Keywords: Protest against nuclear waste plant, Beidaihe, Xi Jinping, Sino-Japan tension, G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Olympics Games, Fu Yuanhui, independence of Hong Kong, judicial reform in Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Protest against the construction of a nuclear waste treatment plant in Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province

• //Several thousand residents of Lianyungang, 480km north of Shanghai, protested outside government offices at the weekend, eyewitnesses told the AFP news agency. They were worried about the health implications of a nuclear waste reprocessing plant they believe may be built there. French nuclear group Areva agreed in 2012 to cooperate with state-run China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) to build a reprocessing facility in China without stating the location. Local people believe that Lianyungang, a port city in Jiangsu province, is a prime candidate because CNNC is building a large nuclear power station there.// Source: RFI, 08 August 2016.

Soon after the protest, the government announced to suspend site selection work. It is reported that the police deployed use of force to dispense the protestors:

• //Following demonstrations by Lianyungang citizens, the city government has decided to halt work on a nuclear waste treatment plant in the area. The municipal government shared the news on its Weibo microblog in the early hours of Wednesday morning, saying it had suspended preliminary site selection work on the project. Lianyungang, in eastern China’s Jiangsu province, has for the past several days seen thousands of people take to the streets to express their discontent with the nuclear waste treatment plant that was potentially going to be built in their city. On Sunday the protests were beaten down by police in riot gear. The municipal government organized a press conference on Sunday evening, in which it stressed that the project, a Sino-French plant, was still looking at multiple locations along China’s east coast. State news agency Xinhua reported last year that the plant was designed to process 800 tons of nuclear waste per year, and that construction was to begin in 2020.// Source: The Sixth Tone, 10 August 2016.

The project in question is a collaboration between the French group Areva and the Chinese state-owned enterprise China National Nuclear Corp with the support from the French and Chinese governments. The need for the nuclear waste plant project comes from the Chinese government’s plan to build more nuclear plants in the next 5 years.

• //[報]道說，中法核廢料循環項目是中法兩國最大的戰略合作項目，也得到了兩國政府的鼎力支持。成立於2011年的中核瑞能科技有限公司，負責中法合作核循環項目的選址、立項以及中法合作談判等前期工作。中法合資的這項核循環項目計畫於2020年動工，2030年投入使用，每年計畫可以處理800噸核廢料。法新社指出，法國的核電集團阿海琺與2015年和中國的核巨頭中國核工業集團公司就在中國建造核廢料處理循環工廠達成意向協議，但是始終沒有透露這個工廠未來的地址。該協議價值100至150億歐元，對處於困境中的阿海琺集團至關重要，因為目前該集團已經將重心轉向對核廢料循環管理工作領域。周三，阿海琺集團的發言人告訴法新社，有關該項目的商業談判繼續進行，但沒有給出具體的時間表，該發言人強調指出，未來工廠的地址由中國當局來選定。據中國媒體介紹，自2015年初以來，中核瑞能科技有限公司已經在山東、福建、江蘇、浙江等沿海省份對10多個站點進行了普查比選。2015年，中核瑞能科技有限公司到連雲港市開展了中法核循環項目選址前期工作。目前，該項目處於前期調研和廠址比選階段，尚未最終確定。對於連雲港市民上街抗議的原因，據紐時報駐京記者報道，可能是中國核工業集團公司的一個下屬單位曾在其網站上表示，管理人員曾赴連雲港“調研核循環項目擬選廠址”。很可能是這條消息似乎在一些居民中引發恐慌，除了走上街頭抗議，他們還在社交媒體和網絡論壇上發聲，反對把處理廠建在連雲港的想法。中核集團一位負責人今年三月份曾證實，與阿海琺在此領域的談判繼續進行，但是雙方在技術和商業領域達成協議前還有很多路要走。實際上，而中國政府已表示，為了讓經濟更快地減少對煤碳的依賴，將加快核電站和核燃料加工廠的建設。今年3月，全國人大批准了下一個五年計畫，保證將推進更多核電站的建設。而中國目前是世界上最大的民用核電市場。中國環境保護部核電安全監管司司長湯搏今年四月曾透露，，如果按計畫開工，今年中國核機組數會超過法國的59台，成為世界第二”。自然，如此多的核電站，迫切需要越來越多的反應堆的乏燃料修建一座循環處理廠。//Source: RFI, 11 August 2016.

Lin Boqiang from Xiamen University warned that nuclear projects are similar to the PX chemical projects in the past, which stirred up massive protests over health and safety concerns. For more information about the mass incident related to the PX chemical project, please find the research article of China Perspectives in 2014.

• //The process has been shrouded in secrecy, with Lianyungang residents discovering that their city could be the site for the plant after the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence announced in a press release that a deputy head visited the city on July 26 and claimed “much progress has been made on site selection”. The Lianyungang city government issued a statement on Sunday to try to calm the public, saying the plans were still at an early stage and no location had been confirmed. Sporadic protests continued on Monday and Tuesday, with video footage posted online showing police mobilised to protect the city government’s office building from protesters. Xiamen University energy policy specialist Lin Boqiang said the plan was shelved as a result of a lack of transparency and communication by the government and state-owned nuclear companies. “Public concerns can be contagious and spill over to other cities, as has been the case with various incinerator and PX [chemical] projects,” he said. Many local governments have been forced to scrap plans for such projects after public protests over health and safety concerns. A series of deadly blasts at industrial sites over the years has only worsened public fears and deepened distrust of government. “China’s PX industry suffered a severe setback. If the developers of nuclear projects do not learn a lesson, they could be faced with similar problems in future,” Lin said. China is the world’s most active builder of nuclear power plants. It has 32 reactors in operation, 22 under construction and more planned.// Source: SCMP, 10 August 2016.

The news about the protest first appeared on social media, but it only got greater media attention since 08 August when the news was covered by international media.

• //中國江蘇連雲港市民近日為反對在當地修建核廢料處理廠，數千市民走上街頭遊行抗議。當地警方指遊行未經批准，參與者可能違法，並出動大量警力戒備。該市紀委亦發布通知，嚴禁「共產黨員和國家公職人員」參與非法聚集活動。而市政府及負責建設核廢料處理廠的企業則稱項目仍在調研階段，未必會落地連雲港。 示威人群打出的標語這次遊行的消息最早在8月5日就在微信等社交媒體上傳播，但因中國禁止媒體報導國內的集會新聞，直到8日才被國際媒體廣泛報導。連雲港警方官方微博曾於8月5日深夜發布警告，稱未接到任何集會遊行的申請，「希望廣大市民不要被互聯網、手機短信、微信傳播集會、遊行、示威的信息所蠱惑，不參加非法集會、遊行、示威活動。不信謠、不傳謠、不圍觀」。不過在5日、6日的週末兩天，仍有數千市民舉着標語走上街頭，高呼口號，反對在當地興建核廢料處理廠。// Source: The Initium, 09 August 2016.

The labour strike scheduled on August 15 in Lianyungang was not materialized due to official suppression. Rumors on the Internet suggested that the alternative site would be in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province. This prompted the local residents of Zhangjiang to amount protests against the project in recent days:

• //在当局高压维稳及严密戒备下，江苏省连云港市民众为抗议兴建核废料处理厂，发动的罢市罢工行动周一（15日）胎死腹中。经过连日的打压行动，有市民为免惹祸上身，已删除网上的维权讯息。另外，有传广东省湛江市会是核废料厂的另一选址，当地民众纷纷于网上发布反核废料厂的讯息，有居民指现正蕴酿大规模的示威行动。[…] 小胡：（警察）他们都在马路上3个或5个人为一组，在马路上走过来走过去巡逻，之前在网络中转发了一些视频，在网络上都已经被屏蔽删掉了，所以根本 就看不到，我的（发那些反对核电废料处理厂）的讯息，我也删除掉了，我不可能（将这些讯息）一直留在朋友圈或者QQ空间里面，不然被发现的话，也不太好， 要负法律责任的啊，如果在网上有发这一类讯息的话，你会被抓起来的。他表示，除了当局积极打压，令到市民不敢再出外抗议，而不少企业的老板为免员工罢工造成经济损失，亦会配合政府，呼吁员工不要罢工游行，否则会被扣工资，员工就是怕失去工作，所以周一就没有游行了。此外，网传市政府下达强制命令，所有公务员，国企，企业单位所有员工必须签核废料同意书，不签不发工资，所以现在市面上愈来愈少人谈论反对核废料处理厂一事了。核废料处理项目除了连云港市是其中一个选址外，网传另一个选址就是广东省堪江市的“奋勇高新区”，近日当地已有大批网民在网上发起反对核废料处理项目落户的讯息，当地居民宋先生向本台表示，若果政府未能处理居民的诉求，或会激发大规模的示威行动。//Source: RFA, 15 ugust 2016.

• //江苏省连云港居民抗议核废料处理厂的示威尚未平息之际，广东湛江亦传出是选址之一，湛江居民周五（12日）开始在网上抗议，并号召800万湛江人起来拒绝核废料，湛江市规划局及传为选址之一的奋勇高新区，急出面辟谣指并没此事。[…] 根据中核集团旗下的中核瑞能招标讯息显示，早在今年4月，中核瑞能方面就对核废料处理厂址进行多项调查，譬如“土地利用及陆上资源、水及水产资源利 用、外部人为事件、与核事故应急相关的厂址环境状况”等，并已经基本确定二选一的厂址选项。除连云港厂址之外，广东湛江的“奋勇高新区”的厂址亦上榜。消息立即引起湛江居民的警惕，一份题为“坚决抵制在湛江建设核项目”的呼吁书，迅疾在微信朋友圈传播。一些居民呼吁立即行动起来，阻止有关项目落户湛江，并要求政府作出说明。湛江市规划局周五（12日）发布消息透露，由于大量市民在规划局网站留言，并影响到网站的正常运作。规划局指，根据相关规定，有类似的项目他们会进行公示，到目前为止，他们没有收到有关项目选址的任何申报资料。[…] 中法合作核废料项目，是中法两国最大的战略合作项目。但随著民众维权意识的逐渐兴起，通过行政命令实施可能存在污染的项目，难度正在增加。中国涉核及化工项目的选址，如今已经成为敏感事件，多次引发激烈的群体事件。// Source: RFA, 13 August 2016.

2. The political elites’ Beidaihe holiday this year

a. Scholars suggest that Beidaihe’s political significance may be reduced

Analysts suggested that there are some changes in the Beidaihe holiday meeting this year. They argued that while Xi Jinping has revived this tradition after Hu Jintao, he intended to the keep retired party leaders from meddling the current political business through this occasion:

• //While there are no official schedules, agendas or statements acknowledging the closed-door meetings, Beidaihe has long been known as the backstage for intense power jockeying among the top echelons of the Communist Party and where policy direction is decided. […] “The summer holidays are normally followed by the annual autumn plenums, thus the Beidaihe gathering is easily perceived as a preamble to the ensuing conference, where major policies are formally made and announced,”said Warren Sun, a historian of the Communist Party at Monash University, referring to the annual meeting of the 200 or so members of the Central Committee. “Little wonder there is intense media interest in this Masonic club gathering.” […] This year’s retreat had in particular generated much attention, Sun said, pointing to a backdrop of “continuing economic underperformance, foreign policy setbacks, and the approaching 19th party congress when a massive number of leaders are due to be replaced”. […] Despite the attention it receives, the Beidaihe meeting has lost much of the political significance it once held, analysts said. “Outsiders tend to talk about Beidaihe as if it were the same as before. In the past, it offered an occasion where retired and [incumbent] leaders came together to discuss future plans. But I don’t think that’s the case any more,” said Bo Zhiyue, a professor of Chinese politics at Victoria University in Wellington. Bo noted that former president Hu Jintao abolished the “summer office system” in 2003, soon after he took over the country’s top job from Jiang Zemin. Since then, Beidaihe has been less of a venue for major decision-making than a place for leaders, model workers and leading scholars to “have a little break”, Bo said. This year, 56 academics and researchers were invited to the resort for a five-day holiday, bringing the total since 2001 to more than 900, state media reported. The political significance of the Beidaihe gatherings had faded even more under Xi, as he increasingly replaced collective leadership with “one-man rule” and sought to keep the influence of retired leaders at arms’ length, Bo said. Chen Daoyin, an associate professor at Shanghai University of Political Science, agreed. “Xi is reducing the opportunities for the so-called party elders to meddle in politics, in order to make space for a more institutionalised and formal process of decision-making,” Chen said. Sun acknowledged the Beidaihe gathering was “increasingly meant for collective relaxation and luxury holidays at the expense of the state purse”. However, Sun noted that regardless of whether any formal meetings took place at the resort, “in a regime where networking is paramount and informal politics is still salient, such an occasion of ‘head-bumping’ and social interaction among the current and retired decision-makers is bound to have political significance”.// Source: SCMP, 14 August 2016.

b. The secrecy of the Beidaihe holiday continues to give rise to media speculations

Wang Xiangwei, the former editor-in-chief of the South China Morning Post, suggested that a number of personnel issues may have discussed in the run-up to the 19^th CCP National Congress next year.

• //The only sign the Chinese leaders had begun their holidays came on Friday when Xinhua reported Liu Yunshan ( 劉雲山 ), the propaganda tsar and one of the Communist Party’s seven-member Politburo Standing Committee, met a group of scholars invited to holiday at the resort. Xinhua emphasised Liu was there on Xi’s behalf. […] Despite the secrecy, the Beidaihe meetings have long been the subject of intense speculation in overseas media, particularly Chinese-language publications. That’s especially the case this summer, as the retreat comes in the run-up to a key plenum of the party’s central committee, scheduled for October, when the leadership will meet to discuss and approve a new code of conduct to regulate its members, particularly senior officials, as Xi continues to push his anti-graft campaign to consolidate his power. More importantly, speculation abounds on whether the leaders will discuss the leadership line-up to be unveiled at the party’s 19th congress – expected late next year – when five of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (all bar Xi and Li) will retire. There are also suggestions that Xi plans to force Li to give up more of his power over economic decisions following a rift over the direction of the economy.// Source: SCMP, 13 August 2016.

According to the analysis quoted by AFP, Xi Jinping might retain the position of the CCP’s Secretary General beyond the 10-year unofficial restriction set by Deng Xiaoping. Such speculation arises from the fact that there is no successor of Xi named as at this point and Xi has been breaking a number of unofficial rules and concentrating power within the Party after his ascendance to power.

• //The 19th Party Congress, slated for next year, will decide a new PSC line-up, traditionally seen as indicating Xi’s most likely successor after he steps down, due in 2022. But Xi has thus far delayed anointing an heir. And while Chinese Communist leaders have often maintained influence after their official retirement, scholars and analysts increasingly believe Xi will try to stay in office beyond his standard term. “A lot of analysts now see it as a given” that Xi will seek to stay party general secretary, the country’s most powerful post, said Christopher K. Johnson, a former CIA analyst and now China specialist at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. Willy Lam, expert on politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said there was a 60 to 70 percent chance that Xi would refuse to give up the role. Doing so would violate the unofficial rule set by Deng Xiaoping, who led China from 1978-1989, that general secretaries stay in office no longer than 10 years. That principle has helped smooth transfers of power within the party since the 1990s. […] China’s constitution sets term limits for presidents and ministers, but there is no such rule for the party secretary. Analysts say if Xi’s close ally Wang Qishan, a PSC cadre who is due to retire, is allowed a second term it could establish a precedent for the party chief. Xi has made his enduring ambition clear by installing himself as chairman of most of the powerful new groups within the party, said Victor Shih, professor at the University of California, San Diego. Doing so “increases the threshold for anyone to replace him,” he told AFP. “Moreover, there is no heir apparent now.” Xi has already smashed several unwritten party rules since ascending to general secretary in 2012, Johnson noted.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 09 August 2016.

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

1. Tension between China and Japan

• //Tensions between China and Japan flared on Tuesday as Tokyo’s top diplomat warned Beijing’s envoy that Chinese activity near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea could worsen ties “markedly”. Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida summoned Chinese ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua to protest against China’s deployment of a record number of government vessels to disputed waters near the Senkakus, known as the Diaoyus in China. […] On Monday, 15 Chinese ships were spotted near the islands, after some 230 Chinese fishing boats and seven coastguard ships – four apparently armed – sailed into the waters on Saturday. Analysts said the move suggested China was taking a harder line in response to what it perceived as pressure and interference from Japan in South China Sea disputes.// Source: SCMP, 09 August 2016.

• //Hundreds of Chinese fishing boats have swarmed around the islands since early August with the start of the mackerel season. Up to 15 Chinese coastguard vessels – four times the usual number – were also in the area, prompting a Japanese protest. Tensions between China and Japan have been on the rise recently, with Beijing reportedly cancelling a trip to Tokyo by assistant foreign minister Kong Xuan­you as the Japanese side repeatedly protested against the activities of Chinese ships near the Diaoyus.// Source: SCMP, 12 August 2016.

Huang Dahui, director of Renmin University’s East Asia Studies Centre, said:

• //ties between the two countries would continue to worsen, presenting further diplomatic challenges to China. Huang said that at a special legislative session next month the Japanese government, led by the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was likely to revise its constitution to allow a more active military because of the threat posed by China.// Source: SCMP, 09 August 2016.

State-owned Global Times published a commentary by Feng Yue from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and raised the sovereignty question of Okinawa/ Ryukyu Islands. The same newspaper also held an online poll where over 90% of the Chinese people agreed the islands should not be called Okinawa.

• //众所周知，直到19世纪70年代末琉球群岛仍是独立的，那以后才被日本强占，这是非常晚近的事。而美国长期不承认日本对琉球的所谓主权，也不使用日本人给起的“冲绳”名字。[…] 二战结束之后，琉球群岛在美国的管理之下，直到1971年美国和日本才签署了《关于琉球诸岛和大东诸岛的协定》，将琉球群岛交给日本管理。但我们需要特别注意的是1971年美国只是将琉球群岛的行政管辖权交给了日本，实际上未认定琉球主权的归属。[…] 琉球群岛的地位按道理、法理、历史来讲，其实到现在也可视为未定。这与当初英国将香港返还中国是完全不同的概念。我们过去在无意中落入了对方设置的一些陷阱，现在要跳出对方设置的战略陷阱，从更广的范围进行博弈。// Source: Global Times, 12 August 2016.

Increasing demand for seafood in China and government policy lead to rapid expansion of the Chinese fishing fleet and depletion of fish stocks in China’s rivers and coastal areas, laying the background for Sino-Japan conflict over the sea territories:

• //Overfishing in Chinese rivers and seas has seriously depleted stocks and the government is to cut the size of the nation’s fishing fleet, the agricultural ministry said. A well-known fishermen in Tanmen, Hainan province, said local fishermen have been told not to increase their fleet while counterparts in other provinces have been told to cut the number of ships by 3 per cent. […] Agriculture minister Han Changfu told China National Radio that it was time to trim China’s fishing fleet, the world’s largest, to protect fish stocks. […] The ministry says Chinese controlled seas can sustain a catch of between eight million to nine million tonnes per year, but in recent years the catch has been about 13 million tonnes. […] China consumes more than a third of the world’s seafood supply. The World Bank forecasts demand for seafood in China will increase by another 30 per cent by 2030. Many coastal provinces in China give diesel subsidies to ocean-going trawlers, helping to increase the number in operation. […] Poor catches in coastal waters have driven Chinese fishermen further afield, including to disputed waters near China and even as far as the Indian Ocean. Japan’s government protested earlier this month after more than 230 Chinese fishing boats and armed coastguard ships sailed into the waters near the disputed Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. China’s strengthening of territorial claims over the South China Sea has also pushed fishermen in Hainan to go further to fish, and with government subsidies. […] The decision to reduce the fishing fleets was “certainly a good thing to do”, but not enough, said Professor Cai Shengli, a marine biologist at the College of Fisheries and Life Science at Shanghai Ocean University. If the government removed smaller, older boats from the fleet the industry would build bigger vessels capable of longer-distance voyages as long as Chinese consumers’ demand for seafood kept growing at a “scary pace”, Cai said. A possible solution was to convert trawlermen to fish farmers, he said.// Source: SCMP, 15 August 2016.

2. The run-up to the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province in September

Purposes of the summit:

• //Given the importance of the G20 platform to China, Beijing has made big plans for the forum as it seeks to present itself as a global leader. Towards an innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive world economy – that’s its theme for the summit. As this year’s host, Beijing will set the agenda for the talks and is expected to factor domestic considerations into its international priorities for the forum. China is likely to focus on resolving specific issues in the global economy and strengthening cooperation in shared interests. It will also strive towards transforming the forum “from a crisis-response system to a long-term-governance mechanism”, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in May. Contentious issues will likely be avoided. Beijing’s key plans – laid out in a central government memo on the G20 – include seeking new growth drivers, empowering emerging economies in global governance, boosting trade and investment, and fostering growth in developing countries, among others. // Source: SCMP, undated.

Commentators proposed that the upcoming G20 Summit needs to make long-term strategy as well as short-term solution in a post-Brexit world:

• //[I]n the wake of Brexit, Beijing may find it trickier to bring its plans to fruition, experts say. “The Brexit decision will undoubtedly complicate the Hangzhou summit,” says Tristram Sainsbury, director of the G20 Studies Centre at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. Zhu Jiejin, associate professor at Fudan University’s School of International Relations and Public Affairs, says: “At a time when China is trying to shift the G20’s focus to long­term structural issues, Brexit may demand that the Hangzhou summit focuses on immediate challenges as well.” Other analysts see a silver lining. Many leaders and media organisations have portrayed Brexit as a crisis. But as the Chinese term for “crisis” suggests, with danger may well come opportunity. While the result of Britain’s referendum threatens to derail China’s plans for the forum – especially if market turbulence follows – it could also make it easier for the summit to produce results more concrete than a general communiqué and for the country to present itself as a global leader. “Brexit will drive the Hangzhou summit back to the basics and really spur them to deliver much more strongly,” says John Kirton, political science professor and co­director of the G20 Research Group at the University of Toronto. Ren Kangyu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University’s G20 Research Institute, says: “China can promote its view about a post­Brexit global financial order. It can demonstrate its leadership if it can make good use of this opportunity.” // Source: SCMP, undated.

Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos offered his views about the importance of the G20 summit in Hangzhou on the column of China.org.cn:

• //To start with, the organization of the G20 Summit in a Chinese city for the first time has both symbolic and practical significance. It outlines China’s role as an economic superpower which is now openly acknowledged by its partners. It also gives the chance to the Chinese administration to elaborate on developments in its national economy and better inform not only participants but also the world audience about measures it takes to change its growth model. The so-called « New Normal » is a term extensively used in China but one the West is often not familiar with. […] Additionally, the G20 Leaders Meeting this year will be a platform to discuss four issues which are not necessarily related directly to the official agenda but all of them reflect the need for international cooperation. The first is connected to the course of the world economy after the Brexit. […] The second theme is concerned with the need for energy security. G20 countries, principally the ones highly dependent on imports of oil and natural gas, are skeptical about political instability which generates turmoil in energy routes as well as delays and higher prices in transportations and transactions. The presence of the Islamic State in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the problem of piracy in some regions is leading world powers to sit at the same table and find appropriate remedies. // Source: org.cn, 18 August 2016.

China intended to focus economic development but not contentious issues such as the South China Sea Dispute:

• //Vice-foreign minister Li Baodong stressed that Beijing was also keen to keep the focus off other contentious issues, such as South Korea’s plans to deploy a US-backed advanced anti-missile system, when leaders of the world’s 20 major economies met in the capital city of Zhejiang province on September 4-5. Asked about territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Li said the consensus among members was to “focus on economic development and not be distracted by other parties”. “The Hangzhou summit must focus on economic issues,” Li said. “This is what people want to talk about most at the summit.” […] Professor Pang Zhongying, from Renmin University’s School of International Relations, said that if the topic was raised, it would have a negative effect on bilateral relations. To help keep the focus on the economy, Beijing said it would propose a joint initiative to revive weak global growth. Vice-finance minister Zhu Guangyao said details of the proposal were still being worked out, but it would stress “inclusive growth” to spread economic benefits widely and shore up support for free trade.// Source: SCMP, 15 August 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. The unexpected popularity of the Olympian swimmer Fu Yuanhui

Fu Yuanhui became very popular on social media platform in China due to her extraordinary facial expression in front of camera and her funny responses to reporters’ question. Her special personality in the China national team also drew the attention of foreign media. On 07 August, when being asked about her performance in a media interview, Fu said she has already utilized all “prehistoric power”/ “mystic power” (洪荒之力), figuratively meaning that she has taken everything she got for the swim.

• //以总成绩第三跻身决赛，这是傅园慧没有想到的。在记者问她半决赛是否有所保留时，傅园慧直摇头，“没有保留，我已经……我已经……用了洪荒之力了！”这是傅园慧100米仰泳的最好成绩，“我用了三个月做了这样的恢复，鬼知道我经历了什么，真的太辛苦了，有的时候感觉我已经要死了，奥运会训练真的生不如死。”// Source: The New Beijing News, 09 August 2016.

Although Fu Yuanhui did not get the gold medal in the 100m backstroke final on 09 August, she has managed to win the bronze medal and broke the Asian record:

• //里约奥运会游泳女子100米仰泳决赛8月9日上午结束，“洪荒少女”傅园慧最终以58秒76摘得铜牌，这一成绩也打破了亚洲纪录。赛后被记者告知差01秒无缘银牌后，傅园慧笑称那可能是因为自己的手太短了。昨天的半决赛后，“洪荒少女”火遍全中国，这让今天的决赛格外引人瞩目。最终，傅园慧游出了58秒76，刷新了个人最好成绩，这也是中国选手在该项目奥运赛事中首次游进前三名。匈牙利名将霍斯祖以58秒45拿到金牌，傅园慧与亚军、美国人贝克仅有0.01秒的差距，她戏称“那是因为我的手太短了。”比赛结束后，傅园慧一度以为自己没有拿到奖牌，“虽然没有拿到奖牌….”“不是呀，你已经拿到了，你第三呀。”被记者打断后，傅园慧有些不相信，“啊?我第三?那还是不错的!” 接受采访时，傅园慧笑称洪荒之力都已经用完了，“我会对在绝望边缘挣扎的自己说，你的坚持和努力都没有白费，虽然不是冠军，但我已经超越了自己，我现在腿都快抽筋了。”// Source: The Beijing News, 09 August 2016.

• //「洪荒之力」波及全球！在中國游泳運動員傅園慧接受採訪視頻紅遍中國大江南北後，外國媒體也紛紛關注她，讚譽她是本屆里約奧運會的「最可愛選手」。美國《赫芬頓郵報》網站昨日發表題為「里約奧運最可愛選手傅園慧」的文章說，傅園慧在女子100米背泳決賽中獲得了銅牌，但賽後第一時間她竟然還不知道已經拿到獎牌了。在記者的提醒下，她很快表露出了驚訝的表情。英國《每日郵報》和《太陽報》均以「我游這麼快？」為題，報道傅園慧迅速成為「網紅」的過程，並配發了多張傅園慧在接受採訪時表情的大幅圖片。她的相關視頻和圖片也都配上了英文字幕。報道甚至還對傅園慧有關「洪荒之力」的回答進行了全文翻譯：「I didn’t hold back…I used all of my mystic energy!（沒有保留！我已經……用了洪荒之力了！）」究竟「洪荒之力」是什麼？這個詞其實是出自電視劇《花千骨》，劇中的主人公花千骨，最後被灌輸了洪荒之力即妖神之力，成為了令人敬而生畏、力量無邊的妖神。// Source: Wen Wei Bao, 11 August 2016.

A commentary from CRNTT (中國評論新聞) notes that the popularity gained by Fu may indicate a change of attitude of the Chinese towards the purpose of participating in the Olympics Games. Now the Chinese general public is more tolerant of the national team’s failure in getting gold medals, and more appreciative of the authentic expression of athletes.

• //這兩天“洪荒之力”紅了，紅到前方的記者們都愛用這句話來打招呼，“那麼早就出門啦，真是用洪荒之力在工作啊！”“排隊吃個飯都要耗盡洪荒之力。”即便拋開仰泳銅牌，傅園慧依然是本屆奧運會最亮眼的網紅。有人說，里約的冬天有點冷，很多世界級名將都在里約比得不順手，但自從傅園慧亮相後，開啟了里約的歡樂模式。一路誇張的表情，一路段子手本色，傅園慧自評“重口味”，其實，她才是這個冬天裡的一股小清新。有網友說“（對決賽）沒有期待，我已經很滿意了”可謂中國體育史上有里程碑意義的金句，不要說放在20年前，放在6年前周洋遭遇“感謝門”時，如此率真的回答也難以想象，而如今，換來的是一路點贊和力挺。6年的時間，從感謝祖國的模式化表達，到現在的耿直、隨性、段子手，這劇變的背後，不僅僅是我們的更寬容和包容了，更重要的是，我們從“80後”主導的奧運時代，全面進入了“90後”、“00後”的世界。[…] 和“80後”李娜的麻辣犀利不同，孫楊絲毫不掩飾自己的情感，想哭就哭，想說就說。他不懼怕愛掉眼淚，也不懼怕新聞發布會上外國媒體惡意滿滿的禁藥話題；有賽後面對鏡頭哭著說“媽媽對不起”，也有“每一個運動員的成績都值得被尊重”。在遭遇了女友門、換教練門、無證駕駛門……他又讓大家看見，里約奧運會前骨折依舊能奪冠的逆襲，不懼怕當刺頭，也勇於當好漢，這個有血有肉的孫楊是“80後”偶像們不具備的，也是他在里約圈粉的重要原因。[…] 當然，也有網友說，在大家接受傅園慧的各種段子、在網友心疼孫楊的銀牌、在我們為中國體操男團銅牌點贊時，已經是一種進步，對於失利和遺憾，所有人都變得更寬容。 就在奧運大家庭即將告別“80後”時代，全面進化到“90後、00後”的世界時，這個陡然突變的畫風也的確開啟了新的一種體驗，把四年一度的這個體育盛會當做春晚來看，少一點對金牌的死命追求，也許，洪荒之力便能為這個里約的冬天帶來歡樂。// Source: CRNTT, 10 August 2016.

A commentator from the Initium Meng Chang (孟常) argued that, despite the political censorship on the Internet, the rise of social media allows the Chinese to express their own feelings and thoughts in public in a freer style with stronger personal characters. Such environment changes the public expectation of athletes representing China. Also, he pointed out that Fu Yuanhui is not the first one who seems ‘deviated’ from the state official line in responding to the media, but this time her attitude is even endorsed by the People’s Daily. He argued that it indicates a change of attitude towards the Chinese athletes who fail to get gold medals on the part of the government as well.

• //傅園慧們越來越難被完全馴化，體制鐵幕無法將他們與訓練場外的世界隔離開來。雖然仍要遵守體制的規定和紀律，但那種規整打磨的痕跡和流水線式的千人一面，在他們身上越來越淺。而那些沉默訥言、循規蹈矩的運動員發現，單靠競技成績不足以贏得公眾發自內心的喜歡──你得有個性，說他們熟悉的語言，在社交網絡上跟他們互動──就像流行明星一樣。公眾也在變化。中國過去數十年的市場化和現代化，即便推進艱難時有反覆，仍大大解放了個人化、個性化的空間，社交網絡的興起和普及，更讓個體，無論處於社會的什麼階層，獲得了成為主角的平台和機會。人們重新意識到，運動員和他們一樣，也是「人」，有着不同的面孔，有喜怒哀樂七情六慾，說着共同的潮語，表達着共通的情感。[…] 成為舉國體制下的「異數」的代價也在變化。在傅園慧的「異數前輩們」的年代裏，特立獨行乃至跟體制高牆衝撞，押上的可能不只是人氣和聲譽，而是整個職業生涯。多次炮轟中國足協弊病的郝海東，數次被體制重罰和打壓，雖然身為最出色的中國足球運動員之一，他至今不為體制接受；李娜也曾因諸如「我打球不是為了國家」等大膽言論惹來爭議，甚至官方媒體的「圍剿」。再往前，在職業生涯最巔峰的四年間，王治郅因違反中國籃協規定而被國家隊封殺，後經多方斡旋才得以再次為國參賽；長跑世界紀錄創造者、「東方神鹿」王軍霞21歲時突然離開成就她的遼寧女子中長跑團隊，之後多名隊員退出引起「馬家軍兵變」，有關她疑險遭教練馬俊仁侵犯，驚怒之下一走了之，至今眾說紛紜。但這一次，傅園慧賽後的率性言論，獲得了《人民日報》等官媒的連日熱捧，就連北京市食藥監約談外賣平台，都要求用「洪荒之力」來整改。體制似乎逐漸明白，宣傳策略需要調整：不要急於推出模範人物，讓輿論先飛一會兒，再挑選合適的話題人物，用自己的敘事套路「加冕」。面對社交網絡、個性化浪潮的沖刷消解，控制力難免下降的體制已在改變打法，「舉國體制」仍在舉一國之力控制着中國最優秀的運動員走上奧運賽場的獨木橋，但運動員們過橋走路的姿態，越來越不整齊劃一，篩選淘汰的關卡，也不得不側耳聽聽民眾對這些「異態」是歡呼還是倒彩。// Source: The Initium, 10 August 2016.

Earlier in May, Brenda Goh from Reuters reported that the Chinese society is undergoing changes and fewer parents are willing to send their child to sports schools where talented athletes are selected for the Olympics Games ultimately. The state authority related to sports also makes changes to the policy, implying less emphasis on gold medal attainment but more on mass sport education with happiness.

• //China’s sports system has been enormously successful since the country returned to the Olympic fold in 1980, culminating with the host nation topping the medals’ table at the 2008 Beijing Olympics with only a slight dip into second place behind the United States in London four years later. And yet, with the Rio de Janeiro Games less than three months away, the system is beginning to break down due to the shifting demographics of a more prosperous nation. It poses a big challenge to the school’s party committee secretary, Huang Qin, whose institution is one of 2,183 around the country producing 95 percent of the country’s Olympians. Fewer parents are willing to let their children endure gruelling training routines from as young as six years of age, leading to a fall in student numbers. Some schools have closed and others are adjusting the way they work. The number of sport schools is down from 3,687 in 1990, government numbers show. […] Debates about the continued relevance of the sports school system began to emerge around the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Huang and other schools said, as emerging tales of difficulties facing retired athletes jarred against rising expectations of education standards among China’s booming middle-class. The country’s declining birth rate as a result of China’s one-child policy has not helped either, along with its cut-throat education system, which sees Chinese students spend twice as much time on homework a day compared to the global average. Beijing responded to these concerns in 2010 by issuing a new policy, known as document 23, ordering sport schools to improve teaching standards and to give more support to retired athletes. […] Now, more than half of the school’s 700 athletes study at other schools. Of its remaining 300 or so full-time students, about 10 percent live off-campus. Other schools like the Shanghai Yangpu Youth Amateur Athletic School, are going into kindergartens to advertise gymnastics as an after-school play time activity to parents. « We call it happy gymnastics, » said principal Zhu Zengxiang.// Source: Reuters, 16 May 2016.

 2. Statistics shows the extent of smart phone usage in China

• //There are almost as many mobile accounts as people in the world’s most populous country. The mainland had 1.3 billion mobile users by the end of last year and nearly 30 per cent of them – a swathe of humanity larger than the whole population of the United States – were connected to the 4G network, according to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. […] Nearly everyone who accesses the internet – a staggering 92.5 per cent – does so via their mobile, official Chinese bodies say. They are hedged in by the “Great Firewall” – strict regulations that block politically sensitive content and foreign sites such as Facebook, Google and Twitter. […] These days, mainland users can send their grandmother a virtual red envelope of money, order a box of live scorpions or summon a beautician to the door for an in-house manicure, all without even leaving the interface of a single app, such as the monstrously popular WeChat. The huge population of mobile users, which boomed as a result of a burgeoning middle class, represents one of the world’s most important markets for companies such as Apple. The Californian giant’s profits slumped last quarter due in large part to slowing sales in China – including Hong Kong and Taiwan – where revenues dropped 33 per cent in the face of increasing competition from home-grown brands such as Oppo, Huawei and Xiaomi.// Source: SCMP, 12 August 2016.

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CHINA – POLITICS

Local discussion on the independence of Hong Kong in public area and schools

a. Rally by the pro-independence party in Hong Kong on 05 August

• //Hong Kong independence advocates banned from next month’s Legislative Council elections vowed at a defiant rally on Friday night that they would press on with their cause and campaign for wider public support. The gathering, dubbed the “first pro-independence rally in Hong Kong”, went peacefully at Tamar Park outside the government headquarters in Admiralty. About 2,500 people, mostly the young and some middle-aged, took part, monitored by about 500 police officers on the ground with another 500 on stand-by at police stations. Five of the six disqualified pro-independence candidates attended the rally. Taking centre stage from among them was high-profile Hong Kong Indigenous member Edward Leung Tin-kei. Referring to the stage backdrop reading “Hong Kong Independence” in Chinese characters, Leung said: “This is the first time that these four characters … have appeared in Tamar Park and so many Hongkongers came out. This is a historic moment.” He said he could not utter those words himself because he would launch a legal challenge against his disqualification. The University of Hong Kong philosophy student called on the crowd to continue the cause, speaking of “revolution”. […] “You might associate it with bloodshed, jail or suppression … But revolution is a change from the bottom up. Would you ask Beijing and the Hong Kong government to change from top down and give us democracy? ­Impossible.” The independence movement would take time to win hearts and minds, Leung said, citing the 1911 Chinese Revolution which took 16 years to materialise. Leung noted that a recent public opinion poll found 17 per cent supported their cause. “We need to win more support and one day we will be the mainstream,” he said. […] A woman attending the rally said she hoped Hong Kong could become independent so there would be no more Chinese Communist Party interference” in the city affairs. She supported the use of violence to enforce change because “otherwise the Communist Party will not listen”. Also in the crowd was a public hospital nurse, who said he was motivated to attend by the disqualification of Leung. “Some candidates are deprived of the right to run and their supporters are deprived of the right to choose,” he said.// Source: SCMP, 05 August 2016.

b. Two bottom lines proposed by government officials

Law Minister (王振民) from the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong proposes two bottom lines to contain the spread of Hong Kong’s independence ideas: no advocates of Hong Kong independence shall be allowed to take political offices, and none can enter schools below university level so not to ‘poison’ the youth:

• //中聯辦法律部部長王振民表示，談論港獨本來已是涉嫌觸犯香港本地法律，亦違反《基本法》，作為一般市民討論港獨，和一個要從政的人討論港獨是不一樣，認為香港社會已是非常寬容，政府也無採取行動禁止他們。 […] 王振民表示，對待港獨有兩個底線原則：第一，一定要禁止主張港獨的人進入政權機構，要進入立法會絕對不可以，進入行政、立法、司法機關也不可；第二，不能毒害青少年，不能讓港獨進入中小學。另外，他表示，基本法的修改不能違反一國兩制方針，以及香港是中國一部分的事實，這兩方面的條文永遠不能修改。// Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, 16 August 2016.

In response to the spread of localism at secondary schools, the Education Bureau warned of de-registering teachers who advocate the ideas of Hong Kong’s independence in schools or do not discuss the issue within the framework of the Basic Law, i.e. they must guide the students to oppose the independence of Hong Kong:

• //當局表示，校園在討論相關（港獨）議題時，應以《基本法》為基礎，不應有任何政治灌輸的成分，又指相信教師都會理解《基本法》的重要性和特區政府反對「港獨」的法理基礎。[…] 教育局又表示，教師應該引領學生了解《基本法》作為特區憲制性文件的重要性，讓學生準確認識《基本法》及「一國兩制」概念，並清楚明白「港獨」不符合特區在《基本法》下的憲制及法律地位。當局指，如教師在校內鼓吹「港獨」思想，須承擔相關責任和後果，又指教師如涉及違法或失德行為，教育局會按機制檢視其註冊資格，按事件性質、裁決結果等，決定是否及如何懲處相關教師，最嚴重的包括取消或拒絕其註冊教師資格。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 14 August 2016.

On August 11, the Education Minister Eddie Ng was also reported to have met the vice-chancellors of universities in Hong Kong and suggested no discussion on or advocacy for Hong Kong independence shall be allowed in campus as it is in violation of the Basic Law:

• //據知情人士透露，吳克儉於上周四（8月11日）召見8大校長，會面時有討論院校學生涉及港獨的問題，席間更派發吳克儉於8月6日出席活動時會見傳媒的談話內容，大意指局方注意到有些港獨組織，聲稱在學校內宣傳其政治立場，以及招攬學生加入活動，強調港獨不符合基本法，任何港獨主張或活動不應在校園進行；知情人士指，吳克儉曾提出校方若在有需要時，可考慮報警處理。然而，出席的校長提出一些疑問，有校長認為，「任何港獨主張或活動不應在校園進行」的做法，可能影響學術自由，在理據及執行上均有極大困難；亦有校長質疑報警方式是否有理據、是否可行。另一名知情人士透露，有校長認為大學講求學術自由，教職員及學生要就基本法、或港獨等議題進行學術討論，校方也難以阻止；學生若在民主牆上發表意見，校方同樣難以控制。據了解，有大學校長與吳克儉開會後，隨即與校方管理層召開會議，討論如何應對，但有意見認為，執行上有困難，亦擔心引發學生不滿，暫時宜靜觀其變。教育局發言人回應指，不時與持份者包括教資會資助大學的領導層，保持聯繫、交流；8大均是獨立自主法定機構，按基本法享學術自由，局方尊重大學自主，校方可自行決定如何善用資源，進行教學及研究工作。而局方已公開及明確指，港獨主張及活動違反基本法及一國兩制方針，相信校方既有責任亦有能力照顧學生的利益，並符合公眾期望，防止有人濫用大學平台和資源推動港獨主張及活動。//Source: Hong Kong Economic Times, 15 August 2016.

c. The spread of Hong Kong’s independence ideas at schools

Student Localism, an organization established by pro-independence secondary school students, plans to initiate the set-up of localism concern groups in secondary schools to promote the idea of Hong Kong’s independence:

• //本土思潮近年在港冒起，有支持港獨的中學生成立「學生動源」組織，並計劃在各中學成立「本土關注組」，宣揚港獨。有教育界人士稱，不會阻止關注組成立，但為學生安全考慮，不同意在校內鼓勵學生參與校外的港獨活動；也有校長會代表稱，應以歷史道理說服學生打消港獨念頭。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 02 August 2016.

A survey published in the latest issue of the student magazine the Undergrad of the University of Hong Kong reveals that there is an increasing number of students who support Hong Kong’s independence with or without Beijing’s approval. The state-owned media the Global Times made criticism against the magazine:

• //[香]港大學學生會刊物《學苑》今期（8月號）公布其第三度在校內進行的「政治與抗爭」民調結果，顯示若明天舉行公投表決「香港應成為一個獨立國家」，不論北京承認與否，都有超過六成學生會投贊成票。同時認為香港應維持一國兩制的受訪學生比率，由2014年的68%，持續下跌至今年的43%；反之認為香港應獨立成國的，就由2014年的15%大幅增至41%。此外，有34%受訪者相信香港終有一天會獨立；31%受訪者更支持武裝革命追求港獨。《學苑》由2014年起連續3年進行「政治與抗爭」調查，今年的調查在今年6月31日至7月11日舉行，成功邀得385名港大學生登入內聯網填寫網上問卷。對於如果明天舉行公投表決「香港應成為一個獨立國家」，而結果會被北京承認，表示會贊成的受訪者，由2014年的42%躍升至65%，反對的就由41%下跌至29%；但若結果不會被北京承認，表示會贊成的受訪者亦由前年的37%升至61%，反對者則由43%跌至31%。受訪者當中，自認是泛民主派的受訪者，由2014年的61%，下降至今年的25%；唯當年未有「本土派」選項，但今年自認為本土派的受訪者，就有48%。在抗爭手法方面，認為需要恪守「和平理性非暴力」原則的受訪者，由前年的76%，持續下跌至41%；認為不需要的就由前年的21%升至48%。// Source: The Stand News, 10 August 2016.
• //实际上，这份所谓的民调只是在香港大学内联网上进行，仅有385人参加，根本不具代表性。香港教育政策关注社主席张民炳批评，此类调查形同儿戏，一些别有用心的人网上自行填报，调查结果没有人会理睬。香港立法会议员候选人蔡若莲也质疑，“港大有逾万名学生，只有三百多人网上填问卷，在没有交代清楚如何取样、选项的情况下，只有极少数人支持‘港独’，是否有代表性呢？”她表示，《学苑》这种散播歪理的做法极不负责任，“类似的情况长此下去，只会为香港添乱局”。香港教联会副主席胡少伟表示，《学苑》选在暑假期间做这种所谓的调查，纯为配合立法会选举和“港独”议题。“这些人好有心机，一心只想自己赢，就要香港社会陪葬，这是香港人的悲哀”。// Source: Global Times, 12 August 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Controversies over the leadership in judicial reform in Taiwan

Tsai Ing-wen promised to undertake judicial reform after she swore to power. Social controversies arise over her nomination of Hsieh Wen-ting (謝文定) and Lin Jin-fang (林錦芳) for the heads of Judicial Yuan for the judicial reform in July. In light of the criticisms, Tsai withdrew her nominations of the two nominees recently. Tsai also established the Presidential Office Judicial Reform National Meeting Preparation Committee (總統府司法改革國是會議籌備委員會) in order to advise her on the matters of judicial reform in July. Recently Tsai announced she would act as the convenor of the Committee, citing public huge concern for judicial reform as the reason. Her move has caused controversies.

• //蔡英文總統同意撤回司法院正副院長提名咨文，被解讀為推動司法改革的一大挫折。但總統府高層昨天透露，蔡總統將擔任「總統府司法改革國是會議籌備委員會」召集人，親自領導司法改革，並邀請具公信力的民間意見領袖擔任副召集人，最快九月底、十月初就展開相關工作。 […]至於總統親任召集人，有無干預司法問題？府方高層強調，「這不是政治干預司法，因為總統關心的是整個制度面的改革」，「總統的出發點是協助改革，讓改革順暢」。// Source: United Daily News, 16 August 2016.

Taiwan-based Storm Media’s editorial argued that it may not be appropriate for Tsai to become the convenor of the judicial reform meeting as it runs the risk of political intervention by the President into judicial reform:

• //司法改革，自前總統李登輝執政伊始就是重中之重的改革議題，很奇特的是，法界或學界對司法改革有期待有訴求者，似乎對「總統主導司法改革」始終有著特殊的期待，然而，這樣的期待合乎實際嗎？一九九四年李登輝任命施啟揚擔任司法院長，要施「拿出勇氣推動司法改革」，擺在今日看，施啟揚大概就屬「為威權政體服務」（雖然他不是司法官），想當然耳，無法得到民間司改團體的認同。果不其然，施啟揚就任當天就召開司法改革委員會籌備會議，三十三名委員中以法官佔多數，其中涵括學者律師檢察官等，經過一年多討論，對司法院定位做出改革方案，一九九七年施啟揚率同民間司改團體晉見李登輝，李登輝當下指示司法院籌備召開全國司法改革會議；一九九八年民間團體要求李前總統親自召開會議，不得由司法院主辦，李登輝甚至也點頭應允主持，但被當時的法務部長城仲模擋下而叫停，兩周後，施啟揚請辭下台。質言之，施啟揚請辭的理由，和七月提前請辭的司法院副院長蘇永欽（院長賴浩敏同步請辭）相同，就是總統不宜主導司法改革，最好的辦法，就是讓總統任命他所信賴的司法院長，讓司法改革能避開政治的干擾。//Source: Storm Media, 16 August 2016.

Beijing-based commentator criticizes Tsai of using judicial reform to centralize power:

• //就在这么短的时间内，蔡英文举着“转型正义”的大旗，对“司法改革”接连出手，《今日海峡》连线专家中国社科院研究员王晓鹏就分析其目主要有两层：一、 蔡英文依仗着民进党团在台立法机构已经取得绝对多数，就试图加大行政干涉司法的力度，逐步把相当一部分司法权力甚至未来立法的权力囊获到自己的辖下。接下 来如果她要推出一些不确定性政策的话，就大大减少阻力，也就为台湾未来的政策走向，特别是两岸的政策走向带来不确定性。二、蔡英文仍然在炒作民粹主义，炒作方向主要是依赖于民进党团在相关机构之内占据的绝对多数，形成对在野党团优势之后，她想去抬拉自己党团的民意，形成更大的支持率，无非就是靠再度炒作两岸议题，所以她必须得到所谓的司法权，为接下去炒作这些议题扫清司法和立法的障碍。// Source: The Paper, 17 August 2016.

Analysts have different interpretations of Tsai’s setbacks and controversies in judicial reform:

• //The latest opinion poll released by the private Taiwan Indicators Survey Research on Monday showed that 49.2 per cent of the public found Tsai trustworthy and that 45.5 per cent were satisfied with her performance, a drop of 6.6 and 4.7 percentage points respectively compared to a similar survey in July. It was the first time Tsai’s trustworthiness or approval rating fell to below 50 per cent. “Tsai will soon have been in office for 100 days and many opinion poll results, including two conducted by pro-green institutions, have shown her approval rating falling,” said Lo Chih-chiang, a former presidential spokesman under ex-president Ma Ying-jeou. While the poll results were generally blamed on Tsai’s poor crisis management of cross-strait, diplomatic and domestic issues, the results from the pro-green institutions pointed to dissatisfaction with her failed judicial nominations, Lo added. He said this showed that Tsai was losing control of the green camp, which could continue to challenge her policies, including her strategy of maintaining the cross-strait status quo. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu, however, said withdrawing the nominations would not hurt Tsai’s image or weaken her authority. Professor Chen Fang-ming of the graduate institute of Taiwan literature at National Chengchi University said withdrawing the nominations showed that Tsai was willing to heed public voices.// Source: SCMP, 15 August 2016.

The criticisms mounted against Hsieh Wen-ting and Lin Jin-fang led to their withdrawal from the nomination for posts in the Judicial Yuan:

• //Tsai announced on Sunday that she was withdrawing her nominations of Hsieh Wen-ting and Lin Jin-fang for president and vice-president of the Judicial Yuan due to “unfair accusations levelled against the two”. Hsieh, who heads the Public Functionary Disciplinary Sanction Commission, and Lin, the secretary general of the Judicial Yuan, have come under fire from the green camp since Tsai nominated the two in July. Civic groups and members of the legal community, especially those identified with the green camp, allege that Hsieh, a veteran judicial official who served during the martial-law era of the 1970s, colluded with the then-authoritarian KMT government in silencing dissent. They also criticised Lin, describing her as highly conservative and alleging that she had plagiarised other people’s work. On Sunday, both Hsieh and Lin said they did not want the posts because of the accusations, prompting Tsai to withdraw the nominations.// Source: SCMP, 15 August 2016.

• //司法院正副院長被提名人謝文定、林錦芳下午分別發出聲明，表示退出提名。謝文定的聲明稿指出，當初總統徵詢他的時候，他對自己半生從事司法工作的情感和使命而接受，希望能跟司法同仁一起推動改革；不過經提名後外界質疑他擔任檢察官時曾是威權體制的打手，他除了在聲明稿中將一併解釋，日前也曾多次像總統表明另尋其他適合人選，今天獲總統同意，也希望各界將關注的焦點回歸司改實質議題的討論，讓司改工作順利推動。林錦芳表示，她從被提名以來，一直受到外界指摘，各項指控與事實全然不符，破壞她一生司法名譽；她任何職位都可以放棄，但名譽和尊嚴必須捍衛，經多方思考並和謝文定商討後，決定請辭，今日下午2點到總統府向總統表明心意，已獲總統首肯，也希望各界將焦點回歸司改議題。// Source: United Daily News, 14 August 2016.

Background of the Preparation Committee:

• //總統府發言人黃重諺說，籌委會主要任務是籌辦司法改革國是會議，提供總統司法改革政策相關諮詢事項。黃重諺表示，總統府今天正式發布「總統府司法改革國是會議籌備委員會設置要點」，這是總統蔡英文推動司法改革的重要起點。他說，繼上午總統提名新任司法院正副院長人選，並咨請立法院同意後，今天公佈的「總統府司法改革國是會議籌備委員會設置要點」，是總統為了落實全民參與司法改革，籌備辦理司法改革國是會議，特別設置司法改革國是會議籌備委員會。黃重諺指出，籌備委員會的設置，最主要在落實「司法是人民的司法」的精神，因此要點明定籌備委員會委員法律專業人士不得多於1/2，藉此讓其他領域長期關注司法改革的民間團體、弱勢代表及學者專家可以有更多的參與，藉由籌備委員會此一平台，讓龐大社會力加入，共同來參與司法改革的工作。他表示，除了司法院、法務部等政府部門外，未來司改的過程更需要民間部門的共同參與。// Source: United Daily News, 11 July 2016.