Keywords: Pastor Gu Yuese; state-owned media; Xiao Gang; private property right in China; left-behind children; Mongkok disturbance; Hong Kong Indigenous; localism; By-election of Legislative Council; HSBC.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Leading China pastor Gu Yuese under investigation

Gu Yuese (顧約瑟), who is the pastor of the largest Protestant church in Zhejiang Province as well as in China, was detained by the Chinese authorities. He was later accused of embezzling funds. Supporters for Pastor Gu argued that the authorities detained him because of his effort to oppose government policy in the province of Zhejiang. For the background of Pastor Gu, please see here prepared by China Change. Prof. Ying Fook Tsang (邢福增) from the Chinese University of Hong Kong argued that the change of state policy lost the hearts and minds of the Christians in China.

• //A leading Christian pastor who opposed a campaign to remove crosses from atop churches is being investigated on suspicion of embezzling funds, state-backed church authorities in China’s eastern Zhejiang province said. We feel deeply shocked and filled with regret,” the government-backed Hangzhou Christian Council said in a statement on its website regarding the investigation in Gu Yuese, adding that the investigation was due to his individual conduct. The council gave no further details of the charges or evidence against Gu in its post late on Friday night. It said it had been notified by a “relevant department”, but did not say who was conducting the investigation. Police in Hangzhou did not immediately respond to calls for comment. Gu could not be reached for comment. Zhejiang is known for its large Christian population. Previous campaigns by authorities there to dismantle crosses on top of churches have incensed the local religious population.// Source: SCMP, 31 January 2016.

• // Mr Gu is the pastor of the Chongyi Church in Zhejiang, which has thousands of followers. The church could not immediately be reached for comment. The local chapters of state-backed church authorities China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement posted similarly-worded statements on their websites on Friday about Mr Gu’s arrest. They said they had learned in « recent days » that Mr Gu was « being investigated because of suspicions of economic issues, including embezzling money », adding that the matter had « to do with one individual’s behaviour ». However, Bob Fu, of the US-based Christian human rights group China Aid, told the BBC that the charges were « political revenge » for Mr Gu’s « disloyalty to the Chinese Communist Party’s religious policy » by opposing the government’s forced demolition of crosses on churches. […] A group of about 40 Christians in Hong Kong, some of whom are church leaders, also alleged in an open letter to the media that Mr Gu’s arrest was connected to his opposition to government efforts to contain churches in the province. They said that after local churches objected to the tearing down of crosses last July, authorities began investigating Chongyi Church « in order to cook up charges and suppress suspected dissidents ».// Source: BBC, 30 January 2016.

• //2016年1月18日，杭州市基督教兩會發出公函，透露根據「有關部門要求」，顧約瑟牧師不再擔任杭州市基督教崇一堂主任牧師一職。此後，顧牧師的情況一直備受各界關注。此舉正式標誌着，浙江省自2014年起開展的強拆十字架運動，終於發展至政治清算省內反強拆的基督教最高領袖的局面。1月28日，再傳來顧牧師夫婦於27日晚上被當局帶走的消息；29日，杭州市基督教兩會及浙江省基督教兩會（三自愛國運動委員會，基督教協會，簡稱「市兩會」和「省兩會」）先後發出通知，指顧牧師「因涉嫌挪用資金罪等經濟問題」，遭相關部門調查。[…]不過毋庸置疑的是，當局以經濟犯罪起訴顧牧師，實為掩飾問題、轉移視線的做法；其藉此迴避公權在強拆十架運動中各種行為的不當，與在執行過程中各類違法違規問題，並反過來以執法者姿態，打擊反對拆十的教會人士。拆十運動開展以來，省內基督教兩會的合法性，遭受前所未有的衝擊。由於兩會在體制上依附黨國建制，其權力的合法性源自官方，故貫徹執行宗教政策成為其工作重點。在官方政策着重團結的時候，兩會有較大空間拓展其教務職能，藉此建立其民間合法性；但當官方政策方向出現逆轉，以鬥爭取代團結的時候，兩會的「官方」職能便只能向政治屈服。拆十運動期間，省各級兩會順服取態，結果卻使兩會在信徒心中形象徹底崩潰。省內各地信徒強烈不滿「兩會」體制未能為教會權益發聲，萌生離心傾向（註七），甚至原有地方兩會牧者也有「去三自化」的傾向。此舉根本地動搖甚至瓦解基層（縣、市）兩會體制。筆者在溫州訪談中，幾位教牧傳道均一致表達了「去三自化」的傾向，即或沒有退出兩會，也以不同方式將兩會邊緣化，使之處於名存實亡狀態。例如有溫州某地牧區不再經省基兩會自行按牧，也有不再上繳經費予地方兩會。甚至更有「冰封」兩會的主張，意即由兩會全體常委另起爐灶，成立新的「總會」來聯繫牧區，推動工作。// Source: The Initium, 03 February 2016.

2. The Spring Festival Gala (春晚) accused of being too political

It is reported that the Spring Festival Gala for 2016 has included many political messages that marked the program different from its previous ones. For the video of 2016 Spring Festival Gala, please find it here. Many netizens in China expressed criticisms on social media and relevant keywords were later blocked as a result.

• Patrick Wong from Global Voices: //For decades, the Spring Festival Gala, produced by China’s state-owned Central Television (CCTV), has been must-watch programming for Chinese on Lunar New Year. Being such a high-profile media event, the program’s producers usually manage to strike a balance between entertainment and political propaganda. Not so this year. The gala in 2016, which is the year of the monkey, was arguably the most politicized in the show’s history, and is now facing unprecedented criticism from the public. [… The] program fell in line with Xi’s ideological theories and policies: singing about the Chinese Dream; emphasizing the need to make the People’s Liberation Army strong; promoting the 13th Five-Year Plan, or roadmap for the country’s development; stressing the patriotism of overseas homesick Chinese; and educating viewers on the core values of socialism. […] The gala ended with a presenter saying, “Let us gather around the central Communist Party with the core principles of Xi.” […] Chinese portal Sina took a poll on “How would you rate this year’s gala?” Approximately 115,000 or 75 percent of voters gave the gala one star out of 10.// Source: Global Voices, 10 February 2016.

• //To dampen criticism, a number of related search terms have been blocked on Sina Weibo, including CCTV Gala + politics (春晚＋政治), CCTV Gala + brainwash (春晚＋洗脑), and CCTV Gala + suck up (春晚＋献媚). As Wong noted, some complained that the gala felt like an episode of network’s propaganda-heavy nightly newscast: CCTV Gala + News Simulcast (春晚＋新闻联播) is also blocked. Another censored search term is CCTV Gala + steamed bun (春晚＋包子), referring to Xi’s appearance at a Beijing steamed bun shop in 2013 which became a symbol of his personal image-crafting. Many of those hoping for more entertainment lamented the absence of iconic Monkey King actor Zhang Jinlai from the monkey-year celebrations. Searches for CCTV Gala + Liu Xiao Ling Tong (春晚＋六小龄童), Zhang’s stage name, are blocked.//Source: China Digital Times, 10 February 2016.

3. President Xi Jinping emphasizes the importance of state-owned media to follow CCP’s leadership

On 19 February, President Xi jinping toured state-owned media and ordered them to follow strictly Party’s leadership. Willy Lam argued that such move reflects Xi’s sense of insecurity with its power in the party core leadership in light of party fractions and discontented public due to China’s economic slowdown.

• //Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday ordered news media run by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government to strictly follow the Party’s leadership and focus on « positive reporting. » Speaking in a symposium Friday afternoon after touring China’s three leading news providers, the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television, Xi, also General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, called Party- and government-run news outlets the « publicity fronts » of the party and the government. All news media run by the Party must work to speak for the Party’s will and its propositions and protect the Party’s authority and unity, Xi said. They should enhance their awareness to align their ideology, political thinking and deeds to those of the CPC Central Committee and help fashion the Party’s theories and policies into conscious action by the general public while providing spiritual enrichment to the people, he said. Marxist journalistic education must be promoted among journalists, Xi added, to make them « disseminators of the Party’s policies and propositions, recorders of the time, promoters of social advancement and watchers of equality and justice. » According to Xi, the mission of the Party’s media work is to provide guidance for the public, serve the country’s overall interests, unite the general public, instill confidence and pool strength, tell right from wrong and connect China to the world. To do so, Xi continued, they should also stick to guiding public opinion on the correct path in every aspect and stage of their work.// Source: Xinhua, 19 February 2016.

• //Also see a recent report from The Economist on Xinwen Lianbo and its efforts to gather public confidence and affinity for Xi. At Medium, Bandurski notes that Xi’s state media tour will likely “shed further light on media policy at the very top in China” in days to come. The researcher continues to offer a translation of an obsequious poem to Xi from Xinhua deputy editor Pu Liye that is drawing ridicule on Chinese social media platforms. During Xi’s stop at CCTV, a large studio teleprompter, possibly intended to remain off camera, declared: “CCTV is Party Family; Absolutely Loyal; Please Inspect Us.” Global Voices Oiwan Lam notes that CCTV also aired a vox populi segment, reinterpreting the Confucian concept of “filial piety” (xiào 孝) as something that should first be shown to the state; netizens replied with mockery. Nervousness within Party leadership, mentioned above by Bandurski (via the Wall Street Journal), may also help explain China’s ideological climate beyond the media landscape. At Project Syndicate, professor Minxin Pei described the current atmosphere as characteristic of a “return of [the] fear-based governance” of the Mao era, citing ongoing campaigns against Party corruption, critical foreign journalists, liberal ideas in the academy, human rights lawyers and civil society activism, and Hong Kong publishers known for printing salacious tales of mainland leaders.// Source: China Digital Times, 19 February 2016.

Willy Lam, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said:

• // Xi is raising standards for state media by requiring they obey the will of the Communist party’s core leadership, which is increasingly defined by Xi himself in another sign of how he has accrued more personal authority than either of his last two predecessors. “This is a very heavy-handed ideological campaign to drive home the point of total loyalty to the party core,” Lam said. “On one hand, Xi’s influence and power are now unchallenged, but on the other hand, there is a palpable degree of insecurity.” Lam said Xi faces lurking challenges not only from within different party factions but also from among a disaffected public, who are unhappy with the slowing economy and a recent stock market meltdown.// Source: The Guardian, 19 February 2016.

4. Details of the Counter-terrorism Law

On 26 February 2016, Liu Yuejin (刘跃进), counter-terrorism commissioner of the Ministry of Public Security, gave greater details of the Counter-terrorism Law (《中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法》) effective January 2016. Lately he particularly explained the definition of ‘terrorism’ where proposition of terrorist ideas already widespread was also included, and referred specifically to the domestic and overseas influence of the East Turkistan force.

• //A Chinese counter-terrorism official has pledged to resolutely prevent and crack down on terror and protect citizens’ rights in accordance with the country’s first counter-terrorism law. The new law, adopted by China’s top legislature in December and took effect in January, includes stipulations on preventing, detecting, handling and punishing terrorism […] The new law also encourages participation by the public and spells out protection of citizens’ personal and property rights. Liu said the definition of the term « terrorism » in the law was inspired by a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) counter-terrorism convention, and the UN’s Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. According to the new law, « terrorism » is defined as any proposition or activity — that, by means of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, undermines public security, infringes on personal and property rights, and menaces government organs and international organizations — with the aim of realizing political and ideological purposes. Liu explained that the word « proposition » refers to systemic terrorism ideas that are already widespread. « It is to deter and punish the circulating ideas and will not criminalize any unuttered state of mind or unimplemented attempts. » […] While describing the country’s current anti-terrorism situation as « stable and under control, » Liu noted that terrorism is nonetheless permeating further in the country under the influence of international terrorists’ activities. « Domestic and overseas ‘East Turkistan’ forces are stepping up their instigating efforts, and there’s a growing tendency for activities that are masterminded overseas, organized online and implemented within the country, » Liu said. Liu stressed that « a very few persons with terrorist thinking » are still secretly planning violence and sabotage activities in the country, and violence and terror incidents still occurred occasionally in some parts of Xinjiang. According to Liu, as the law took effect, various departments will innovate anti-terrorism methods, strengthen prevention of and crackdown on violence and terrorism activities while enhancing international cooperation in fighting terrorism.// Source: Xinhua, 26 February 2016.

CHINA – ECONOMY

1. The removal of the Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission

On 19 February, it was announced that the Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) Xiao Gang (肖钢) was removed and replaced by who formerly headed the Agricultural Bank of China Liu Shiyu (刘士余). Observers believed that the removal was resulted from Xiao’s inability to guide proper development of the stock market over the past year and a half. Some argued Xiao was just the scapegoat of the policy blunders in the financial field given the administrative rank of CSRC, and there might be little change in policy towards financial reform.

• //新华社发布信息，原农行董事长刘士余出任中国证监会党委书记、主席，现任证监会主席肖钢卸任。现任证监会主席肖钢自2013年3月17日出任中国证监会党委书记、主席一职，至今不到3年。期间A股市场经历了大起大落，最高曾在2015年6月12日创下5178点的最高点，之后出现暴跌，在市场跌至3300点一线时，证监会组织各方力量救市，包括证金公司、汇金公司、券商等机构动用接近2万亿元人民币参与救市，不过由于市场杠杆率过高，一旦开始下跌就引发一轮又一轮的快速急跌，救市资金也悉数被套。截止2月19日收盘，上证指数已跌至2800点一线。期间市场对于证监会的各种政策颇多不满，包括史上最短命政策熔断机制、IPO注册制的迟迟不推等。而证监会内部也出现了包括副主席姚刚、主席助理张育军、投保局局长李量、稽查总队副队长习龙生、原处罚委主任欧阳健生等多位局级以上官员被调查。//Source: Caixin, 20 February 2016.

• //the mainland authorities announced the removal of Xiao Gang as the chairman of the CSRC on Saturday. Photos online showed a small group of senior commission officials lined up to say farewell to Xiao, whose job security had been the target of intense speculation over the past six months since mainland stock markets fell more than 60 per cent from their record highs. His fate seems to have been sealed early last month after the ill-considered introduction and hasty rescinding four days later of the circuit-breaker mechanism, an about-turn that spooked markets at home and beyond, and wiped out several trillion yuan in market capitalisation on the mainland alone. // Source: SCMP, 21 February 2016.

Background of Liu Shiyu and his challenges:

• //Liu, a graduate from the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing, worked at the People’s Bank of China for 18 years. He also worked for Zhu Rongji when the former premier was mayor of Shanghai. He is experienced in managing financial risks as he was a key official in cleaning up the country’s urban credit cooperatives. He was also current central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s deputy in reforming China’s state banks in the early 2000s when most state lenders, including the Agricultural Bank of China, were suspected to be technically insolvent. Liu faces huge challenges in his new role, according to analysts. His priorities will include restoring investor confidence, streamlining regulatory procedures for the listing of new companies without flooding bourses with new shares, plus opening up China’s stock market to foreign firms and investors.//Source: SCMP, 21 February 2016.

• //The shake-up also does little to solve the underlying problem: a government increasingly under the control of one man, President Xi, who is trying to subdue economic turbulence. It is this penchant for control, investors and analysts say, that is driving talent away from the technocratic bureaucracy and rewarding officials who fall in line. “That’s the problem of a very top-down policy style that’s emerging in China now,” said Victor Shih, a professor at the University of California, San Diego, who studies the confluence of finance and politics in China. […] The new securities chief may be in an impossible position, expected to control inherently uncontrollable markets and take the blame if the efforts fail. The push by Mr. Xi’s to assert state control over the markets and the economy go against the philosophy of China’s early reformers under Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader who sought to give more space to the market. “The approach that they took toward the stock market is telling me that they are not willing to let go control,” Yasheng Huang, a professor of political economy and international Management at M.I.T., said of China’s current leaders in a December interview. One former Chinese financial official, who requested anonymity so he could freely discuss personnel issues, said Mr. Xiao, the former securities chief, might be heading to a new post to help oversee economic policy under China’s cabinet. The influential magazine Caijing also reported that Mr. Xiao may be moving to a new government position.// Source: New York Times, 20 February 2016.

2. G20 Meeting in Shanghai

G20 Group’s financial ministers and central bank directors have met in Shanghai for the first time to discuss challenges of global economy and how to revive it. In the released statement, they emphasized the importance of loose monetary policy in economic growth and stability, while expansionary financial policy should also be encouraged if debt rate could be kept within sustainable level. Also, they said the recent market turbulence did not reflect the basis of global economy, and would communicate to avoid competitive devaluation.

• //公报强调，货币政策将继续支持经济活动，保持价格稳定，与中央银行的职责保持一致，但仅靠货币政策不能实现平衡增长。财政战略的目标是提振经济，将灵活实施财政政策，增强经济韧性。对此，中国财政部部长楼继伟在27日晚举行的主席国新闻发布会上表示，大家一致认为，货币政策将继续致力于确保经济增长和稳定。也就是说，货币政策还要继续保持适度的宽松，“尽管大家意识到货币政策的作用代替不了财政政策。”他还表示，最好实施扩张性财政政策，但是各国国情不一样，有的是过分福利，造成财政不可持续，不能使用财政刺激，大家的共识是，扩张性财政的国家，债务率要确保在可持续的水平。// Source: Caixin, 27 February 2016.

• //公报认为近期市场波动并未反映全球经济基本面。各国将采取所有政策工具，强调财政政策重要性。重申宏观经济政策和结构性改革相辅相成；将就外汇市场密切沟通，避免竞争性贬值。// Source: Caixin, 27 February 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. Streets in the enclosed residential areas are to be made publicly accessible

The Chinese Communist Party released a directive about how to further strengthen urban planning and development management (《关于进一步加强城市规划建设管理工作的若干意见》) on February 21 and proposed not to build any privatized streets in principle and to make the existing privatized streets of residential areas accessible to the public, although they are owned by the residents collectively in the gated neighbourhood (zhuzhai xiaoqu jiequ hua住宅小区街区化). Analyst argued that gated community could reduce management cost, but also bring negative consequence to city’s traffic. The proposal largely concerned the general public about whether such proposal would infringe the property right of the residents who paid and own the streets and whether it would reduce the safety level of the residents. For details of the new proposal, please see here prepared by Xinhua (in Chinese).

• //根据《意见》，推动“街区化”指的是“加强街区的规划和建设，分梯级明确新建街区面积”，并指出 “原则上不再建设封闭住宅小区”，“已建成的住宅小区和单位大院要逐步打开，实现内部道路公共化”等方针。如此一来，城市便可形成“窄马路、密路网”的道路布局，节约利用土地空间。[…] 但在中国的传统都市空间布局里，“高墙大院”才是政府单位和居民住宅区规划的主流。北京市社会科学院副院长赵弘告诉财新记者，受传统观念影响，中国的住宅小区大多会建围墙，而在计划经济时期，很多房屋及其配套服务设施，都由单位大包大揽，同一个单位的人往往居住在一起。积习所致，使得目前很多行政机关和商品化住宅区，都呈现出封闭式小区的格局。“封闭式小区有边界，管理起来成本较低，可控性强。”赵弘认为，封闭式的住宅小区发展至今，自有一定的固有益处；但随着城市的发展，这种空间上的排他性，也带来了许多负面影响，特别是对城市交通方面，负面影响尤烈。目前，中国城市里的大部分住宅小区，都不能任由外来车辆甚至行人进出，其内部道路更无法让社会共享。中国城市和小城镇改革发展中心规划院副院长文辉认为，若小区只是封闭的方块，那么它四周的道路遇到小区边界时都会“断掉”，行人车辆只能绕行。[…] “这个改革，我最害怕的就是‘一刀切’，现在好多政策都是‘一刀切’，问题特别大。” 国家发改委城市和小城镇中心研究员、中国城市发展研究院副院长袁崇法对财新记者表示，哪些小区开放后，能增加小区业主利益和公共利益？哪些小区开放后，既对公共利益无益，又会明显损害业主利益？这些情况需要区分清楚。袁崇法举例说道，北京天通苑等地方的很多小区占地特别巨大，车辆必须绕很大一个圈子才能到达目的地，还有些小区仅一墙之隔，却不能共享服务设施。如果将这些小区开放，或将有利于同时服务公共利益和业主利益；但也有些小区，一旦来往车辆和人流变多，会严重影响到业主生活，这就需要谨慎论证。[…] 据了解，中国《物权法》第42条规定，为了公共利益的需要，依照法律规定的权限和程序可以征收集体所有的土地和单位、个人的房屋及其他不动产；征收集体所有的土地，应当依法足额支付土地补偿费、安置补助费、地上附着物和青苗的补偿费等费用。王才亮告诉财新记者，依据《物权法》，为了公共利益，政府可以征收集体所有的土地。例如把住宅小区开放，就是把小区业主对道路的使用权，“变为国家共有”。但是，这么做的前提是“不能白占”，“小区居民付了钱，这个钱要还”。// Source: Caixin, 22 February 2016.

• //The ruling Communist Party and the cabinet released a directive on February 21 that proposes opening up the gates of enclosed residential areas and government compounds. The government also said that no more gated communities should be built so that the traffic situation can be improved and land better used. The authorities did not say when the new rules would come into effect or how they will be implemented, but the announcement generated much discussion among property analysts, academics and the public. More than 70 percent of nearly 38,000 Internet users polled by the news portal Sina.com opposed the idea, with most survey respondents saying property owners should be compensated if they have to comply with the requirement. Many respondents cited safety concerns as their main reason for objecting. The 2007 Property Law says homeowners collectively own the roads, green spaces and other facilities built within their communities. Yuan Chongfa, a researcher at the National Development and Reform Commission’s City, Small City and Town Center, said this meant the new rules would break the law. However, Yuan said that opening government compounds could improve traffic because they often cover large parcels of land in prime locations. Wang Cailiang, a lawyer who specializes in property law, said the government can legally force gated areas to open if it is in the interest of the public, but homeowners would have to be compensated.//Source: Caixin, 23 February 2016.

Response from Supreme People’s Court Cheng Xinwen (程新文):

• //对此，最高人民法院民一庭庭长程新文回应道，《中共中央国务院关于进一步加强城市规划建设管理工作的若干意见》中提到了新建住宅要推广街区制，原则上不再建设封闭住宅小区；已建成的住宅小区和单位大院要逐步打开，实现内部道路公共化。[…] 程新文表示，“我们认为，上述举措的目的是为了实现物和有关资源效益的最大化，这是一个非常具有前瞻性的、与时俱进的城市发展理念，符合当今世界的潮流和发展趋势，对于推进城市现代化具有重要指导意义。目前，党中央、国务院提出的这一意见属于党和国家政策的层面，涉及包括业主在内的有关主体的权益保障问题，还有一个通过立法实现法治化的过程。作为人民法院，我们将密切关注，并积极应对。”//Source: 人民網, 23 February 2016.

2. Central government’s plan to protect left-behind children in rural area

According to Caixin, the State Council lately rolled out a proposal about strengthening the protection for left-behind children in rural area (《关于加强农村留守儿童关爱保护工作的意见》) to protect the children left behind by parents who need to go long distance for work. First, the proposal suggests that children under 16 years old are not allowed to live alone and family members are their primary guardians. Second, a directory of left-behind children is to be maintained by the government. Third, school, medical clinics, village (residents) committee, social service organizations, relief organizations, or welfare organizations are required to report cases of left-behind children who live alone without parental guardianship. Commentators argued that while the proposal has cleared the responsibility of those who need to take care of left-behind children, the shortage of resources in social service provision beyond first-line cities continues to impede the effectiveness of the protection for children of this group.

• //据财新记者了解，在《意见》中，文件吸纳了不少留守儿童问题社会工作者的专业意见，具体包括：其一，明确强化家庭的监护主体责任。根据相关统计，在全国约6000多万的留守儿童中，存在着205万的独居儿童。例如去年贵州省毕节市七星关区自杀的张启刚四兄妹，就属此类。 这些独居儿童，是各类留守儿童中生存境况最危险的一群孩子。《意见》明确，不得让不满16周岁的儿童脱离监护，单独居住生活。外出务工人员要尽量携带未成年子女共同生活或父母一方留家照料，暂不具备条件的，也应当委托有监护能力的亲属或其他成年人代为监护。 […] 其二，要求乡镇人民政府或街道办事处，建立翔实完备的农村留守儿童信息台账。一人一档案，实行动态管理、精准施策。[…] 其三，建立强制报告机制。专精于服务留守儿童的非政府组织“中国歌路营”总干事杜爽指出，过去，发现留守儿童的权益损害后，“向谁汇报”是个实务上的难题。因为在中国，与儿童福利和儿童保护相关的部门较多，却又权责不分明——包括教育部门、卫生部门、民政部门、司法部门、妇联、共青团，街道办，都有救助困境儿童的部份责任；而分管相关工作的副区长、教育局局长、村领导、乡党委书记、乡长等等，似乎也都是“相关责任人”。然而，具体到日常工作中，谁又应负责持续盯紧留守儿童的生活实况，并为他们的急迫需求排忧解难？这次出台的《意见》便规定，学校、幼儿园、医疗机构、村（居）民委员会、社会工作服务机构、救助管理机构、福利机构及其工作人员，在工作中若发现农村留守儿童脱离监护单独居住生活，或是有失踪、监护人丧失监护能力或不履行监护责任、疑似遭受家庭暴力、疑似遭受意外伤害或不法侵害等情况的，都有在第一时间向公安机关报告的强制义务。未履行报告义务的，将被严肃追责。[…] 接下来，关键是落实。杜爽表示，建立这样的留守儿童问题应对机制不是一朝一夕的事。目前，关键问题并非“能不能发现”留守儿童，而是发现了之后，仍然难以处理。比如，在毕节四兄妹自杀的悲剧中，学校早就发现了他们的问题，乡政府也知晓，但没有找到好的处理办法。当前，中国的社工队伍仍严重不足，主要的专业力量都集中在北上广。在西部地区的二线城市，就可能难以找到成熟的社工队伍，遑论广大村镇或乡村地区。//Source: Caixin, 15 February 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Mongkok disturbance on the First Day of Lunar New Year

Around midnight of 8 February 2016, the First Day of Lunar New Year, officers of the Food and Hygiene Department were sent to clean up the illegal food hawkers in Mongkok. Some protesters clashed with the officers and the police was called in to control the situation. The clash between the protesters and the police was later turned into a social disturbance with a number of injuries of protesters, policemen, and media reporters. There were reports about protesters using sticks to beat up policemen or throwing concrete bricks at them. The police did not control the disturbance until morning the next day. For a detailed timeline of the Mongkok riot on the midnight of 8 February 2016, please see here prepared by the SCMP. For video footage, please see SCMP and Cable TV (in Chinese).

Formed after the Umbrella Movement in 2014, the political group the Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線), which preaches the priority of localism for Hong Kong and emphasizes the need for violent resistance to China’s interference, is largely regarded as involved in the Mongkok disturbance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC condemned those involved as ‘local radical separatist organization’, and the director of the Central-Hong Kong Liaison Office, Zhang Xiaoming, also labelled them as ‘radical separatist’. Zhang was later quoted making a remark that read ‘separatism’ and ‘independence of Hong Kong’ only had very little difference. While the People’s Daily (overseas edition) also accused the student-based political group Scholarism (學民思潮) and professional-based the Civic Party (公民黨) for their involvement, members of the two political groups denied. So far there is no evidence to suggest the involvement of the Triad in the Mongkok disturbance. A number of suspects were quickly arrested and prosecuted with the charge of rioting, including the convenor of Hong Kong Indigenous Ray Wong Toi-yeung (黃台仰). The issue is further complicated as one of the Hong Kong Indigenous members, Edward Leung Tin-kei (梁天琦), who has also been charged with rioting, was a candidate for the by-election of the Legislative Council which took place on 28 February 2016. In total there have been 78 persons being arrested in connection with the Mongkok disturbance as at 27 February 2016.

• // A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Thursday night the central government firmly supports the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government and the police in safeguarding social security and punishing illegal and criminal activities in accordance with the law. Spokesman Hong Lei made the remarks in response to the riot erupted in Mong Kok of Hong Kong on Tuesday. Hong said in a statement that a riot plotted mainly by a local radical separatist organization rocked Mong Kok, Hong Kong on the early morning of Feb. 9. //Source: Xinhua News, 12 February 2016.

• //Zhang [Xiaoming] said he was shocked and deeply saddened by the riot erupted in Mong Kok on Feb. 9, expressing his sympathy to the police officers and journalists injured in the riot. « We strongly condemn those rioters who maliciously committed beating, smashing, arson and other violent crimes, » Zhang said. « We strongly condemn those radical separatists whose behaviors got more and more violent and even showed terror tendencies, » the director said. « We strongly condemn those remarks and sophistries that agitate for violence and confuse right and wrong, and even attempt to shift the blame onto other people, » Zhang added.//Source: Xinhua News, 14 February 2016.

• //港區人大代表和全國政協委員昨日在兩會前，與中聯辦主任張曉明新春茶敘，並舉行預備會議。有與會者表示，張曉明席上提及旺角農曆新年的大衝突，指香港絕大部分青年人都是理性的，只有一小撮人在搞「分離」，但張曉明會上未有提出具體建議如何梳理事件。[…] 全國政協委員、民建聯立法會議員譚耀宗會後表示，張曉明在會上肯定人代和政協對國家和香港的貢獻，亦有講述國家經濟發展和香港最近的形勢，包括旺角大衝突。他引述張曉明表示，對旺角暴亂感震驚和痛心，認為特區政府對事件定性為「暴亂」是正確的，又指相信香港絕大部分的青年人都是理性的，只有一小撮人在搞「分離」，「雖然分離及港獨有少許差別，但差別是很近的差別。」//Source: MingPao, 26 February 2016.

• //Student activist group Scholarism and the pro-democracy Civic Party have been named as supporting protesters who took part in the unrest in Mong Kok in a signed commentary published by the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on Tuesday. The commentary, entitled “Hong Kong must say ‘no’ to violence,” cited Hong Kong media when it said that protesters “received without exception the legal support of organisations such as the Civic Party and Scholarism.” […] Scholarism said last week that the police tried to link the group up with the Mong Kok unrest after arresting one of its members, Lam Shun-hin, who was involved in the protest. Alvin Yeung, a member of the Civil Party, provided legal aid to arrested protesters after the events in Mong Kok, and was criticised for “helping the rioters.” […] In response to the People’s Daily commentary, Yeung told HKFP: “I am a person, I am a human being, I’m a lawyer, before my Civic Party role. So any suggestion that our role in different protests or our role as a pro bono lawyers have links to do with the Civic Party is completely groundless and outrageous.”// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 16 February 2016.

Some criticisms were targeted at the poor management of the police, which allegedly led to a large number of policemen being injured.

• //While the police have long been monitoring the movements and plans of radical groups in the cyber world since the Occupy movement and acknowledged that “something” would happen on the first day of the Lunar New Year, it seems they did not have the full picture. “The force did not see it coming to be honest, or at least not that violent and irrepressible. They thought it would be like the so-called gau wu [shopping tour] protests staged in Mong Kok every night,” a police source close to the matter told the Post. Widely circulated video footage shows a group of traffic police officers outnumbered and struggling to cope with a large group of rioters, which resulted in an officer firing two live rounds into the air. The source close to the situation said force manpower was at its “weakest point” on Monday due to the Lunar New Year holiday, while a large number of officers were deployed to the Lunar New Year parade in Tsim Sha Tsui the same night. “There were simply not enough people working. The unit had to call up people when the protest became aggressive,” the source said.// Source: SCMP, 11 February 2016.

Response from the localist group Hong Kong Indigenous:

• //’Radical? Yes. Separatist? I have no objection either,’ said the protester, Edward Leung, a 24-year-old spokesman for the group Hong Kong Indigenous. He is among dozens of people charged with rioting in connection with the Feb. 9 clashes. […] Mr. Leung, who was rallying protesters with a loudspeaker before his arrest, denied that Hong Kong Indigenous had orchestrated the violence, though city officials later noted that the group had carried plastic shields to Mongkok. About 20 of the 69 people who have been arrested in connection with the clashes are affiliated with the group, according to Mr. Leung. ‘If history decides we’re culpable for the violence, so be it,’ Mr. Leung said, but ‘if we manage to achieve self-government, or even build a nation of our own, what happened in Mongkok would be called a revolution.’// Source: The New York Times, 20 February 2016.

• Background of the Hong Kong Indigenous: //Calling the movement a failure in terms of striving for that goal, Wong shunned the milder approach adopted by the pan-democratic camp and groups like the Federation of Students and Scholarism. He co-founded localist group Hong Kong Indigenous in January last year, an organisation that advocates “separation between Hong Kong and China” as well as “using force in resistance”. The group believes that the influx of mainland immigrants would undermine local culture and lead to abuse of the city’s welfare system. It advocates for Hongkongers’ right to self-determination. Since its founding, Wong has been a core member of the group core member and its spokesman. The group drew attention with its participation in a spate of protests against visiting mainlanders, especially those conducting parallel trading across the border in Yuen Long, Tuen Mun and Sha Tin last year. Some of the protests escalated into intense clashes with the police and pedestrians, and several group members, including Wong, were arrested.// Source: SCMP, 22 February 2016.

Responses from the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong:

Academics initiated call for the set-up of Independent Investigation Committee to probe the disturbance in Mongkok. The SAR government declined the call by saying it was not necessary. Pro-democracy politicians vowed to initiate a move in the Legislative Council to investigate the case if the SAR government refused to do so.

• //近30名學者發起網上公開聯署行動，要求政府就旺角大衝突成立獨立調查委員會，授權現任或退休法官深入調查事件經過的真相、成因及建議，向政府提交報告。[…] 聯署發起人、中大地理與資源管理學系副教授姚松炎表示，發起學者對當局事發至今只集中「譴責、拘捕和檢控」，並沒向公眾交代事件成因及警方處理方式，「做法令人遺憾」。他續稱，現時有必要盡快梳理衝突源頭，「獨立委員會的公信力，可探究背後的底因及相關的社會基礎，會為社會的撕裂找出路」。姚松炎表示，若政府3月9日前沒接納意見，會促請立法會以特權法調查，否則便需民間自行邀請資深法律界及學者調查事件，「但公信力當然有不同，政府要明白用意」。聯署其他發起人包括理工大學助理教授鍾劍華、教育學院高級專任導師莊耀洸、浸會大學助理教授杜耀明、中文大學副教授黃洪、香港大學首席講師張達明等。// Source: MingPao Daily, 15 February 2016.
• //多名學者及專業人士上周日發起聯署，要求政府成立獨立調查委員會，調查年初二凌晨旺角大衝突，但政府早前表示不會成立獨立調查委員會。泛民議員將於下周五(26日)立法會內委會提出動用特權法調查旺角大衝突，冀得到議員支持。//Source: MingPao Daily, 19 February 2016.

Responses from the pro-establishment camp in Hong Kong:

Pro-establishment academics called for the enactment of Basic Law’s article 23 (i.e. the law relating to the state security and prevention of subversion of state power)

Lau Siu-kai and Rao Geping (饒戈平) from Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macau Studies (CAHKMS):

• // 饒戈平指出，從佔中以來，香港社會出現不少這種街頭暴力活動，對公共秩序、對香港的社會治安產生了一種嚴重的威脅。 […] 他提到，有本土主義鼓吹港獨，騷亂當晚在短期內演變成大規模暴力活動，難以不令人認為，是有組織及有預謀。就外交部形容是「本土激進分離組織」所為，他認為，有極少數本土激進分離組織，主張與台獨、藏獨、疆獨組織沒有分別，只是嚴重性有差異。他強調，維護國家統一及領土完整是憲法規定，對危害國家安全的行為是不容許的。// Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal, 16 February 2016.

The CAHKMS also accused the judiciary branch of appeasing those who were prosecuted for the violence. The former deputy commissioner of the ICAC Tony Kwok Man-wai (郭文緯) in the conference organized by the CAHKMS urged to launch a campaign to name and shame those judges who seemed to pass sympathetic sentence to those which inflict violence. The Bar Association responded that such attempt would put pressure on judges and might have committed a contempt of court.

• //A campaign to name and shame “political” judges who pass “lenient” sentences on street protesters ­– the public backing of which has forced a former high-ranking anti-graft official to apologise […] But the Bar Association hit back on Thursday: “Anyone attempting through speech or conduct to put pressure on judges so as to affect their adjudication of cases may have committed a contempt of court.“We find deeply deplorable the suggestion, made collectively by ‘experts’ who hold subjective views drawn from incomplete assessments of selective individual cases, that some judges should be ‘named and shamed’.”// Source: SCMP, 25 February 2016.

Analyses of the Mongkok disturbance by journalistic commentators and scholars:

Some views expressed by commentators and scholars on the Mongkok disturbance are noted below. For the historical account of the rise of localism and anti-China sentiment in Hong Kong, please refer to the article “The Making of Hong Kong Nationalism” by Prof. Alvin So.

Alex Lo, political commentator on SCMP: violent actions are not a good strategy to deal with Beijing

• //It’s a central belief among localists and not a few pan-democrats that communicating and compromising with Beijing over the years has got Hong Kong nowhere. Instead, they believe, it only makes things worse for us. […] But just for argument’s sake, let’s say trying to work with Beijing has yielded zero results. What then is the alternative? We must then confront Beijing. I have no problem with that. The peaceful mass rally in 2003 was also a singular achievement that forced Beijing and the government to shelve Article 23 national security legislation for years to come. So I would argue that reasonable compromise and peaceful “confrontation” have both produced results, so the jury is still out as to which way is better. But escalating confrontation to the level of violence and riot as Leung has advocated is counterproductive. It will not force Beijing to yield, but with certainty make it take an even harder line.// SCMP, 17 February 2016.

Kent Ewing, public affairs commentator on Hong Kong Free Press, expressed similar views:

• //Hong Kong, meet your sister region, Tibet. The “radical separatists” responsible for the violence in Mong Kok a fortnight ago have elevated you to that status of alarm in the words of Beijing’s top man in the city, Zhang Xiaoming. Hong Kong, meet another restive sister, Xinjiang. The protesters’ inclination “towards terrorism”—again, according to Zhang—places you in this hair-raising category as well. […] Yes, as many have pointed out, there are explanations for that fiery night of turbulence rooted in Hong Kong’s growing economic inequality and the sense of powerlessness felt by far too many of its people, especially the young. The profound disconnect between the government and the people should be the true source of alarm here. Still, that does not mean we offer a free pass to those who engaged in a prolonged brick-and-glass assault on police. The perpetrators should be punished with the full force of the law. To claim, however, that a small, ragtag band of violent localists represents a serious challenge to Hong Kong’s status as a Special Administrative Region of China is simply absurd. Hong Kong Indigenous and other such misguided groups stand clearly on the fringes of Hong Kong society. Although they may have succeeded in ruining the first night of the Lunar New Year for the rest of us, they do not, by any stretch of the imagination, represent a genuine threat to China’s hold on Hong Kong. But there is a real worry that, if they persist in their violent ways, Beijing will use their stupidity as a pretext to justify a more heavy-handed approach to security in the city. Ironically, the Mong Kok rioters could very well be playing right into the hands of their nemesis, the central government.//Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 21 February 2016.

Lau Sai-Leung (劉細良), former Adviser of the Central Policy Unit of HKSAR Government: The fundamental reason for the disturbance lies in the government’s reluctance to recognize the importance attached to localism by the youth in Hong Kong, and the oppressive attitude by the C. Y. Leung.

• //政府至今仍不願面對，本土議程得到年輕人支持這事實，一概視為廢青廢嗡（一事無成的年輕人說廢話）。由於共產黨直接管治模式丶爭奪資源引發中港矛盾，以及梁振英的強硬緊隨中央路線，「保衛香港」口號成為情感動員力量，年輕人投身激進政治行動之中，今天年輕人已視特區政府只代表共產黨政權。英治殖民地警察一樣是鎮壓機器，但即使當時激進的七八十年代托派示威衝擊，因沒有群眾支持，也是象徵式行動，不會出現雙方互毆局面，甚至雙方不會動真格互罵。至於泛民及主流中產民意，昔日扮演穩定力量的功能，已被梁黨同伐異的管治手法而廢了武功。他們一是加入本土丶激進陣營，一是選擇淡出政壇。無可否認，香港今天已陷管治失效、政治失敗的局面，但掌權者不單沒有意識到危機，以圖平息各方憤怒及矛盾，及委任獨立調查借檢討警民衝突原因去修補裂痕，重建信任，反而再次趁機以強人平暴姿態出現，爭取政治本錢。按其慣常手法，下一步又會是再次抬出本土港獨，進行意識形態批判，及引用殖民地嚴苛的公安條例「參與暴動」的條文，起訴示威者。香港管治方式及能力的大倒退，只懂用法律、警棍及政治口號，製造仇恨，野心政客以權謀心術作管治，真正大規模暴動危機，正迫在眼前。// Source: the Initium, 11 February 2016.

Stephanie Cheung on SCMP: political polarization in the city as a reason for the controversy over the nature of the Mongkok disturbance:

• //The Mong Kok riot is symptomatic of a lack of rigorous reasoning which has been prevalent in Hong Kong these past few years. And this does not apply exclusively to the young, but also to government officials, politicians and opinion leaders. One aspect of bad reasoning is the trend to treat different concepts as somehow opposite, without any room for middle-way negotiation. We saw a notable example in the January cold spell, when a woman berated a police officer standing between her and a climb up Tai Mo Shan. The police had been called in to rescue stranded hikers. Going uphill to see frost was her freedom, she claimed, and she alone had the right to determine her personal safety, whereas rescuing people was the police’s duty. The police should not curb her freedom in carrying out their duty. […] However, when we portray one concept as opposite to another, we are pushing people to choose sides. Without proper reasoning, choices are made based on prejudices and emotive appeal. The Mong Kok incident was a case of people rallying round a call for protection of local traditions. Applying this black or white mode of reasoning, respect for law and order was inevitably thrown out of the window, since it was portrayed as being opposite to localism.// SCMP, 18 February 2016.

Professor Tai Lok-lui (呂大樂), Chair Professor of Hong Kong Studies from the Institute of Education: the rise of radical localism in the past five years has gained influence, resulting in the ambiguity of attitudes of the Hong Kong society towards the violence seen in the Mongkok disturbance. Also, he regarded that there was little hope that the current SAR government can properly take up the role of reconciliation of the society under current political situation:

• //上面所討論的情况，背後是一種頗值得了解的心理，這就是在目前香港社會裏，至少在大部分年輕人（我的觀察是年齡在35歲以下）圈子，誰跟梁振英政府同一陣線，一定是負分，至於屬現屆政府的對立面，則有可能屬不同高低的正分數。這是廣泛社會大眾層次上的情况，而正因為存在這種大眾情緒，我們才能理解為何上面所指出在政黨、社會運動等不同範圍的活躍分子，會作出種種自相矛盾、不易理解的行為。中游「泛民」害怕的不是「動武派」（反正早已不是同一陣線，後者專以拖前者後腿而建立聲望和爭取支持者，而前者對此亦心裏有數），而是背後支持或接受後者的行動、手段、論述的（隱形）群眾。而社運界的不同派系，同樣擔心會因在言論上不靠近一下，便會被貼上標籤，再難介入那個圈子。在過去5年左右的時間裏（我的看法是在2010年前後），這種情緒慢慢累積、結集起來，而（其無形的）影響力逐年遞增。所以，儘管爆發了旺角暴力衝突，預期中市民對梁振英政府的同情分會有所增加的情况未有出現，而全民聲討暴力的場面也未有在社會上形成。以當晚事態之嚴重，社會是應該會出現反彈的，但結果又並非如此。香港目前這個社會狀况，確實相當古怪。這是一種政治疏離的狀態，現屆特區政府似乎完全沒有辦法將市民大眾和坊間的輿論拉近過來，反對力量就不用多說了，就連「建制派」也會小心翼翼，很謹慎的作出有限度支持。究竟誰是誰非，暫且不談，但從香港社會發展的角度來看，則在這次旺角暴力衝突事件後，我看不到現屆特區政府可以擔起推動社會重建的角色。若由他們來牽頭，很多人——尤其是年輕人——便會走到對面，令重建規範、秩序倍加困難。但這項重建工程是當前香港最為重要的事情。或者在現屆特區政府缺席的情况下，香港社會和香港人更有辦法去做好事後的工作。//Source: MingPao Daily, 19 February 2016.

• Some vivid description of the background of Mongkok: //A place of extremes, it is popular with tourists, messy, yet lively with links to triads and is where the city’s underdogs, the sex trade and colourful entertainment flourishes. It is always viewed as the antithesis of the “high-brow” Hong Kong Island, which is a place for the intellectuals and the middle and higher class. But it has its unique charm which is irresistible and its own distinct identity with a recognised “Mong Kok culture”, with youths who hang out in the area identified as “MK guys” and “MK girls”. From the world’s cheapest Michelin-starred restaurant to small quirky eateries; from upstairs bookstores to pirated CDs; from karaoke to brothels; from cheap fashion to trendy products; from goldfish to birds, Mong Kok has something to satisfy every taste and all budgets. […] Today, this is the busiest and most crowded part of Hong Kong, a shopping and entertainment district, transport hub, business centre and residential zone packed into a relatively small patch of land. Shoppers now bargain hunt zealously at Tung Choi Street, nicknamed Ladies’ Street – a key hawking zone for cheap women’s clothing, accessories, cosmetics and other trendy products – a fascinating shopping area which began life due to a policy change about hawking introduced in the mid-70s. […] However, the booming hawking business also attracted triads – particularly the Wo Shing Wo and 14K. Many of the stall spaces were in fact “bought” from triads when the street was made a permitted area in 1975 while many hawkers simply became triads for reasons of self-protection. The triads had another, more lucrative, business to take care of, namely the vice business in Portland Street, the city’s most famous red light district serving mostly local Chinese clientele and being a popular feature in triad movies.// Source: SCMP, 16 February 2016.

2. Update on the case of Lee Bo’s disappearance

It is now confirmed that Lee Bo was detained by the Mainland officers in Guangdong Province but the exact location remains unknown. It is reported that Lee Bo issued open letter, urging the Hong Kong society not to make a fuss about his assistance to the Mainland officers in an investigation. On 12 February, the British government in its bi-annual report accused the Chinese government of ‘serious breach’ of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, in particular the part regarding legal autonomy for the city. For details of the report, please find it here. Pro-establishment lawmaker Ip Kwok Him, who is also the vice-chairman of the Democratic Alliance for Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong as well as a deputy of National People’s Congress, urged the Beijing government to improve the notification mechanism between Mainland and Hong Kong authorities, and to enhance education for the Mainland officers about the unlawfulness of law enforcement in Hong Kong. The case of Lee Bo has caused concerns about the autonomy of Hong Kong by Britain which has a significant number of business ties in Hong Kong as well as the practice of ‘One Country Two Systems’ within the pro-establishment camp in Hong Kong.

• //The UK has said a British bookseller who has disappeared in Hong Kong was likely « involuntarily removed » to China, calling it a « serious breach » of the handover treaty.The statement from Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond is the UK’s strongest comment so far on the case of Lee Bo. It is also the first time the UK has noted a serious breach of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.// Source: BBC, 12 February 2016.

• Heather Timmons on Quartz: // The strange case of Hong Kong’s disappearing booksellers, who went missing ahead of the publication of books critical of Chinese president Xi Jinping, has raised global concerns about free speech and rule of law in the Asian financial capital. […] Still, Hong Kong remains important to Britain because of the continued ties British companies—in particular, banks—have in the city, as the report points out. There are over 600 UK companies with offices in Hong Kong and 3.7 million British passport holders living there. Overall, UK investment in the city around a third of total British investment in Asia.// Source: Quartz, 12 February 2016.

• //National People’s Congress deputy Ip Kwok-him, from the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, said he would also urge Beijing to improve the notification mechanism between mainland and Hong Kong authorities, after it took a month for Guangdong police just to confirm that Lee was assisting in an investigation in the province. […] Ip said education was important as it was not enough for officials to know that it was unlawful to enforce mainland laws in Hong Kong. “To implement this rule under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, we need law enforcement officers to understand the law more clearly as well,” he said.// Source: SCMP, 18 February 2016.

Zheping Huang, Echo Huang Yinyin and Heather Timmons wrote that the abduction of Lee Bo and his associates from the Causeway Bay Bookstore might indicate an extension of intra-party struggle within the Chinese Communist Party in Mainland China, and the case has grave implication for the freedom of publication in Hong Kong.

• // [t]he crackdown on publishers in Hong Kong is also a sign that the Chinese Communist Party continues to be deeply divided, academics and publishers in Hong Kong believe, and signals the latest brutal attempt by Xi to silence dissenters within. That’s because Hong Kong’s “banned books” market serves as a place for the 85 million member strong party, one of the world’s largest and most powerful, to air its dirty laundry. Xi has eliminated some of his most powerful rivals since taking power in 2013, but warring factions inside the party remain, and Hong Kong is serving as their battle ground. In recent years, the Hong Kong book market has “become an extension of the infighting within the party,” Ching Cheong, a former vice-editorial manager with the Communist Party’s official newspaper, Wen Wei Po, told Quartz. Since Hu Jintao became president in 2002, different factions within the party have begun using Hong Kong publishers to disseminate information and earn political favors, or smear their opponents, Ching said. Since Xi took office in 2013, the trend has only increased, to the point where half of the books published in Hong Kong seem to be criticizing Xi, while the other half praise him, Ching said. The recent crackdown on Hong Kong booksellers show the ruling party elite will no longer tolerate the political instability these books stir up, Ching said. […] So-called “upstairs” bookstores like Causeway Bay, which sell political titles banned in mainland China, don’t just cater to mainland tourists looking for a thrill read in Chinese they can’t get at home. For decades, they have also served as an outlet for the Communist Party to read about itself, settle scores, and rewrite the official, whitewashed “history” and highly censored “news” available on the mainland. These bookstores’ steadiest customers, and many books’ authors, have been former or current party members. Hong Kong’s “banned” publishing industry has its roots in journalists with deep knowledge of the Communist Party, who were often members as well. […] Though Hong Kong is technically guaranteed the right to free speech, press, and publication by the “Basic Law” that covers the city, self-censorship is spreading. Commercial Press, one of the three major local publishers who are ultimately owned by Beijing’s representative office in Hong Kong, has withdrawn books banned on the mainland from sale, local newspaper the Standard reported. Page One, the Singapore-based international retailer who owns eight outlets in the city, began to stop selling sensitive titles in late November, around the time the first of the five linked to Causeway Bay Bookstore went missing. Now, Page One is no longer carrying books about the Communist Party at all, according to a memo circulated this month. This month, Open Books pulled a planned sequel to the book comparing Xi to a “godfather,” Xi Zinping’s Nightmare. “Circumstances have changed, and I am not able to face the huge consequences,” Open’s chief editor told the author Yu Jie in a letter.// Source: Quartz, 17 January 2016.

3. By-election of the Legislative Council on 28 February 2016

Triggered by the resignation of Ronny Tong Ka-wah, a previous Civil Party member, Legislative Council had the by-election on 28 February to fill in the vacancy of the geographical constituency in the New Territories East, before the general election later this year. The by-election draws much attention of the Hong Kong residents with the participation of the localist group Hong Kong Indigenous which has many members accused of being involved in the Mongkok unrest, and solicits many hard-core supporters from the younger generation. Also, in terms of the political cleavage, some observers worried that many pro-democracy candidates participating in the by-election would allow the only one pro-establishment candidate to win the seat, which in turn will make pro-democracy Legco members one person short to dominate the other half of the Legislative Council composed of the geographical constituency. Given the continued use of filibustering strategies by the pro-democracy legislators and the consequential tension developed between the two political camps, some analysts pointed out that pro-establishment camp would take advantage of the situation and reduce the room for filibustering with the potential amendment to the internal rules of the Legislature should they have enough pro-establishment legislators to support this move.

• //此次立法會補選將選出一名議員，填補原立法會議員湯家驊在2015年6月22日辭去立法會議席後的空缺。七名候選人包括無申報政治聯系的1號劉志成、中間路線政黨「新思維」的2號黃成智、3號親建制「民建聯」周浩鼎、報稱獨立的4號梁思豪及5號方國珊、本土派「本土民主前線」的6號梁天琦、屬泛民主派「公民黨」的7號楊岳橋。原本，這場選舉被外界視為3號周浩鼎和7號楊岳橋，即建制派與泛民之爭，哪一方取得議席，將會在地區直選組別中取得過半數議席。現時，立法會部分議案及法案，需要在分組點票，即地區直選及功能組別中，同時獲得過半數議員通過。因此，泛民派如果在今次補選中取回過半數議席，將會在分組點票中保有「否決權」，相反如果建制派贏得補選，將會同時在兩個組別中獲得過半數議席，在分組點票時取得絕對優勢。因此，這個補選議席又被稱為「關鍵一席」。不過，選情在過去三星期出現了變數。2月9日凌晨旺角發生騷亂後，暴力抗爭的主導組織本土民主前線及其發言人梁天琦迅速冒起，並在網絡上得到不少年輕人支持。原本較為鬆散的本土派亦全力動員，呼籲票投梁天琦，新界東補選形勢突然「不可預測」。有分析指，梁天琦選票會增加，但最終贏得議席的機會不高，但他在補選中的得票率，可被視為香港市民對「本土」和「抗爭」路線的表態。// Source: The Initium, 28 February 2016.

• //《基本法》規定，立法會議員個人提出的議案和法案，以及對政府法案的修正案，都要得到功能組別議員和分區直選議員，這兩組出席議員各超過半數支持才能通過。現時，功能組別中，建制派議員過半；而在地區直選組別中，前公民黨成員湯家驊辭任之後，泛民和建制在這個組別都各有17人。換句話說，假若此次補選獲勝的議員屬於建制派，那麼泛民很可能失去對議案的「否決權」。[…] 228補選後，立法會將在七月暑假休會，期間只剩下四個多月的工作會期。梁家傑坦承，政府未必有足夠時間在短時間內提出爭議性議案，但他擔心建制派議員會利用這四個月提出「修改議事規則」。近年，香港部分立法會議員在會內採用「拉布」策略，即透過提出大量修正案及不斷點算人數，達致會議流會，作為阻止或延遲爭議性法案通過的策略。// Source: The Initium, 23 February 2016.

On 29 February, the voting result was announced and Alvin Yeung Ngok-kiu, who is a barrister and member of the Civic Party to whom the traditional pro-democracy camp has given full support in this campaign, won the election with the 160,880 votes over the 150,329 votes received by his arch-rival Holden Chow Ho-ding, who is a member of the Democratic Alliance of Betterment and Progress for Hong Kong (DAB) and represented the pro-establishment camp to run this election. Also, Edward Leung, who represents political group with localist orientation, received 66,524 votes, accounting for about 15.4% of the total votes cast. For a geographical illustration of supporters by district in the New Territories East, please here prepared by Hong Kong 01 (in Chinese).

• //Edward Leung Tin-kei may have lost the the Legislative Council ­by-election, but the 24-year-old has paved the way for a new era of Hong Kong politics where localist sentiments will increasingly come to matter. The pan-democrats scored a victory in New Territories East, with Civic Party’s Alvin Yeung Ngok-kiu winning the seat and maintaining the bloc’s voting power in the chamber. But the emergence of candidates like Leung signals a looming battle for the city’s pro-democracy vote. Leung, who represented Hong Kong Indigenous, secured 66,524 of the 434,000 votes – a credible result of about 15.3%.//Source: SCMP, 29 February 2016.

Alvin Yeung said he only won by a small margin of votes this time, and he regarded this by-election as the last chance for the traditional democrats to reform. He also thanked the support from the pro-democracy camp in this by-election.

• //楊岳橋以160,880票力壓周浩鼎的150,329票，勝出這次補選。通宵守候點票結果的楊岳橋，今早接受商台訪問時表示，以新界東94萬選民之數和這次投票率，自己只贏1萬多票，絕對不多。被問到結果宣布一刻，他的表情不太興奮，他表示，這是泛民和公民黨最後一個革新機會，知道自己責任很大。至於如何革新、未來數月會做什麼，楊表示，泛民須超越以往只是投反對票、然後出來講幾句話的做法，選民已不滿足於這個，必須超越以往的做法。他又認為，這次選舉顯示泛民非常團結，他亦多謝民主派鼎力相助，相信未來日子必然更團結，作為少數的民主派要更凝聚才有力量。//Source: Ming Pao Daily, 29 February 2016.

Chinese University political scientist Dr Ma Ngok said:

• //[t]he number of votes Leung canvassed was greater than expected, but it was still too early to say whether the young student had a real chance to enter the Legco in the September elections. “There are no other alternatives representing the radicals or localists in this by-election, but there will definitely be more than one choice in the general elections,” he said, referring to incumbent radical lawmakers Raymond Chan Chi-chuen and “Long Hair” Leung Kwok-hung, as well as the the post-Occupy group Youngspiration, which is likely to field candidates in the polls. Leung had gained support not only from those who supported the idea of localism or even independence, but also those who were dissatisfied with the performance of traditional pan-democrats and who sympathised with what happened in Mong Kok. “Now, with Hong Kong Indigenous getting more than 66,000 votes, it seems the Mong Kok incident, which [Chief Executive] Leung Chun-ying said was triggered only by the extreme minority, has won support from a considerable amount of people,” said Ma, the head of the school’s government and public administration department. “The government should reflect on why the violent protests could still win support from many,” he ad[d]ed.// Source: SCMP, 29 February 2016.

Chinese University political analyst Ivan Choy Chi-keung said:

• // it was normal for by-elections to have a lower turnout rate than full citywide elections. The constituency has been a stronghold of the pan-democrats, who won over 56 per cent of the votes in 2012. Yeung saw his lead over Chow narrowing in the wake of the violence in Mong Kok and Leung’s growing prominence. He said in Fanling yesterday: “Most cast-iron votes are pro-establishment, so a low voter turnout rate is usually not a good sign for the pan-democrats.”//Source: SCMP, 29 February 2016.

4. Tai Kung Pao and Wen Wai Po in Hong Kong will merge into one as to re-structure resources

The two Pro-Beijing newspapers were announced to be merged into one media agglomerate (香港大公文匯傳媒集團) on 02 February 2016. In history, there have been discussions on their merge as early as days before the Handover of Hong Kong in 1997 and the recent merge was first reported in October last year. The current Tai Kung Pao’s Editor-in-chief Jiang Zaizhong (姜在忠) will become the president of the new media organization, while the former Wen Wai Po’s Editor-in-chief Wang shucheng (王樹成) was transferred to the post of Editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily (Overseas Edition). The two newspapers were under the control of CCP’s Hong Kong-Macau-Work Committee (中共港澳工委). For a brief history of the two newspapers in Hong Kong, please see this article by a former Wen Wai Pao’s reporter Johnny Lau Yui-siu (劉銳紹).

• //香港大公報和文匯報於2月2日宣布，由大公報和文匯報整合組建的「香港大公文匯傳媒集團」日前正式在香港成立，兩家媒體未來將按不同的定位「各自出報」，亦將統籌採編和技術力量，力求在「融媒體」方面獲得發展。大公報是中國發行時間最長的中文報紙之一，1902年創刊至今已有114年歷史。文匯報則創刊於1948年，已連續出版68年。兩家報紙的香港版現均由中共港澳工委控制，被視為香港親北京的左派報紙。// Source: The Initium, 03 February 2016.

• //曾長期在《文匯報》任職至1989年六四事件為止的香港時事評論員程翔說，文匯大公合併計劃已經討論了至少20年，如今終於得到落實。程翔對BBC中文網說：「其實大家都知道，這兩份報紙都是嚴重虧本的。過去很強調有政治任務，虧了也就算了。」「但在今天的社會很難允許無限期的虧損下去，合併了以後，我相信能節省一些資源。」然而，程翔對兩報合併以後能否增加在香港的輿論影響力抱有疑問。「因為這兩個左報，他的目的是要宣傳中共的思想、政策，這種意識形態很難（跟香港）融合一起的。」[…] 在《蘋果日報》透露合併方案後，免費報章《AM730》報道說，北京早於1997年香港政權移交前已在考慮兩報合併，政權移交後數年也有再討論，但未有實踐。然而，報道說，因為未來要收縮預算，《文匯報》、《大公報》合併一事再度提上日程，希望合併後將兩報的管理層、業務與後勤部門精簡，只維持各自的編採團隊。而在《蘋果日報》的報道發表後不久，《文匯報》社長王樹成調任中共人民日報社編輯委員會委員兼《人民日報海外版》總編輯。至11月，一份據稱來自《大公報》的公函通報，北京、上海、廣州、深圳等中國大陸21處《大公報》辦事處自2015年結束起撤銷，人員遣散，「經營業務」同步終止。當時《蘋果日報》提到，新的報業集團董事長將由《大公報》現任社長姜在忠出任，「第二把交椅」則由《文匯報》社長出任。但是，《文匯報》星期二在其簡訊中說，姜在忠擔任集團董事長，並同時兼任《文匯報》、《大公報》社長。// Source: The BBC, 02 February 2016.

HONG KONG – ECONOMY

HSBC’s headquarters not to be re-located to Hong Kong

On 15 February, HSBC’s headquarters decided to stay in London despite previous discussion on the re-location to Hong Kong. Commentators offered both economic and political reasons for such decision.

• Henny Sender from Financial Times: // There are many reasons HSBC decided to keep its headquarters in London and most of them have to do with the evolving circumstances in China. Much has changed there since the bank announced it was reviewing whether to return to its roots in China and Hong Kong. For a start, the regulatory risk has soared as local and foreign investors have lost their faith in the government and regulators’ ability to manage the markets and the currency. That matters to HSBC because if it had shifted back to Hong Kong, the People’s Bank of China would have been in effect its regulator and certainly its lender of last resort. […] Now though, the opportunity seems both smaller and less seductive. Growth is slowing, albeit off a huge base. The sources of growth are also changing; in future China will be more domestically driven. There will be less business for a foreign bank — and Beijing will always regard HSBC as a foreign bank. Moreover, this is no time to be aggressively expanding in China. Mr Gulliver is an astute risk manager, who was running Asian markets during the Asian financial crisis from Hong Kong. For more than two years he has been bracing for a slowdown in China, reducing his counterparty risk with smaller financial institutions and dealing only with the most blue-chip borrowers. Although the announcement of the decision to stay in London spoke of the “particular emphasis” HSBC is putting on investing further in the Pearl River Delta”, it neglected to say that most of that is in financing HSBC’s Hong Kong corporate clients as they go across the border. Both Mr Gulliver and his board recognise that this is a moment that calls for greater caution. No wonder the vote in favour of London was unanimous.// Source: Financial Times, 15 February 2016.
• Patrick Foulis from The Economist: //In a statement, the bank said London was a leading financial centre and home to a large pool of highly-skilled international talent. It added that the decision “offered the best outcome for our customers and shareholders”. […] Patrick Foulis, The Economist’s New York Bureau Chief, said that HSBC’s decision was wise: “As one of the largest world banks, if it fails and is based in Hong Kong, it would become China’s responsibility to bail it out. HSBC is already thriving in China and does not need to be domiciled there to succeed,” he said. He added that a move to Hong Kong might have infuriated the US, as it would not be keen on a bank with a large Chinese influence playing a big role in the dollar-clearing system. The UK Treasury described the bank’s decision as “a vote of confidence” in the government’s economic plan, adding that the decision would help to make the UK a great place to do more business with China and the rest of Asia.// Source: Hong Kong Free Press, 15 February 2016.
• Heather Timmons from Quartz: //HSBC just wrapped up its latest review of where the bank should be located, and despite the fact that some analysts estimated moving to Hong Kong could save the bank $14 billion, and Asia contributes most of the bank’s profits, HSBC will stay in London. The UK “has an internationally respected regulatory framework and legal system, and immense experience in handling complex international affairs,” the bank said in a statement on Feb. 15, and London is “home to a large pool of highly skilled, international talent.” Unless there’s a major change, the decision is permanent, HSBC said. “The Board has decided that it is not necessary to continue the previous practice of reviewing the location of the Group’s headquarters every three years,” the bank said. A bank spokesman would not elaborate on how much of a factor Beijing’s influence on Hong Kong played in the decision, but HSBC’s board reportedly enlisted former US secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice for advice—a sign that politics, not the nitty-gritty of tax savings or employee recruiting played a big factor. Beijing’s growing control over Hong Kong was certainly considered by the board, an unnamed HSBC “insider” told Reuters last month. “The situation in Hong Kong appears to be getting worse. You have to wonder if the city will remain a suitable base for an independent-minded, top global financial institution.”// Source: Quartz, 14 February 2016.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Taiwan’s reception of the remarks by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi

On 25 February, Wang Yi said he hoped to see Taiwan’s new leader after 21 May to follow their own constitution to develop cross-strait relations within the framework of One-China Principle. Former Deputy Minister of Mainland Affairs Council Tong Zhenyuan (童振源) argued that Wang’s statement indicated a larger room for negotiation between the two governments, and it was seen as a compromise on the part of Mainland China. The Vice-President of the Legislative Yuen, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) member Tsai Chi-chang (蔡其昌) responded that Wang’s remarks were out of goodwill if the Mainland side respected the de facto existence of the Republic of China.

• //大陸外交部長王毅25日在華盛頓表示，希望、也期待「台灣新的執政者」520後以自己的方式、表明願依照「他們自己的憲法」，繼續推動兩岸關係和平發展。他又說，「她（民主進步黨總統當選人蔡英文）既然是按照目前『他們的憲政』所選出來的，她不能違反自己『憲法』的規定，『他們的憲法』是規定『大陸台灣同屬一個中國』，是非常清楚的」。王毅並強調，執政者是依照憲政體制而當選，如果違反憲法，那是難以想像的，也是無法持續的。王毅從頭至尾沒有提及蔡英文3個字，也沒有使用「中華民國」或「總統」等字眼，但卻是中方高層官員公開談論兩岸關係時，首度提及「憲法」、「憲政」等字眼，而他也罕見地未提及九二共識。[…] 但這位前中國大陸國務院台灣事務辦公室主任接著說，這是政權更替，是選舉政治的規律，很正常，「我們不關心誰在台灣執政、誰掌握中國台灣地區的政局；我們關心的是，成為執政者之後，她如何處理兩岸關係，她能否繼續維持兩岸關係和平發展，能否繼續承諾『兩岸同屬一個中國』這個重要的兩岸關係發展的政治基礎，這才是我們關心的核心的事情」。// Source: China Times, 27 February 2016.
• //曾任陸委會副主委、現在美國柏克萊加州大學擔任訪問學者的童振源，針對中國外交部長王毅25日(當地時間)於華府智庫談及台灣憲政的言論撰文回應。 […] 童振源認為，這席言論可說是中國對台政策「從九二共識往前邁進妥協的一大步」，讓兩岸和解的路更加寬敞，也讓民進黨新政府與中國政府互動的政治基礎出現可協商的空間。// Source: NewTalk, 26 February 2016.
• //立法院副院長蔡其昌26日表示，該發言是不是讓步還有待觀察，但尊重中華民國存在的事實，就是善意。蔡其昌表示，對岸一貫的主張，大家都很清楚，蔡英文也多次強調維持「中華民國」現狀，也就是維持制度、維持兩岸現行關係，他認為，兩岸既然過去可以和平共處，對岸基於相互尊重，未來不管誰執政，北京方面也應該持續對兩岸現狀維持釋出更多善意，不希望換了政黨就標準不一。// Source: New Talk, 26 February 2016.