Keywords: Reforms, NGO Law, Xinjiang, New Silk Road, Hong Kong, Taiwan

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Xi highlights « big picture » in reform drive

1. // Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday called on officials to view the country’s reform drive in the context of « a larger picture » in order to deepen reforms (共同把全面深化改革这篇大文章做好). Xi made the remarks at the 12th meeting of the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform, during which he called on authorities to « grasp the larger picture of reform » and fully implement the « Four Comprehensives », an ideological framework that identifies the main pillars needed to support the rejuvenation of China. « Four Comprehensives » refer to comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society 全面建成小康社会, deepening reform 全面深化改革, advancing the rule of law 全面推进依法治国, and strictly governing the Party 全面从严治党 // Specifically, the meeting highlighted a pilot reform plan for public interest litigation and a plan on improving legal aid, as well as a plan to deepen reform in the science and technology sectors. Source: Xinhua, Xinhua Chinese
2. Hu Shuli urges continuing reform on her Caixin column, otherwise China might fall into the middle-income trap: // The concept of the middle-income trap was first put forward by the World Bank in its 2006 report on the development of East Asian economies. The idea is that in many middle-income economies, growth slows and they are unable to move up to high-income status. […] Time and tide wait for no man, and China must respond quickly. Urbanization must be speeded up, to release the farming population. Urban areas need renewal to make it easier for modern enterprises to survive. To this end, investment in rural education and infrastructure must increase. Household registration, social security and rural land use must be reformed. Labor, capital and land markets must be built during the process of urban-rural integration. There must also be strong urban and land management, plus a healthy local fiscal system. All these were mapped out during the third and fourth full meetings of the Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee. Only by deepening reforms can China avoid the middle-income trap. // No mention of political reform, though. Source: Caixin
3. The Diplomat asks, will China’s reforms succeed? Shannon Tiezzi reports on “a recent conference in Vancouver, Canada, Chinese economic and legal scholars voiced their concerns about the challenges facing the country”: // Cheng Xiaonong, an expert in Chinese political and economic issues based at Princeton University, said that China’s economic “new normal” is an attempt to solve “old problems” with “old models.” Since the 1980s, China’s government has felt political pressure to keep economic growth at 8 percent per year – 30 years later, China is still facing the same issue. Yet the “old model” of a hybrid state-controlled and market economy still dominates in China. “The more things change, the more they stay the same,” Cheng said. // Source: Diplomat

2. Foreign Affairs published a China-heavy May/June issue. It asked 32 China experts on the proposition that “the current Chinese regime will not survive the next decade without major reform.” And the result is almost a quarter concurred, but some 60% disagreed.

1. One article by “Youwei”, “a pseudonym for a scholar based in China”, argues that China’s authoritarian adaptation is hitting a wall: // The need for further reforms still exists, due to widespread corruption, rising inequality, slowing growth, and environmental problems. But the era of authoritarian adaptation is reaching its end, because there is not much potential for further evolution within China’s current authoritarian framework. A self-strengthening equilibrium of stagnation is being formed, which will be hard to break without some major economic, social, or international shock. One reason for the loss of steam is that most easy reforms have already been launched. Revamping agriculture, encouraging entrepreneurship, promoting trade, tweaking social security—all these have created new benefits and beneficiaries while imposing few costs on established interests. What is left are the harder changes, such as removing state monopolies in critical sectors of the economy, privatizing land, giving the National People’s Congress power over fiscal issues, and establishing an independent court system. Moving forward with these could begin to threaten the hold of the Chinese Communist Party on power, something that the regime is unwilling to tolerate. Another reason for the loss of steam is the formation of an increasingly strong antireform bloc. […] [… The …] most likely future, at least in the short term, is a continuation of the status quo. Whatever problems it has, the regime’s current model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is not exhausted. From demographics to urbanization to globalization to the revolution in information technology, the structural factors that have facilitated China’s rise are still present and will continue to operate for some years to come, and the regime can continue to benefit from them. // Source: Foreign Affairs
2. Perry Link explores the question of nationalism and identity in Xi’s China: // Xi’s “Chinese dream” stresses party-loving patriotism and materialism, but it does not say anything about the moral treatment of fellow human beings in daily life. This is a major weakness, given the heavy emphasis that Confucian tradition puts on interpersonal ethics. No dream about what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-first century can feel right in Chinese culture if it omits all mention of moral behavior. Democracy advocates who speak of “rights” and “dignity” may be using foreign terms, but they are also answering a very traditional Chinese question about how people should relate to one another. // Source: Foreign Affairs
3. Chen Zhiwu wrote an insightful analysis on China’s debt problem: // Understanding how China accumulated so much debt across much of its economy requires understanding how growth occurs at the local level. For more than a decade, there has been no more important driver of Chinese economic success than the country’s booming real estate market. Rising property prices provided the basis for a massive expansion of credit and a steady supply of capital, which allowed local governments to invest heavily in infrastructure and labor-intensive industrial projects. […] Yet most of the cash has come from loans that local governments have secured through shell companies, or so-called local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), using public land as collateral. It is such funds that have, since 1998, made possible the country’s feverish construction of highways, high-speed railways, airports, subways, steel foundries, office parks, and so on. […] Since Chinese law forbids local governments from borrowing directly, most transferred land titles to LGFVs, which could take out loans freely. These bodies have been so successful at circumventing Beijing’s prohibitions against local government borrowing—on paper, they look just like other SOEs—that nobody, not even the Ministry of Finance, knows how much local governments owe. […] Local governments are already struggling in the face of declining property markets, and they are increasingly using shell corporations to bid up prices and keep land valuations high.
   […] Swapping short-term local government debt for long-term bonds represents an important step forward, since China’s debt structure has been extremely short-term and thus unnecessarily risky. But the move also raises a major concern. Since China is not a democracy, allowing local governments to sell bonds could establish a dangerous precedent, leading them to freely issue debt without any real intention of paying it back, which is what happened in the early 1990s.
   […] In the meantime, China is trying to improve the country’s roughly 155,000 SOEs through the “mixed ownership” reform it announced in November 2013, which aims to open SOEs up to private investment. […] The effect will be to enable SOEs to raise additional funds and expand their asset bases—which will enlarge, rather than reduce, the relative share of the state sector in the Chinese economy. // Source: Foreign Affairs
4. Also in the special issue are articles by Hu Angang on “Embracing China’s ‘New Normal’,” Baozhen Luo on whether “China Will Get Rich Before It Grows Old,” James Leung on “Xi’s Corruption Crackdown”.

CHINA – SOCIETY

 1. The end of China’s ‘migrant miracle’?

1. A series of articles on the Financial Times explore whether China is near its end of its ‘migrant miracle’, its source of labour surplus that fuelled economic growth. // China’s labour force is shrinking and the “migrant miracle” that powered its industrial rise is mostly exhausted, removing the factors that propelled the country’s meteoric development, according to leading economists. High quality global journalism requires investment. The transformation will lead to slower growth, reduced investment and a loss of export competitiveness, […], increasing the urgency of implementing ambitious economic reforms aimed at finding new sources of expansion. // Source: Financial Times
2. China migration at the turning point: // The end of surplus rural labour — a significant milestone that economists call the Lewis Turning Point — carries profound implications for China’s economy. As the flow of low-paid migrants into Chinese factories slows, workers demand higher pay, a phenomenon that has been evident for several years. This either drives low-end manufacturers out of business or forces them to raise prices, actions that could slow the export growth that has helped drive the country’s economy for decades. // Source: Financial Times
3. Also see “Policy bottlenecks add to labour shortage” and “China’s great migration”

 2. Foreign NGO law (2^nd draft) is out

1. // Article 6: Foreign NGOs carrying out activities within the territory of China shall register in accordance with law through a representative office; unregistered representative offices that want to carry out activities shall, in advance, obtain a temporary activity permit. Foreign NGOs that have not registered or obtained temporary activity approvals must not carry out activities within the territory of China, must not commission or fund domestic Chinese individuals, legal persons or other organizations to carry out activities within the territory of China. Article 7: The State Council’s Public Security Department and the provincial level public security organs are the registration and management agencies of the foreign NGOs that carry out activities within the territory of China. 国务院公安部门及省级人民政府公安机关是境外非政府组织在中国境内开展活动的登记管理机关。 The relevant departments of the State Council, relevant departments of provincial level people’s governments, and organizations authorized by the State Council or provincial level people’s governments are the operation management units of foreign NGOs carrying out activities in China. 国务院有关部门、省级人民政府有关部门、国务院或者省级人民政府授权的组织是境外非政府组织在中国境内开展活动的业务主管单位。 [return of dual registration?] The relevant departments of the State Council and local people’s governments at the county level or above are responsible for management of foreign NGOs within the scope of their professional responsibility. The state will establish coordination mechanisms that will manage foreign NGOs and be responsible for researching, coordinating, and resolving major problems in the management of foreign NGOs. // Source: NPC, ChinaLawTranslate
2. From China Daily, // The draft that was given a second reading at the bimonthly meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Thursday allows NGOs to open branches in the country with the permission of the State Council. The change was made “in light of the Chinese government’s positive attitude toward some international NGOs”, an explanation text of the draft said. “Foreign NGOs and their representative offices are not allowed to establish branches in China unless the State Council gives them special policies,” the revised provision said. // Source: China Daily
3. Reuters has more on the changes: // The draft was altered after “some localities and departments” pushed for change, noting there were already important science and technology-related international NGOs operating in China, the website of the National People’s Congress said. It was “recommended that the provisions be more flexible”, said the notice, dated on Wednesday. // Source: Reuters
4. Reuters reported that the law would focus on “harmful moral standards,” and noted that the security legislation in effect since 1993 had its name changed late last year: // « The draft law called for reinforced education and dissemination of socialist core values, to prevent the infiltration of harmful moral standards, » Xinhua said, without elaborating. […] Last November, China renamed its first national security law, which took effect in 1993, as the Counterespionage Law.// Source: Reuters, BBC
5. SCMP’s Verna Yu outlines the incredibly wide reach of the proposal—covering political, commercial, technological, religious, ideological, and military issues as comprehensive security concerns. She also notes analysts’ concerns on the law’s potential to limit rights: // Eva Pils, a China law expert at King’s College […] said that by not making a direct reference to the [newly formed National Security Commission, led by Xi Jinping …], the law was leaving open which party entity would be in charge of national security. And as the law did not regulate party organs nor seek to curb the party’s power, it affirmed the party’s supremacy over the state on national security. Pils said she was also worried that the definition of national security meant that “practically any aspect of social or economic life can be regarded as a matter of national security and thus gives the institutions empowered by the law a mandate to intervene”. “I think the law also manifests a neo-totalitarian ambition to reach into every sector or society.” // Source: SCMP
6. The new bill also calls for protecting cyber-sovereignty, in addition to many other aspects: // The provision on “cyber sovereignty” was added to the second draft of the security law, which also stressed the need to safeguard the security of “industries and key areas important to the national economy”. The new proposal, which was reviewed last month by the body’s Standing Committee, also adds language about protecting the country from risks to the financial system. […] The bill includes economic, financial, food, culture, environment, and energy matters into the realm of national security and emphasizes the importance of upholding Communist Party rule. The latest draft stresses the need for “cultural security” and improving socialist education to prevent the “infiltration of unhealthy culture.” // Source: Bloomberg
7. SCMP’s Jeffie Lam looks at the territorial and sovereignty implications of the proposed national security law, noting that it emphasizes the duties of semi-autonomous Hong Kong and Macau, and de facto independent Taiwan—a departure from the current national security legislation: // Article 11 of the draft states: « China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, including people in Hong Kong and Macau as well as Taiwan. » Article 36 goes on to say: « The Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong and the Special Administrative Region of Macau must fulfil their responsibility to safeguard national security. » […] While legal experts doubt that China’s national security legislation can be directly enforced here, local commentators and politicians see the unprecedented reference to Hong Kong as a clear signal Beijing wants the city to stop dragging its feet on drawing up its own legislation to ban acts of « treason, secession, sedition or subversion », as stipulated under Article 23 of the Basic Law. // Source: SCMP

 3. Unrest in Xinjiang: is minority policy helping?

1. Shops ordered to sell alcohol in Xinjiang village: Amid China’s ongoing crackdown on terrorism in Xinjiang, authorities have rolled out policies limiting Islamic dress and custom, and blamed homegrown religious extremism and influence from the Islamic militants abroad for inciting violence. The most recent measure was the order to sell alcohol and cigarettes in a village in Hotan. // Last week, authorities in Laskuy township, in Hotan prefecture’s Hotan county, issued an announcement in the town seat of Aktash village that “all restaurants and supermarkets in our village should place five different brands of alcohol and cigarettes in their shops before [May 1, 2015].” […] Signed by the Aktash village Party Committee of Laskuy township, the notice stated that the order had been handed down “from the top echelons of [China’s ruling Communist Party], in order to provide greater convenience to the public.” […] Aktash village party committee secretary Adil Sulayman told RFA’s Uyghur Service that the new policy was part of an effort to undermine Islam in the area. “We have a campaign to weaken religion here and this is part of that campaign.”// Source: Radio Free Asia
2. Expert say that such measures are counterproductive: // James Leibold, an expert on China’s ethnic policies at Melbourne’s La Trobe University, said Chinese officials were “often flailing around in the dark” when tackling extremism. An acute lack of understanding leads them to focus on visible, but imprecise, perceptions of radicalism such as long beards, veils and sobriety, he said. The result is often “crude forms of ethno-cultural profiling.” “These sorts of mechanistic and reactive policies only serve to inflame ethno-national tension without addressing the root causes of religious extremism, while further alienating the mainstream Uighur community, making them feel increasingly unwelcome within a hostile, Han-dominated society.” // Source: The Washington Post
3. AFP’s Benjamin Haas reports from the Xinjiang village of Elishku or Shache, the scene of a violent confrontation last July. // Something hideously violent happened in Elishku. Whether it was a separatist attack or a civilian massacre is shrouded in the mists of conflict, control, claim and counter-claim that plague China’s mainly Muslim region of Xinjiang. […] Residents described more than 500 people, some carrying hoes, axes and other farm tools, marching down a dusty tree-lined road to meet a line of security personnel armed with assault rifles. Mahmouti heard them ordering the crowd to “Step back”, and moments later, a stream of gunfire. The shooting continued intermittently for hours, he added. “Anyone who went out that day never came back,” said Yusup, a farmer who did not want to give his last name for fear of reprisals. “It was chaos, maybe as many as 1,000 people vanished.” // Source: AFP
4. A decade old, Xinjiang film shows changes in restive Chinese region: // Ju Anqi’s low-budget film « Poet on a Business Trip » took just one main actor, one camera and 40 days on the road in China’s remote western Xinjiang region to make back in 2002. But it would be another 12 years before the film was completed, after a decade-long dispute between director Ju and actor-poet Shu put the project on hold. The long gap between shooting and editing means that what originally set out to be a story of a journey into the nature of human desire became a powerful record of a more peaceful time in the increasingly restive region on the borders of central Asia. // Source: Reuters, official website

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

 1. Washington’s policy on China

1. In Washington, a Strategic Shift on China—Toward Containment: // Given that, the just issued report on U.S.-China relations, co-authored by Robert Blackwill, one of the most distinguished American diplomats of his generation, signifies a major shift in establishment thinking about China. And the conclusion is, as these things go, astonishing: The U.S. should place « less strategic emphasis on the goal of integrating China into the international system, and more on balancing China’s rise.” Which is to say, we should basically chuck what has been U.S. policy for the past three decades, and try something that sounds almost (but not quite) like containment. […] But there’s little question that any measure of trust between Beijing and Washington has diminished; a foreign ministry official late last year told Newsweek that there is « no question » that relations between the two countries were “better when George W. Bush was president than they are today.” The question is, to what extent does that matter to Beijing? Foreign diplomats there seem increasingly to think it’s not that big a deal to Xi & Co.; Beijing is increasingly suspicious of the U.S. as a rival in Asia and increasingly convinced that its own ascendancy is irreversible. The quest for supremacy in the Pacific, therefore, is likely to intensify. […] If China, in fact, doesn’t care that it’s “losing Washington,” that only makes it more likely that it will lose it. And at the moment, that appears to be the road Beijing is on. // Source: Newsweek
2. During Japanese PM Shinzi Abe’s diplomatic visit to Washington, a tour to cement US-Japan partnership, the two countries // unveiled new guidelines for defense cooperation on Monday, reflecting Japan’s willingness to take on a more robust international role at a time of growing Chinese power and rising concerns about nuclear-armed North Korea. […] The guidelines allow for global cooperation militarily, ranging from defense against ballistic missiles, cyber and space attacks as well as maritime security. They follow a cabinet resolution last year reinterpreting Japan’s post-World War Two pacifist constitution.// Source: Reuters
   1. US President Barack Obama accused “China of flexing muscle in disputes with neighbors”, particularly “its approach to maritime issues and its claims”. Source: Reuters

2. Xi’s visit to the New Silk Road

1. Last week, Xi left China for a visit to Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. According to Xinhua, //a highlight would be his attendance at the Victory Day commemoration in Moscow, which demonstrates China’s determination to safeguard the post-WWII world order. Xi is also set to deepen win-win cooperation with the three nations, push forward the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt while seeking common development with existing economic belt initiatives. // Source: Xinhua
2. The Diplomat looks at Xi’s stopover in Kazakhstan on his way to Russia and then Belarus: //Most intriguingly in geopolitical terms, Kazakhstan increasingly sees China as the answer to over-reliance on Russia, particularly given the hurdles facing the new Eurasian Economic Union. […] For China, Kazakhstan’s importance indeed extends far beyond economics. The Central Asian state is not only an important energy source and investment destination for China – cooperation with Kazakhstan has clear links to security in China’s Xinjiang province. China hopes that the Silk Road Economic Belt will boost Xinjiang’s economic fortunes, and that this growth will help quell ethnic tensions in the Uyghur Autonomous Region. Kazakhstan, which shares a lengthy border with Xinjiang, is seen as first step on Silk Road that will make economic development possible. // Source: Diplomat
3. But analysts said China’s expanding influence in Central Asia might come into clash with Russian interests: // Xi’s strategy of expanding Chinese interests through the former Soviet states of central Asia could potentially clash with President Putin’s plans for a Eurasian Economic Union, and undermine a recent renaissance in Sino-Russian relations, according to Bobo Lo, author of “Russia and the New World Disorder” to be published in June. “The Silk Road, though its an infrastructure idea, is about the promotion and expansion of Chinese interests, which leaves a clear conflict of interests with Putin’s own Eurasian Economic Union,” Lo, an associate at Chatham House in London, said […]. “They haven’t directly clashed because they are both nascent ideas, but give it time.”// Source: Bloomberg
4. SCMP notes that defining and incorporating mutual interests into the new Silk Road strategy is part of the plan in meetings with Russian President Putin and Belarusian President Lukashenko: // Xi and Putin will define the priorities and direction of China-Russia ties, the foreign ministry said. They will discuss combining the Silk Road belt with Russia’s idea for a trade and infrastructure network across Eurasia, as well as the development of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. // Source: SCMP
5. Russia and China Sign Cooperation Pacts: // On the eve of a celebration commemorating to the defeat of Nazi Germany, the presidents of Russia and China on Friday signed 32 bilateral agreements designed to highlight the warming of relations […]. [Putin] and [Xi Jinping] presided over a signing ceremony that included a road map to balancing their regional interests in Central Asia, secured more than $6 billion in Chinese investment in a Russian intercity rail line and established an information security agreement heralded as a “nonaggression pact” between the countries in cyberspace. […] Yet amid the warm words and declarations of shared intent […], there were also signs of tense, behind-the-scenes negotiations. Notably absent from the agreements signed Friday was a compromise on a price for gas to be sold by Russia to China through a new, multibillion-dollar pipeline from the fields of Western Siberia to the Chinese border. // Source: New York Times
6. Reuters warns of the undercurrent: // […] Although relations are improving, it has not proved as easy as some Russian officials had hoped to secure funds from China, with some suspicion lingering in the relationship. Russia is wary of becoming the junior partner and little more than a provider of natural resources for China’s booming economy […].// Source: Reuters
7. Interesting to note is both leaders’ alignment on historical memory on WWII: // In public remarks, Mr. Putin said China and the Soviet Union had borne the greatest human cost in World War II. “Now we are as a result standing against any attempts to rehabilitate Nazism and militarism, against the falsification of history,” Mr. Putin said, referring to Imperial Japan as well as Germany. Mr. Xi invited Mr. Putin to a victory celebration in September, which Mr. Putin said he would attend. // Source: New York Times
8. “Remember history” alignment: // In a signed article published in the Russian Gazette recently, Xi recalled the sacrifices and contributions China and Russia made in WWII, reaffirmed the two countries’ joint determination to uphold the outcome of the war, and called for win-win cooperation in dealing with international affairs.  » Xi said the peoples of China and Russia will stand together with all peace-loving nations and peoples firmly against any attempt to deny, distort or tamper with WWII history, » said Pavel Negoitsa, director-general of the Russian Gazette. // Source: Xinhua
9. But New York Times’ Jane Perlez notes CCP’s role in war was a disputed one: // During his two years in office, Mr. Xi has traveled widely to advance China’s international prestige, and he is in Moscow in part because he wants to make sure that his country’s costly fight against Japan is not lost amid the celebrations of the defeat of Germany. Mr. Putin, for his part, is happy to have Mr. Xi as evidence that his highly public pivot to the Far East — as a counterweight to the economic muscle of the West — is bearing fruit. However, there are several awkward factors that impinge on the images that both Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin aspire to project. First, although Mr. Xi may be the paramount leader of the Chinese Communists, and while his father was a prominent Communist commander, it was not the Communists who bore the brunt of the fighting against the Japanese during World War II, when 14 million to 20 million Chinese died. Rather, it was the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, backed by the United States and Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who deployed most of the troops against the Japanese. // Source: New York Times

 3. China’s Taiwan policy and upcoming Taiwan presidential election

1. In National Interest, Jonathan Sullivan argues that // The heterogeneity of positions across the party meant that the ultimate policy recommendations did not radically differ from the “Taiwan consensus” (which urges caution in cross-Strait affairs and establishing bipartisan agreement and supervision before pursuing further economic policies with China). However, Tsai, who has again secured the DPP’s nomination, appears much more confident in her understanding and delivery of the DPP’s position. At a party meeting in April, Tsai expressed her support for “maintaining the status quo” and “stability in cross-Strait relations,” remarks that won praise from officials in the United States. Earlier this week, though, President Ma used a long address to the Mainland Affairs Council to question how Tsai expects to achieve these goals while rejecting the “one China” principle and “1992 Consensus.” Tsai’s response should provide food for thought for Chu and Xi as they meet in Beijing: the Taiwanese people, she said, do not share Ma’s preoccupation with the intricacies of the “1992 Consensus” because they are too busy worrying about a swathe of economic and social ills. If Tsai’s moderate rhetoric is sufficient to convince the electorate (and opinion polls suggest it is) that the DPP’s China policy won’t be a dangerous liability, the KMT has nothing left to fight with. Outside of championing the “1992 Consensus,” the KMT is bereft of ideas. […] The key question is thus what the KMT and the CCP intend to do if the DPP wins the presidency, and in the worst-case scenario, controls the legislature, too. […] And with Xi Jinping exercising that confidence more robustly in many areas of Chinese foreign policy, there is no reason to think the CCP will concede acceptance of the “one China” principle in order to work with the DPP. The most likely outcome is a repeat of the scenario that pertained during the Chen era—a “united front” where the KMT and CCP combined to squeeze the life out of the DPP presidency, and used a private body to circumvent a democratically elected president whose policies they didn’t like. // Source: The National Interest
2. On the Wall Street Journal, Sullivan further argues that China’s Taiwan policy is failing: // Mr. Xi will want to know what contingency plans the KMT has in store to contain the historically pro-independence DPP if the voters swing to the opposition. To minimize the damage to its interests, the Communist Party has already started drawing rhetorical battle lines to box in the DPP’s ability to push toward formal independence for the island. […] in recent months China has begun to insist on the “one China” principle minus the “separate interpretations.” In effect it is moving the goalposts. That suggests if the DPP comes to power in 2016, relations across the Taiwan Strait could again become deadlocked. […] Nevertheless, the timing and opacity of this meeting will do nothing to assuage Taiwanese concerns that Beijing wants to coopt the KMT. The CCP seems to be persisting with a Taiwan policy that has not yet delivered the results it desires. // Source: Wall Street Journal
3. Meanwhile, on his China tour, KMT’s Eric Chu trumpets the “1992 consensus”: // New Taipei City Mayor and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) yesterday expressed hope that Taiwan would develop a greater role in the global community based on the so-called “1992 consensus” between Taiwan and China. Speaking at the 10th Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum in Shanghai, Chu said that he expects Taiwan to play a bigger role if the nation takes part in the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” trade initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade bloc.// Source: Taipei Times

HONG KONG – DIPLOMACY

 1. High-level delegation denies any US role in Occupy protests

1. // A high-powered delegation of visiting US lawmakers have assured Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying face-to-face that the United States did not have any role in last year’s Occupy Central protests. In a pointed but diplomatically worded statement issued last night, Republican congressman Matt Salmon, who led the three-man delegation from the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, also stressed that it was « important to fully understand the extent to which Beijing is honouring the ‘one country, two systems’ form of government » at what he described as a « critical political juncture » for Hong Kong. […] During the meetings with Hong Kong lawmakers on Friday, Salmon, who chairs a congressional subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, suggested that « moving forward, sometimes half a loaf is better than no loaf« , in a hint at compromise over the 2017 electoral reform. // Source: SCMP

 2. Beijing negotiator on Hong Kong affairs Lu Ping dies at age 87

1. // Lu Ping, Beijing’s tough-talking point man on Hong Kong affairs during the city’s handover to Chinese rule in 1997, has died at the age of 87. […] Local politicians and others who knew him remembered Lu as a gentle, easy-going man, and even his critics had praise for him.
   […] As such, he was one of a handful of mainland officials who oversaw Hong Kong’s handover from beginning to end. He was a key member of the Chinese delegation in the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong’s future and later, a deputy secretary general of the Basic Law Drafting Committee. He retired from the HKMAO a few days after the handover.
   […] But many Hong Kong people remember Lu best as the feisty man who condemned former governor Chris Patten as a « sinner for 1,000 years » back in 1993 for disrupting the handover by changing the election system for the Legislative Council in breach of the Basic Law. // Source: SCMP
2. SCMP editorial: Hong Kong owes top Beijing negotiator Lu Ping a debt of gratitude // The local public was probably most impressed by his straight-talking style. During the height of the Sino-British war of words over the electoral reform initiated by Chris Patten, news headlines were often dominated by his tough rhetoric, including his criticism of the former governor as « a sinner for 1,000 years ». He also queried the hefty spending on the new airport by the colonial government. Lu is to be commended for his role in fulfilling the unprecedented venture of steering a colonial capitalistic city to Chinese rule. He was one of the few officials involved in the drafting of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Basic Law and many more arrangements put in place to ensure a smooth transition. That Hong Kong remains a stable and prosperous city today owes much to those who have played a part in laying the foundation for continuity. Lu is no doubt at the forefront of those responsible for this achievement. // Source: SCMP
3. SCMP on Lu’s biography

 HONG KONG – POLITICS

Commentaries on electoral reform

1. Sociologist Lui Tai-lok argued on Mingpao last week that the pan-dem lacked an overall strategy and vision: //今天，泛民為應否通過政改而不知所措。其實他們先要問的問題是：在民主運動進入艱難的階段時，究竟香港的民主運動應該怎樣發展下去？那才是要思考的問題，至於是否否決政改，則是在那個大前提下的一個次問題而已。 // Source: Mingpao
2. Political scientist Ma Ngok argued that the “concessions” in the current electoral reform package are rather pointless // 政府說現方案已在8‧31框架下引入競爭，例如說提委可以投暗票、投2至N票、提名門檻降至120人可以容許10人入閘等，但這些都是無關痛癢的。首先，只要中央仍然可以控制689票，無論其他511人如何投票，中央還是可以完全決定哪3個人進入普選階段的。這就是中央的底線。提名門檻降低至十分之一是沒有用的，因為最終只會有3個候選人嘛。用回賽馬的比喻：10匹馬入閘然後3匹馬出閘，相對於5匹入閘3匹出閘，哪個馬迷會覺得公平一些呢？提委會投暗票當然作用不大。君不見2012年特首選舉也是投暗票？何曾把票投給泛民？ 據說政府游說泛民，說當每名提委有2至N 票，以2012年為例，唐英年的支持者便可能把餘票投給何俊仁。這個推論很有問題：支持唐英年的會把票投給何俊仁，前提是他們覺得何俊仁不會贏。如果泛民參選人在民調中有三成支持，各建制派提委是不會放他／她出閘的。// Source: Mingpao