Keywords: Healthcare in China, social organization management, military reform, G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Legislative Council Election in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Independence.

CHINA – SOCIETY

 Healthcare reform in China

 a. National Hygiene and Health Conference in Beijing

Xi Jinping and other Politburo members attended the “National Hygiene and Health Conference” (全国卫生与健康大会) from 19 to 20 August to discuss healthcare reform. Xi has elevated the healthcare reform to strategic importance since the Fifth Plenum of the CCP’s 18^th National Congress under the slogan “Healthy China” (健康中国). He also emphasized that “no healthiness for all Chinese citizens, no well-off society for the whole country” (没有全民健康，就没有全面小康). After the meeting, editorials of state media such as Xinhua and People’s Daily soon promoted the importance of healthcare reform on 21 August. The People’s Daily has also prepared a thematic coverage on healthcare reform.

• //中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平出席会议并发表重要讲话。他强调，没有全民健康，就没有全面小康。要把人民健康放在优先发展的战略地位，以普及健康生活、优化健康服务、完善健康保障、建设健康环境、发展健康产业为重点，加快推进健康中国建设，努力全方位、全周期保障人民健康，为实现 “两个一百年”奋斗目标、实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦打下坚实健康基础。中共中央政治局常委、国务院总理李克强在会上讲话。中共中央政治局常委张德江、俞正声、刘云山、王岐山、张高丽出席会议。[…] 习近平指出，在推进健康中国建设的过程中，我们要坚持中国特色卫生与健康发展道路，把握好一些重大问题。要坚持正确的卫生与健康工作方针，以基层为重点，以改革创新为动力，预防为主，中西医并重，将健康融入所有政策，人民共建共享。要坚持基本医疗卫生事业的公益性，不断完善制度、扩展服务、提高质量，让广大人民群众享有公平可及、系统连续的预防、治疗、康复、健康促进等健康服务。要坚持提高医疗卫生服务质量和水平，让全体人民公平获得。要坚持正确处理政府和市场关系，在基本医疗卫生服务领域政府要有所为，在非基本医疗卫生服务领域市场要有活力。习近平指出，良好的生态环境是人类生存与健康的基础。要按照绿色发展理念，实行最严格的生态环境保护制度，建立健全环境与健康监测、调查、风险评估制度，重点抓好空气、土壤、水污染的防治，加快推进国土绿化，切实解决影响人民群众健康的突出环境问题。[…] 习近平强调，当前，医药卫生体制改革已进入深水区，到了啃硬骨头的攻坚期。要加快把党的十八届三中全会确定的医药卫生体制改革任务落到实处。要着力推进基本医疗卫生制度建设，努力在分级诊疗制度、现代医院管理制度、全民医保制度、药品供应保障制度、综合监管制度5项基本医疗卫生制度建设上取得突破。[…] 习近平指出，推进健康中国建设，是我们党对人民的郑重承诺。各级党委和政府要把这项重大民心工程摆上重要日程，强化责任担当，狠抓推动落实。// Source: People’s Daily, 21 August 2016.

A commentator from the People’s Daily pointed out the importance of civic participation in health maintenance:

• //实现健康中国，有赖于人人参与。对于健康，无论是个人、家庭，还是社会、政府，都应未雨绸缪，进行健康投资和健康建设，对各种健康危险因素进行全面的预警 和管理，尽可能用较少的投入换取较大的回报。随着社会的发展，人与人、人与社会的联系日益紧密，相互依赖程度不断提高，个人的健康不仅关系到自身的幸福， 还关系到家庭、集体和社会的利益。个人选择健康的生活方式，本身就是对社会的贡献，是一种有道德、有责任感的体现。所以说，健康对于每个社会成员来说既是责任也是义务。从“大卫生”“大健康”的视野看，我国仍面临多重疾病威胁并存、多种健康影响因素交织的复杂局面。特别是近年来，多种疾病出现年轻化趋势，环境污染、生态失衡、职业危害、食品安全、生活方式等因素造成的健康透支有可能吞噬经济发展的红利。有人整夜沉迷于形形色色的娱乐活动，有人自诩“宅”男而不愿意锻炼，有人天天大快朵颐，还有人明知吸烟之害却不能自拔……所有这些，到最后都会以损害健康为代价。健康中国建设，共建是路径，共享是归途。树立“人人有责、人人参与”的主体意识是当务之急。 // Source: People’s Daily, 25 August 2016.

A Xinhua’s article explains the significance of the Conference on healthcare reform. First, the mention of “Hygiene and Health United Frontline” by Xi Jinping indicates that the issue of healthcare is no longer the sole responsibility of health-related departments but involves many other departments to achieve this objective. Second, Xi also emphasized the preventive aspect of the public policy, indicating a change from illness treatment to health maintenance of the Chinese public.

• //中共中央政治局常委悉数出席此次大会，反映出高层对卫生健康工作的高度重视。本次大会具有多重新意：新名称、新战线与新部署。上一次规格相若的此类会议，要追溯到1996年。那是新中国成立以来由中共中央、国务院召开的第一次全国卫生工作会议。今次会议定名为“全国卫生与健康大会”，树立“大卫生”、“大健康”并重观念的意图显而易见。习近平在大会上提出的“将健康融入所有政策”、“卫生与健康战线”，是不同寻常的表述。卫生战线是常见讲法，指以往工作吃重的医疗卫生部门与相关行业。而从习近平的讲话中可看出，“卫生与健康战线”延展到更广泛领域，并指向多个部门的职责担当。“切实解决影响人民群众健康的突出环境问题”、“推动全民健身和全民健康深度融合”、“加强食品安全监管”、“努力减少公共安全事件对人民生命健康的威胁”、“为老年人提供连续的健康管理服务和医疗服务”等要求，明确了环保、体育、食品安全、公共安全、民政养老等部门须“守土有责”，也契合了“把以治病为中心转变为以人民健康为中心”的新主旨。// Source: Xinhua, 26 August 2016.

• //The revival of the conference over the weekend after 20 years is a sign that medical reform is shifting direction. Professor Liu Tingfang, from Tsinghua University’s Institute for Hospital Management, said the meeting stressed the importance of health rather than medical treatment or medical reform. “It marks an important milestone and will lead to more achievements than the one 20 years ago,” Liu said. […] But the health system has been criticised as inaccessible and unaffordable for vast numbers of people. At last week’s meeting, Xi called for full protection of the public’s health and underlined the need to make public health a central part of the country’s development strategy. He said China faced health issues common to developing and developed countries and not addressing them risked undermining economic development and social stability. Xi said health should be factored into government policy for the widest benefit, including mechanisms to prevent air, soil and water pollution, improve food safety and limit the impact of public safety accidents.// Source: SCMP, 23 August 2016.

b. Reform on the price schedule of medical services by public hospitals

Development and Reform Commission will implement reform on the price schedule of the medical services provided by public hospitals by the end of this year. Zhu Hengpeng (朱恒鹏) from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that the phenomenon that doctors rely on selling medicine and medical checking for their survival results in part from the fact that the prices for their medical services are set by the government and do not cover the deserved return for the doctors.

• //8月24日，国家发改委公布了《关于贯彻落实推进医疗服务价格改革意见的通知》（下称《通知》），要求各地价格主管部门在2016年底前，制定医疗服务价格改革实施方案，报备国家发改委价格司，并对外实施。[…] 据财新记者了解，一般患者的医疗费用主要包括药费、检查费、耗材费，以及挂号费、手术费等医生提供的医疗服务的费用，住院患者还有床位费等费用项目。在公立医院先行的价格体系中，医疗服务费用主要由政府定价，价格远低于其实际成本和价值。 中国社科院经济所副所长、公共政策研究中心主任朱恒鹏曾对财新记者表示，目前医患冲突频见报端，“以药养医”“以检查养医”的现象普遍，部分原因即在于医疗服务价格长期被人为扭曲，医生的劳动价值与回报极不匹配。[…] 年底前启动医疗服务价格改革，依据政府的医改规划，其改革核心在于“腾笼换鸟”。卫计委体制改革司司长梁万年表示，“腾笼换鸟”就是说先把药品价格中的水分、医务人员不合理行为中的水分挤干，把挤出来的部分补到医疗服务价格上，使药占比下降，劳务技术占医疗费用的比重上升。// Source: Caixin, 25 August 2016.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. The new regulation for social organizations in China

The CCP together with the State Council recently promulgated the “Opinion on the Reform of the Social Organization Management System and Promotion of the Healthy and Orderly Development of Social Organizations” (《关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见》). Principles of the new regulation include upholding the leadership of the Party; insisting reform and renovation on social organization management so as to clear the relationship between the state, market and the society; devolving more power to social organization with strengthened supervision; and implementing the reform progressively. Full text of the new regulation are available in Chinese prepared by the People’s Daily or in English by the China Law Translate.

• //坚持党的领导。按照党中央明确的党组织在社会组织中的功能定位，发挥党组织的政治核心作用，加强社会组织党的建设，注重加强对社会组织的政治引领和示范带动，支持群团组织充分发挥作用，增强联系服务群众的合力，确保社会组织发展的正确政治方向。坚持改革创新。改革社会组织管理制度，正确处理政府、市场、社会三者关系，改革制约社会组织发展的体制机制，激发社会组织内在活力和发展动力，促进社会组织真正成为提供服务、反映诉求、规范行为、促进和谐的重要力量。坚持放管并重。处理好“放”和“管”的关系，既要简政放权，优化服务，积极培育扶持，又要加强事中事后监管，促进社会组织健康有序发展。坚持积极稳妥推进。统筹兼顾，分类指导，抓好试点，确保改革工作平稳过渡、有序推进。// Source: The People’s Daily, 22 August 2016.

One aspect of the regulation is that current civil servants are no longer allowed to be the person-in-charge of foundations or social service organizations. Social organizations are also not allowed to make administrative approval unless particular laws specify.

• //《意见》明确，除法律法规有特殊规定外，政府部门不得授权或委托社会组织行使行政审批。国务院决定取消的行政审批事项，原承担审批职能的部门不得通过任何形式指定交由行业协会商会继续审批。同时，严格执行《中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅关于党政机关领导干部不兼任社会团体领导职务的通知》、《中共中央组织部关于规范退（离）休领导干部在社会 团体兼职问题的通知》，从严规范公务员兼任社会团体负责人，因特殊情况确需兼任的，按照干部管理权限从严审批，且兼职一般不得超过1个。在职公务员不得兼 任基金会、社会服务机构负责人，已兼职的在本意见下发后半年内应辞去公职或辞去社会组织职务。// Source: Xinhua News, 29 August 2016.

The Minister of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Li Liguo (李立国) explains the significances of the new regulations as to encourage the development of social organizations while exerting greater state control over them according to the law. The new regulation aims to facilitate social organizations to take up public services amidst the changing functions of the state, and develop a legal mechanism to monitor the social organizations by both the government and the society.

• //要积极推进社会组织登记制度改革，落实中央关于行 业协会商会类、科技类、公益慈善类、城乡社区服务类社会组织直接登记的要求，按照法律法规和规章确定的条件和程序，加强对申办社会组织非营利性、名称、业务范围、发起人、拟任负责人等事项审核，支持符合条件的社会组织依法成立。采取降低准入门槛、简化登记程序等办法，支持符合条件的社区社会组织登记成立， 对达不到登记条件的社区社会组织，由街道办事处或乡镇政府实施管理，引导其开展活动，发挥积极作用。要完善政策支持社会组织发展，结合政府职能转变，支持社会组织承接事务性管理工作及公共服务。落实各项税收优惠政策，安排专项财政资金，实施并扩大政府购买服务，支持社会组织参与社会服务。把社会组织人才工 作纳入国家人才工作体系，为社会组织发展增强人才支撑。要依法加强对社会组织的监督管理，构建登记管理机关、业务主管单位、行业管理部门和相关职能部门各司其职、协调配合的综合监管体系和联合执法机制，创新监管方式，鼓励社会监督。加强对社会组织负责人、资金、活动的管理，推进社会组织信息公开，建立健全年度报告制度、第三方评估机制和投诉举报受理机制，切实做到一手抓积极引导发展，一手抓严格依法管理。要指导支持社会组织加强自身建设，建立健全法人治理结构和运行机制，加强诚信自律建设，加强活动、资金等信息公开，主动接受社会监督，增强活动能力，提高社会公信力。要加强党对社会组织工作的领导，完善领导体制，推进社会组织党的组织和工作有效覆盖，发挥社会组织党组织的政治核心作用，促进社会组织健康有序发展。// Source: The People’s Daily, 24 August 2016.

Prof. Gu Xijin (贾西津) from Tsinghua University pointed out that the new regulation encourages more professionals to enter the field of social organizations by recognizing their role and providing subsidies to qualified professionals. Prof. Deng Guosheng (邓国胜) from the same university also agreed that the new regulation helps to alleviate the problems that plague the development of social organization, i.e. insufficiency in both financial and human resources.

• //《意见》提出，把社会组织人才工作纳入国家人才工作体系，对社会组织的专业技术人员执行与相关行业相同的职业资格、注册考核、职称评定政策，对符合条件的社会组织专 门人才给予相关补贴，将社会组织人才纳入国家专业技术人才知识更新工程。贾西津表示，“我认为这是《意见》重点改革的方面。消除广大社会组织的人才面临的 一些不平等待遇，有助于提升他们的积极性”。// Source: Guangming Ribao, 23 August 2016.

• //“社会组织的发展，一是缺钱、二是缺人。”清华大学公益慈善研究院副院长邓国胜说，意见就完善社会组织发展的人才政策给出了清晰的指导性意见，有利于社会组织完善这一薄弱环节，推动更多优秀人才进入社会组织领域。// Source: Xinhua, 22 August 2016.

Prof. Zheng Gongcheng (郑功成) from the Renmin University of China argued that the new regulation recognizes the important role of social organization in socio-economic development in China as they can now legitimately participate in social management. Also, the new regulation prevents party cadres from acting the directors of social organizations, which he thinks helps to separate the government from society:

• //“这个文件是方向性的，不仅充分肯定了社会组织对于我国经济社会发展的重要贡献，还将其上升到了公民参与社会管理的一种有效途径的高度，有助于统一认识、凝聚共识。”中国人民大学教授郑功成说。[…] “一方面，意见明确四类社会组织实行直接登记，这体现了简政放权、激发活力的改革要求；另一方面，意见对推进社会组织政社分开，尤其是严格规范党政机关领导干部不兼任社会团体领导职务等予以规定。”郑功成认为，这将有助于推进政社分开。// Source: Xinhua, 22 August 2016.

Party School of the Central Committee of CCP Prof. Xiang Chunling (向春玲) argued that the new regulation emphasizes the importance of setting up and clearing the role of party units in the social organizations so that these party units can provide political orientation and supervision. The inclusion of social organization management into the party and government evaluation mechanism will also lead local party cadres to greater attention to such work.

• //《意见》指出，按照党中央明确的党组织在社会组织中的功能定位，发挥党组织的政治核心作用，加强社会组织党的建设，注重加强对社会组织的政治引领和示范带动，支持群团组织充分发挥作用，增强联系服务群众的合力，确保社会组织发展的正确政治方向。“社会组织的党建要有明确的导向性，这个导向性就是中国共产党在社会组织中建立党组织，目的是发挥党组织政治引领作用，实现社会组织的健康发展。”中央党校教授向春玲说。《意见》提出，完善领导体制，各级党委和政府要把加强和改进社会组织管理工作列入重要议事日程，列入地方党委和政府绩效考核内容和社会治安综合治理考评体系，这势必将使各地党委政府高度重视社会组织工作。“社会组织种类非常多，领域不同，诉求也有不同。对不同地区不同类型的社会组织，要给予有针对性的党组织建设。”向春玲说。// Source: Jingji Ribao, 24 August 2016.

2. Reform on the military force

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to undergo reform since last year when Xi Jinping announced in September that the PLA will be downsized, general departments will be clear of corruption, more focus will be put on joint operation, etc. After a year, the related reforms were reported to take place. On China File, various commentators recently offered their views on whether the reformed PLA could deal with the recent South China Sea Dispute if an armed conflict between China and the United States were inevitable.

a. Downsizing the military force

• //Some of the existing 18 Army Corps will be turned into 25 to 30 divisions, they told the South China Morning Post. The size of a corp varies from 30,000 to 100,000 soldiers. The approach was inherited from the Soviet Union, but it’s a bulky model no longer suited to the demands of modern warfare, which prizes modularity, according to a retired senior colonel based in Beijing. “This is a main trend in modern warfare. Even the Russian army has tried to learn from the US army by reducing the size of their troops, making land forces become more nimble and quick-response,” the veteran said. […] The source said Xi called on leaders of the land force to speed up reforms in administration and combat capability. Currently the biggest land force in the world, the army comprises 1.55 million soldiers, of which 850,000 are mobile troops, most of whom are under the army corps, while the rest are regional garrison troops. A source said it was only a matter of time for the army corps units to be either downsized or scrapped, although the change would inevitably encounter strong opposition from the ground force. The transition to divisions is likely to result in the dismissal of tens of thousands of military personnel and, hence, trigger huge resistance from the troops affected.// Source: SCMP, 24 August 2016.

b. A number of top-level military officers were reported being arrested

• //A top general and former ally of China’s disgraced security tsar Zhou Yongkang has been arrested for violating party discipline, a euphemism for corruption, two sources told the South China Morning Post. General Wang Jianping, 62, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department under the powerful Central Military Commission, was taken away in Chengdu, Sichuan province, on Thursday afternoon, one of the sources said. Wang’s wife and secretary were taken away that same day, the source said. His former secretary Su Haihui, deputy director of the armed police’s training department, was also taken, he added.// Source: SCMP, 26 August 2016.

• //A senior People’s Liberation Army officer who played a lead role in organising a massive military parade in Beijing last year was put under investigation for suspected corruption last week, according to two military sources. Major General Qu Rui, a deputy chief of the Combat Operations Department under the People’s Liberation Army’s newly established Joint Staff Department, was taken away by military graft-busters during a meeting on Wednesday, the sources said. […] It was not clear what prompted the investigation into Qu but sources said it was probably linked to his previous stint as head of a unit in charge of military equipment under the General Staff Headquarters No 5 department, which oversees information technology.// Source: SCMP, 31 July 2016.

• //A former senior People’s Liberation Army official and an ally of disgraced former Central Military Commission vice-chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou has been placed under investigation by China’s anti-corruption body, military sources familiar with the matter said. General Tian Xiusi, 66, former political commissar in the PLA Air Force and a member of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee, was facing an internal graft probe, two sources told the South China Morning Post. If the case is confirmed, any investigation in the PLA would be carried out by a branch within the Central Military Commission. “With both his wife and personal secretary taken away [for investigation], Tian has been the subject [of an internal graft probe],” one of the sources said. As political commissar, Tian was in effect a top decision-maker in harge of the world’s fastest-growing air force during his term in office, analysts said.// Source: SCMP, 09 July 2016.

c. Assessing the reform on PLA

Joel Wuthnow from the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University and Phillip C. Saunders from the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies contended that inter-service rivalry could hinder the full implementation of the reform.

• //Nevertheless, the PLA will face several obstacles in fully implementing the reforms. One problem is inter-service rivalry. In an era of slowing economic growth, services will naturally compete for budget share and hold onto unique advantages, which could limit cooperation. A second challenge concerns ground force influence within the PLA. Despite the reforms, the army will be the largest service by far, and most of the PLA’s senior leadership will remain career army officers. This could inhibit the development of a joint mentality in which all service perspectives are represented. A third problem is the lack of combat experience. The PLA hasn’t fought a major war for over 35 years, which means that its organizations, systems, and doctrine haven’t been tested under the “fog of war.” Another reason for skepticism is that the U.S. military is attempting to stay ahead of the curve by investing in new technologies and developing new operational concepts designed to assure access to contested regions, such as maritime Asia. Greater use of undersea warfare, distributed basing of forces, and other means will help to “offset” China’s growing advantages. If successful, U.S. forces will retain an ability to win in a Taiwan or South China Sea scenario.// Source: China File Conversation, 25 August 2016.

Michael S. Chase from and Jeffrey Engstrom from the RAND Corporation argued that China could become a strong regional power after the full implementation of the military reform, but it might not be intelligent for China to have military conflict with the United States.

• //China currently is implementing a sweeping reorganization of the military that has the potential to be the most important in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Xi Jinping, who serves as China’s president, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and chairman of the Central Military Commission, seeks to transform the PLA into a fully modernized and “informatized” fighting force capable of carrying out joint combat operations, conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW), and providing a powerful strategic deterrent to prevent challenges to China’s interests and constrain the decisions of potential adversaries. Scheduled for completion by 2020, the reforms are likely to offer benefits in several areas, including improving joint operations, optimizing organizational structures for combat, and ensuring the PLA is able to wage war in new domains, seeking to attain information dominance against an adversary […] If Xi’s aspirations are realized, his reformed PLA will be one that is more capable of protecting China’s regional and global interests as it will be increasingly able to execute its main functions of strategic deterrence, combat operations, and MOOTW. As a result, it will be capable of posing an even more potent challenge to China’s neighbors, and to U.S. interests in the region. Yet even with a stronger, more capable military China is not likely to be eager to take on a potential adversary as powerful as the United States.// Source: China File Conversation, 25 August 2016.

CHINA – ECONOMY

G20 Summit in focus

a. Scholar’s analyses of the issues to be discussed

Prof. Lu Feng (卢锋) from the Peking University observed that the G20 Summit in Hangzhou would initiate structural reform of the global economy. He contended that structural reform is essential as the current economic stagnation after the Financial Tsunami in 2008 shows that the world needs such reform for medium- and long-term economic growth. In particular, the global governance mechanism should be reformed to facilitate the flow of international finance, trade, and policy innovation. Other agendas to be discussed include expanding investment in infrastructure to boost up economy in a short term and better cooperation on tackling over-capacity of the steel industry on a global scale.

• //国际金融危机全面爆发后，世界主要国家联手实施大规模货币财政刺激措施，特别是主要发达国家一直实施超常货币刺激政策。这类需求政策对扭转经济下滑与维持 经济复苏发挥了积极作用，然而危机后八年全球经济未能根本改变增长乏力态势的事实说明，仅仅依靠需求刺激政策难以推动全球经济摆脱危机阴影并再造繁荣。合理稳健的政策框架应体现长期结构性改革与短期需求管理政策适当配合，包含激活市场政策与社会托底政策的大体平衡。[…] 国际金融危机凸显现行国际货币金融体系存在诸多局限，不适应21世纪全球经济发展需要。另外中国等新兴大国发展改变全球经济格局也必然要求不断改进完善国际治理架构。如果说促进长期经济增长是G20基本使命，完善国际货币金融治理架构则是G20优先合作领域之一。[…] 国际贸易与投资如鸟之两翼与车之双轮，对全球经济增长发挥关键推动作用。近年全球经济增长乏力，与国际贸易与投资形势低迷也存在直接联系。如何遏制少数国 家贸易保护主义冲动，降低国际投资面临的有形无形壁垒，通过制度创新与政策调整为贸易投资注入更大活力，是推进结构性改革与提振经济增长的重要途径。在中国引领推动下，今年G20在改善体制政策促进贸易投资领域取得多方面突破性进展。[…] 基础设施投资是各国经济增长的重要抓手，更是广大发展中国家普遍面临的发展“短板”。通过G20务实合作积极扩大各国基础设施投资，短期可扩大经济总需求，长期可提升潜在供给能力，因而对全球经济增长发展可发挥功在当下利在长远的积极效果。[…] 近年钢铁等行业出现全球性产能过剩，成为影响全球经济结构调整与国际经贸关系的热点问题之一。经G20成员国协商同意，钢铁等行业产能过剩第一次成为G20讨论议题。[…] 一是直面“全球经济复苏缓慢和市场需求低迷使得包括一些行业产能过剩在内的结构性问题更加严重，这些问题对贸易和工人产生了负面影响。”二是指出“钢铁和其他行业的产能过剩是一个全球性问题，需要集体应对。// Source: Caixin, 30 August 2016.

Rafael Bittencourt from Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais argued that the developing countries, especially Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa under the banner “BRICS”, would like to push for greater reform on the mechanism of global governance in order to earn themselves greater voices.

• //对于这届G20峰会，基础设施建设、可持续发展、能源与气候变化、工业化进程、反腐败以及健康，将是金砖国家关注的主要议题。[…] 拉斐尔认为金,砖国家在G20峰会的作用体现在代表自己和代表全球发展中国家。第一，金砖国家正在寻求在国际组织中重要的相关代表权，特别在世界银行和国际货币基金组织，讨论多级世界架构问题。金砖国家借G20峰会机会给发达国家施压，为他们开放更多空间，特别是考虑到他们在世界的经济总量的时候。// Source: Caixin, 30 August 2016.

John Kirton from the University of Toronto analyzed that the Hangzhou Summit will discuss innovative way to steer the economy, sustainable development, trade, anti-corruption, and industrialization in Africa. He argued that China would play a greater role in leadership in its pursuit of more extensive global governance.

• //加拿大多伦多大学柯顿（John Kirton）教授分析，今年中国G20峰会的主要议题包括：创新推动经济、可持续发展、贸易、反腐败和非洲工业化。G20成员国会优先围绕中国关注的议题讨论，因为没有人不需要经济增长，不需要可持续发展，不需要创新，也没有人认为反腐败不好。关键是在这些议题上大家能走多远。中国一直奉行对全球经济增长采取更加平衡的做法，希望利用G20轮值主席国机会表现出对全球合作的坚定承诺。面临的挑战是，在解决关键性问题时，如何敦促G20国家采取有实质意义的行动，而非形式化，并增加其弹性。[…] 中国在G20发挥领导力的最大特点是谨慎、包容务实和逐渐增强。多伦多大学柯顿（John Kirton）教授说：“中国的行动是谨慎和有限的，但越来越积极、广泛和有效。中国强调渐进式改革，避免单方面采取行动，与其他成员国一起领导和建立特定议题的联盟，并且愿意为集体共识做出调整。”在新书《中国G20领导力》中，柯顿归纳指出，中国在G20的领导力来自制度、物质和政策改革，分三个阶段：1999-2009年：金融危机时期成功应对；2010-2013年：确保有效避免危机；2013-2016年：寻求更广泛全球治理合作。“杭州峰会，中国将比以往发挥更大的领导作用，这也是新的挑战。”// Source: Caixin, 30 August 2016.

Some scholars are sceptical of the active effectiveness of the Summit:

• //“Hosting the G-20 offers a significant opportunity for China to become a rule maker rather than a rule taker,” said Zhu Jiejin, an associate professor of international relations at Fudan University. “The G-20 may not be a platform of bounding force, but at least it ensures we have equal say along with the developed countries.” […] “There will not be any policy miracles coming out of the summit,” said Tristram Sainsbury, project director of G-20 studies at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Australia. That makes the show itself even more important. “For China, first and last it’s about the show, and to show they can organize a major international meeting,” said Matthew P. Goodman, a Group of 20 expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.// Source: New York Times, 30 August 2016.

b. Impacts of hosting G20 Summit on Hangzhou

New York Times reported that citizens in Hangzhou prepared the Summit at a cost. For example, buildings near meeting site are vacated, ethnic minorities such as Uighurs are under close monitoring, factories are temporarily suspended of operation to ensure good air quality, shops are closed down, and criticisms against the Summit on the Internet were silenced.

• //The government is using all the levers of its authoritarian system, forcing residents to move out of buildings near the meeting site to diminish the risk of protests or attacks and telling workers to take vacations to help clear the city and present a sanitized version of one of China’s most vibrant economic hubs. It has gone so far as to banish cooks who are Uighurs, a Muslim minority that has been accused of fomenting terrorism, from working at one restaurant in the city. […] In Hangzhou, thousands have been forced to move from luxury high-rise buildings near the conference center, their apartments sealed with tape to prevent a sniper from venturing inside. Government and private sector workers have been granted vacations, and migrant workers have been told to return to their home provinces. In an effort to guarantee blue skies, factories within a wide perimeter around the city have been closed. […] In June, police officers in the migrant neighborhood of Qibao, 15 miles from the city center, ordered all the grocery shops, clothing outlets and street-side restaurants closed, said Wang Jinfu, a municipal government worker. In some instances, small businesses were asked to close on the grounds that if they stayed open and an accident occurred, local party officials would be penalized. […] One party official was detained for 10 days in July for complaining online about the high costs of the preparations. The state-run Global Times reported that the official, Guo Enping, was held because his article, “Hangzhou, Shame on You,” drew such wide readership // Source: New York Times, 30 August 2016.

A civil servant, Guo Enping (郭恩平), was fired in July because he wrote an article that criticized Hangzhou municipal government for over-spending on the preparation for the Summit. In response to the criticism, the government posted a statement that quoted a survey in which it found over 90% of the Hangzhou citizens are happy about hosting the event, but it got backfired online.

• //A public servant has been fired and detained for 10 days for fabricating rumors that claimed the Hangzhou government had « spent unnecessary on construction » for the preparation of the upcoming G20 summit. Since July 10, an article « Hangzhou, shame on you » wrote by a netizen named « Pingzi », identified by Internet police as Guo Enping, a deputy director of the street office in Jiaojiang district in Taizhou, East China’s Zhejiang Province has gone viral online. […] Guo said in his article that at the beginning of July, police officers in the province were dispatched to Hangzhou and each of them will be paid a bonus of 100,000 yuan. The article also slammed the government for shutting down shops and factories near the G20 Summit venue, which « severely disturbed local residents’ lives. » The police statement said that before the article was deleted by Guo on July 12, it had been viewed and reposted many times online.// Source: Global Times, 25 July 2016.

• //In response to official media reporting of Guo’s case on Weibo, a large number of Weibo users expressed sympathy for Guo. The official report offers no systematic explanation of the “falsity” of Guo’s claims. In order to deny Guo’s criticism, officials simply use another “official” figure: 96.8% of local residents are happy about hosting the G20. However, this official message has backfired. As shown in the following screen capture, most comments challenge the official survey result. Also, as some of the comments suggest, certain posts criticising the government have already been removed from the system.// Source: The Conversation, 31 August 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Results of the Legislative Council Election

General Election of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong was held on 04 September 2016 for all of its 70 seats, half returned from geographical constituencies and half returned from functional constituencies. For a brief introduction to the electoral method used, please see here by SCMP. The election this year broke the record of voter turnout rate at 58.28%. According to the final vote count, the non-establishment camp fared better than the last General Election in 2012 by obtaining 30 seats (19 in the geographical constituencies and 11 in functional constituencies), 3 more than the last election.

• //A record 2.2 million people, or 58 per cent of the electorate, came out to vote in the most critical legislative polls since the handover – the highest turnout since direct elections were first introduced in 1991. The biggest winner was social and political activist Eddie Chu Hoi-dick, crowned the “king of votes” with 84,000. Localists and pan-democrats combined won 30 of 70 seats, allowing the de facto opposition camp to retain its critical minority of 24 seats needed to block constitutional changes. They grabbed 1.19 million votes (55 per cent) – more than in 2012, when they won 27 seats. The pro-establishment Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong was the biggest party winner with seven seats in the geographical constituencies. […] Pro-establishment lawmakers cautioned that the newly elected localists could escalate their call for independence to a whole new political level. Last night, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the State Council warned against pro-independence activities by the new lawmakers. “We resolutely oppose any form of activities for ‘Hong Kong independence’ in and out of Legco, and resolutely support the HKSAR government in punishing [offenders] according to law,” an office spokesman told the official Xinhua news agency.// Source: SCMP, 06 September 2016.

• // A record number of voters turned out for Sunday’s Legislative Council elections, reflecting Hongkongers’ eagerness to make their voices count in the most politically critical and bitterly fought polls since the city’s 1997 handover. Many flocked to polling stations late in the evening, galvanised by last-minute appeals for support. At a polling station in Taikoo Shing, the last vote was cast at almost 2.30am, four hours after the polls were originally scheduled to close. Earlier, Electoral Affairs Commission chairman Mr Justice Barnabas Fung Wah said about 2.2 million people voted in the five geographical constituencies, and the turnout rate was around 58 per cent – 5 percentage points higher than four years ago. It also surpassed the 55.64 per cent in the 2004 Legco polls, which came after 500,000 people marched on July 1, 2003 to protest against proposed national security legislation. Fung faced a flurry of questions early on Monday morning about why it took so long for the voting to finish at Taikoo, and why some voters who went to cast their ballots were told that someone had voted under their name.// Source: SCMP, 05 September 2016.

a. The rise of the localists

Six localist candidates managed to become the newly elected legislators, signifying the rise of the localist camp within the Legislature. For their profiles, please find here.

• //Six backers of “self-determination” for Hong Kong, including Yau Wai-ching and Sixtus “Baggio” Leung Chung-hang from the post-Occupy group Youngspiration, Occupy student leader Nathan Law Kwun-chung, Polytechnic University lecturer Lau Siu-lai, Eddie Chu Hoi-dick as well as Civic Passion’s Cheng Chung-tai, were returned in geographical constituencies in Sunday’s elections. Candidates from localist groups, including those who failed to clinch seats, won a total of 409,025 votes, accounting for 19 per cent of about 2.2 million valid votes cast in five geographical constituencies. […] Youngspiration, which won two seats, will become the third biggest pro-democracy party in the legislature, after the Democratic Party and Civic Party. Most of the six winners from localist groups are not eager to work with the local or central governments.// Source: SCMP, 05 September 2016.

Ray Yep Kin-man, a political scientist at City University, and Ivan Choy Chi-keung, a political analyst from Chinese University, offers their views on the rise of localists:

• //Yep said Beijing would assess the rise of localists with a negative perspective. “The winners from localist groups will certainly raise the issue of self-determination after they enter the legislature,” he said. “Traditional pan-democrats may not have the political courage to oppose calls by localists to discuss this sensitive issue. “The central government may feel an urgency to take tough measures to rein in the separatist movement. It may think there is a need to relaunch the legislation to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law in the next few years to safeguard national security,” Yep added. He said the Hong Kong government would have little incentive to facilitate dialogue between the newly elected legislature and Beijing in the wake of the localists’ victories. Choy said there was a lack of strong leaders among the pan-democratic and localist camps within the new legislature. “We can hardly expect pan-democrats and localists to go the extra mile to compromise on political issues with Beijing as the Democrats did in 2010,” he said. The results look set to create more headaches for Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying’s administration, with lobbying pro-democracy forces about to get a whole lot harder.// Source: SCMP, 05 September 2016.

In another article on Mingpao, Ivan Choy made further analysis on the basis of the figures he and his colleague collected. In essence, he pointed out that 1) While the proportion of votes received by non-establishment camp remains similar to that in the last election, votes in this camp have been transferred from traditional democrats to the localist or pro-independence parties, making it the “Third Force” in the political landscape of Hong Kong; 2) while the proportion of votes received by the localists in this election (19% of the total votes cast) indicates the rise of localists, he remains doubtful whether the 6 of the localist legislators can cooperate with each other regardless of their deep ideological divide; and 3) the Central Government’s Liaison Office was reported to coordinate voters in order to support a few candidates from the establishment in its favor, but Choy argued it was done at the expense of the party development of traditional pro-establishment parties.

• //如果把支持自決／本土／獨派（羅冠聰、朱凱廸和劉 小麗＋熱普城＋青年新政）的組織加起來，整體得票份額更高達19%（表2），亦有羅冠聰、朱凱廸、劉小麗、鄭松泰、梁頌恆、游蕙禎6個候選人奪得議席，成了一個獨特的政治板塊。這裏不單反映出可觀的民意支持，且如果6人進入議會後能彼此合作、共同進退，更能通過議會這個平台，有效倡導有關議題，觸動北京最 敏感的神經。但問題是，青年新政／本民前，本來一直得到黃毓民和「普城」的稱許及支持，但當今次選舉選情白熱化，因為雙方選情皆吃緊，且彼此選票重疊，因而出現雙方支持者互相攻訐、意圖搶對方票的情况，網上的廝殺尤其慘烈，估計傷口短期難以癒合。另外，不錯，朱凱廸、劉小麗、羅冠聰3名同時主張「香港前途民主自決」，况且10年前，朱凱廸更是天星碼頭等保育運動的主要發起人之一，是九七之後本地第一 代本土派先驅；但發展至今天，他們在抗爭中所體現的「和平理性非暴力」，已經與如今新的本土派如「熱普城」，尤其是後者的「勇武」主張，可謂南轅北轍。且他們關懷弱勢（包括新移民）、重視普世價值等立場，甚至被本土派拿來猛烈攻擊和鞭撻，更譏之為「左膠」。因此，兩者之間的合作基礎，並不樂觀。[…] 繼前兩屆讓梁美芬和謝偉俊兩人先後成功入局之後，中聯辦今次再推出何君堯和容海恩兩人，且完成地區直選「全壘打」，4人全數入局。這樣中聯辦成功增加了其政治「親兵」，於未來在議會及政圈的影響力將持續增加。中聯辦似乎對法律界人士情有獨鍾，因此4人皆是律師。其實這也難怪，律師的專業形象有利於吸納中間選票，讓中聯辦可以事半功倍。但這樣的做法，卻以本地愛國陣營政團的發展與壯大作為代價。多份報章均有報道，中聯辦在推出這些「契仔契女」時，為了確保其勝算，不惜要求民建聯等作出犧 牲，把部分票倉及樁腳撥給前者作為拉票區，增加他們的選票資本。這樣做無疑會讓民建聯等的發展陷入樽頸，停滯不前；但卻或許正正這樣，會更符合中聯辦自己 想成為「幕後話事人」的利益。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 06 September 2016.

Tian Feilong, an associate professor at Beijing-based Beihang University also noted that the rise of localists in the Legislature will make it hard for the communication between non-establishment camp and the Beijing Government:

• //[w]hile the pro-establishment camp remains generally stable, no one expected young Hong Kong localists – the youngest of whom is just 23 years old – to win eight seats in the election after failing to win a single one four years ago. Young localists’ actions will increase the difficulty of talks between the anti-establishment camp and the central government and will also make more pan-democrats lean toward radical parties, Tian said.// Source: Global Times, 06 September 2016.

b. Chinese government’s response to the election result

• //The mainland underscored its « resolute opposition » to any form of « Hong Kong independence » activities inside or outside of the special administrative region’s (SAR) Legislative Council (LegCo), according to an official statement on Monday. The statement, issued by the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, noted that certain organizations and candidates in Hong Kong were publicly advocating for « Hong Kong independence, » capitalizing on the exposure afforded to them by the LegCo election.// Source: Global Times, 06 September 2016.

c. Media coverage in Mainland China on the election

David Bandurski points out that media reports on the Legislative Council Election by Mainland media have been virtually non-existent.

• //A search in the WiseNews database, covering more than 300 mainland Chinese newspapers, returns just a single Chinese-language report on the Hong Kong elections. That’s quite a contrast to the total of 166 articles that come up in the database for local Hong Kong newspapers. Not surprisingly, the lone Chinese-language article comes from the Global Times newspaper, which typically has much greater leeway in reporting on affairs outside Mainland China. The article takes quite a bland approach to the elections, giving very little indication at all of the controversies involved, including the question of Hong Kong independence. By contrast, an article in the English-language Global Times, which I include after my translation, is nastier in tone, alluding to attempts by the “anti-establishment” (anti-Beijing) camp to “slander” the “pro-establishment camp” through social networks, and the supposedly nefarious role of the Apple Daily newspaper. Together, these two articles in Chinese and English nearly form the sum total of all Hong Kong election coverage in Mainland Chinese newspapers.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 06 September 2016.

2. Highlights of the electoral campaign process

a. Localist candidates calling for Hong Kong Independence

Candidates who managed to secure candidacy after the political censorship by the government also expressed their support for Hong Kong’s independence during the campaign. The Hong Kon SAR Government warned of “follow-up” actions to those candidates.

• //Legislative Council candidate Chan Chak-to has made use of an election forum hosted by public broadcaster RTHK to promote independence. Chan, from the Kowloon East Community group, also called on the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, to be scrapped. The localist made the claims during the two-hour election forum broadcast on Sunday, after making a similar declaration in an earlier election forum hosted by TVB on August 14. “I do not believe the ‘one country, two systems’ policy can be materialised any more. And we see that our core values like democracy and rule of law are now being stepped on. Therefore, we need to get rid of anything related to the policy if we want Hong Kong independence.”// Source: SCMP, 22 August 2016.

• //The warning came just a day after a third Legco candidate, Kacee Wong Sum-yu, declared her support for independence. “The government is concerned that … individual candidates have during the election period advocated or promoted the independence of the Hong Kong SAR,” a government spokesman said, adding that this was against the statutory declaration that they would uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the special administrative region. “The HKSAR government reserves the right to take follow-up actions in accordance with the law,” the statement said, without specifying what kind of action would be taken. Legal experts have cast doubt on whether the returning officers had the right to disqualify candidates whose nominations were already verified and gazetted. […] In a video posted on Facebook, Kowloon East candidate Chan Chak-to – who has backed Hong Kong independence at a previous forum – said the call would be “an attitude of Hong Kong people” to voice disapproval of the current Hong Kong and Beijing governments. Chan and another localist contender, Wong Chun-kit, said at a public rally on Sunday that they supported independence. At a New Territories East election forum organised by RTHK on Monday, Kacee Wong openly backed the contentious notion in a bid to challenge the returning officers, saying that the city’s freedom of expression would be at stake if a single word – independence – could be grounds to terminate her candidacy.// Source: SCMP, 30 August 2016.

The Hong Kong-based political commentator Johnny Yui-Siu Lau (劉銳紹) argued that Beijing has taken the issue of Hong Kong independence seriously and aimed to tackle it “comprehensively”. He also contends that a number of reasons that might prompt the fear of Beijing over the force of Hong Kong Independence and thus put itself to high-level alert. For one thing, Beijing sees Hong Kong embedded with a number of factors of instability. Second, Hong Kong continues to be close to foreign forces. Third, the “anti-China” forces in both Hong Kong and Taiwan have come closer to each other recently. He pointed out that Beijing officials decide to take a hardliner approach to the rise of Hong Kong independence, but he questioned the appropriateness of such approach.

• //在此，姑且引用內地官員的一句話：「反港獨必須是全方位的。」在這方針之下，出現了「全方位反港獨」的言行──梁振英、林鄭月娥、袁國強等高級港官 必須緊跟其後，不用多說；在立法會選舉中臨時出籠、逼使參選人表態的「確認書」，也是當前必不可少的門閂，只要把主張「港獨」的人趕走，那怕確認書會引發更大的後遺症；教育局長吳克儉後知後覺，或者先前不敢爭領風騷，最近也不得不趕快行動，約見教育界人士，阻止港獨在教育圈中繼續發酵，甚至在這個敏感時刻 上京與教育部官員會面，令外界質疑他是否到京請示。中聯辦官員當然不遑多讓，除了主任張曉明和法律部長王振民先後發表「義正辭嚴的講話」之外，其他官員在不同場合碰見友好人士，也直接要求反港獨，「一定要有底線，不能超越底線」。於是乎，建制派內的各路英雄，紛紛照本宣科，不管是拾人牙慧，還是自由發揮，總之就是要政治正確。有某種代表性的劉兆佳更直言：有關方面也預計到會 出現反彈（尤其是確認書出籠之後），但估計可以承受得起，而且長痛不如短痛。所以，去馬反港獨吧！其他建制派人士，無論是否參加立法會選舉，都紛紛祭起反港獨的正義大旗，還以質問政敵「你是否支持港獨」為武器，力求先發制人。[…] 其一，香港回歸以來，北京對香港一直有一種愛恨交集的心態，只是在不同的領導人主政期間有不同的表現而已。從領土和主權的角度看，北京視香港為中國不可分 割的一部分；從經濟角度看，北京比較務實地看待「兩制」以及「兩制」的差異，因為經濟部分已愈來愈趨向「一制」，即大陸經濟運作也愈來愈資本主義化，兩地 磨擦較少。但在政治和意識形態之上，北京一直視香港為「白區」，即香港仍然不是中國共產黨直接管轄，甚至不能直接發號司令而且一令即行的地區，香港仍殘留著很多舊痕和充滿不穩定因素。[…] 其二，自從2003年之後，北京認為「外國勢力」加緊利用香港，旨在搞亂中國。後來，「外國勢力」（尤指美國和英國等西方國家的政府）在北京眼中逐漸演變為「外來勢力」（反對中共的台灣和海外華人力量也被包括在內，因為他們不算外國），再演變為「外部勢力」（香港和境外非政府組織也被包括在內）。北京認為，「外部勢力」在香港和內地正進行六大方面的滲透，也就是和平演變，包括：挑起因貧富懸殊而形成的社會危機；提升中產階級和知識分子的民主訴求； 刺激青少年的躁動；推動傳播界爭取更大的新聞自由；協助發展民間的互聯網，以及協助非政府組織不斷擴大。所以，北京認為要修定《國家安全法》，要制定境外 非政府組織管理辦法，要加強互聯網法例。[…] 其三，除了存在已久的「外部勢力」之外，北京還感到最近一兩年出現了一個非常值得注意的新動向，就是香港和台灣兩地的「反共力量」（尤其是青少年）在「外國勢力的暗中支持下」，正不斷加強聯繫，交流經驗。[…] 其實，北京面對港獨趨勢，應該自行深入地找尋原因（例如政治改革逆民意，青年政策不符合青年期望），而不是盲目打壓。可惜，反省不是中國的政治文化，認錯更不是中國的政治血液。// Source: The Initium, 22 August 2016.

b. Infighting among localists

• //The entry of a dozen localists to this election has added a new dimension to the battlefield, which used to be fights between only pan-democrats and the pro-establishment. Unlike the six candidates who have been disqualified for their unequivocal advocacy for Hong Kong independence, these localists make varying calls, ranging from “sustaining the Basic Law” with amendments that protect Hongkongers’ interest to advancing self-determination. But they are hardly marching in solidarity. At a televised forum for Hong Kong Island constituency, former Occupy Central student leader Nathan Law Kwun-chung sought to differentiate himself from Alvin Cheng Kam-mun, after Cheng identified himself as “the only localist candidate in the constituency”. “I call for self-determination, but he talks about sustaining the Basic Law. Note the difference,” Law retorted. Law’s party, Demosisto, has pledged to organise a referendum in 10 years for Hongkongers to decide on the city’s future. It neither advocates independence nor rules it out as an option in the future referendum. Some localists have also come under attack by older radicals. At the same forum, Christopher Lau Gar-hung accused Cheng of being a “fake” localist, arguing that his advocacy of “sustaining” the Basic Law was no different from supporting Beijing’s continued grip over Hong Kong. Lau’s People Power, a non-localist group that played a key role in Legco filibustering and was once considered radical, is seen by critics to be the most vulnerable to losing its base to the new radicals on the block, the localists.// Source: SCMP, 22 August 2016.

c. Televised debates are superficial and livelihood issues are not of big concern

• //The election watchdog’s “equal time” principle, which requires broadcasters to allocate exactly the same amount of time to each candidate in a debate, means each team of candidates has barely a few minutes to introduce their platforms and take on their rivals. The most chaotic battlefield is New Territories East, where 22 lists of candidates are vying for nine seats. The debates have become superficial and fragmented, said Ma Ngok, a political scientist at the Chinese University. In the current campaign, there have been forums dedicated to certain livelihood issues but the response has been lukewarm. At a forum on welfare policy organised by the Society for Community Organisation, three out of 15 candidates in Kowloon West were absent, and two others left it to lower-ranking colleagues, who are second on their candidates’ list, to attend the event.// Source: SCMP, 22 August 2016.

Among the issues discussed, the issues of universal pension scheme and the question of whether to support C. Y. Leung’s re-election have attracted relatively more attention. For the interviews with candidates about their electoral platforms conducted by Jason Ng for Hong Kong Free Press, please see here.

d. One candidate Ken Chow withdrew from running the electoral campaign in the shadow of threats

• //The Liberal Party’s Ken Chow Wing-kan, who dropped out of the Legislative Council race, fearing for the safety of those close to him, said the threats he faced came from a source “outside Hong Kong” that was more powerful than Beijing’s liaison office or the triads. In an interview with Next Magazine, Chow said there is no way for local authorities to investigate those behind the threats against him. […] Chow dropped the bombshell last Thursday during a televised debate that he would stop his campaign, explaining he did not want those close to him to get into “high level troubles”. The Independent Commission Against Corruption has since launched an investigation into the incident, after several political parties filed complaints. Following his announcement, Chow released a voice recording from a volunteer who worked for one of his rivals, Beijing-loyalist Junius Ho Kwan-yiu. […] When asked whether he was worried he would be disappeared, Chow said: “That’s why I would not visit the mainland, Thailand or Myanmar.” The Liberal Party candidate added that he will return to Hong Kong from the UK after the election.// Source: SCMP, 31 August 2016.

e. Candidates from the non-establishment camp withdrew from campaigns to save the gloomy situation for the whole camp

As the many tickets from the non-establishment camp would likely divide the voters base for the whole camp, making many tickets fail to win seats according to the proportional representational system, some candidates from this camp announced their withdrawal of campaigns two days before the election in order to focus votes for those hopefuls.

• //Five pan-democratic candidates, including Paul Zimmerman and two “super seat” underdogs, pulled out of Sunday’s Legislative Council elections last night. The unprecedented move in local politics was seen as a last-minute effort to unite the fragmented bloc in the face of fierce competition from the pro-establishment camp. Adding to the pessimistic picture for the pan-democrats, the latest rolling poll suggested that they would not be able to retain a simple majority in Legco’s geographical constituencies. […] “I hope you will all consider casting your vote for democrats who are almost in,” Zimmerman said in a statement, suggesting his supporters switch to Demosisto candidate Nathan Law Kwun-chung. The biggest surprise, however, was the pullout of the pair running for super seats, a functional constituency sector that provides a second vote for 3.5 million registered voters in the geographical constituencies. […] The Civic Party’s Sumly Chan Yuen-sum, who funded his own campaign as the party initially opposed his electioneering, made the announcement five hours after last appearing in Central to canvass votes. “[We] urge voters to utilise their wisdom and ensure that the pan-democrats retain three super seats,” party chairman Alan Leong Kah-kit said.// Source: SCMP, 02 September 2016.

f. Non-establishment camp’s strategic voting scheme under attack

• //Several veteran pan-democrats last night appeared to be on the brink of defeat – an outcome which could lead to one-man bands for their grassroots parties, or their parties not even having a presence in the legislature. These candidates blamed a controversial strategic voting scheme that presented a different picture of their standing from other polls and which did not recommend them to voters. […] Ma Ngok, a political scientist at the Chinese University, said Lee’s party might become a one-man band if he and Ho lost, with their colleague Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung having a good chance of winning as he had done well in the polls. Also facing difficulties in New Territories West was Frederick Fung Kin-kee, who was the lone lawmaker of the Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood. Fung doubted the accuracy of Tai’s plan, saying his supporters, mostly in the grassroots, were less likely to respond to the electronic poll. There would be a change in Legco’s outlook if Ho, Lee and Fung – and super-seat candidate Leung Yiu-chung – all lost. “After all, these veterans come from parties that focus the most on district work and grassroots interests,” Ma said. He also noted that ThunderGo was “making many candidates nervous – even the potential winners”. Jeremy Tam Man-ho, who had topped other opinion polls previously, ended up issuing an emergency appeal last night. The Civic Party candidate in Kowloon East said about one-third of supporters he approached yesterday had chosen someone else at the polls because they thought he had “enough” votes already. People’s misunderstanding of the voting tactic could result in his defeat, he said.// Source: SCMP, 04 September 2016.

g. Analyses of the electoral campaigns

Prof. Ngok Ma from the Chinese University of Hong Kong studied the recent polling figures and suggested that the non-establishment camp (pan-democrats and localists) did not receive less support from voters than before, but the excessive amount of candidate tickets from the non-establishment camp is likely to risk losing seats to the candidates from the establishment camp. According to votes each camp might receive in proportion to their support base, the non-establishment camp has about 50% of voters support and thus should have about 17-18 seats, competed by 38 candidate tickets. On the other hand, the establishment camp has similar voter support at 40% but only competed by 19 candidate tickets.

• //這個表最有意思的地方是：五大區加上超區，建制派相對「泛民主派＋本土／獨派」的支持比例在不同區相差甚大。以前選舉中的得票比例，不同區沒有大分別。與2012年的實際得票相較，泛民支持度減少的只有兩區：新西和港島，其餘4組數字和4年前差不多（甚至更高）。如果說泛民流失選票給中間或建制，根據這民調只是兩區的事，而不是全港現象。[…] 以上表看，民主派總體仍有超過四成得票，按比例在35席中應該拿14至15席，但據民調推算只得10席，這就因為名單太多了。 […] 如果以總體票源計算，泛民五區有四成票可拿14席，但有29張主要名單。本土和獨派只得一成多支持，按比例應該是3至4席左右，但五區有9張名單。反觀建制支持已超四成，但只得19張主要名單。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 29 August 2016.

In another article on the Initium, he contended that one of the mistakes made by the non-establishment camp was that they paid too little attention to the election of functional constituencies, which might have helped their electoral campaign in light of the challenging situation in the elections of geographical constituencies.

• //今屆立法會選舉，泛民的議席上落，其實很取決於功能界別的戰績。直選部分可以預見由於名單分裂，泛民戰績不會好，很可能重演上屆直選不同分區選票過半，但議席少於一半的結局。但由於上屆本來已經是很糟的戰果，要再差很多又不容易。反而傳統功能界別的六個現任議席能不能保住，以及其他嘗試搶灘的席位能否成功，可以是很大的變數，對泛民的總體議席有相當影響。雨傘運動後，不少專業界別內湧現新的政治組織，差不多有20個之多。我本來以為會有不少新候選人出現，挑戰建制派的現任議員，為功能界別選舉帶來新的變數。但令人失望的是，真的是「傘後」的挑戰者，只有建築測量界的姚松炎、飲食界的伍永德，和體育文化界的周博賢（批發零售界的區諾軒屬傳統政黨，不在此列）。[…] 民主派在雨傘運動後，沒有認真考慮如何參與功能界別的選戰，例如如何著手挑戰不少根深蒂固的功能界別現任議員。結果是不少功能選戰無法改變現狀，也不能透過在功能選戰提出政治議題（例如取消功能組別、未來政改問題等），提升整體的選舉氣氛。這可算是泛民（如果這可以算是一個「集體」的話）今屆眾多選舉策略 失誤的其中之一。// Source: The Initium, 16 August 2016.

Prof. Chung Kim-wah from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University argued that coordination among the non-establishment camp is hard to achieve as there is a great variety of political ideologies and inter-party conflicts, and there is no ‘central authority’ similar to the Central Government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong to coordinate parties within the same camp.

• //理大應用社會科學系助理教授鍾劍華認為，泛民在立法會選戰中一直難以實行「棄保」，皆因泛民政治光譜廣闊、山頭林立，且缺乏願意擔當協調角色的龍頭大佬， 不似中聯辦般有強而有力的協調機制。例如在討論超區初選時，選情形勢較好的公民黨願意參加協調，但個別細黨不願意合作，最終令協調工作告吹。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 29 August 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

First Cross-strait city forum after the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen

• //Three agreements between the two cities were signed on the event’s opening day, including cooperation deals on film festivals and marathons. Sha [Hailin], who is attending the forum, is a member of the Communist Party’s Standing Committee in Shanghai and head of the city’s United Front Work Department. Addressing the conference, Sha said his trip to the island was “open and transparent” and called for mutual understanding and respect. […] Wrapping up the event, Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je said the forum succeeded not because Taipei acknowledged the “one China” principle but because of friendship between the two cities. “When we understand and respect Beijing’s insistence on some aspects, we hope Beijing can understand and respect Taiwan’s insistence on democracy and freedom,” Ko said. Sha is the highest-level mainland official to visit Taiwan since Tsai took office in May 20. Cross-strait exchanges were cut amid Beijing’s demand that Taipei recognise the “1992 consensus”, an understanding that both sides acknowledge there is only one China, but each has its own interpretation of what that means.// Source: SCMP, 23 August 2016.

 The Shanghai-Taipei City Forum was accompanied by protests:

• //Dozens of demonstrators waved placards reading “Expel propaganda communist, defend Taiwan’s sovereignty” and “[Taipei mayor] Ko Wen-je sells out Taiwan”. Some supporters also rallied outside the airport with welcome signs. While most demonstrators were cordoned off, one man holding a poster got into the airport arrivals hall and shouted “Sha Hailin, get out!” as Sha walked by. The protester scuffled briefly with policemen before he was taken away. […] Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced it had suspended official contact with Taipei after Tsai’s government, which took office in May, failed publicly to accept the “one China” principle which governed relations under her predecessor.// Source: SCMP, 22 August 2016.