CHINA – POLITICS

Power balance at the top

1. Willy Lam: Communist Youth League (CYL) clique maintains clout despite congress setback: “This close-knit network is particularly strong amongst Fifth Generation cadres (those born in the 1950s) as well as Sixth Generation cadres (those born in the 1960s). Moreover, its predominance will manifest itself no later than the 19th Party Congress set for 2017.”
   1. At least 9 of 25 Politburo members are deemed to be tuanpai affiliates: Aside from Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, there are State Councilor Liu Yandong; the newly-appointed Propaganda Department Director Liu Qibao; Beijing Party Secretary Guo Jinlong; Director of the General Office of the Central Committee Li Zhanshu; Shanghai Party Secretary Han Zheng; and Inner Mongolia Party Secretary Hu Chunhua.
2. At the same time, decline of princelings: just a few Fifth Generation princelings were elected into the Central Committee, and only as alternate members
   1. A good example is Li Xiaopeng, age 53, the executive vice governor of Shanxi Province and a former president of the state-held energy giant, the Huaneng Group. The fact that Li, the eldest son of former premier Li Peng, garnered the least votes among the 171 Alternate Central Committee members testified to the unpopularity of princeling politicians.
   2. Only political sector where Fifth Generation princelings have retained influence is the military: 41 of 205 Central Committee members hail from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police.
3. Another power bloc that gained impressively is representatives of China’s yangqi, centrally-held, SOE conglomerates: 6 full Central Committee members are yangqi bosses, compared to just 1 five years ago. In contrast, only 1 private entrepreneur:
   1. Yangqi are traditionally close the princeling gang.
   2. “The increasing political clout of the yangqi CEOs seems to testify to the fact that the trend—characterized by Chinese economists as “the state sector advances even as the private sector retreats” (guojin mintui)—probably will continue for the foreseeable future.”

Chongqing Affairs

New details emerging on Wang Lijun’s past style:

1. SCMP: “wild, self-centred and highly particular about appearances”. Did not hesitate to mete out punishment: “Many officers, including some who once worked closely with Wang, were subjected to punishment, ranging from receiving demerits or demotion to loss of their jobs or even detention over minor mistakes.”
2. China Newsweek:
   1. 专门为王立军摄影摄像的团队超过二十人，身着蓝色夹克，被称为“蓝精灵”，任务是拍下王最为动人的时刻。王立军有欣赏自己照片的爱好，常在夜里看自己的视频。
   2. 局长经常破口大骂，脏话连篇。一个秘书将他办公室的花盆打碎了，王在众人面前叫道：有人要谋害我。
   3. 李庄：王立军在重庆任职的近4年时间里，曾有51任秘书。 忻建威成为王立军的第三任秘书，这一关系维持了四个月，但他已是时间最长的秘书。
   4. 王立军到了重庆公安局后不久就将原《重庆公安报》停办了。之后，他将新的警察系统内刊命名为《警察文化沙龙》： 这份报纸实际上是王立军的“个人秀”，里面充斥着他最喜欢的“联动战役”“锋线”等词汇。

Xi Jinping’s “nanxun”

1. Shenzhen as venue of Xi’s first inspection trip:
   • Paying tribute to Deng Xiaoping and father Xi Zhongxun, who was given the task by Deng to set up experimental zones for economic reforms in 1979.
   • Sending a signal of commitment to deepening reform.
   • Comparison with Hu Jintao: Xibaipo as first trip, the red headquarters of the CCP and the PLA in the late 1940s
2. Accompanied by four “reform elders” in Guangdong, all of whom have accompanied Deng on his inspection tour 20 years ago, as well as worked with Xi Zhongxun during his two years in
3. A more friendly style?
   1. SCMP: “The new leader appeared relaxed and willing to interact with onlookers who scrambled to get close to him, shaking hands with several of them. Wang [Yang] also signalled a plain-clothes policeman not to stop a Sunday Morning Post reporter from taking photos.”
   2. Xi’s Shenzhen tour on Friday coincided with a strike of some 3,000 workers at a printing factory. According to witnesses, several workers were taken away and beaten by cops.
4. Reuters: Xi more confident, direct and relaxed than Hu but also quick to invoke nationalistic themes to win public support and legitimacy: Xi’s talk of “revival” or “rejuvenation” at the Road Toward Renewal exhibit at the National Museum of China. “Raising eyebrows” among China’s neighbors who are wary of China’s territorial claims.

Corruption investigations

Wen Wei Po: List of officials investigated for corruption after 18^th Congress

1. China’s anticorruption commission has opened investigation into deputy party secretary of Sichuan province, Li Chuncheng. He was named at the party congress as one of 171 alternate members of the Central Committee.
   • Potential link to factional struggles? Li worked his way up the CCP ladder from Harbin until 1998, when he was transferred to Sichuan, as vice mayor of Chengdu. Zhou Yongkang was party secretary of Sichuan from 1999 to 2002.
   • Speculation over implication of Liu Qibao, the new propaganda chief: Liu was conspicuously absent for nine days, some alleging that he was implicated in downfall of Li, Liu’s former subordinate when he was Sichuan party chief. Xinhua dispelled rumors stating that Liu had made visits to the State Council Information Office and the cultural ministry.
   • Investigation into Li followed detention since August of Dai Xiaoming, chairman of Chengdu Industry Investment Group, on suspicion of involvement in bribery: bribed Chengdu officials to obtain access to oil industry.
2. Blackmail operation uncovered:
   1. Lei Zhengfu sacked over leaked sex tapes: uncovering of blackmail ring installed under Bo Xilai: Girls hired to spend nights with officials who have control over certain projects. Girls secretly filmed the liaisons providing material for future blackmail. Strategy used by property company.
   2. According to reports, Lei confessed his situation to Bo Xilai, who told Wang Lijun to help. Wang set up an investigation team, detained the girls and jailed the property developer for forging company seals. The tapes were suppressed by the regime, but following the scandal “found their way” to Zhu Ruifeng, founder of “Supervision by the People” website.
   3. A similar case in Chongqing concerns Wu Hong, who works for the Peiling district’s Urban Administration and Law Enforcement Bureau. Pictures appeared online showing him with young woman.
3. Further cases involving private conduct: Shanxi province, Taiyuan city, former village party head Li Junmin found to have four wives and ten children. Gansu province, Lanzhou city, mayor Yuan Zhanting found to own many expensive watches. Xinjiang province, Wusu city, police chief Qi Fang sacked after it was revealed that he kept twin sisters as mistresses.

Analysis:

1. NYT: Xi Jinping trying to make an anti-corruption campaign one of the first hallmarks of his tenure, as seen in his inaugural address and his first speech to the Politburo. Wang Qishan is also well positioned to fight corruption given his extensive contacts with banks, and has few conflicts of interest with other top Chinese officials because he does not have children.
2. Wave of “online anti-corruption” (網絡反腐，微博反腐): Phenomenon of 天天都有貪官抓
3. Ming Pao editorial: “這一波網絡反貪腐，肯定與總書記習近平三令五申反腐倡廉有關，不過，這次疑似官民契合的網絡反貪腐，是一場走過場式的運動、抑或是中共決心反貪倡廉，救黨救國的序曲，仍待觀察。”
4. Why such positive and speedy reactions from local governments?
   1. Local governments declaring loyalty to new leadership: “今次反貪腐，地方積極回應，應該有向中央輸誠的盤算，另外也不能排除地方官員有割除毒瘤，以免受到牽連的考慮”
   2. Local officials jostling for power: “各級官員執位情勢未定。現在內地官場處於權力交替期，網絡反貪腐方興未艾，會否成為別有用心者攻擊政敵的平台，值得注意。因為類似近期已落馬官員的惡行，內地官場絕不難找，而網絡反貪腐的不可控制因素，使舉報有可能成為權鬥的工具”
   3. Need to break cycle of corruption: “薄熙來召來王立軍在重慶掃黑，確實清剿了一批黑社會，但是結果怎樣呢？只是重塑了重慶的黑社會程序，另一批黑社會冒起，接受「領導」而已。這個荒謬境况， 用來檢視反貪腐，若其他一切不變，則掃除一批貪官污吏，可能只是重塑另一種權錢關係，由另一批人上場，重複另一次貪腐循環而已”
5. Questioning the sustainability of the “movement”: “網絡反貪腐，實際上就是人人都拿着一個咪高峰，都有發言機會。這種人人都可以在網絡舉報貪官的「大民主」，必然出現泥沙俱下，爆料真假難辨，或是存心誹謗等，都難以避免，最終會使網絡反貪腐失去公信力，這種粗放式的舉報，持續性成疑，不應該成為常態。若中央決心反貪腐，必須進行有關制度建設”
6. WSJ: Pulling attention away from initiatives in education and healthcare? “Anti-corruption sounds to some like the same-old, unconnected Party—interested in its own struggles, instead of those underneath.”

New rules for new leadership

1. New Eight Do’s and Don’ts for new leaders published by Xinhua 12/4
2. Objective and aim: 抓作风建设，首先要从中央政治局做起，要求别人做到的自己先要做到，要求别人不做的自己坚决不做，以良好党风带动政风民风，真正赢得群众信任和拥护。要下大决心改进作风，切实解决群众反映强烈的问题，始终保持同人民群众的血肉联系。
3. 八项规定 :改进调查研究；精简会议活动；精简会议简报；规范出访活动；改进警卫工作；改进新闻报道；严格文稿发表；厉行勤俭节约。

改进调查研究: 多到困难和矛盾集中、群众意见多的地方去，切忌走过场、搞形式主义

精简会议活动: 要轻车简从、减少陪同、简化接待，不张贴悬挂标语横幅，不安排群众迎送，不铺设迎宾地毯，不摆放花草，不安排宴请。

精简会议简报: 提高会议实效，开短会、讲短话，力戒空话、套话。

规范出访活动: 从外交工作大局需要出发合理安排出访活动，严格控制出访随行人员，严格按照规定乘坐交通工具，一般不安排中资机构、华侨华人、留学生代表等到机场迎送。

改进警卫工作: 减少交通管制，一般情况下不得封路、不清场闭馆。

改进新闻报道: 中央政治局同志出席会议和活动应根据工作需要、新闻价值、社会效果决定是否报道，进一步压缩报道的数量、字数、时长。

严格文稿发表: 除中央统一安排外，个人不公开出版著作、讲话单行本，不发贺信、贺电，不题词、题字。

厉行勤俭节约: 严格执行住房、车辆配备等有关工作和生活待遇的规定

Analysis:

1. SCMP: The absence of traffic controls for a PSC motorcade last week was one of the first indications that the new leaders are serious about change; a refreshing change of style.
2. Wen Wei Po editorial: “八項規定可謂習式「新八項注意」，直指中國官場陋習陋規，從小事著手於細微處見功夫，牽微髮動筋骨，對撥正黨風化解脫離群眾的危險，意義重大。”
3. 龍子明 全國政協委員:
   1. 中央高層從自身做起改進作風，直指官僚主義、形式主義和消極腐敗，展現出「自上而下」從嚴治黨的膽魄，具有高度的示範意義和指導意義，將引領風清氣正的政風民風。
   2. 八項規定的重大意義之一，就在於扭轉中國社會根深蒂固的「官本位」文化。八項規定內容十分具體，對調研、開會、文件、出訪、警衛、新聞、文稿、勤儉等予以剛性要求，是對「官本位」文化的徹底否定。
   3. 在當代， 「官本位」是腐敗的催化器，「官本位」作為以官為本、以權為綱、以仕途為個人事業選擇導向的一種意識和價值取向，強調的是一切服從於官級地位、一切為了做官和陞官、把做官陞官看作人生最高價值追求和評判人生價值大小的標尺，而且當官可以享受到一般群眾難以企及的特權。
   4. 要解除社會的重負、破除「官本位」，必須從「官本位」回歸「民本位」。

Greater transparency for cadres’ family assets in Guangdong province

1. 根据广东省委的要求，广东省纪委认真研究和借鉴了港澳地区以及其他国家的经验，分别在粤北和珠三角地区各选择一个县、区，开展领导干部家庭财产申报并在一定范围公示的试点工作。 根据广东省《从严治党五年行动计划》的要求，在2014年前完成领导干部家庭财产申报试点，并逐步推开。
2. Guangdong party dicisplinary chief Huang Xianyao: “From next year, officials who are to be promoted will be required to declare their personal and family assets, provide information about any investments and private businesses, and say whether they have kept a clean record during their political careers”
3. China’s own ICAC in Zhuhai? 广东珠海市横琴新区今年成立了全国首个集纪检、监察、反贪、审计为一体的廉政办。 在必要时也可以“廉政办”名义与港澳反腐机构开展反腐倡廉的合作与交流。
4. Senior researcher at Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences: Absence of effective supervisory mechanism to verify whether officials declare their assets honestly:
   35. Scandal in October 2012: Political commissar of Panyu’s Urban Management Bureau found to own 22 properties valued at over 35.5 million yuan, but the official only declared 2 apartments under his name.
5. Aside from Guangdong, at least 19 other governments at municipal, district, county or prefecture level in 10 provinces/municipalities have required officials to declare assets since 2009.
6. Ming Pao editorial: “官員申報財產，可能要以特赦政策配合，既往不咎；特赦可以減少阻力，也是現實需要，因為內地貪官實在多到抓不勝抓。香港當年也是頒令特赦，從零開始，才可以割除貪污毒瘤”

Black jails

1. NYT report on the “black jail verdict that never was”:
   1. Beijing Youth Daily reported on 12/1 that a Chaoyang municipal court in Beijing had sentenced 10 people to jail for illegally detaining and assaulting a group of petitioners from Henan who had gone to Beijing to lodge complaints about official malfeasance. It was reported in People’s Daily and Xinhua, but deleted by the end of the day.
   2. Is it true? Why censor? NYT: The repeated denial of the existence of black jails by top officials. Denials increasingly challenged after exposes on the hiring of security companies: municipal and provincial governments paying “retrievers” to grab petitioners off street
2. Further signs of cracking down on black jails? Days after the Beijing Youth Daily report, the Chengdu-based Tianwang Human Rights Centre reported that a Beijing detention centre has released thousands of petitioners.
   1. Released petitioner speaking to SCMP: Detainees were held according to where they come from: Those held in the Zhejiang hall, numbering 300-400, were set free and those in Shandong hall.

Human rights

1. December 10 marks the day the Charter 08 was signed and the day Liu Xiaobo should have received his Nobel award. Group of 134 Nobel laureates signed letter to petition for release of Liu and his wife.
2. Associated Press reporters’ visit of Liu Xia, who is under house arrest in Beijing. Related to Xi’s recent gestures?
3. Chinese police barred Hu Jia from leaving home after he proposed marking UN Human Rights Day near home of Liu Xia.
4. Xu Zhinyong’s open letter to Xi Jinping. According to the SCMP, Xu was then held by the police for nearly 40 hours in what XU said was a bid to stop him from meeting supporters for dinner.
5. Chen Guangcheng’s video: “Dear Mr. Xi Jinping, the whole nation is watching you. Whether you will follow the call of heaven and people to carry out reform, or kidnap the government and maintain the power of the Communist Party, it is a matter of whether China will have the transition in a peaceful way or a violent way.”
6. Chen Guangcheng’s nephew Chen Kegui sentenced to three years and three months in prison on Nov 30 for injuring officer during raid. Chen’s family was just given a few hours’ notice of the “trial”, and lawyers they chose were rejected by the court.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

China Affairs Committee

1. 11/21: DPP set up China Affairs Committee (中國事務委員會)
   1. Convened by DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌). Tsai Ing-wen has accepted invitation to be a member of the Committee, which will consist of 7-9 members meeting once every two months. The Committee is to serve as an internal consensus building platform with members of “accredited seniority”.
   2. Hsieh turned down the offer: not as aggressive as he wanted: “the committee appeared to be nominal”. Yu Shyi-kun, former premier in DPP administration: DPP should focus on economy and its long-term goal of making Taiwan an independent, sovereign nation, also refused joining committee.
   3. Yazhou Zhoukan: A political move to attract voters and a demonstration of good will to China: 蘇貞昌當選新一任民進黨主席後，提出兩項重要主張，一是恢復民進黨原有的「中國事務部」，二是要成立一個委員會來研究和處理兩岸關係：這兩個主張是為了讓台灣選民相信民進黨重視並能夠處理好兩岸關係，同時也向大陸展現善意，目的是為了今後選舉中能贏得選舉信任，避免二零一二年的覆轍。
   4. Controversial:
      1. DPP Legislator Chen Chi-mai (陳其邁): Should include more young DPP members who could promote innovative ideas, instead of “a roster of senior politicians which looked almost identical to the Central Standing Committee.”
      2. Central Executive Committee member Hung Chih-kun (洪智坤): Chinese dissidents, China-based Taiwanese businesspeople and academics from various think tanks should be included in the committee
   5. Lawrence Chung, SCMP: Su’s move appeared to have backfired: did not build up official contacts with mainland, while failing to placate DPP hardliners. Think tank finds that 55.7% of opposition supporters are for the idea of party-party exchange between DPP and CCP.
2. Competition between Tsai and Hsieh?
   1. Hsieh’s visit to the mainland in October, where he proposed a new formula for cross-strait relations based on “different interpretations of the Constitution”: 以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，以「憲法各表」來取代「一中各表」
   2. Yazhou Zhoukan: 蔡英文登陸早有預案，北京統戰部協調運作，由中華全國台灣同胞聯誼會（簡稱全國台聯）發出邀請，以小英基金會董事長身份登陸。不過謝長廷搶先登陸，又引發黨內的不同聲音，消息人士告訴亞洲週刊，蔡英文登陸會暫時擱置，但不會放棄，「最快至明年新春前後成行」。

Relations with mainland

Yazhou Zhoukan: “北京新班子對台新思維”

Four signs of progress in the 18^th Party Congress era:

1. The new emphasis on strengthening institution building (加強制度建設)
   1. Past lack of formal institutions: “過去二十年，兩岸高層之間只存在非正式的對話管道，除了以民間協會身份存在的海基、海協兩會，就是台灣高層官員間或以黨派身份訪問大陸，制度管道搭建基本上處於停滯狀態。”
   2. New mentions: 商談建立軍事安全互信機制， 簽訂和平協定
   3. “如果說十六大、十七大報告還是北京隔空表態式喊話，十八大報告已經開始切實強調兩岸未來多個合作領域的具體政策預期，是有史以來的重要突破。”
2. The affirmation of the success of ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) by Taiwan entrepreneurs
3. The changing attitude of DPP: Frank Hsieh’s visit. New competition between Ma’s government and DPP likely to result in friendlier attitude to Beijing: “綠營態度的變化意味著藍營不再在意識形態上壟斷親陸態度。這在客觀上對藍營變向起到鞭策和促進作用。只有制定更多、更有效的兩岸政策，藍營才能繼續保住已 有的意識形態陣地。馬英九曾表示，對謝長廷示好北京，改善兩岸關係樂見其成。那麼，如果藍綠互爭親陸陣地，北京更加樂見其成。”
4. Reformist outlook of China’s new leadership: five of seven PSC members will be replaced in five years, reform-minded officials likely to take over.

Anti media monopoly protest

1. Sale of Taiwan media outlets owned by Hong Kong-based Next Media completed in Nov 28 in Macau: fear of losing freedom of press. The chairman of the Want Want China Times Group, Tsai Eng-meng, has been cited by critics as the leading example of the encroachment by the Chinese Communist Party into Taiwan’s free media.
2. Anti-Media Monopoly Youth Federation: If Want Want acquires Apple Daily, it will take 46 percent of the market!

Lung Ying-tai’s visit to Hong Kong: excerpts from speech

1. 因为是边陲体系，香港成为一个“逃生门”(emergency exit)。
2. 台湾不是一个逃生门，反而是一个让你想留下来，找一个有土会长出丝瓜，丝瓜会开出黄花的地方。它的强项与弱项跟香港非常不一样。 你问我台湾最可爱的地方哪里?我觉得台湾的可爱就在于它的不假装伟大，它的不用力变成什么样子，它的自自在在的过日子。它基本上慢的调性是一种文化的从容。
3. 台湾的民主有它深沉的一面：我们也都知道，民主，是诸多不得已的、坏的选择当中，一个大概不是最坏的选择。在诸多的选择中，华文世界，包括台湾自己，可以试图在台湾一点一滴的实践过程里头，培养出一个更敏锐的判别力，判断甚么是泡沫，泡沫下面有没有静水流深的东西?
4. 台湾与香港有一个相似的地方：就是相对于那个大传统，台湾和香港都是“边陲”;但是边陲有边陲的优势，边陲有边陲的自由，边陲有边陲可以 做出的独特的贡献。我们这几年常常用一个词“soft power”(编者注：指软实力)，我相信soft power这两个字真正的重点不是在power，真正的重点在soft。所以我相信香港和台湾可以在将来做更多的接触，更多的彼此的对望，更多的深入的、 深刻的了解。因为soft power告诉我们的是：正是因为边陲，反而有一种温柔如水的力量，更长更远。

MACAU – POLITICS

Signs of corruption crackdown

1. Chinese government increasing scrutiny of Macau’s casino industry and junket operators that bankroll its gamblers. In recent weeks, police have detained people from at least three of Macau’s biggest junket operators.
2. Tightening of restrictions over cross-border financial transactions involving Chinese funds. Casino operators receiving requests from Macau police about people staying at their hotels.
   1. According to WSJ, “Chinese individuals aren’t allowed to move more than $50,000 a year out of the country, including to Macau, which, like Hong Kong, is part of China but has its own financial system and its own set of laws. That restriction has prompted some high-roller gamblers to rely on junket operators to get around Chinese laws and provide access to greater sums.”
3. Recent news:
   1. Release of “Broken Tooth” Wan Kuok-ko, former leader of a triad after serving 14 years in prison for triad membership and money laundering.
   2. Detention of Pang Yufeng, a partner of one of Macau’s major junket operators, David Star, who has ties to Bo Xilai.
4. The crackdown comes as the Macau government conducts a major review of its antimony-laundering rules. HK has tightened its in April, a move that pushed banking business to Macau.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Central Policy Unit controversy

1. Central Policy Unit (CPU) announced decision to take back administration of a $20 million funding scheme from the Research Grants Council operating under the University Grants Committee (UGC):
   1. Scheme announced in 2005 under the Tung administration to boost policy research. Every year $20 million is allocated to the UGC. The Council is responsible for inviting applications, evaluating proposals and making funding decisions.
2. Political neutrality of CPU questioned:
   1. Rescinding annual funds seen as move with political motive: Unit could use money to appoint pro-government or pro-Beijing think tanks to conduct studies and surveys favoring the government.
   2. CPU head Shiu Sin-por: Need to fight public opinion battle. Controversial proposal at Legco seeking approval for the creation of a new full-time position at the CPU to monitor public opinion through new media and opinion polls. Labor Party chairman Lee Cheuk-yan: Is CPU becoming a body like the central government’s propaganda department?
   3. Appointment of Sophia Kao Ching-chi to coordinate all appointments to government advisory and statutory bodies.

The rise of new “red” organizations

1. iSun Affairs:
   1. 特務政治: 靠地下工作起家的中共，在執政60年之後，仍然迷戀和依賴於這種方式。近年來由於內地群體性事件增多，互聯網高速發展，中共統治危機加劇，特務政治大行其道。「五毛黨」遍佈互聯網，便衣跟蹤成了異議人士的家常便飯，大學生告老師秘狀也多有所聞。
   2. 香港抗議運動風起雲湧，也帶來了特務活動的蓬勃發展。無論是議員選舉還是學生會選舉，不乾淨的選票愈來愈多；無論是媒體輿論還是街頭論壇，喬裝打扮越來越肆無忌憚。
2. Student organization: 香港各區專上學生同盟 ： 本刊調查發現，今年港大多個幹事職位已被TSA「攻陷」，其最終目標是要與一向以爭取民主自由為宗旨的香港專上學生聯會（學聯）分庭抗禮，成為最有影響力的學生組織。
3. 愛護香港力量： 近期由網上走至地上，發起多次支持特區和北京的集會遊行。召集人陳淨心表示：「我願意成為共產黨員，無私的為國家奉獻。」
4. 香港青年關愛協會: 與法輪功展開「攻防戰」，兩邊一齊搶佔公眾地方作為宣傳據點，雙方近期已爆發多宗衝突。