Keywords: anti-corruption campaign, Panama Paper, Internet censorship, economic slowdown, control over vaccine distribution, Hong Kong independence, deportation of Taiwanese to Mainland China.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Anti-corruption campaign

A number of provincial-level officials have been arrested by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection since April. Others include the city mayor of Jinan Yang Luyu (杨鲁豫), Secretary for Political Legal Affairs Committee of Liaoning Province Su Hongzhang (苏宏章), vice-provincial governor of Sichuan Province Qin Yuhai (秦玉海), and another Political Legal Affairs Committee of Hebei Province Zhang Yue (张越).

• //2016年第二季度打虎形势高开，继本月初一连拿下了山东济南原市长杨鲁豫、辽宁原政法委书记苏宏章、四川原副省长李成云之后，河北省委常委、政法委书记张越在上周被查。杨鲁豫和苏宏章因涉嫌严重违纪被免职。早前已落马的河南省人大常委会原副主任秦玉海、黑龙江大庆市委原书记韩学键、新疆维吾尔自治区人大常委会原副主任栗智，均在上周因涉嫌受贿，被提起公诉。// Source: Caixin, 18 April 2016.

The former head of Political and Legal Affairs Committee Zhang Yue (张越) was investigated by the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. It is reported that his case is related to Guo Wengui (郭文贵), a property tycoon in Beijing, for details of the background of Guo Wengui, please see Caixin’s article here.

• //A senior Communist Party official in Hebei Province who has been linked to a controversial businessman and a disgraced former vice minister of state security is being investigated for « serious violations of party discipline, » a term usually taken to mean corruption.The party’s top graft buster, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), announced the probe into Zhang Yue, the head of the northern province’s Political and Legal Affairs Committee, on April 16. […] The investigation into Zhang, 55, is linked to his ties with Guo Wengui, a property tycoon who controls Beijing Pangu Investment Co., and Ma Jian, a former vice minister of state security, a person who has been briefed on the inquiry said. The source, who asked not to be named, told Caixin that Zhang introduced Ma, a long-time friend, to Guo around 2004. The group colluded to advance Guo’s business interests by taking advantage of Ma’s clout within the country’s domestic security apparatus and Zhang’s control of the political and legal affairs commission in Hebei, the source said. […] Zhang spent much of his career in the capital’s police force and in the Ministry of Public Security before being transferred to Hebei in October 2007 to serve as the party secretary of province’s police force. He was promoted to the head of the province’s political and legal affairs body a year later.// Source: Caixin, 16 April 2016.

2. The aftermath of Panama Paper in China

Family members of high-ranked officials are banned from running commercial business as part of Xi Jinping’s recent anti-corruption effort. For details, please see here prepared by Xinhua (in Chinese).

• //The Communist Party’s leadership is expanding a Shanghai pilot programme aimed at weeding out corruption via the families of senior officials. The programme, which defines and regulates the business activities of officials’ relatives, has been up and running in Shanghai since the middle of last year and on Monday a central task force headed by President Xi Jinping decided to expand the experiment to cover four other provincial-level regions: Guangdong, Xinjiang, Beijing and Chongqing. The expansion of the programme also comes after the Panama Papers revealed that, among other countries’ prominent figures, family members of eight serving or retired Chinese leaders were involved in using offshore companies for business. The decision to expand the programme was taken at a meeting of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, chaired by Xi. State media said earlier that the Shanghai scheme was a pilot for national regulations as part of Xi’s wide-ranging anti-corruption campaign. The rules are among the most direct attempts to rein in graft among officials through the business dealings of family members. […] Reports of corruption cases that have come to light suggest that it is common for family members of senior officials to use their relationships to enrich themselves financially. […] Officials are also required to make regular reports to their superiors on the business activities of their relatives. But Shanghai’s scheme does not spell out specific punishments for violations of such terms.//Source: SCMP, 19 April 2016.

Analysis of China’s situation after the “Two Sessions” by Steve Tsang, Professor of Contemporary Chinese Studies, the University of Nottingham:

• //Xi’s self-assurance has contributed to a tendency in the West to gloss over China’s current economic challenges and assume Xi and the Communist Party have the tools to sustain high-level, albeit reduced, economic growth. At home, though, Xi fears his authority slipping, and China’s annual parliamentary-style sessions last month revealed signs of weakness and paranoia. At a time when China is in desperate need of a bold and clearly communicated strategy for economic reform, specific policy announcements coming out of the legislative meetings were far more limited than the circumstances require. The most noteworthy aspect of the two sessions was the climate of political control in which they were conducted rather than any concrete outcomes. Delegates were reportedly advised against giving interviews to overseas media and Chinese media were subject to even stricter censorship constraints. Xi’s obsession with power consolidation is overriding policymaking. More than three years after taking the helm, Xi has fallen into a cycle of attempting to strengthen his position almost for the sake of doing so, while failing to deliver solutions that can steer China through a period of deep economic uncertainty. […] The now infamous open letter calling for Xi’s resignation, which was published on a news website on the day the National People’s Congress opened and was signed by “loyal Communist Party members”, attracted a robust response from the authorities. Such a strong official reaction gives credence to the idea that the publication of the letter had the backing of members of the party’s senior ranks, which suggests that Xi has not succeeded in silencing opponents in positions of power. […] The preoccupation with power struggles and shifting blame at the top of the Chinese leadership betrays a sense of anxiety and furthers the feeling that the party is not on top of the economic and social challenges that it faces. With five of the seven members of the Politburo’s standing committee due to retire in 2017, Xi will see a compelling opportunity to consolidate his power base yet further, while his enemies will be plotting counter-attacks. The upshot is that any substantive economic and political reforms are likely to be put on hold until the dust has settled on the Politburo reshuffle. Can the Chinese economy wait?// Source: SCMP, 07 April 2016.

3. Internet censorship in China listed as trade barrier by the US

United States recently added the China’s Internet censorship system to the list of trade barrier, meaning that the United States can now file a case at World Trade Organization against China for the blocking of the Internet. Commentators note that this move represents the struggle between China and the United States in defining the standard of global Internet space. Also, the restrictions on the Internet do not just hurt foreign companies who want to enter the China’s market, but also those which are based in China and would like to reach out to foreign market.

• //United States trade officials have for the first time added China’s system of Internet filters and blocks — broadly known as the Great Firewall — to an annual list of trade impediments. The entry says that over the last decade, the limits have “posed a significant burden to foreign suppliers, hurting both Internet sites themselves and users who often depend on them for business.” The move, which isn’t likely to have immediate repercussions, speaks to the American government’s growing concern over Chinese Internet regulations and could foreshadow more aggressive actions. It also underscores the opposing visions the world’s two largest economies have on how the Internet should work and be managed.// Source: New York Times, 07 April 2016.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, an assistant editor at Foreign Policy, suggests that the international Internet environment is still under construction and China and the U.S. are struggling to set their standard aboard:

• //International Internet law and governance is still in the early stages of development. While the United States has championed an open and free Internet based on principles of free expression and universal values, China has framed Internet regulations as issues of national sovereignty and national security, arguing that each country has the right to determine what should or should not be allowed to pass its virtual Internet borders. The United States has worked to promote its vision for the Internet by incorporating its emphasis on free flow of information into several major free trade initiatives. The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2011, for example, was the first to raise the issue of cross-border data transfers. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, two sweeping trade agreements which would, if approved and enacted, aim to guide trade practices for the 21st century, also include provisions which discourage or prohibit restrictions on cross-border data transfers. If, in the long term, USTR were to take further steps towards building a case that Chinese Internet restrictions constitute a trade barrier, and eventually file a WTO case against China challenging the restrictions, this could further bolster the U.S.—though even if the WTO ruled in favor of the United States, Chinese compliance seems extremely unlikely.// Source: China File Conversation, 12 April 2016.

Emily Parker, a Future Tense Fellow at the New America Foundation argues that the negative impact of the Internet censorship is on both foreign and Chinese domestic companies:

• //China’s Cyberspace Administration has already responded to USTR, saying that censorship does not violate trade commitments. “The aim of the internet security inspection system is to guarantee the security and controlability of information technology products and services, safeguard user information security, and strengthen market and user confidence, » CAC told Reuters. […] [s]ome will argue that blocking Web sites can actually protect Chinese start-ups from foreign competition. But barriers to online information can have a negative impact on Chinese companies as well. A 2014 New York Times article, for example, described how Google’s troubles in China were not only creating problems for the US company. “Chinese exporters have struggled to place Google ads that appeal to overseas buyers. Biotechnology researchers in Beijing had trouble recalibrating a costly microscope this summer because they could not locate the online instructions to do so,” the article said. A few years earlier, Baidu CEO Robin Li remarked on the costs of domestic self-censorship, suggesting that such costs gave Google a competitive advantage. “We have to spend a lot of resources to make sure our content and services abide by Chinese law, and they don’t,” Li said. China is currently in the midst of a start-up fever. It would be useful to illustrate how a less restricted Internet would bring China closer to its goal of becoming a center of innovation.// Source: China File Conversation, 12 April 2016.

CHINA – ECONOMY

1. New kind of protestors due to the financial turmoil last year

Quoting the report by the Wall Street Journal, China Digital Times reports that protestors who lost money in wealth-management products in the last year demands their money back from the government because the government and state media have created a perception that the financial market would have risen last year. The protests are soon suppressed by the authorities. For the details of the financial turmoil last year, please find the current affairs article on the China Perspectives by Anthony Li.

• //The Wall Street Journal’s Chuin-wei Yap reported this week on a wave of protests by frustrated investors, some of whom have reportedly been intimidated, beaten, or detained. According to the Journal, some 1.6 million investors lost a total of at least $24.3 billion to collapsing wealth-management products over the past year. Many say they invested because of the perceived endorsement of government officials and state media, and are now demanding reimbursement from authorities. Yap reports that “police and public-security officials have told some journalists not to report on the collapsed lenders.” A series of leaked media directives published by CDT further illustrates efforts to manage discontent. Trying to steer a course between inciting panic and stoking further exuberance in June, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Film, Radio and Television told broadcasters not to “join the chorus of the bull or bear market.// Source: China’s Digital Times, 14 April 2016.

2. The cost of manufacturing slowdown

As China’s leaders announced plans to re-structure the economy, some industries with overcapacity will face downsizing and layoff of workers. Now more and more workers have their wages cut. Scholars point out that those unemployed can no longer go back to their rural homelands for work due to rapid urbanization. While the government is eager to organize job agencies to re-channel human resources to where work force is needed, the job-quality is not satisfactory according to scholars in this field.

• //In February, the Chinese government announced that it will cut 1.8 million jobs from its steel and coal sectors, one of the first major steps in Beijing’s plan to transform its industry-heavy economy into a more service-oriented one. The statement has fostered bleak outlooks among those who may find themselves out of work due to this restructuring, including Yang and his factory workers. […] The manufacturing industry population comprises approximately 1.5 percent of China’s 800 million-strong urban workforce , which between 2013 and 2014 grew by 13.2 million. In previous economic contractions, such as the financial crisis between 1997 and 2005, manufacturing employment in state-owned companies dropped from 70 million to 37 million workers. Back then, the newly unemployed often returned to their rural homelands, where they could rely on family support and networks, or work in the fields to earn a living. Ho-Fung Hung, an associate professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University, said returning to one’s provincial origin for agrarian work is no longer a viable option, as the farmable land in workers’ provincial origins is being eroded due to urbanization across China. “Rural farmland for decades has been a kind of buffer of any economic downturn in the city,” said Hung in a telephone interview. “When this buffer is gone and China has a soft or hard landing – whatever kind of landing – it will be less buffered, and it will create a rise in conflict in the cities.” With China planning to layoff millions of workers in the coming years, policymakers have been fretting over how they can minimize the impact of large-scale job losses. Yin Weimin, China’s minister for human resources and social security, said at a news conference this past February that the government has budgeted 100 billion yuan ($15.3 billion), which it will use over the next two years to help laid-off workers from the steel and coal sectors find new jobs.“The government is very concerned about the higher rates of unemployment, given the increasing number college degrees and the natural growth of the population and so on,” said Jenny Chan, an associate professor of sociology at Oxford University, in a Skype interview. “There has been a strong push by the government itself to run job agencies or the human resources firms to absorb parts of the unemployed labor force, and then rechannel them to somewhere their labor power is needed. This is, most of the time, what we would say is unstable and quite poor job-quality.” […] Even though government-ordered layoffs have yet to come into effect, many are already feeling the pain of China’s economic shift away from the manufacturing sector.// Source: The Diplomat, 14 April 2016.

3. Shenzhen’s land reclamation plan recently revealed

Shenzhen’s Party Secretary Ma Xingrui (马兴瑞) recently announced his plan to make land reclamation of 55km² in order to solve the shortage of land for housing in Shenzhen. Proponents argue that it can turn Shenzhen into the City of the Sea (海上城市). Opponents raise concerns about the impact of the land reclamation on the environment and argue that the land reclamation project is just another show of political performance.

• //3月2日，為了進一步解決房價問題，深圳市委書記在接受當地電台訪問時表示深圳將填海55平方公里，一時嘩然。55平方公里，相當於一個半澳門的大小。過去深圳發展的30年間，總共填海面積100平方公里；以香港100年的填海歷史計，總共填海面積也不過是76平方公里。[…] 深圳與香港一河之隔，共享四片海域，從西至東因此是：前海灣、深圳灣、大鵬灣和大亞灣。「深圳像一把梳子，在過去三十年的發展中卻是向內陸發展，現在可以轉個面，向海洋發展。」這是深圳政協委員、北京大學城市規劃學院副院長陳可石在過去兩年間不斷向深圳市各級政府遊說的主要理念──讓深圳成為「海上城市」。而實現這個理念的前提，陳可石認為，就是大面積填海。2015年11月及2016年2月，深圳市國土規劃委員會（簡稱規土委）兩度貼出公告：深圳將在珠江口開啟四項填海工程，其中包括寶安綜合港區、機場跑道三的擴建、倉儲工程等，共計15平方公里。填海還將淹沒一塊受保護的生態濕地。這四項工程引發了環保組織、傳媒及不少專業人士的擔憂和反對，「但政績工程是政府填海最大的衝動。」一位不願具名的深圳規土委規劃師說。[…] 在位於蛇口的辦公室接受端傳媒訪問時，陳可石指了指腳下的土地說，70年代，蛇口就是填海而成，主要是工業基地，從路名就能窺見這裏的歷史痕跡，蛇口的馬路都是以「工業」命名，「工業一路」「工業二路」等。但現在蛇口從工業園區轉變為高檔住宅區，緊鄰深圳灣，四處都有豪華樓盤在開工建設，「原來是蛇口工業區，沒有濱海概念，現在是海景房，比沒有海景的房子貴一倍。」陳可石認為，深圳有200多公里的海岸線，就應該成為深圳生活工作的主要空間。「深圳想要吸引人才，海景房才能吸引人才。」// Source: The Initium, 18 April 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

Strengthening control over second-type vaccines to be consistent with current control over first-type vaccines

The State Council made a new ruling to strengthen control over the second-type vaccine and the practice for second-type vaccine will be the same as the first-type one from now on where provincial-level authority centralizes the purchase of vaccines and distribute them through the disease-control institutions. Formerly the second-type vaccine can also be purchased directly from vaccine manufacturers or vaccine wholesale enterprises, which may provide loopholes for individuals’ exploitation if the government can only offer insufficient oversight. For one thing, since the second-type vaccination is not mandatory by the government but self-financed, disease-control clinic staff has incentive to make huge profit from its sale. Second, for their own business records, some staff from vaccine manufacturing companies or wholesale enterprises may sell the vaccines to those who lack the expertise to handle them, thus resulting in problematic vaccines circulated in the market.

• //据了解，目前国务院批准成立的部门联合调查组，已基本完成了第一阶段针对山东非法经营疫苗案的调查处理工作，目前各地已立案刑事案件192起，刑事拘留202人。会议指出，此次疫苗系列案件涉及面广，性质恶劣，暴露出疫苗质量监管和使用管理不到位、对非法经营行为发现和查处不及时、一些干部不作为、监管和风险应对机制不完善等突出问题，为标本兼治、强化制度监管，会议通过了《国务院关于修改〈疫苗流通和预防接种管理条例〉的决定》（下称《决定》）。根据会议披露的《决定》内容，今后，民众自愿自费施打的第二类疫苗，将和国家强制计划接种的第一类疫苗一样，全部纳入省级公共资源交易平台集中采购，不再允许药品批发企业经营疫苗，坚决制止通过借用资质和票据进行非法经营的“挂靠走票”等行为。国家卫计委官方网站则进一步透露，未来省级疾病预防控制机构组织集中采购二类疫苗后，由县级疾控机构向疫苗生产企业采购后供应给辖区内接种单位。接种单位不得直接向疫苗生产企业购买第二类疫苗。[…] 财新记者了解到，迄今为止中国发生的诸多涉及问题疫苗的事件，在一定程度上，均和政府监管不到位有关。[…]过去，在流通途径方面，一类疫苗和二类疫苗并不相同。按照国家规定，一类疫苗由各省疾控机构，统一公开招标采购，经疾控系统内部层层下发，最终到达各接种单位，而二类疫苗除通过疾控系统层层下发外，疾控机构、接种单位也可从疫苗生产企业、疫苗批发企业处直接购进。相较而言，一类疫苗的流通呈闭环状态，而二类疫苗的流通环节，涉及诸多疫苗生产、批发、流通和销售企业，若监管不到位，易出现漏洞。山东非法经营疫苗案曝光后，有业界人士对财新记者分析称，该案犯罪嫌疑人庞氏母女，之所以能长期非法购进、销售存在变质、过期风险的疫苗，便与二类疫苗流通体系的漏洞，以及疫苗追溯制度执行不到位有关。一方面，因二次疫苗由居民自费接种，二类疫苗的收入在很大程度上影响着疾控中心及其人员的收入。为此，地方疾控机构在调拨二类疫苗的过程中层层加价，以获取利润，疫苗最终到消费者手中的价格与实际购进价存在极大的差距。[…] 另一方面，疫苗销售人员为完成业绩，当有卖不出去的疫苗时，他们就可能会想办法卖给不具备经营资质的个人或团伙。而部分疾控机构及其人员，可能会利用手中职权，从非法商贩手中购买“问题疫苗”，只看价格不看质量，低价购进，高价卖出。//Source: Caixin, 13 April 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Debating the legality of the agenda of independence for Hong Kong

Wang Zhenmin (王振民), the new legal chief at Beijing’s liaison office in Hong Kong as well as a member of the Basic Law Committee under the NPCSC, argues that the advocacy for independence is in breach of local law:

• //Wang Zhenmin, also a member of the Basic Law Committee, said those floating the idea of independence were not only in breach of the city’s mini-constitution, but also the Crimes Ordinance and Societies Ordinance. There has been some concern among officials and pro-establishment figures over the formation of the Hong Kong National Party last month. At the same time, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, a core student leader of the Occupy protests in 2014, has vowed to organise a referendum to decide Hong Kong’s future after 2047, with one option being self-determination when the 50 years of autonomy promised by Beijing expire. Speaking to the media after attending a Chinese University forum on legal education, Wang expressed concern about the political discourse and talk of independence.“If a few of you have a chat about it during a meal, you can say this is your freedom,” he said. ”But if it’s a large-scale discussion in the hope of gathering a large number of like-minded people to act together, this is ‘sedition’ under the Crimes Ordinance.”// Source: SCMP, 08 April 2016.

Deputy Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in Hong Kong Hu Jianzhong (胡建中) also expressed strong words against the call for independence:

• //[t]he Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in the city, deputy commissioner Hu Jianzhong also cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, saying there were clauses that placed restrictions on freedom of speech on grounds of national security. […] In his speech, Hu hit out at “a few radical groups” that he said had stirred up trouble by advocating self-determination and the nullification of the Basic Law, in an oblique reference to the Hong Kong National Party and Demosisto, two parties formed in recent weeks.“They even tried to form a group to enter politics and contend in Legco elections,” he said. “Such acts are undoubtedly against the Basic Law.” Instigating hatred towards the central government as well as anti-state speeches and publicity, he said, should be defined as treason and sedition under the Crimes Ordinance. There were also laws restricting the registration of social groups and companies and their acts of protest if they advocated independence, Hu said.// Source: SCMP, 17 April 2016.

The Hong Kong’s Chief Executive C. Y. Leung claims that there is no need to discuss independence as the government has already put Hong Kong people’s interest as priority:

• //There is no need to talk about Hong Kong independence, as the government has put Hong Kong people’s interests as its priority, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying has said. Leung was speaking a week after the formation of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, which was slammed by China’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office as a threat to national security. China Liaison Office director Zhang Xiaoming and Chief Secretary Carrie Lam also voiced criticism.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 05 April 2016.

Mr. Benny Tai (戴耀廷) argues that whether the advocacy of “self-determination” and “independence” is breaching the law (Crimes Ordinance) is subject to legal debate since the court in Hong Kong needs to balance the protection of “freedom of expression” and the offence of sedition, and in the common law system the immediate effect of the seditious expression must be substantial and violence which damages other person’s body or property must happen in order to constitute the ‘seditious intention’:

• //香港法例第200章《刑事罪行條例》第9條及第10條禁止一些有「煽動意圖」的言論。按第10 條，「發表煽動文字」和「輸入、刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物」都構成罪行。第一次定罪可處罰款$5000及監禁2年，其後定罪可處監禁3年。連管有煽動刊物也是犯法的。[…] 但即使言論涉及「離叛」，普通法對什麼才構成「煽動意圖」，還有額外的要求。除非能證明一個人在發表言論時，是意圖煽動別人「即時」以「暴力的行為傷害其他人的身體或破壞財物」，或「製造騷亂」去達成「港獨」的目的，他才有可能觸犯第10條的罪行。只是討論「港獨」、表示相信及支持「港獨」、說服其他人去認同「港獨」、提出實現「港獨」的具體方法及行動，甚至鼓動人去參與實現「港獨」的行動，只要所建議的行動本身是合法或不涉及暴力，都很大可能不算是違反了第10條這一部分。再者，第9條及第10條還得符合《人權法》保障言論自由的憲制要求。《人權法》要求所有限制言論自由的法律條文須是清晰的。第9條及第10條都有一些重要部分並不夠清晰，如「煽動意圖」和「離叛」的意思。另外，保障國家安全雖是限制言論自由的一個合理因素，但限制言論自由的方法要是「必須」的，即所施予的限制與保障國家安全是須合乎比例的。若有人被起訴觸犯第9條及第10條，法院即使未必會把第9條及第10條完全撤銷，但按着《人權法》保障言論自由的憲制要求，起碼會把「叛離」以最狹窄的方法來演繹，並把上述的普通法要求讀進（read in）條文中來解讀「煽動意圖」，以減低它們對言論自由的限制來符合《人權法》的要求。// Source: The Initium, 18 April 2016.

Another member of the Basic Law Committee, Albert Chen Hung Yee (陳弘毅), points out that the call for independence in Hong Kong will cross the bottom line of the Beijing Government:

• //[a]t a separate forum on “one country, two systems” at the University of Hong Kong, legal scholar Professor Albert Chen Hung-yee warned that if calls for independence continued to grow, the only outcome would be the mainland fully taking over the city’s governance. Professor Chen, also a member of the influential Basic Law Committee, said the city’s current constitutional arrangement with the mainland was in the best interest of all Hongkongers.“Calls for independence are beyond the bottom line of the central government,” he said.// Source: SCMP, 14 April 2016.

SCMP Editorial condemns those who advocate independence or self-determination:

• //It should be noted that pro-independence remains the minority view in society. It may well be an election slogan rather than a real campaign. That said, the debate on independence and self-determination may intensify when more of these groups are elected into the political structure. Beijing and the Hong Kong government are understandably worried, especially when the notions appear to have an appeal to younger people. […] That Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China and enjoys a high degree of autonomy is spelled out clearly in the Basic Law. Any discussion of the future development must not deviate from that basis lest the city’s interests will be undermined.// Source: SCMP, 16 April 2016.

2. Mingpao’s senior editor suddenly fired

On 20 April 2016, a veteran editor at Hong Kong Newspaper Mingpao Keung Kwok-yuen (姜國元) is suddenly fired by the management of Mingpao. The editor-in-chief Chong Tien Siong (鍾天祥) who have served a number of media outlets in Southeast Asia, including the Nanyang Business Daily as Editor-in-chief, explained to the media staff that the firing of Keung is part of a budget-cut plan for the media incorporation which is said facing financial difficulties lately.

• //A top editor of a major Hong Kong newspaper was abruptly fired on Wednesday, triggering anger among its staff members and deepening concern about press freedom in the city. Management at Chinese-language Ming Pao insisted that staff members including executive chief editor Keung Kwok-yuen were dismissed to cut costs, but the paper’s staff union questioned whether the move was meant to punish “dissidents of editorial decisions” like Keung. The news came a month after the Journalists Association’s latest survey showed the perception of press freedom in Hong Kong had deteriorated for a second straight year. […] It also came as local media companies struggled to survive. Earlier this month, Sing Tao News Corporation announced a pay cut of up to 20 per cent for its senior news executives. A Ming Pao Staff Association spokesperson said Keung was fired by his boss, chief editor Chong Tien Siong, early Wednesday with immediate effect. […] In a joint statement, the Journalists Association and six industry unions said Keung played a leading role in covering politically sensitive issues such as the July 1 protest march in 2003 that drew half a million participants as well as the city-wide campaign against a national education curriculum in 2012. “We express our utmost regret that a veteran and objective journalist like Keung … was no longer [welcome] at Ming Pao,” the statement read.// Source: SCMP, 20 April 2016.

• //《明報》管理層以「報業經營環境困難」為由，今日凌晨突然解僱執行總編輯姜國元（筆名安裕），編輯部過百名員工要求與總編輯鍾天祥對話，鍾天祥於下午4時半向員工交代事件，指香港報業進入寒冬，公司需節流，解僱姜國元是其中一個配套。被問及為何不是鍾離開而是姜離開，鍾回應稱：「如你是老闆，我聽你的，可惜你不是。」鍾天祥指香港報業進入寒冬，很多報紙面對極大挑戰，《明報》亦走上同一道路。他指公司需節流，目標8%，而解僱姜國元是其中一個配套。員工多次追問，是否由鍾天祥決定解僱姜國元？鍾沒正面回應，重申裁員的三個準則：第一是裁減表現不好的員工；第二是新來員工先走，但非每一個新來的都要他們非走不可；第三是薪水最高的員工。他表示：「拿最高薪水的人，編輯部裏頭就兩個，一個我，一個就是我的最得力的助手：姜國元先生。」// Source: MingPao Daily, 20 April 2016.

3. New Political Party in the making

A new political party Xianggang liezhen (香港列陣, literally Hong Kong’s show of force) is to be formed by former political activists such as the students who led the Umbrella Movement Alex Chou (周永康) and Lester Shum (岑敖暉), together with other university lecturer and professor. They aim to join the Legislative Council Election in September.

• //多個本土派組織雄心壯志備戰立法會選舉，派出政治素人冀在議會建立新勢力，但組織之間未有好好協調，9月立法會選舉時隨時「攬炒」。繼青年新政等「傘兵」組成選舉聯盟、前學民思潮及學聯成員籌組政黨「香港眾志」之後，前學聯秘書長周永康（Alex）及副秘書長岑敖暉（Lester）亦會另起爐灶成立新組織「香港列陣」。「香港列陣」包括多名社運組織成員，除了周永康及岑敖暉二人外，亦有人稱「小麗老師」，不時落區舉辦「小麗民主教室」的香港專上學院講師劉小麗，以及土地正義聯盟執委朱凱迪及中大教授姚松炎。據知，新組織目前仍在籌備當中，估計要到五月初才正式宣布成立。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 16 April 2016.

A Member of the Democratic Party, Au Lok Hin, argues that a sharp increase in the number of non-establishment political groups which will join the Legislative Council Election this year could result in a total defeat of the non-establishment camp because some groups from the non-establishment camp are targeting at each other and most of the groups in this camp lack the needed coordination capacity to maximize their gain in the Legco seats. All these will just add advantages to the establishment camp as argued by Au.

• //近日非建制派陣營相繼湧現不同新政團，劍指今年九月立法會選舉。細讀各政團的參選宣言，不外乎認為雨傘運動過後，應該為政壇帶來新改變。部分民主派政黨更加進取，本來只有個別地區擁有議席，又想染指其他選區，擴充版圖。然而，立法會的遊戲規則不是鬥參選人數，而是考驗配票得宜，讓政治勢力按比例當選。筆者認為，這種過分積極參選的發展，或許可圓個別志士就義之夢，換來的更可能是民主陣營選舉覆沒。[…] 現階段有意參選的大多非玩票性質，位位也有一定叫座力，如此，除了以「攬炒」（玉石俱焚）形容，實在想像不到還有什麼可能發生。一些政黨意圖多派新人到未開發選區試票，或意在虛晃一招，但會否因分散選舉機器而減低現任議員勝算，只有他們才知道。筆者亦同情地理解，很多新興政治勢力，參選就是路線之戰，革走傳統民主力量是實際的潛藏目標，哪有協調可言？何況現實是，民主陣營根本沒有妥善分配選票的能力，妥善分配選票從來靠選民的聰明智慧。附表可見，除了新界東和區議會（二），基本上都由建制派囊括末席，這和他們統一戰線下合組的選舉機器，不無關係。正如九龍東的建制派，可以白天為工聯會拉票，晚上得知謝偉俊勢危，便可一換助選衣服，易幟助選。建制派也會清晰劃分各政團的「責任區」，統計親中社團動員能力，細緻地劃分選票分布，這點反對陣營是決計沒可能發生的。// Source: The Initium, 20 April 2016.

Another new political party, Xinjie Jinbu lian meng dang (新界進步聯盟黨, literally New Territories Progressive Alliance Party) from the pro-establishment camp, also announced its formation this month. Although this party is intended to serve the indigenous inhabitants in the New Territories, it faces strong opposition from many of the indigenous inhabitants as well as the Central Government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong which is supposed to help coordinate elections at various levels to the advantages of the pro-establishment camp in Hong Kong.

• //上水鄉事委員會主席侯志強有意成立“新界進步聯盟黨”，並派人參加9月的立法會選舉，但組黨計劃遭由沙田鄉委會主席莫錦貴牽頭的15個鄉委會反對。包括粉嶺、荃灣、沙田等15個鄉委會主席昨日下午舉行記者會。召集記者會的莫錦貴稱，不滿組黨聲音愈來愈大， 他說:“(組黨)不是我們看法”。新界鄉議局副主席林偉強亦有出席，他指，鄉議局十多年前已有組黨構思，亦曾組織新界聯盟競選，得知十多個鄉事委員會對組新黨感憂慮。林偉強和荃灣區議會主席鍾偉平表示，《鄉議局條例》列明鄉議局只是法定諮詢機構，不能組黨，如侯志強等人以鄉議局名議組黨，怕會違反條例。// Source: SCMP (Chinese edition), 07 April 2016.

• //消息人士向《香港01》透露，最初劉業強剛登上鄉議局主席之位，希望藉組黨一事建立威望，增加自己政治籌碼，繼而令一眾鄉事元老信服。可惜事與願違，由於鄉事組黨一事未獲中聯辦首肯，但不少支持組黨的鄉事派人士卻急不及待對外「放風」，不停宣揚其組黨大計。隨事態繼續發展，劉業強已經對侯志強、梁福元等「鄉頭」失去控制權，所以有消息指出，劉業強目前正考慮「斬纜」，放棄出任新進步聯盟的榮譽主席一職，避免讓人感覺他在鄉事組黨一事上，有決策角色。正當劉業強思索應否擔任「新進聯」榮譽主席之時，同一時間亦受到中聯辦施壓。有鄉議局中人透露，近日有中聯辦高層向劉業強表示，不滿有鄉事派另起爐灶搞新黨，認為鄉事派發展成兩大陣營，最終只會影響建制陣營在9月立法會選舉的部署及佈局，故要求劉業強「唔好搞咁多」，以免立法會選舉時節外生枝。// Source: Hong Kong 01, 19 April 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Controversy over deportation of transnational fugitives

A number of Taiwanese who are accused of phone scams are caught in Kenya and deported to China under the pressure of the Beijing Government. Taiwan, however, will send a legal delegation to Beijing to negotiate the matter with the Beijing Government in response to a Chinese invitation. While some legal scholars argue that China is acting in accordance with the international law, the Taipei Government argues that Beijing has broken a tactic agreement between the two sides to negotiate on cross-boundary crimes like this before any deportation actions. Beijing’s forced deportation of Taiwanese to Mainland China stirs up public outcry in Taiwan.

Nature of the crime committed by the Taiwanese:

• //The two were said to be among 45 Taiwanese who were recently deported to China, instead of Taiwan. Of the 45, 23 were cleared of involvement in the telecoms scam by a Kenyan court. Taiwanese authorities have accused Beijing of “abducting” its citizens. China, however, said it was holding them on suspicion of fraud and that some had already gone on trial, according to Xinhua. […] The Xinhua report cited a police officer as saying Taiwanese phone scam rings originally targeted Taiwanese, but then turned to people on the mainland after Taiwan authorities increased education on phone scams. The rings also moved their bases far away to South East Asia, Africa and far east regions in Russia, which made it harder for the authorities to enforce the law, the report added.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 15 April 2016.

• //Early this week, news broke of eight Taiwanese nationals being flown from Kenya to mainland China last Friday, reportedly due to pressure from Beijing. The eight were among 77 ethnic Chinese arrested in November 2014 for illegally entering Kenya to engage in cybercrime; all eight were also among a group of 37 acquitted on all charges by a Kenyan court last week.// Source: China Digital Times, 15 April 2016.

• //Taiwan’s representatives from South Africa had rushed to Kenya to try to stop the deportations but they were prevented by the Kenyan authorities, who worked closely with Beijing, from gaining access to the Taiwanese. Officials say the Taiwanese may have worked with Chinese nationals in a telecommunications fraud ring to cheat people in China of money. But regardless, they say, the two sides had worked out a verbal agreement not to extradite each other’s people in such cases, following a similar incident involving the Philippines extraditing Taiwanese crime suspects to China in 2011. It took nearly five months for Taiwan to negotiate their transfer back to Taiwan.// Source: BBC News, 12 April 2016.

Legal experts on the legality of the deportation:

• //“Despite the fact the crime was committed in Kenya, the victims are in mainland China. Therefore the mainland’s jurisdiction is recognised by the territorial principle in international law, in which the state can exercise its jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victims,” Xue Lei, an international law expert at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said. “It is the common handling of transnational criminal cases like this in international law.” His view was echoed by Justin Chen, vice-president of the ­Taipei-based Cross-Strait Policy Association, who said it was natural for Kenya to deport the suspects to the mainland as Nairobi, which has diplomatic ties with Beijing, considered Taiwan part of China. “Kenya and China, both of which are parties of the Palermo Convention, have the obligation to cooperate in [transnational] organised crime,” said Simon Young, a law professor at the University of Hong Kong. “On the other hand, there is no extradition agreement between Taiwan and Kenya.” Among the 45 Taiwanese, 23 had been cleared of charges of telecommunications fraud by a court in Kenya. “Just because they have been acquitted in Kenya doesn’t mean that they can walk away free from mainland Chinese law,” Xue said. The Palermo accord was adopted by the United Nations in 2000 with the aim of promoting cross-border cooperation in tackling organised crime.// Source: SCMP, 14 April 2016.

Responses from Taiwan:

President Ma Ying-jeou accused the Beijing government of violation of procedural justice by failing to contact the Taiwan side before the deportation, and the President-in-elect Tsai Ing-wen both argues that those Taiwanese should be sent back to Taiwan for trial in respect of Taiwan and the matter should be resolved through consultation.

• //在台湾居民被从肯尼亚分批遣返至大陆的消息传回岛内后，迅速在台湾形成重大社会与时政议题。台湾地区领导人马英九曾在4月11日表示，大陆方面从肯尼亚“强行带走”台湾居民又未事先通知台湾方面，“有违程序正义”。台当局已向大陆方面表达严正抗议，并将尽最大努力保护台湾居民。已当选为下一任台湾地区领导人的民进党主席蔡英文在日前通过个人Facebook页面表态称，大陆无权代表台湾方面处理涉及台湾人民的遣送事宜，更不应以强制手段将台湾人民押送至大陆。蔡英文认为，如果台湾人民涉及海外犯罪问题，“应该押解回台湾依法审判。即使涉及管辖权竞合，也要尊重台湾，透过协商解决”。蔡英文呼吁大陆，应立即与台湾方面协商，并释放遭到关押的台湾人民，让争议尽速落幕，维持两岸关系的正向发展。// Source: Caixin, 13 April 2016.

• //Taiwan says Beijing violated a tacit understanding under which both sides agreed not to interfere in the legal affairs of their citizens abroad. China’s moves on the deportations are widely seen an attempt to assert its claims to sovereignty over Taiwan and legal authority over its residents, particularly in the run-up to the inauguration of Taiwan’s independence-leaning President-elect Tsai Ing-wen next month.// Source: Associated Press, 20 April 2016.

Freelance writer, Liu Shizhong (劉世忠) argues that Beijing’s forced deportation of Taiwanese to Mainland China not only irritate Taiwan’s public, but also reinforce the already heighted awareness and identification with Taiwan.

• //北京如此的戰略思考不但只會激起台灣民意更大的反彈，深化高漲的台灣意識和認同，更是具體片面改變台海現狀的舉動。台灣朝野其實不必隨之起舞，民進黨新政府更應沉穩應對，維持既有立場，預擬邦交關係、國際空間和兩岸交流危機處理準備，同時做好對國內民眾和國際社會的溝通說明。北京破壞南海區域秩序已經被視為是「麻煩製造者」，如果在台灣的民進黨新政府沒有挑釁的情況下，還要做出破壞兩岸關係與台海現狀的舉動，將進一步承擔台海「麻煩製造者」之名。// Source: NewTalk, 20 April 2016.

• //Chen Wen-chi, director of the Department of International and Cross-Strait Legal Affairs under the Ministry of Justice, arrived in Beijing on Wednesday morning. Chen, the leader of Taiwan’s delegation, said she hoped to negotiate a joint investigation into the alleged crimes of the 45 Taiwanese suspects. Chen added that she wanted to ensure the suspects were being granted their legal rights; as of Wednesday evening, however, Taiwan’s delegation had not been granted permission to visit the suspects, according to Taiwan’s Central News Agency. Ultimately, Chen’s goal is to have the suspects brought back to Taiwan for trial. However, Taiwan’s premier, Simon Chang, warned on Wednesday that would be difficult. “We cannot be optimistic” that the suspects will be returned to Taiwan in the near future, he said. Any arrangement worked out while Chen’s delegation is in Beijing will take place under the framework of the 2009 Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement. That agreement allows (among other things) for cross-strait cooperation on criminal investigations and the repatriation of convicted criminals. It notes, however, that repatriation requests can be delayed “until after the conclusion of judicial proceedings” against suspects. Chiu Tai-san, who is set to serve as minister of justice when the new Democratic Progressive Party administration is inaugurated on May 20, has suggested that the two sides reach an agreement on how to deal specifically with cross-border fraud cases, where suspects and victims alike can be Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. “With the existing agreement in place aimed at bolstering joint crime-fighting efforts between Taiwan and China, the two sides should examine issues such as by what means and by whom different types of fraud cases should be dealt with,” CNA explained.// Source: Source: The Diplomat, 21 April 2016.

Analysts’ points for such hardline approach by the Beijing Government:

• //Analysts say China’s specific goal is to extract concessions from Taiwanese President-elect Tsai Ing-wen, who has refused to endorse Beijing’s position that Taiwan and the mainland are part of a single Chinese nation. The sides split amid civil war in 1949, and China has threatened to use force to gain control over the self-governing island. Part of Beijing’s approach is to isolate Taiwan internationally, excluding it from global institutions like the United Nations and leaving it with just 22 formal diplomatic allies. Kenya and Taiwan have never had diplomatic relations. Although Beijing eased the pressure under Taiwan’s China-friendly outgoing president, Ma Ying-jeou, indications are it’s redeploying such tactics to influence Tsai ahead of her May 20 inauguration. One of the first signs that China was hardening its attitude came last month when China established diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese ally of Gambia. In that case, Beijing said only that it was acceding after months of requests from the small African nation. As a major investor in Africa, China has used its influence with several of the continent’s governments to further its own aims. South Africa has barred the Dalai Lama, a nemesis of Beijing, while Zambia has used force to suppress anti-management protests against Chinese-run copper mines. Kenya is a particularly close ally and its government may have been more than willing to comply with Chinese demands that the Taiwanese be turned over to Beijing. Along with massive investment in Kenyan infrastructure and businesses, China has chosen the capital, Nairobi, as the African hub for state broadcaster CCTV’s African operations.// Source: Associated Press, 13 April 2016.

In a similar case, Malaysia made a different response to Beijing’s request:

• //Malaysia Friday deported 20 Taiwanese implicated in fraud back to Taiwan despite Beijing seeking to have them sent to mainland China, Taipei said, in a new bout of diplomatic sparring between the rivals. The latest incident involved a group of 52 Taiwanese, some of whom were due to be deported to Taiwan on Friday as China allegedly intervened, just days after Taipei accused Beijing of “abducting” its citizens from Kenya. According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry, the Taiwanese were detained by Malaysian police last month during five raids linked to telecom fraud, which also led to the arrests of 65 mainland Chinese and two Malaysians. Malaysian and Chinese officials did not have immediate comment on the case. Taipei this week blasted Beijing for being “rude and violent” over the deportation of 45 of its citizens from Kenya to China where they face investigation for fraud.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 16 April 2016.

• //A similar situation nearly unfolded in Malaysia, where 52 Taiwanese suspects were detained on suspicion of telecoms fraud. Beijing reportedly also pressured Malaysia to deport the suspects to the mainland, but Kuala Lumpur sent 20 of them to Taiwan instead. The other 32 are reportedly due to be sent back to Taiwan as well. Taiwanese authorities released the first 20 suspects once they arrived from Malaysia, saying there was not enough evidence to charge them. Beijing responded angrily, with a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office saying that Taiwan had “disregarded many victims’ interests and harmed them a second time.”// Source: The Diplomat, 21 April 2016.