.S. have expressed growing concern over Beijing’s diminishing tolerance for activism and dissent since Mr. Xi took power more than two years ago. // Source: WSJ
3. Bloomberg Business has more on the portions of the U.S. report pertaining to China’s human rights record: // The report portrays modern-day China as a ruthlessly repressive political system that regularly deploys extralegal measures to keep dissent in check, particularly among groups such as Uigurs, a Muslim minority group, and Tibetans. The report noted the disappearance of influential Tibetan monk Tenzin Lhundrup, who advocated for the preservation of Tibetan identity. Throughout China, officials use “enforced disappearance and strict house arrest, including house arrest of family members, to prevent public expression of independent opinions,” the report said. Attempts to exert control extended to cyberspace, the report found, as China’s “authorities continued to censor and tightly control public discourse on the Internet.”// Source: Bloomberg Business
4. Full text of Human Rights Record of the United States in 2014
5. Full text of 2014 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)

Chinese billionaire Nicaraguan Canal project

1. In December 2014, a canal project in Nicaragua broke ground. The project is ran by Chinese billionaire Wang Jing and his Hong Kong-based Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co. Since the project was announced, questions about Wang’s political connections and the environmental and social impact of the construction have persisted (see CDT’s summary), and local residents and environmentalists staged protests against it (see BBC).
2. //The previously unknown Hong Kong-based company is headed by equally mysterious Beijing-based telecom magnate Wang Jing, a man rumored to have close ties to China’s leadership (see rfa); while the businessman himself denies these ties as well as Party membership, Al Jazeera points out that he and his Nicaraguan project have received much praise by Chinese state media. // Source: CDT
3. In a five-part multimedia series for McClatchy, Tim Johnson examines the political, social, economic, and environmental ramifications of the planned canal project, which he calls, “without doubt the largest earth-moving project of the modern era”; 50,000 workers will be needed to dig a 90-foot-deep ditch across the entire country of Nicaragua. Source: McClatchy
4. BBC’s interview with Wang Jing
5. Guardian travelled along the route of the canal and interviewed affected residents. Source: Guardian
6. Also see another detailed report by Al Jazeera

Hong Kong electoral reform voted down

1. Hong Kong’s legislature voted against the proposed electoral reforms, which would have mandated chief executive candidates to be approved by a pro-Beijing panel, in a vote of 28-8. While the bill was widely expected to suffer defeat, many pro-Beijing representatives surprised many by walking out of the chambers before casting a vote. // About 30 pro-establishment lawmakers walked out of the chamber less than a minute ahead of the vote. They included the central and local governments’ staunchest supporters from the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, Federation of Trade Unions and the Business and Professionals Alliance. They were yet to explain why they walked out of the chamber and refused to vote on the reform package. The only eight pro-establishment lawmakers who voted for the reform package were the five lawmakers from the Liberal Party, Federation of Trade Unions lawmaker Chan Yuen-han, and independents Lam Tai-fai and Chan Kin-por. // Source: SCMP
2. The walk-out was described as a fiasco for the pro-Beijing camp, and led to finger-pointing. Some pro-establishment politicians apologized for the walk-out, with New People’s Party chairwoman Regina Ip and Business and Professionals Alliance vice-chairman Jeffrey Lam Kin-fung both publicly weeping. Their explanation was that the walk-out was a technical mistake: // The fiasco has been described by analysts as an “embarrassment” for Beijing, and the central government’s liaison office has been meeting or phoning pro-establishment lawmakers about it over the last two days. Much of the blame has been placed on business representative and Executive Council member Jeffrey Lam Kin-fung, seen as a key instigator of the walkout in which 31 lawmakers left the chamber in an attempt to force a suspension of the meeting so that Lam’s Business and Professionals Alliance colleague, Lau Wong-fat, could make it for the vote on the Beijing-decreed package. During the drama, seconds before the historic vote was due to proceed, another pro-establishment heavyweight, Ip Kwok-him of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, stood up and ushered everyone to the exit. He apologised for his part yesterday. // Source: SCMP
3. SCMP’s Jeffie Lam offered an anatomy on the outcome of the walk-out: // The fiasco that left the government’s reform package with merely eight yes votes not only intensified the split within the pro-establishment camp but unexpectedly created bunches of winners and losers. The Liberal Party, which swiftly won praise from the central government’s liaison office for having all five of its lawmakers stay in the chamber to vote for the plan, is now reaping the harvest after people across the board paid tribute to its « independent thinking ». […] Political scientist Dr Ma Ngok said Thursday’s fiasco had turned the pro-establishment camp’s election strategy upside down and they would now find it harder to urge Hongkongers to « vote pan-democrats out » for denying the public voting rights in the next chief executive race – a slogan frequently used by the camp before the reform vote. […] While the blame game the Beijing-loyalists originally planned to use against the pro-democracy camp now seems a less feasible tactic, their rivals are also prepared to reverse their passive position. Some pan-democrats sense a golden chance to highlight the incompetence of Beijing-friendly lawmakers. // Source: SCMP
4. Economist reports on the incident and its impact on Beijing’s relationship with Hong Kong: // Though expected, the outcome is an embarrassment for the leadership in Beijing. It had badly wanted to be seen to be fulfilling the commitment it gave in its mini-constitution for post-colonial Hong Kong, known as the Basic Law, which says that the territory may eventually enjoy universal suffrage. China never offered Western-style democracy in Hong Kong, but thought it could allow one-person-one-vote while maintaining sufficient control over the process to ensure that a critic of the party would never be elected. The leadership in Beijing had made it clear there was no other offer. That means the next elections will be held according to the existing rules: a similar kind of committee will choose the chief executive, but without a public vote. This leaves pro-democracy politicians in a quandary. Polls had suggested that public opinion is roughly evenly split between those who wanted legislators to vote down the plan, and those who believed that it would be better to accept it, even if it is flawed. If the outcome of the vote is greater tension between radical activists in Hong Kong and leaders in Beijing who are unwilling to make any concessions on voting procedures, then democrats risk losing support among moderates who fear turmoil. The possibility of growing street unrest became evident late last year when pro-democracy demonstrators staged unprecedented sit-ins on major roads for 79 days. // Source: Economist
5. As expected, Beijing officials condemned the results of the vote and cast blame on the pan-democratic representatives. Associate Press reports on the People’s Daily editorial, which neglected to mention the walk-out: // The Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper published an editorial deploring the vote and accusing the pro-democracy camp of being “selfish” and not heeding public opinion in rejecting the government’s election proposals. “The actions of the opposition camp show they are the upsetters and destroyers of Hong Kong’s democratic development process,” the People’s Daily said. […] The People’s Daily editorial said pro-democracy lawmakers should take “full responsibility” for blocking the proposal but didn’t mention an embarrassing blunder by pro-establishment lawmakers that left most of them accidentally unable to vote in support. // Source: AP
6. A day after the vote, Chief Executive C.Y. Leung appeared to heed the State Council’s recommendations and announced a series of economic initiatives, promising to work together with the Legislative Council on future issues. // Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said Hong Kong’s government hoped to “forge a new relationship” with Legislative Council members. The remarks, at a news conference Friday, represented the first clear sign the government hopes to soothe some of the tensions in Hong Kong society after a year of political turmoil. […] Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying said he would bring a series of economic initiatives to lawmakers next week, and called for their support. // Source: Wall Street Journal
7. While protests that broke out days leading to the vote remained peaceful, a foiled bomb plot has aroused suspicion of subterfuge on both sides. Ten people were detained after bomb-making equipment was found in their possession. According to police reports, some of the suspects were part of a “localist” radical group. From Reuters: // Some of those arrested in the raids belonged to a little-known group called the National Independent Party, media reported on Tuesday. According to its Facebook page the group was set up in January, but the page has now been deleted. A June 1 post purportedly from the group warned that, if the reform package was passed, “Hong Kong people should be mentally prepared there will be casualties”. The Global Times, a widely-read tabloid published by the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily, said in an editorial that following the finding of the explosives, Hong Kong risked descending into chaos. // Source: Reuters
   1. Parallel protests showed China’s intensified effort to exert control: // The tense hours before the vote sparked protests by dozens of pro-Beijing groups outside the Legislative Council – a push diplomats, politicians and academics believe highlights an intensified effort by China to exert control over the Asian financial hub. That effort is run through the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party’s Central Committee with a mission to spread China’s reach by gaining control and influence over a range of groups not affiliated with the party, sources with ties to Beijing have told Reuters. […]The Chinese national anthem blared from loudspeakers, while burly men wearing earpieces and sun-glasses corralled crowds and led chants. Several scuffles broke out, as pro-Beijing supporters, some wearing identical caps and matching shirts, pushed and kicked democracy activists. […] A Reuters analysis of more than 200 articles in the Ta Kung Pao and another pro-Beijing newspaper, the Wen Wei Po, over the past half-year offers a window into the workings of United Front operations. It found that a flurry of senior United Front officials from at least 14 mainland Chinese cities, provinces and counties visited Hong Kong over the period, meeting the expanding network of pro-Beijing groups, including at least nine involved in the recent protest. // Source: Reuters
8. A few days after the vote, the focus was shifted when messages from a pro-Beijing politician’s WhatsApp group appeared in the Chinese-language Oriental Daily News and were authenticated by Legislative Council president Jasper Tsang Yok-sing. The messages showed the chaotic strategy among the pro-establishment camp before the vote with no mention of waiting for lawmaker Lau Wong-fat, and also showed Legco Chairman Jasper Tsang Yok-sing discussing strategy with allies while in Legco on June 18 – leading pan-democrats to question his neutrality. The Whatsapp leak exposed further cleavages among the pro-Beijing camp, with politicians blaming the whistleblower. At a tea gathering with 40 Beijing-loyalists, liaison office director Zhang Xiaoming was said to have urged to stop trying to trace the whistle-blower who betrayed chat messages circulated among the camp during last week’s historic electoral reform vote. // Meanwhile, more lawmakers denied being the whistle-blower, including independents Paul Tse Wai-chun and Ng Leung-sing. New People’s Party chairwoman Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee showed the media her BlackBerry phone, which she said was too old to use the latest version of WhatsApp. Party colleague Michael Tien Puk-sun, invoking a traditional Chinese curse, said whistle-blowers should be « damned to the 18th level of hell ». Tse, Ng and Liberal Party leader Vincent Fang Kang agreed to set aside the leak issue and focus on strengthening cooperation within the camp. Tsang agreed there should be no witch-hunts, adding: « The important thing is … to unite. » // Source: SCMP
   1. From another SCMP report: // Just as the dust was settling on this increasingly unlikely reason that pro-establishment lawmakers offered to explain their bungled walkout during last week’s electoral reform vote, it turns out that « Uncle Fat » – the nickname of rural patriarch Lau Wong-fat – may never have been a factor. His name never featured in an exchange of leaked WhatsApp messages among the pro-establishment lawmakers discussing how to take control of last week’s historic vote. […] But the WhatsApp messages show not only that Lau did not feature in the exchange but he also did not mind being named as the reason for the blunder – or so it would appear until another turn of events on Wednesday. // Source: SCMP
9. Zhang’s tea gathering with Beijing loyalists offered Hong Kong media rare peek inside the Liaison Office: // Something unprecedented happened at the central government’s liaison office last night as Hong Kong’s press pack waited outside for 40 pro-establishment lawmakers to finish a “tea gathering” with Beijing’s top envoy to the city. At 10pm, around 1 ½ hours before the meeting was expected to finish, liaison office security staff walked out of the gate and told reporters: “You could wait inside.” No journalist could recall being allowed into the office to wait for a guest before and what followed lifted some of the mystery that had cloaked the building in Western District. While journalists must visit the office to collect press credentials to work in mainland China, they are not permitted to take photos inside. // Source: SCMP
10. Olive branch to the pan-dems? // Apart from pacifying pro-establishment lawmakers still licking their wounds in the wake of the botched walkout before the vote on electoral reform last week, Zhang Xiaoming, director of the central government’s liaison office, also made an unexpected conciliatory gesture towards the pan-democrats who voted down the package. According to pro-establishment lawmakers […], Zhang said the central government would invite lawmakers to a military parade in Beijing on September 3 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war. « The central government will also invite representatives from different sectors in Hong Kong, including lawmakers, to inspect the development opportunities arising from the country’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategic initiative, » veteran pro-establishment legislator Tam Yiu-chung said. // Source: SCMP

Lawmaker Ronny Tong quit as legislator and Civic Party members

1. //Moderate pan-democrat Ronny Tong Ka-wah sent shockwaves across Hong Kong’s political spectrum yesterday, giving up his directly elected seat in the Legislative Council as well as quitting the party he co-founded nine years ago. The lawmaker’s departure from the Civic Party had long been expected because of his more compromising approach to political reform, but his decision to quit Legco came as a shock, exposing how wide the rift within the city’s pan-democratic camp has become. Yesterday’s drama came less than a week after Legco voted down the government’s final package of proposals for the 2017 chief executive election. Tong lamented his allies’ failure to come up with a feasible proposal to lobby Beijing, and said it was inappropriate for him to retain his seat in the legislature considering he was elected as a Civic Party member in 2012. […] A barrister by profession and a senior counsel, he was the only pan-democrat who did not join in last year’s Occupy protests. In an internal message to colleagues earlier yesterday, Tong said it was the Civic Party’s change of values that had driven him to take the « extremely painful decision ». // Source: SCMP
2. Also see another SCMP report The outlier: Hong Kong lawmaker Ronny Tong clashed with Civic Party on political reform

Chin Wan on “A Federation for Hong Kong and China”:

1. // This, combined with the relative autonomy Hong Kong already enjoys, has major political implications. While officially a special administrative region within the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong really is more like a federate entity. And that is how Hong Kong and mainland China should treat each other in the future: as equal members of a formal Chinese confederation, also including Macau and Taiwan. // Source: The New York Times

Scholarism leader Joshua Wong called for referendum in 2030.

1. Source: Mingpao