CHINA – POLITICS

1. Anti-China protests in Vietnam

   • After a state-owned Chinese oil company (China National Offshore Oil Corp.) towed an exploration rig into the disputed waters of the South China Sea – 120 nautical miles (220 km) off central Vietnam’s coast – on May 2, an ongoing standoff between China and Vietnam began.
   • The ensuing maritime standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels sparked anti-Chinese sentiment on the Vietnamese shore, leading thousands to riot, burning and looting in industrial parks outside of Ho Chi Minh City on May 12 and 13. Xinhua reported that at least two Chinese citizens were killed and more than 100 others were injured.
   • Vietnamese authorities denounced the move by the Chinese state-owned company. They initially kept a blind eye towards the street protests, which are usually forbidden in the country. But street protests soon evolved into looting and setting fire to Chinese factories. As the unrest spiraled out of control, the government tried to rein in the protests to avoid worsening relations with China. Vietnam’s prime minister sent a text message on Friday to millions of Vietnamese encouraging them to « defend the fatherland’s sacred sovereignty » while refraining from violence. But the message did not explicitly condemn the riots.
   • Chinese media responded strongly against Vietnam’s tolerance towards the protests.
     1. Xinhua said that Vietnam was solely responsible. China Daily urged Hanoi to « shoulder full responsibility for whatever serious consequences the crimes [would] have on China-Vietnam ties ». Another Xinhua editorial said, drawing on the fact that China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner: “Vietnam’s failure to rein in deadly mob attacks against foreign nationals and investment … tarnishes Vietnam’s international image and undermines the government’s credibility”
     2. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted on Global Times, when speaking to Indonesia’s foreign affairs minister: “China’s position on safeguarding its legitimate sovereign rights and interests is firm and clear and will not change… The turmoil is the outcome of Hanoi’s years of anti-China propaganda. Without legitimate grounds and practical capability, Vietnam fabricates and hypes up its jurisdiction over the Xisha and Nansha islands [AKA the Paracel and Spratly islands]. This uncompromising stance, in an attempt to bring its people together, has actually cornered itself.”
     3. During a visit to the US, General Fang Fenghui, the Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, defended South China Sea Oil Rig. At a press conference, Fang repeated China’s official stance that the oil rig is within China’s waters and thus the activity is normal and legitimate. Fang also added some interesting details, such as that the placement of the oil rig had been “carefully selected” to minimize the chance of a dispute. According to Fang, China was surprised and dismayed at the reaction. He pointed out that other countries (referencing Vietnam) have previously drilled in the region without a similar backlash. Fang underlined China’s commitment to both its territory in general and the oil rig in particular. On territorial issues, Fang said, China “will not give an inch” and he warned that China has the means to back up its words with actions. On the oil rig, Fang promised that “we will make sure this well is successfully drilled” without interference from the outside. He said China was willing to discuss the issue with Vietnam but would not cease the drilling activity.
     4. However, as the PLA general talked tough on the dispute with Vietnam, Xi Jinping called for peace. When speaking at an event on Thursday to mark the 60th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Xi said « in Chinese blood, there is no DNA for aggression or hegemony”. SCMP reported that analysts do not see Xi and Feng’s opposite stances as conflicting. “Both Xi and Fang sought to warn Vietnam not to provoke China, as Beijing would spare no effort to maintain regional peace and stability.”

• Since the violence began, China has evacuated more than 3,000 citizens from Vietnam. Xinhua reported that five Chinese ships have traveled to Vietnam to help with the evacuation. Many other Chinese nationals living in Vietnam are fleeing for neighboring Cambodia. China’s tourism administration has posted a note to its website urging Vietnam-bound tourists to « carefully consider » their plans. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities have sent instruction to the media, saying that all reports must follow Xinhua wire copy and information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website
• While rioters were targeting Chinese factories, they also hit plants representing other countries, including those from Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. It is interesting how Taiwanese manufacturers putting stickers up which declare that they are Taiwanese, not Chinese.

2. Massive crackdown before Tiananmen 25^th anniversary

   • It is typical in China that Beijing routinely placed activists under house arrest or sent them away from the capital on “forced vacations” before Tiananmen anniversaries. But as this year marks the 25^th anniversary, the crackdown appeared particularly fierce. Activists are targeted across China including in Beijing, Sichuan, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces.
   • Most recently, rights lawyers Tang Jingling (唐荆陵) and Liu Shihui (劉士輝) are among the latest to be detained. Tang was taken from his home in the southern city of Guangzhou and said he was suspected of starting quarrels and provoking trouble, according to his wife. Liu Shihui has been detained in Shanghai.
   • In Hangzhou, two prominent activists have been detained by the police. Xu Guang, a 45-year-old pro-democracy activist, was arrested on charges of “subversion”. Xu is a student leader during the 1989 protests who holds annual hunger strikes to commemorate the Tiananmen killings. He recently used Weixin to tell friends and fellow activists about plans for a similar protest this year. Lu Gengsong (吕耿松), author of a book called History of Corruption in the Communist Party of China and pro-democracy activist who recently published an online essay attacking Beijing’s pursuit of its opponents, was also detained.
   • Following the detainment of rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, police also took away Pu’s legal aide, Qu Zhenhong (屈振红), who is also his niece, on suspicion of « illegally obtaining personal information ». Also detained was Chen Guang, a former People’s Liberation Army soldier who was deployed in 1989 near Tiananmen Square and later left the army and became a painter. He has urged authorities to allow unfettered discussion of the crackdown. Whearabouts of Xu Youyu, Liu Di, Hao Jian and others who were detained after the June Fourth seminar remained unknown.
   • Gao Yu, a veteran journalist who disappeared three weeks ago, was detained for leaking state secrets. The secret in question is believed to be “Document 9,” an internal Party memo warning against seven “false ideological trends, positions, and activities.” Xinhua reported Gao’s detention. The report said Gao was “deeply remorseful” of her actions and “willing to accept legal punishment”, ending speculation over her whereabouts two weeks after she disappeared. CCTV paraded her confession in a news broadcast, blurring out her face but identifying her by her full name. Another recent TV confession featured Xiang Nanfu, a Beijing-based reporter working for the US-based Chinese news website Boxun. Xiang was accused to have published « false stories » on the Boxun website that « seriously harmed » China’s image. He was also shown on state television admitting guilt.
   • In Guangzhou, a series of talk hosted by Sun Yat-sen University, which invited Po-Chung Chow, political philosophy professor at CUHK, as the speaker, had been cancelled. The cancellation appeared to follow a ban on all public talks on humanities and social science until the end of June. Students and NGO activists still attended the cancelled lecture, singing and reading poems to express their frustration against the cancellation. Meanwhile, Chow hosted a discussion about “freedom” on Weibo for several hours.
   • Authorities have also moved to thwart activities with no clear connection to the anniversary. The New York Times’ Didi Kirsten Tatlow reports that Beijing police broke up an unrelated meeting on Wednesday, detaining several people: “Seizing the cellphone of one of the detainees, the police then sent a text message to about 30 participants in a meeting set for later in the day and canceled it…Although the meeting was a seminar on obstacles facing gay groups wishing to register as nongovernmental organizations in China, it had also advertised itself as an event examining “civil society and the state.””
   • The detentions have drawn international notice, while Pu’s in particular has provoked a strong reaction online. Actor Zhang Ziyi, for example, posted a statement of veiled support on Weibo. Zhang recommended that her Weibo followers watch the South Korean film The Attorney, based on former president Roh Moo-hyun’s rise from tax lawyer to human rights defender. Many netizens read an allusion to Pu. Others are now reinterpreting a line from the 2011 film The Founding of a Party to show their support for Pu. To contain the response, search terms related to Pu’s case have been blocked, while censorship directives have ordered that Sina “wholeheartedly cleanse Weibo of blog posts and comment threads in support of Pu Zhiqiang,” and instructed all sites to “strictly search out and delete” related content.
   • Foreign Policy’s Alexa Olesen noted in a report on China’s ‘Die Hard’ lawyers, Pu’s detention seems to have galvanized many others, quite the opposite of the deterrent effect likely intended:
     1. Jerome Cohen, a professor of law at New York University, told Foreign Policy that the government is responding with an “increasingly repressive policy” that is trying to rein in the legal profession. Pu’s detention, Cohen said, is part of that movement. Although Pu is also considered part of the weiquan or “rights defense” school of lawyering and has represented dissidents like the activist artist Ai Weiwei, Pu straddles factions. And the repression isn’t faction-specific.
     2. Cohen said Chinese authorities are clamping down because they “want lawyers to behave like dentists.” … attorneys should be “good technicians and not involve themselves in cases of political-legal injustice.” But Cohen added that the crackdowns like that which ensnared Pu are only growing the ranks of “angry lawyers” in China, causing more to take up rights-related cases.
   • Efforts to deter or distract foreign journalists from sensitive topics are underway. Journalists reported having been warned by the Public Security to avoid « sensitive subjects » during this « sensitive time » or face consequences, and being for press briefings on all sorts of random topics.
   • But journalists are undeterred. The New York Times’ Chris Buckley is chronicling events leading to the crackdown in a series of posts at Sinosphere. Nicholas Kristof recounted his own experiences as Beijing bureau chief at the time. The Telegraph’s Malcolm Moore described how Chinese triads helped in evacuating the student leaders. NPR’s Louisa Lim, author of The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited, which was published last month. She described the extreme secrecy while she was writing the book in Beijing, and the broader silence surrounding memories of the crackdown: “I wrote my book on a brand-new laptop that had never been online. Every night I locked it in a safe in my apartment. I never mentioned the book on the phone or in e-mail, at home or in the office — both located in the same Beijing diplomatic compound, which I assumed was bugged. I took these extreme measures because I was writing about that most taboo of topics in China: the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, when soldiers opened fire on unarmed civilians on the streets of Beijing, killing hundreds of people, maybe even more than 1,000.”
   • Other believe that memory of Tiananmen has never been completely buried. Reviewing Lim’s book alongside Rowena Xiaoqing He’s Tiananmen Exiles: Voices of the Struggle for Democracy in China, Ian Johnson wrote at The New York Review of Books that many of these individual struggles still have roots in the events of 1989: “But in talking to intellectuals, activists, teachers, pastors, preachers, and environmentalists over the past years, I’ve found that almost all say that Tiananmen was a defining point in their lives, a moment when they woke up and realized that society should be improved. It can’t be a coincidence, for example, that many major Protestant leaders in China talk of Tiananmen in these terms, or that thousands of former students—not the famous leaders in exile or in prison, but the ones who filled the squares and streets of Chinese cities twenty-five years ago—are quietly working for legal rights and advocating environmental causes.”

3. Caijing report on the state of labour re-education after abolishment

   • The report points to the lingering existence of a broader labour re-education: 与此同时，废止劳教制度是在废止一种剥夺人身自由的行政处理措施上的进步，映照着其他众多未经司法程序剥夺人身自由的行政拘禁制度的落后。这就是在劳教之外，存在的被称作“大劳教”的问题。包括收容教育制度、收容教养制度、强制戒毒制度、强制医疗制度等在内，甚至包括“双规”“双指”等纪检措施……对各种“大劳教”措施进行司法化改造，在提倡法治中国的当下，正当尽快提上议事日程。
   • In that issue, a CASS researcher points out the lowering threshold of committing crimes: 另一个值得注意的现象是，劳教制度废止后，最高法院、最高检察院先后出台了诸多降低犯罪门槛、扩大犯罪圈的司法解释，如《关于办理盗窃刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》《关于办理敲诈勒索刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》《关于办理寻衅滋事刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》《关于办理抢夺刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》等。He describe China’s transformation of towards a dual system of public security after the abolishment of laojiao:劳教废除后，原有的治安管理处罚、劳动教养、刑法“三足鼎立”的模式转化成治安管理处罚和刑法处罚的二元模式。原有的劳教对象一部分不能再处罚，如对上访者的违法劳教，因办案期限所限而对犯罪嫌疑人采取“以教代侦”等，其余则要分别归入《治安管理处罚法》和《刑法》的规制范围。
   • Another article looks at what has happened in Guangzhou after the abolishment of laojiao. Caijing reporters found that laojiao centres have been converted into drug rehabilitation centres. Laojiao personnel have been retained and retrained to take up the new function: 过渡期间广州原先的劳教干警并没有出现下岗、转岗的情形。在改革开始的同时，地方司法系统和各劳教所即与基层干警开了多次内部大会：一方面给干警们吃“定心丸”，另一方面针对工作对象的转变开展强戒工作的培训——强制戒毒工作带来了新的挑战，除了吸毒人员具有不稳定的身心、精神状态，吸毒者健康状况带来的猝死、重病问题也给管理工作加大了难度。On the other hand, the value chain produced by laojiao inmates also experienced little changes. Production has continued. 目前这些企业也未发生明显变化。以位于广州同沙路99号的前东坑劳教所为例，该地址同时亦是“广州市东发企业公司”的注册地址。工商信息显示，该公司成立于1993年4月20日，注册资本80万元，主要从事一些电子、五金、塑料制品等种类来料加工的业务，目前经营状况正常，法定代表人和经理即是东坑劳教所所长莫尚凯。……由于戒毒所不能直接接合同，所以对外的项目都以东发企业的名义来做。劳教废除后，这部分的生产任务也没有停止，公司仍在照常运行。原岑村劳教所周边居民则透露，改革后它也仍在从事来料加工的生产工作，运输货车正常出入。

4. US indicted five Chinese military hackers

   • The U.S. Justice Department last Monday indicted five Chinese military officers on charges they hacked into the computer networks of U.S. companies and stole commercial secrets, linking all of them to PLA Unit 61398 in Shanghai. This marked the first time Washington charged foreign state employees for “infiltrating US commercial targets by cyber means ». Attorney General Eric Holder said the alleged breaches were « significant » and demanded « an aggressive response ». He identified the alleged victims as Westinghouse Electric, US Steel, Alcoa Inc, Allegheny Technologies, SolarWorld and the US Steelworkers Union.
   • China’s government responded that the indictment is based on fabricated information and suspended certain cooperation with the U.S. government on Internet security, warning that the case would harm US-China relations.
   • Wall Street Journal reports: “Under international law, a state may take countermeasures to punish another country for wrongful acts. In limited cases, a country may also prosecute a foreign national for committing a crime that’s planned or carried out outside its borders. The charges that the U.S. Department of Justice filed against five individuals in the Chinese military represent a rare melding of these two legal avenues…. International law allows a state to prosecute foreign individuals for conduct committed beyond its borders if the alleged actions have a “substantial” effect within its territory. Federal prosecutors could argue that was the case here because the victims of the alleged cybercrime were U.S. companies and a labor union.” An academic who was interviewed by the WSJ saw this as a diplomatic as well as prosecutorial move. “Initially, the Obama administration had sought to apply increasing public pressure in China to cease its cyberespionage against U.S. companies… But after last year’s disclosures by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, the Chinese made it clear that they “weren’t terribly sympathetic to U.S. complaints of cyber-espionage. The U.S. has struggled to make other countries see the distinction between government hacking intended to protect national security and industrial or economic hacking of the likes alleged against China. This prosecution is a political effort to try to do that.
   • Wall Street Journal ran another piece that offered a peek at the accused Chinese Army Unit. Its address was originally unknown, until last year Virginia cybersecurity firm Mandiant Corp. pinpointed Unit 61398’s location to a residential-industrial section of Shanghai’s Pudong district, about 15 kilometers from its familiar skyline.

5. China and Russia signed US$ 400b gas deal

   • SCMP: “China and Russia signed a long-awaited natural gas supply deal worth US$400 billion in a diplomatic boost to show the unity of the two nations. The signing, witnessed by President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, was made on the sidelines of a regional forum at which Xi warned against the establishment of military alliances in Asia and called for a new regional security co-operation mechanism. Under the agreement, Russia’s Gazprom will supply China National Petroleum Corporation with 38 billion cubic metres of gas annually for 30 years.”
     1. The signing was a « tangible result » for Putin that he could get things done despite his difficulties with the West, said Rafaello Pantucci, a senior research fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, a defence and security think tank in Britain.
     2. Li Lifan, an expert in Russian affairs at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, reckoned the gas price would be higher than original Chinese estimate. « China wants to show unity with Russia, and hopes to secure its support when making a larger presence in Asia, » he said.
   • Sarah Lain at the Diplomat discusses the significance of the gas deal.
     1. “Although Russia’s overtures to China do not signify anything brand new in its foreign policy, the urgency for Moscow of finding alternative energy allies has risen significantly following the crisis in Ukraine.”
     2. But China has more bargaining power over the deal. “It is highly likely that the deal offered more favorable pricing to China. China now possesses greater leverage over Russia given the latter’s damaged international reputation after its actions over Ukraine and the reduced exclusivity of its energy offering.”

• “The effects of the deal are significant but do not reflect a zero-sum shift in China’s foreign policy. China has often taken a cautious approach to its partnership with Russia and will not wish to alienate other beneficial relationships in Moscow’s favor. Russian representatives close to the deal have been much more vocal about a breakthrough compared to their Chinese counterparts, who have been consistently more skeptical as to whether both sides could reach an agreement…But there were practical reasons for China to sign the deal with Russia. China’s government has plans to cut coal-burning power plantsin a bid to tackle its huge air pollution problem. In April 2014 China’s government set a target of 420 billion cubic meters of gas per year by 2020 to be part of the energy consumption mix, as it diversifies away from coal and demand increases. There is a gap in its gas supply market that needs to be filled.”

• Economist looks at the growing China-Russia ties, and argues that they are weaker than one thought.
  1. “That an agreement should come now, after a decade of haggling, is no accident. The deal will help the Kremlin reduce Russia’s reliance on gas exports to Europe. It is proof that Mr Putin has allies when he seeks to blunt Western sanctions over Ukraine. Both Russia and China want to assert themselves as regional powers. Both have increasingly strained relations with America, which they accuse of holding them back…Does today’s collaboration between Russia and China amount to a renewal of the alliance against America?”
  2. “…the impression Mr Putin wants to create. Ahead of his visit he gushed to Chinese media, saying their country was “Russia’s reliable friend. Co-operation, he said, is at its “highest level in all its centuries-long history”. From the Chinese side, Xi Jinping chose Russia as the first country he visited on becoming president in 2013.” / “Commercial ties are growing.”

• “But the West should not panic. Despite all this, Russia and China will struggle to overcome some fundamental differences.Start with the evidence of the gas deal itself: the fact that it took ten years to do, and that the deal was announced at the last minute, suggests how hard it was to reach agreement. The Chinese were rumoured to have driven a hard bargain, knowing that Mr Putin was desperate to have something to show from his trip… Although the two countries are united against America, they also need it for its market and as a stabilising influence. And they are tussling for influence in Central Asia. Their vast common border is a constant source of mistrust—the Russian side sparsely populated and stuffed with commodities, the Chinese side full of people. That is why many of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons are pointed at China. In the long run, Russia and China are just as likely to fall out as to form a firm alliance. That is an even more alarming prospect.”

• A new Asian order?
  1. During his China trip, Putin and other leaders of Asian countries attended the 4^th Conference on Interaction and Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA)), which was hosted by China. Xi Jinping gave a speech entitled “積極樹立亞洲安全觀，共創安全合作新局面”
     1. “要尊重和保障每一個國家安全，亞洲是一個命運共同體。不能犧牲別國安全謀求自身所謂絕對安全。任何國家都不應該謀求壟斷地區安全事務，侵害其他國家正當權益。應該恪守尊重主權、獨立和領土完整、互不干涉內政等國際關係基本準則。對恐怖主義、分裂主義、極端主義這「三股勢力」，必須採取零容忍態度。「亞洲的事情歸根結底要靠亞洲人民來辦，亞洲的問題歸根結底要靠亞洲人民來處理，亞洲的安全歸根結底要靠亞洲人民來維護」
  2. Xinhua published a commentary entitled “The Arrival of New Asia”: 官方新華社昨發表題為「新亞洲的來臨」的評論指出，中國提出「共建和平、穩定與合作的新亞洲」戰略構想，當中的新亞洲構造形式，「也許不必是歐洲共同體式的亞洲共同體，或更不必是歐洲聯盟式的亞洲聯盟，但它絕對有必要造就事實上的『亞洲命運共同體』」。習近平代表中國所作的倡議，被外界解讀為中國有意將亞信提高層次，甚至是亞洲共同體的雛形。

6. Nanfang Zhoumo reports on the difficulty of bringing local experimentation up to higher level

   • 因为“下改上不改”被迫调整方向或恢复原状，更多则因为人走政息而陷入停滞或走回头路。而那些效果颇佳、但缺乏整体设计的地方改革，其未来走向也面临着考验。
   • It reported on the demise of a local experiment in a Sichuan county, after the officials who started the experiment left the county, calling the phenomenon “人走政息”: 2006年中央确定地方党委“减副”，各级党委基本维持“一正二副”格局。当时巴中走得更远，只保留一正一副，除了兼任市长的副书记，不再设专职副书记，下属各区县党委也取消了专职副书记。
   • 过去十几年，在国内各地，由于“下改上不改”而被改回去的改革不胜枚举。在基层改革进行较多的四川，多次改革举措因“下改上不改”被迫推倒重来。
   • It also shed light on the hukou reform in Zhengzhou, which was halted because it was carried out too quickly and attracted too many incoming immigrants. 在此背景下，郑州降低落户门槛，聚集城市人气。没想到2003年全面放开后不到8个月，新增人口就超过了38万，教育、交通等公共资源压力明显，不得已在2004年叫停了户籍新政，2006年又恢复了暂住证制度。此后郑州人口增长速度放慢，户籍改革不了了之。
   • Another article looked at police reform in Henan

7. Xinjiang terrorist attack and escalating tensions

   • Another violent attack took place in Urumqi, the second time in a month. Two cars crashed into a market, one of which exploded, while assailants in the cars detonated explosives, according to reports. Xinhua reports that 31 people were killed. State media now says the attack was carried out by five suicide bombers. Government authorities and scholars are linking recent attacks to overseas terrorist groups. Chinese police blamed the ETIM for the Urumqi train station attack last month, state news agency Xinhua said on Sunday, the first time the separatists have been directly linked to the assault.
   • 39 people, mostly with ethnic Uighur names, in Xinjiang were accused of crimes ranging from inciting violence and distributing recordings with extremist content to illegally making firearms and promoting ethnic hatred, and were sentenced to up to 15 years in prison on terrorism charges on Wednesday.
   • Security is drastically tightened in Xinjiang as well as in other major cities
     1. HK Economic Journal: 新疆啟動1年嚴打 軍隊參與 / 新疆23日召開全區電視電話會議，宣布即日起到2015年6月，以新疆為主戰場啟動為期一年的「嚴厲打擊暴力恐怖活動專項行動」。專項行動將充分發揮政法機關和軍隊、武警作用，聯合反恐維穩。會議指出，這是經中央同意，根據國家反恐怖領導小組的決定下達的重大政治任務。必須通過全民動員，採取「超強硬措施、超常規特殊手段」，嚴打恐怖活動，「打掉敵人的行動、打掉敵人的組織、打掉敵人的囂張氣焰」。
     2. An editorial on a Urumqi state newspaper said: 我们与恐怖分子的斗争是一场维护祖国统一与企图分裂中国、维护民族团结与企图挑起民族仇杀、维护社会稳定与企图制造动乱暴乱的你死我活的政治斗争。…我们就是要零容忍、零懈怠，出重拳、下狠手，对暴力恐怖活动先发制敌，露头就打，用铁的手腕予以毁灭性打击。我们决不会对暴恐分子心慈手软，发现一个打击一个，发现一起打掉一起，严惩不贷，绝不姑息，绝不手软。

• Bloomberg reports on China’s enhanced security in the aftermath of the attacks: “The Chinese government tightened security at kindergartens, parks and malls in the Xinjiang region…police patrols have been stepped up, while the city of Urumqi, where yesterday’s attack occurred, limited parking near schools, reported the government news portal Tianshan.net. The U.S. embassy in Beijing told staff to defer personal travel to the northwestern region, according to an e-mail alert.”

1. New York Times reported that Beijing has deployed 150 special armed teams to carry out “antiterrorist stability maintenance” at key junctions throughout the city. Police are authorized to carry out the shoot-to-kill policy. Shanghai also announced that many police officers in the city would begin carrying firearms, in a plan that may spread to other localities. In another security measure, the Beijing government has announced rules requiring bulk buyers of gasoline to provide a letter explaining what the fuel would be used for, as well as business licenses and personal identity documents.
2. Another NY Times report had more details about heightened security measures: “many Chinese cities were stepping up security precautions, holding counterterrorism drills and increasing police presence at train stations, squares and other public places… Police generally do not carry guns, but over the past month, China has begun firearms training for front-line officers and has introduced armed patrols in Shanghai and other cities. …In Beijing, 5,000 police officers have been added to subway patrols and armed officers have been stationed so that they can respond to incidents in major shopping areas within one minute. In the southwestern city of Chengdu, the police posted a notice with counterterrorism safety tips. The advice included not touching suspicious packages, and ducking and hiding behind trash cans in the event of a shooting. “If you encounter a thug with a knife,” it said, “keep in mind these words: Run and hide.””
3. The Los Angeles Times’ Barbara Demick and Julie Makinen argued that the rearmament of police has been on Xi Jinping’s agenda for some time. Xu Jianhua, former policeman and professor at the University of Macao, said “The Chinese police will be more like the U.S. It is a long-term trend…Kunming is just the trigger. Xi Jinping had wanted to do this for some time”

• South China Morning Post’s Stephen Chen reported mixed public reactions to the security surge. Some felt uncomfortable but some said it is an unavoidable cost for safety.

• The New York Times reported that online commentators reacted angrily to the United States Embassy in Beijing for not calling the attack on Thursday “terrorism.”
  1. “On its official account on Sina Weibo, the Chinese microblogging service, the embassy had written: “The U.S. Embassy expresses condolences and sympathy to the victims, their families and all people influenced by today’s violent attack against innocent civilians in Urumqi.” The statement posted on Thursday afternoon received more than 17,000 comments and was reposted more than 26,000 times. The United States government has been cautious in the past about labeling attacks in China as terrorism, citing the lack of independently verifiable information.””
  2. Seeing the rebound, the US government changed its wording and call this terrorist attack. This move was “highly praised” by the Global Times: 美国白宫最新表态的变化值得欢迎。前天英国外交大臣黑格也发表声明谈新疆发生的“恐怖袭击”，表示“此刻我们与中国人民坚定地站在一起”。这些共同构成西方舆论的新动向。
• The New York Times interviewed Gardner Bovingdon, a professor at Indiana University who in recent years has been refused visas to China, on Uighur Discontent and China’s Choices.
  1. “Professor Bovingdon is part of a group known as the “Xinjiang 13,” who contributed to an edited volume in 2004, called “Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland,” that provoked the ire of the Chinese government.”
  2. “People want to know whether this is evidence of greater organization and a sort of crescendoing plan for Uighur separatists, and I think it is premature to conclude that, and I’m particularly skeptical of Beijing’s claims that these events are all tied back to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, which I’m not even convinced exists in its former capacity anymore….The only organization that the United States and the U.N. have identified as a terrorist organization is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which was identified in 2002. And I think that’s the main reason that Beijing keeps tying things to that organization.”

• “I fear that those people are basically keeping their bread well buttered by fomenting the threat of terrorism, which serves their interest as it does Beijing’s”

1. “Beijing has moved against Uighurs’ expressed wishes: It’s cracked down further on religion, it’s cracked down further on language, further oppressing family planning policies and so on”
2. “These particular attacks to my mind bespeak a small group committed to violence possibly motivated by religious beliefs….I think it’s hard to deny that there’s widespread Uighur discontent. I think it would be a mistake to say more bombings, more stabbings means that’s direct evidence that Uighurs are more dissatisfied.”
3. “What are Beijing’s calculations? I think it is trying to play a very challenging game. On the one hand it needs to condemn acts of violence. It needs to reassure the population and in this case primarily the Han population in Xinjiang, because these attacks are clearly targeting places where Hans predominate. It needs to reassure them that it is capable of restoring peace and averting further violence, and it also needs to send out a message that we’re only criticizing, we’re only attacking, that fringe of Uighurs who do not represent the majority and who are terrorists.”

• “To a substantial degree, Beijing has given up on the idea of converting all Uighurs into happy, complacent Chinese citizens fully supportive of the Chinese identity project. There’s no way that Uighurs are going to raise a true military threat. There’s no way they can credibly try to separate now, unless of course there is a crisis of governance in the center of China, in Beijing. But, on the other hand, being in the endgame doesn’t mean that they can avert further acts of violence. One of the most important implications, one of the biggest questions for us looking into the future, is what do that preponderant Han population, possibly majority, in Xinjiang make of all this? Do they think, ‘I will continue to stay here, I will continue to tell my cousins this is good place to do business’ and so forth? Or will people begin to fear, and leave?”

• A HK Economic Journal commentary on the hardening of Zhang Chunxian’s “soft approach” in governing Xinjiang, pointing to a significant rise in financial expenditure in Xinjiang: 自2010年4月接替王樂泉，出任新疆自治區黨委書記以來，張春賢提出的「柔性治疆」新理念至今已推行整4年，張春賢在新疆上演的親民秀、打造的文官形象、向維族傾斜的懷柔政策……從客觀效果來看，不僅沒有讓民族矛盾更「柔」，反而讓新疆局勢更「僵」 。張春賢治疆這4年，中央領導巡疆最頻密、陣容最強。本欄曾分析過全國政協主席、中央新疆工作協調小組組長俞正聲在去年和今年，均曾在一個月內兩度赴疆。今年4月底習近平上任後首度考察新疆，代表團成員包括兩位中央政治局常委和數位中央政治局委員，其豪華陣容也極為罕見。張春賢治疆這4年，中央財政對新疆的支持力度前所未有。僅2014年，中央財政對新疆生產建設兵團養老保險補助額，高達95億元，是14年前的47倍；今年中央財政逾5億元助新疆貧困村脫貧；中央現代農業投入2.45億元支持新疆牛羊肉生產……據悉，中央新一輪扶疆政策最快6月出台，高層將之定調為「只能加強不能削弱」，基礎設施、能源開發將成為以烏魯木齊為中心的「新絲綢之路」重點。
• Reuters quoted state media and reported about a sentencing gathering in Kashgar this month at which 300 cadres and students cheered the announcement of heavy punishments. The court gathering handed down sentences ranging from five to 15 years to five people on crimes of « separatism and endangering national security ». State media said those five people distributed content related to « jihad and (calling on people) to get ready to go to Afghanistan and Pakistan for jihad, adding that they had also downloaded e-books and videos with content that « incited separatism ».