CHINA – SOCIETY

Press freedom

Website of Yanhuang Chunqiu shut down on Friday (registration cancelled) allegedly due to an article calling for political reform and constitutional government.

Nanfang’s New Year’s Greeting incident

1. Dai Zhiyong’s editorial edited by censors: 《南方周末》新年賀詞原題為《中國夢，憲政夢》，五次修改後，變成《我們比任何時候都更接近夢想》 Side by side comparison of the two pieces. Negotiation reached and newspaper resumed publication on Thursday.
   1. Ming Pao: Alleged involvement of Hu Shuli, who knows Wang Qishan personally. Wang, given his past experience in Guangdong province, was able to get Hu Chunhua to deal with the affair.
2. 一個以「南周編輯部」名義再度發出的公開信: 這起事故只是一個導火索，據不完全統計，二○一二年南方周末編輯部被改撤稿件共一千零卅四篇，近一年來，面臨無故審查、斃版、斃稿、被改寫。

Reaction from society

1. Jan 7: Gathering outside Nanfang office in Guangzhou. Estimated 200-800 participants.
2. Open letter by group of prominent former Nanfang Weekly journalists:
   庹震部长曾经在《经济日报》社担任总编辑，在其任职期间，将一家本有希望在市场上一显身手的报纸，整到无声无息；其在新华社分管社办报刊期间，社办报刊风 声鹤唳，万马齐喑，社内有领导称，“他再管上半年，新华社这些社办报刊好不容易占领的市场，将全部失去”；其后去广东任职宣传部长，当时就有传言称广东媒 体“将死得很惨”，事实果真如此，其在广东工作期间，是广东媒体业最黑暗的时候。
3. Open letter to Hu Chunhua, calling for the removal of Tuo Zhen: Signers include Peking University law professor He Weifang (贺卫方), economist Mao Yushi (矛于轼), prominent lawyer Zhang Sizhi (张思之), author Zhang Yihe (章诒和) and veteran journalist and blogger Li Chengpeng (李承鹏), as well as public intellectuals of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Commentaries; Aftermaths

1. John Kennedy, SCMP: “the first big political scandal of 2013”
2. House News: 最近接任廣東省委書記的胡春華有「小胡錦濤」之稱，被視為10年後的國家主席，但其在西藏及內蒙鎮壓異見者的經歷，令人懷疑將他調任廣東，是中央有心壓制廣東這個受香港影響、在政治上「不聽話」的經濟重鎮。胡春華在內蒙時，就遇上當地牧民示威，有海外媒體指他當時錯判形勢，把一件小事看成蒙獨，結果反使事情鬧大；若該報道屬實，則可顯示出胡春華有鐵腕壓制糾紛的傾向，廣東的自由風氣堪憂。今次事件是胡春華調任廣東以來第一個難關，胡處理今次事件的手法，可預示未來幾年廣東將面對的政治控制有多強。
3. Global Times editorial:
   1. 不管這些人願不願意，有一個常識是：在中國今天的社會政治現實下，不可能存在這些人心中嚮往的那種「自由媒體」。中國所有媒體的發展只能是同中國大現實相對應的，媒體改革必須是中國整體改革的一部分，媒體決不會成為中國的「政治特區」。
   2. 即使在西方，主流媒體也不會選擇同政府公開對抗。在中國這樣做，一定更是輸家。一直以來有一些外圍人士試圖推動中國個別媒體搞對抗，他們是在坑這些媒體。
   3. 希望所有喜欢《南方周末》的人配合风波的平息，别逼一份中国报纸扮演它无论如何也承担不了的对抗角色。
4. Dai Zigeng (戴自更), the Communist Party-appointed publisher of Beijing News, announced his resignation on Tuesday after a heated argument with propaganda authorities over the publication of the Global Times editorial. The editorial was run on page A20 but editors refused to put their names at the bottom of the page in protest.
   1. Ming Pao: 據《新京報》內部人士透露，事件令中宣部長劉奇葆震怒，北京市委宣傳部副部長嚴力強前晚8點半親自到報館，明確表態，稱「新京報和瀟湘晨報是被點名的」，必須在周三的報紙上轉發《環球時報》社評，但遭到記者和編輯的抵制，指社評不符合邏輯和良心。
   2. 胡佳、李方平和吳凎（網名「屠夫」）等10多名維權律師和網民，昨午走上北京街頭，手舉《新京報》聲援該報編採人員，並手持「上廁所拉屎送環球屎報」的標語，表示對有關社評的不滿，行動持續約半小時，未遭警方阻止。
5. Sina, Renren and other websites hiding supportive messages among headlines.

Changes within Nanfang Daily Media Group 

All excerpts from ISun Affairs below

從2008年四川地震或更早時候開始，遏制南方、調整南方的辦報方向就是北京的宣傳策略。此間歷經京奧、上海世博、60年大慶、亞運會等反复狙擊不成後，宣傳系統終於痛下殺手。壓制南方報道的聲譽成為控制的全部內容。因此，才會有專門針對南方的特別禁令，也才會有北京上海都可以報、唯獨南方不可報的例外，也才有內部審查疊加常規禁令的變態。這樣的輿論箝制目的無他，就是要讓南方報業在大陸新聞界不斷被邊緣化。從這一年的內外控制看，這個目的收效明顯，南方缺席重大報道、在重要議題上封鎖聲音，成為常態。

Acts of censorship/purges

1. In June and July [in 2012], an internal examiner (内部审读员) at Southern Metropolis Daily suggested to superiors that Southern Metropolis Daily should avoid any further use of the cartoons of a certain well-known arts editor, the reason being that his illustrations would be politically risky for the newspaper.
2. After the July 21 floods in Beijing, an eight-page special feature was pulled from Southern Weekly. Internal examiners used a red pen to strike out stories about ordinary people affected [by the floods], and only reports on the actions of officials were left alone.
3. Former Southern Weekly commentator Xiao Shu (笑蜀) called for an internal reckoning, and pointed his finger at Tuo Zhen (庹震), the head of the Propaganda Department of the Guangdong Committee of the CCP, calling for the tossing out of this extreme leftist ideological official. Xiao Shu was removed from Nanfang Daily Media Group back in March this year. Tuo Zhen landed in the province in May.
4. It is said that when Tuo Zhen came south, he came with the task of cleaning up (整顿) the Nanfang Daily Media Group. Coincident with Tuo Zhen’s arrival in Guangdong was the appointment of Guangdong deputy propaganda minister Yang Jian (杨健) as concurrent Party secretary of the Nanfang Daily Group. He replaced Yang Xingfeng (杨兴锋), the Nanfang Daily Media Group director.
5. In 2011, well-known commentator Chang Ping (长平) was removed and the commentary desk of Southern Metropolis Daily was reshuffled, commentary writers and editors were removed. More recently, there has been the discharge of [well-known investigative reporter] Yu Chen (喻尘).
   1. Note on Chang Ping’s career in Nanfang: 2008年4月西藏三一四事件发生后，他因在英国《金融时报》中文网发表《西藏：真相与民族主义情绪》一文，招致网民及《北京晚报》等媒体的攻击，被撤去副总编辑一职。后调任至南都传播研究院任研究员。 2011年1月底，被南方报业集团解聘。

Why these changes? 母報—子報的權力變異

南方報業的權力結構:

1. 南方報業傳媒集團：南方報社管理委員會委員 (集團社委),屬省管幹部序列，社委作為省管幹部，升遷的否決權掌握在宣傳部手裏。馴服社委就可以控制不聽話的「兩南」
2. 子報系：南方報業傳媒集團所轄《南方周末》、《南方都市報》、《21世紀經濟報道》等十一份報紙
3. 2006年范以錦社長退休之前，一直克制集團對子報的介入，較好地維護子報系的獨立發展權，這一切從楊興鋒擔任社長開始轉變。在楊興鋒社長任期的次年開始，集團委派社委去子報時，開始加大介入力度。
4. 集團社委曹軻下派到南方都市報、王更輝和黃燦到南方周末做負責人之後，子報系的平穩局面被打破，失去對編輯方針和用人權的把握，激發了原本均衡的子報系的內部矛盾。通過2008-2011年三年的衝突與調和，子報系的獨立權被集團收服，社委不再是清白的「集團代理人」，而成為子報系的實際控制者，這種權力結構的模式就此成型。

Censorship apparatus

1. 中宣部和廣東省委宣傳部都對南方報系有審讀機制，但是在報題、成稿、上版、付型等出報流程上，對《南方都市報》和《南方周末》進行日常化、密切審讀的則由南方報業自己完成。
2. 審讀小組:
   1. 主要負責審讀《南方都市報》的評論、深度報道以及整個《南方周末》的報道
   2. 這個審讀小組在汶川地震前後被強化，向總編輯負責，隨時報告，有刪改的建議權。
   3. 南方都市報原本沒有審讀員這個崗位，2010年底開始設置，但這個崗位受到同事鄙視，審讀員與其他同事經常發生口角，作用不大，這位審讀員最後選擇離開。 2011年下半年開始，集團審讀員小組不敷使用，重提在南方都市報內部增設審讀崗位。今年初，在原校對室的基礎上建立審讀校對室，增設審讀員，該室由一名 曾掛職省宣的新聞編輯任負責人。
   4. 因遭受同事鄙夷，審讀員只能向上、向宣傳部尋求保護。為此，他們言聽計從，靠提高審查程度博取歡心，把社會急需的真實報道貼上「危險」的標籤，還做出告密和出賣行徑。
3. 至少在2010年之前，南方報業內部的自我審查有一定的公開性。比如宣傳部的所有禁令都可以在南方都市報內部網上自由查詢，集團審讀小組會定期將審查記錄轉發到報系之間供查閱。現在的情況完全不一樣，審查和自我審查都是秘密進行。禁令再也不能在內部網上備查，只轉發到總編手機上，由他們向下口頭或電話傳達。審讀小組也不會再暴露審查記錄。
4. 南方報業現任總編輯張東明熱衷於激發審查機制的積極性，新聞審查官出身的他親自參與對《南方都市報》和《南方周末》的審讀，是歷屆總編輯中所未有，是內部審查機制的總負責人。

Chen Yizhong on the general trends in censorship since Jiang; direct quotes

“After Southern Metropolis Daily exposed Sun Zhigang’s confinement and fatal beating, as well as the truth about Sars, Cheng was detained in secret for more than five months by the Guangdong authorities in 2004 for “economic crimes”, before being released as innocent.”

1. Towards the end of Jiang Zemin’s term, control over the media by the publicity department, led by Ding Guangen, got tighter and tighter:
   1. One obvious change: the department no longer sent orders to the media in formal documents or cables, requiring editors to implement them. Instead, it left messages on the phone or sent text messages directly to specific people in charge.
   2. Reason: there were increasingly frequent prohibitions. Written documents needed to be approved at every level, and the bureaucracy was too complex and too slow in urgent cases. Passing the message over the phone or by text message was quick; the process was simple and effective.
2. Under Hu Jintao:
   1. A clear change: control became more underground and secretive. Officials would call the media to communicate a prohibition and often stress before hanging up: “Do not make a written record. Do not leave any written evidence. Do not disclose the content of the ban…”
   2. Prohibitions became a “power-seeking tool” for the publicity department: party officials, rich and powerful interest groups and large companies all seek to appease senior officials at publicity department in order to shut off information at the source.
3. After 2005: Strategy of “demoralize, divide and conquer”
   1. Central publicity department started sending censors directly to major media organisations to carry out censorship prior to publication. Dual system of double safeguard: not only passing comment on news after publication, but had a pre-publication checkpoint
   2. Direct appointment of publicity department officials to leadership positions in major media organisations

       

Children’s rights

1. Fire at an unlicensed private orphanage in Kaifeng, Henan province taking the lives of seven children brought attention to the lack of care for China’s orphans. Owner of orphanage (袁厉害) was “good Samaritan” who has provided shelter for some 100 children since the 1980s in her dilapidated home: 弃婴王国
2. According to official data, about 100,000 infants are abandoned nationwide each year, mostly girls and children with disabilities.
3. Existing regulations:
   1. 2008: 民政部、公安部、司法部、卫生部、人口计生委联合下发《关于解决国内公民私自收养子女有关问题的通知》
      1. 无论是医疗机构还是公民，一旦发现弃婴，首先应该向所在地公安部门报案
      2. 爱心人士可以申请从福利院收养弃婴并办理手续，就此“合法”收养
   2. 2013: 民政部于1月6日下发《关于主动加强对个人和民办机构收留孤儿管理的通知》，要求对个人和民办机构收留孤儿情况进行全国性大排查。
4. Current dilemma: 现在面临的尴尬局面是，官方的儿童福利机构体系不足，民间力量的进入又面临高门槛
   1. Woeful lack for government support and welfare, leading to proliferation of unlicensed and underfunded orphanages run by private individuals. Local officials tacitly allow these and even sent abandoned orphans to them.
   2. Official suspicion of NGOs makes it difficult for them to play active role. Unwilling to encourage adoptions by childless couples for fear of child trafficking
5. In the case of Yuan: 2004年到2006年9月底民政部门对袁厉害的救助情况：5900元、1200斤面粉、6床被子、8件衣服；其他项目里包括130件旧衣服和4件方便面。

NYT: Child trafficking in China

1. Statistics:
   2. According to government statistics, some 54,000 children have been rescued from traffickers in the past 2.5 years.
   3. Government says 10,000 children kidnapped each year, but some experts put figure at 70,000.
2. Latest operation in December 2012 covering nine provinces led to rescue of 89 abducted children and arrest of 355 people for trafficking.
3. Mostly baby boys:
   1. Senior police official: baby boys could now be purchased in China’s interior for less than $5,000, and then resold for three times that amount in the wealthier coastal provinces.
   2. Some are sold to buyers in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, but most go to families desperate for male heirs.
4. Parties/interests involved:
   1. Abductors: according to one: during 1990s get a few dollars from orphanage for bringing in a child. As demand increased it started paying US$120, US$250, then US$500 by 2005
   2. Suppliers
   3. Orphanages: Make big profits when babies were adopted. For those kidnapped, identities are erased and paperwork is forged to turn them into “orphans”
   4. Adopters: both locals and foreigners: “Child-welfare advocates working in China say some kidnappings are the result of the increasing prices paid for adoptions by foreigners.”

Gaokao: Ensuring rights of migrant workers’ children

1. Beijing: 37% of residents without local hukou
   1. “Starting this year, children of migrant workers have addition access to education if their parents have had full-time jobs for three years and have contributed social insurance for three consecutive years. The students must have completed three-year middle school study in Beijing. But that qualifies them only for exams for secondary vocational schools.”
   2. “In 2014, they get additional access but still fall short of the full entry the local gaokao offers. If the parents have full-time job for six years and have contributed social insurance for six consecutive years, and their children have completed three-year high school study in Beijing, the children can take exams for higher vocational schools.”
2. Guangdong province: over 25% without local hukou
   1. Beginning in 2013, “the children of what it calls “high tech” skilled workers will gain credits toward taking the gaokao. Beginning in 2016, students who have completed three years of high school study in Guangdong are eligible for the gaokao if their parents have full-time jobs for over three years and have contributed social insurance for a total of more than three years.”
3. Critics:
   1. Contribution to further concentration of people at metropolises
   2. True gaokao reform impossible without hukou reform.

An Ill Nation

1. Shanxi province leaders accused of two cover-ups in the past month:
   1. Christmas Day explosion killing at least eight workers at a tunnel construction site: government confirmed blast only after torrent of online criticisms
   2. Delayed five days in issuing a public warning after 9 tonnes of toxic chemicals entered the river, contaminating drinking water of hundreds of thousands of residents in Hebei.
   3. Beijing News commentary on belated announcement
2. Blame falling on Li Xiaopeng, son of Li Peng. Internet users calling on Li to step down as he is expected to be appointed governor soon.
3. ISun Affairs feature report: 国病
   1. 改革開放以來，中國平均每年經濟增速達10%，但「發展是硬道理」的背後是民眾以病痛之軀付出的「硬代價」。
   2. 官僚機器不僅製造了無數的中國病人，它本身也是一個病態的存在，中國官員是世界上最大的精神疾病群落。
4. Century Weekly feature report: 血荒
   1. Revival of black markets, underground collection and selling operations due to lack of blood: 因供血紧张，需要患者自己“搞血”

South Reviews report on the electronic waste industry in China

1. 目前，中国的电子垃圾处于内忧外患的局面，不仅难以消化自身每年产生的大量电子垃圾，而且还遭受国外电子垃圾的入侵。发达国家每年产生的电子垃圾有80% 出口到亚洲，其中的90%进入了中国。
2. Guangdong province, Qingyuan city: “再生铜都”
3. Development of industry:
   1. 80年代末，台湾地区禁止废五金进口，台湾的电子垃圾拆解业逐步往大陆转移，那些与国外电子垃圾售卖方有着合作关系和丰富经验的台湾人也就成为大陆产业链上游的淘金者。
   2. 大货场场主在早年多是台湾人和江浙人、福建人，都是对货源有控制力者。所谓货源，则几乎全来自国外，美国、欧洲、日本的电子垃圾，在拆解人看来，这些地方 的电子垃圾再回收的质量比国内电子产品的高。这些“洋垃圾”经由香港、佛山南海港、广州黄埔港、广西梧州港等地进来，再分散至各地。清远的货源，多来自南 海。
   3. 2005年到2007年是拆解业的黄金发展期，当时很多拆解户都赚到了可观的收入，但产业在2008年发生了转折
      1. 铜价大跌
      2. 货源越来越紧张：2001年，中国政府加入了《控制危险废物越境转移及其处置巴塞尔公约》，随后又出台了诸多法律法规，规范电子垃圾的回收，这几年国家环保总局也要求严格控制电子垃圾的进口
      3. 进口电子垃圾关税不断提高

4. Cost of development; strengthened regulations
   1. 2009年4月，清远市清城区人民法院对清远市首宗涉嫌焚烧工业垃圾造成重大环境污染事故的刑事案件进行宣判，有5人因在清城区龙塘镇民平村委会的牛栏窝、粪箕窝等地开设垃圾焚烧场，分别被判处有期徒刑1~2年，并各处罚金人民币2万元。
   2. 通过建设循环经济区，加强电子垃圾拆解业的环保治理

CHINA – POLITICS

Regional leadership reshuffle

1. Willy Lam, China Brief: “The traits and political orientations of the new regional chiefs reflect the authorities’ priorities about seeking gradual changes while guaranteeing stability.”
2. Characteristics:
   1. Many have simply involved internal promotions
   2. Continued preoccupation with stability:
      1. Party Secretaries Wang, age 59, and Xia, age 60, as well as Governor-designate Li Qiang, age 53, had worked as secretaries of the Political-Legal Committees that run the police and judicial apparatus of their provinces.
      2. The law-and-order experience of Shaanxi’s Zhao, age 61, considerable: a former police chief of Anhui Province as well as the chief of the Political-Legal Committees of Anhui and Shaanxi.
   3. “Relatively few of the new faces have a reformist track record. Nor do they appear to be charismatic leaders or what the Chinese media used to call “cadres with personality” (gexing ganbu).” Elevation based on “moral rectitude”, i.e. “unthinkingly toeing the party line”.
   4. Most of the new appointees are veteran party apparatchiks with dubious professional competence particularly in areas such as finance, management or information technology-related innovation.
      1. Tianjin’s party boss Sun Chunlan, former Fujian Party Secretary: began her career as a laborer in a watch factory in Liaoning; specialty is running “mass organizations.” Before her transfer to Fujian, Sun had headed the provincial branch of the All China Women’s Federation and the All China Federation of Trade Unions. Yet she is now appointed to lead Tianjin, financial and high technology hub.

Table by Willy Lam, China Brief:

Political-legal reform

1. Background: Conservative turn against legal reform in recent years:
   1. Since 2005, cooling on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s.
   2. Party political campaigns warning Chinese judges and courts against foreign legal norms.
   3. Public interest lawyers subjected to increased pressure, harassment and periodic disappearances or torture.
   4. Growing strength of weiwen apparatus under Zhou Yongkang
2. Prospect of change under Xi Jinping?
   1. Reduced power of Central Political-Legal Committee
   2. Rhetorical change
      1. Hu’s work report at 18^th Congress
      2. Xi’s speech
      3. White Paper on Judicial Reform
      4. Summer series in Study Times on rethinking social management
   3. Shrinking of zhengfawei power in regional appointments:
      省级政法人事调整: 至此，全国现任省级公安厅（局）长中仅有安徽、河北、甘肃、宁夏、江西、湖南、贵州等七省份仍由省级政法委书记兼任，规模进一步缩小。

3. Further signs to watch out for:
   1. Who will take over the Office of Preserving Stability, created during the 2000s to execute the directives of the Preserving Stability Leading Small Group?
   2. Will there be a change to the management of the Ministry of State Security (MSS)? Latest rumours: Moving MSS away from the Political-Legal committee and placing it entirely under the State Council; will further weaken Meng Jianzhu and successor.
   3. Will there be de-politicization of senior Ministry of Public Security positions?
   4. Opposition within the court system: Wang Shengjun, “one of the key figures responsible for recent hard-line policies in the court system”. Wang has retained his seat on the Central Committee.
      • Joseph Fewsmith: Wang will follow the bureaucratic path of his predecessor, Xiao Yang, and be permitted to serve until the 19th Party Congress in 2016.
      • Under Wang, the “model judge” competition has shifted in recent years away from an emphasis on judicial professionalism in favor of revived Maoist populism.
   5. Recent announcement by Meng Jianzhu on changing or even abolishing the re-education through labor (laojiao) system within 2013. For further details on the laojiao system refer to Press Meeting notes for October 22, PM 20121022.

Bloomberg: China’s red nobility

1. “Eight Immortals”: Deng Xiaoping, Bo Yibo (former vice premier), Chen Yun (took charge of the economy when Mao assumed power in 1949), Song Renqiong (Party personnel chief who oversaw the rehabilitation of purged cadres after the Cultural Revolution), Peng Zhen (helped rebuild China’s legal system in the 1980s), Wang Zhen (general who fed Mao’s troops), Li Xiannian (instrumental in the plot that ended the Cultural Revolution), Yang Shangkun (president who backed Deng’s order to carry out the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown).
2. The Immortals “sowed the seeds of one of the biggest challenges to the Party’s authority” by entrusting some of the key assets of the state to their children, fueling public anger over wealth inequality, unfair access to opportunity and exploitation of privilege.
3. Third generation (in their 30s and 40s): At least 11 of 31 members ran their own businesses or held executive posts, mostly in finance and technology. “At least six worked for private equity and venture capital firms, which sometimes recruit princelings with the intention of using their connections for winning business.”

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Governing crisis

1. Jan 1: New Year’s Day demonstrations. Anti-Leung rallies numbering 130,000 (Police: 26,000) and pro-Leung rallies numbering 60,000 (Police: 8,500)
   1. Involvement of 新界总商会: Reporters filmed citizens being handed some $250-300 for participating in pro-Leung demonstrations.
2. Jan 9: 27 pro-democracy lawmakers moved to present the city’s first impeachment motion against CY Leung, accusing him of lying about illegal structures during the CE campaign.

Judicial Independence

1. Secretary of Justice Rimsky Yuen: Requested the Court of Final Appeal to ask the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to clarify the meaning of its 1999 interpretation of Article 24 of the Basic Law, which deals with permanent residency
2. Objective: To resolve two right of abode (ROA) issues:
   1. Foreign domestic helpers: the right to receive permanent residency after seven years in the city?
   2. Babies born to mainland women in the city: automatically become permanent residents?
3. Criticisms of Yuen’s move: Jeopardizes authority of the Court of Final Appeal; fear of repeat of 1999 interpretation.
   1. HKU law dean Johannes Chan: “While there are voices against the standing committee’s clarification or interpretation of the Basic Law, with fears of judicial independence being undermined, there are strong voices from those who are anxious to see a stop to the influx of mainland mothers. Therefore, the court will face criticism from either side no matter what decision it makes. The issue is so politically and socially controversial the government is obviously passing the buck to the judiciary and washing its hands clean.”
4. Alternative solutions?
   1. HKU law professor Cheung Tat-ming: the “zero quota” policy effective in keeping down the number of mainland mothers giving birth in Hong Kong. Government request “unnecessary” and “very damaging”.
   2. Law professor Michael Davis: Government taking a “shortcut”, and can deal with the situation by introducing domestic laws to restrict entry.
   3. Legal scholar Benny Tai Yiu-ting: Can seek amendment of Basic Law to resolve ROA issue. The power of amendment is vested in the NPC.

Remembering 也斯 (梁秉鈞)

1. The Hong Kong author passed away on January 5 after years of battling with lung cancer. He was 63.
2. Ming Pao series of memorials on 世紀版： 告別與追憶也斯
3. Didi Tatlow obituary on NYT: “The Death of a Poet who defined Hong Kong”
   1. On writing in Hong Kong: “Hong Kong people need their humor. On the edge of China, with a different language, political system and social values from those of the mainland, politics has grown tough in recent years, and P.K. was depressed at the increasingly shrill nature of political discourse as positions drifted apart with seemingly no mechanism for resolution: Resentment was growing at the influx of people from China and the impact of enormous amounts of mainland money, often obscure in its origins, on the fragile, postcolonial, sociopolitical ecosystem of the small territory, to the point where he didn’t really want to speak publicly about it any more.”
   2. On writing about 1989: “P.K. also wrote about the 1989 Tiananmen Square military crackdown on student-led democracy protests, which frightened Hong Kong. In a series of three poems he compared Beijing to a room, a metaphor that alluded to the cut-off nature of Chinese society that he believes persists to this day, he told me in our last conversation, and that is reflected in writing from there.