CHINA – POLITICS

Annual Meetings of NPC and CPPCC

New line-up of lawmakers

1. Xinhua; Beijing News: New rural-urban balance; an equal proportion of deputies from urban and rural areas as the “most important feature”
2. Ming Pao; Apple Daily: Big “military bloc”, PLA still makes up the biggest bloc with 268 out of 2,987 deputies. The province of Shandong comes second with 175 deputies.
3. WSJ: Government “took special care” to ensure there are more representatives from the Internet industry: “Though analysts point out that rubbing shoulders with China’s political leaders is unlikely to help soften the government’s stance on censorship, for major companies like Baidu and Tencent, it nonetheless can help with the government’s regulation of other facets of the Internet industry”, e.g. disputes between rival companies, oversight of smartphone software, etc.

全國政協十二屆一次會議舉行第四次全體會議，選舉俞正聲為政協第十二屆全國委員會主席，杜青林等23人為副主席，其中包括港澳前特首董建華、何厚鏵，張慶黎兼任秘書長。會議同時選舉產生政協常委299名，包括16名港區委員。

4. CPPCC presidium members (323): Those on the presidium likely to become a standing member, a ministerial-level position, at the top advisory body.
   1. Appointment of close aides and allies of former leaders: Lieutenant General Nian Fuchun, Chen Jiping, Chen Shiju, Meng Xuenong
   2. Appointment of descendants of revolutionary leaders: Deng Nan (daughter of Deng Xiaoping), Chen Yuan (son of Chen Yun), Li Xiaolin (daughter of Li Xiannian), Wan Jifei (son of Wan Li)
   3. Five current regional leaders also on stage
5. SCMP: Notable omission of Luo Yuan, hawkish retired PLA major general
   1. Not re-elected because he was considered too outspoken and hawkish. Luo confirmed that he failed to be selected after a process of political negotiation.

Farewell Wen Jiabao

1. Historian Zhang Lifan: Aside from introducing the agricultural tax and the Bo Xilai case Wen basically hasn’t done anything in his ten-year term (基本上没有做过什么事情).
   1. A tragic figure: “是一个悲剧性的人物……他的悲剧就是在这种体制下不能够胜任工作时，又没得选择离任或辞职，一直勉勉强强地干到了这个任期的结束，使14亿老百姓白白等了10年。这对个人和国家民族来讲都是一个很大的浪费”
   2. Wen may support political reform but his policies suggested otherwise: “但是我们看到的情況，却是他这些主张都停留在口头上，而他主持的国务院所出台的很多政策，其实是和改革背道而驰的”，例如4万亿救市计划，表面上看，是为了应对金融危机，实际上扶持了国企的垄断”
2. Ming Pao: Headline 温总谢幕，未提政改
   1. 与以往的作风不同，温家宝在他最后一份政府工作报告中并无出现「政治体制改革」的字眼。去年他在报告中，有关来年工作部署里提出，「要以更大决心和勇气继 续全面推进经济体制、政治体制等各项改革，破解发展难题」，但今年报告回顾过去5年工作时，仅是最后提到要切实加强政府自身建设，进一步深化「行政体制改革」
3. Ming Pao editorial: Agriculture and medical pension as main success, Strengthening of SOE monopolization as main failure
   4. “过去5年，中央给「三农」累计支出47万亿元，年均增长23.5%。中国无论工业、实业有多大发展，占人口最多的仍然是农民，若农村富足，土地农民留 得住农民，对中国来说是一个庞大的稳定因素。以农立国在现代社会，或许被认为落伍、不合时宜，不过，若农业式微，不能餵饱中国人，不仅是中国的灾难，也是 世界的灾难。温家宝在工作报告宣示守住了18亿亩耕地的底线，在全国大兴土木建设住房之际，这个信息应该值得关注。所以，温总10年的「三农」政策，亮点 或许不够耀目，但是对中国前景的深远影响却是世世代代的。 此外，内地全民基本医保体系初步形成，各项医疗保险参保超过13亿人，这是社会保障制度取得的历史性巨大成就，意义深刻，影响深远。”
   5. “楼价居高不下，贫富悬殊日益尖锐，都是经济发展做大了饼，而分配未能更合理的结果。而在经济改革方面，对国企的改革进展缓慢，近年浮现的「国进民退」现象，更因为政策向国企倾斜，挤压了民营企业的生存和发展空间，变相形成国企垄断的局面。这是温总10年施政的败笔。”
   6. “这几年来，温家宝都提出要改革政治体制，才可以突破各方面发展的瓶颈，但是在党内，温家宝并未获得积极回应，今次在最后一份工作报告，再没有「政治体制改革」的提法，反而谈行政体制改革，或许反映温家宝的意兴阑珊。”
4. Apple Daily: Headline 温家宝鞠躬隐退
   1. 舆论认为温多年来打亲民牌、树改革旗，虽得民心，却在党内树敌；去年更被曝光家族财产丑闻，「晚节不保」。温在报告后对代表接连鞠躬，「实为黯然谢幕」
5. Andrew Jacobs, NYT:
   1. Notable for what was missing: “In contrast to his speeches of years past, there was no mention of political reform and only a passing reference to the rampant corruption that Communist Party leaders have acknowledged could threaten their hold on power. Instead, Mr. Wen, famous for his liberal pronouncements, coolly reaffirmed the party’s heavy-handed approach to the nation’s political and economic affairs.”
   2. Citing Willy Lam: Speech disappointing, “he spent a lot of time trying to justify his last years in office”
6. SCMP: Focus falls on shadow banking
   1. Reflects “mounting concerns over the default dangers bank face and the under-regulated yet burgeoning shadow banking system”
   2. Echoes recent remark by China Banking Regulatory Commission chairman Shang Fulin: “banks faced increasing default risks from loans to local government financing vehicles, real estate developers and industries with excess capacity”; lenders “should also try to ‘prevent risk contagion’ from the underground financing market and the shadow banking system”

Restructuring and streamlining

1. Railways Ministry to be scrapped: responsibilities split between the Transport Ministry and a new China Railways Corporation
2. National Population and Family Planning Commission: The executor of the one-child policy also marked for dismantling, most of its portfolio going to a ministry-level health agency
3. Proposed merger of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) to create a new broadcast and press administration. Both SARFT and GAPP may come under greater control by the Publicity Department. Talks of creating a super-ministry of culture (Ministry of Culture combining with SARFT and GAPP) fell through.
4. National Oceanic Administration: given consolidated control over the numerous agencies that now oversee coastal security:
   1. Will take over the Public Security Ministry’s coastguard patrols, the Agriculture Ministry’s fisheries patrols and the General Administration of Customs’ anti-smuggling efforts.
   2. The National Oceanic Commission, a consultative body, will be set up to help formulate strategies for developing maritime resources
   3. General Liu Yuan: the restructuring will reduce risks of military face-off. Liu also recently remarked that using peaceful means to sort out conflicts is the wisest way.
5. A single agency will be created to deal with food and drug regulation after recent scandals. Current system “tangled in red tape, with up to 13 government agencies controlling food and drug regulation and supervision”. The food safety commission, set up in 2010, was considered a temporary move.

Developments in China’s “trial of the century”? 

A series of reports on Bo Xilai from end of February onwards:

1. Feb 21, Reuters citing sources: Bo was on hunger strike twice and force fed. He refused to shave in protest of unfair treatment and had grown a long, chest-length beard.
   1. Bao Tong: Too much time has past and “this is not good for the party’s image”.
   2. “Two independent sources with ties to the family said Bo’s trial was likely to be delayed until after an annual full session of parliament and its top advisory body in March because he was not physically fit.”
2. Feb 13 and 23, John Garnaut on SMH:
   1. Spring Festival gathering of the Children of Yan’an Fellowship:
      1. “Members of the Children of Yan’an make up the largest and most organised group of children of revolutionary heroes, who are using their hereditary privileges to sound the alarm about what they see as a crisis in the party.”
      2. Convened by Hu Muying, daughter of Hu Qiaomu, former politburo member and chief speech writer for Mao and Deng. Hu reportedly urge fellow princelings to get involved in affairs of state continuing the tradition of their ancestors.
   2. “The purge of Bo Xilai is in danger of losing momentum as the maverick political star remains defiant”:
      1. Lawyer He Weifang: China’s court procedures like a show, requiring good rehearsals beforehand. Hence they need Bo to be cooperative above his sentence, and “won’t dare open the trial while there is any disobedience”
   3. “Support for the charismatic and polarising leader has grown over the Spring Festival break as powerful princelings visit one another’s families and gather to share opinions and information, several princelings and close observers have told Fairfax Media.”
      1. Bo family supporters showed support by visiting Gu’s mother in her Beijing courtyard home
      2. But representatives from three families pulled out of a small princeling reunion “in order to avoid inflaming a delicate situation”
   4. 7 million yuan, stuffed inside seven locked suitcases, seized from Mr Bo’s Beijing home, according to a close friend of Xi.
3. Feb 24, Caijing: Report on an underground operation that was settled way back in 2009. Caijing may be reporting the case solely for reference to Bo Xilai: “据《财经》信源，新近调查的薄谷开来及其家人的经济账目，也与连氏赌厅及其地下钱庄网络存在交集。后者与内地腐败链条存在多大范围的并网，或许只有连氏清楚。”

Xi “courting” the military?

National budget forecast: Military expenditure of 720.2 billion yuan, 10.7% increase to 720 billion yuan. This is the second consecutive decrease in percentage: 12,7% in 2011, 11.12% in 2012. SCMP citing experts: Beijing wanted to play down “China Threat” fears amid territorial disputes with neighboring countries. But more spending allocated to the navy.

1. Chris Buckley, NYT: Xi established control of the military much earlier than his predecessors.
   1. Hu had to wait two years before Jiang handed him chairmanship of the CMC, while Jiang was overshadowed by Deng in his early years.
   2. Xi has already visited army units or met commanders and troops at least nine times since November, and also “assumed charge of a secretive civilian-military group steering strategy in maritime disputes”, according to analysts. Xi has “repeatedly demanded “battle readiness” from the military and sent ships and aircraft to assert China’s claims over islands also claimed by Japan”.
   3. China’s actual military spending believed to be higher than budget figure “by a large degree”
   4. “The main risk posed by China’s mix of military swagger and insecurity is not a deliberately initiated conflict, analysts say. Rather, combined with poor communication between the opaque military and civilian bureaucracies, it could lead to missteps that spiral into dangerous confrontation.”
2. Jeremy Page, WSJ:
   1. Citing article in upcoming China Quarterly, by Adam Liff and Andrew Erickson
      1. China’s official military budget increasingly reflects actual spending, and include items (e.g. disaster-relief operations) that aren’t calculated as part of western defense budget
      2. “Increases in the official defense budget are roughly consistent with GDP growth and constitute a declining percentage of central government expenditures”

• “This suggests that, generally speaking, investment in military modernization—aside from specific capabilities considered exigent for party leadership continuity, national survival and defense of critical national interests—remains a lower priority overall than economic development for Beijing’s leadership”

1. “Mr. Xi’s more dynamic military profile is mainly designed to build up a political support base within the armed forces, and cultivate a public image that distinguishes him from his predecessor, Hu Jintao, who struggled to establish his authority over the armed forces and was widely viewed as a weak and uncharismatic leader.”

1. Willy Lam, China Brief: The military as Xi’s premier power base:
   1. He has maintained good ties with an elite corps of princeling generals during his career as a senior cadre in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces
      1. At least three CMC members have revolutionary bloodlines
      2. Xi had taken indirect control over the zhengfa apparatus: high-profile inspection of a Beijing-based division of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) late January
   2. In contrast to Jiang and Hu, whose inner circles were made up of colleagues and underlings, Xi has not built up a coterie of associates and followers. Networking skills “surprisingly weak within the party and government apparatuses”, “lack close aides whose personal loyalty to the party boss has been anchored upon decades of service”:
   3. Again in contrast to his predecessors, Xi has weak connections with academics, public intellectuals and other professionals: Zeng often sought advice from CASS scholars or official newspapers editors; Zhu Rongji from prominent economist like Professor Wu Jinglian; Li Keqiang also reportedly put together personal think tank with professors and former classmates from alma mater Peking University.
   4. Lam’s overall assessment: “The preponderance of military figures within his inner circle, coupled with the country’s increasingly tense confrontation with Japan and the United States, could predispose the commander-in-chief toward pursuing more pugilistic foreign and military policies. The dearth of relatively liberal aides among his corps of advisers could affect the extent to which Xi might be pushing political liberalization.”

Factional politics

1. ISun Affairs, 黃小仙: The Communist Youth League regrouping
   “十八大一役，團派慘敗。日前，全國人大和政協兩會緊鑼密鼓在北京召開，最惹外界關注的，是以候任總理李克強為首的新一屆國務院的領導班子。內閣中的重要位置由誰來做？團派可否藉此機會東山再起？”
   1. Wang Yang
   2. Liu Yandong
   3. Yang Jing, Chairman of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission since 2008: 59, native of Inner Mongolia.
2. ISun Affairs feature report: 「紅二代」重整旗鼓
   1. 查辦谷俊山，劉源復出
      1. 刘源：为什么要改造我们的文化历史观
      2. “在突飞猛进而又积累了巨大矛盾的中国，我们必须严防造反余孽与民粹主义“愤青”合流的极左大破坏；又需警惕狭隘自大民族主义加“暴民”造势的极右大爆发！”
      3. “在当下的社会中，能够涵盖“主流非主流”合成的“最小公倍数”，能够弥合“左右理论”求得的“最大公约数”，可能非“新民主主义”莫属了。”
   2. 林立：新民主主义0: 经过争论达成的基本共识包括：改革方向上承认人权、法治、民主等普世价值，并承认一段时间内共产党的执政地位有利于中国的改革与发展，以及对开放性与多元性的强调
   3. 陈子明：理论中保守的「世界革命」理论和强悍的「国家主义」意识形态可能将国家引入极其危险的境地
   4. 罗小朋：红二代怀揣在毛时代形成的「责任感」和「光荣梦想」，愿意与包括自由派在内的改革力量进行对话，争取他们的支持，并挑战导致中共政权走向全面败坏的新贵们
   5. 荣剑：等同于威权主义的新民主主义无法引领真正的政治转型，多党制才是改造中国政治的真正出路

3. 吴庸：关于「新民主主义」的争议
   1. 对毛泽东的新民主主义论分析得最透辟的是朱厚泽:“很多同仁认为新民主主义是美好事物，毛泽东1953年急急忙忙转为社会主义，转得太早，把事情搞糟了。这样的看法是糊涂 的，在逻辑上是不通的。毛氏新民主主义和祸国殃民的毛式社会主义，是息息相通、一脉相承的两个阶段，毛自己就讲得很清楚。如果说1953年转得太早 了，1963年早不早？1983年早不早？今天转到毛氏社会主义，还早不早？能不能接受？新民主主义本身就是假民主主义，根子上出问题，因为它以中国共产 党的领导为前提，蕴涵一党专政。”
   2. 此时此刻，刘、张等人搬出「新民主主义论」以惑世，说明中共的确已经走投无路：马克思主义已经不灵，列宁主义已经破产, 邓小平「理论」已经露馅，三个「代表」已经献丑，和谐社会从未和谐，批毛浪头正在掀起，只有「新民主主义」这个假民主主义似乎还可抵挡一阵。
   3. 张木生在接受雷天采访时有句惊人之语：「只有共产党才能救中国；只有新民主主义才能挽救共产党。」这里的逻辑关系是：新民 主主义是最佳选择，有了新民主主义就可以挽救共产党，而只有共产党才能救中国。看来，刘、张二人郑重推荐新民主主义，其战略布局就在张木生的上述表达中。

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. Feb 27: Over 100 people signed open letter urging Beijing to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
2. March 1: China Media Project reported that Wang Keqin, journalist famous for his investigative reporting, was forced to leave his newspaper Economic Observer after a series of hard-hitting reports, esp. reports on the July Beijing floods. He was previously forced to leave the China Economic Times in 2011.
3. March 1: Live broadcast of four foreigners being led to their executions caused controversy. The WSJ suggested that the central government faced mounting pressure to better protect Chinese citizens abroad, where they are targeted for growing wealth and political influence. Lawyers argued that the move violated ethics and the Criminal Procedure Law.
4. March 4: Tsering Woeser awarded the 2013 International Women of Courage Award by the US Department of State as “the most prominent Mainland activist speaking out publicly about human rights conditions for China’s Tibetan citizens”. Issue 44 of ISun Affairs runs a collection on Tibetan literature with a leading article by Woeser.
5. March 10: Violent repression of land-related protests in Shangpu village, Guangdong province (廣東揭陽揭西縣上浦村) by authorities.
6. March 11: Hong Kong activist detained for 41 hours in Beijing before being deported to Hong Kong (以干犯尋釁滋事罪驅逐回港) after attempt to visit Liu Xia.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

 Energy security

1. Protest against nuclear plants following premier Jiang Yi-hua’s announcement that the government would hold island-wide vote on the fate of Longmen Nuclear Plant. Plant began construction in 1999, and is already 96% complete. Scheduled to begin commercial operations by 2015. Both safety and cost are main concerns:
   1. Project has since 2008 suffered from mishaps like floods and small fires
   2. Cost expected to up from original estimate of NT$167.9 billion to NT$330 billion.
2. Protesters: Called on government to suspend last phases of construction of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant in Gongliao District (貢寮), New Taipei City (新北市), and to phase out the nation’s three operational nuclear plants.
3. Taipei Times editorial: “The government is responsible for exploring all the options for generating electricity and reducing the nation’s reliance on nuclear power, and the first is to devise an energy policy that reflects the public’s concerns. However, there is no sign that the government intends to change its existing policy of seeing nuclear power as the solution to the nation’s energy needs. The planned referendum is placing the public on the front line of the fight for clean and safe energy. Holding this referendum is a way for the government to shake off its responsibility to provide stable power to the nation under the guise of democratic participation.”

Commemorating 228: Transitional justice

1. Ma Ying-jeou bowed to apologize for the KMT government’s crackdown, and instructed the Ministry of Education to increase the amount of educational materials to teach the next generation. A small group of protesters called on Ma to step down. Procession organized by the Taiwan National Alliance (TNA) and the Taiwan 228 Care Association to commemorate the 66^th
2. ISun Affairs articles:
   1. 林怡廷:创伤之后，共生如何可能？台湾未竟的转型正义
      Three phases in Taiwan’s attainment of transitional justice
   2. 吳叡人:國家建構、內部殖民與冷戰：台灣國家暴力的歷史脈絡與轉型正義問題的根源
3. Earlier article by 吴乃德：转型正义和历史记忆——台湾民主化的未竟之业
   为何台湾的转型正义是“一万多受害者，却没有任何加害者”?
   1. 民主转型的模式：“威权体制的执政党在民主转型之后，于李登辉的领导下继续执政了十多年。在这十多年间，国民党自然不可能自动检视它过去对人权的侵害，不可能在道德上否定自己的过去。”
   2. 威权体制在经济发展上的表现：“白色恐怖时期，刚好也是台湾经济起飞的时期；而蒋经国的统治风格，也回异于一般的独裁者。他统治台湾数十年，其间不论是反对派或是传播媒体，没有人敢挑战他、甚至批评他。可是他似乎成功地防止了统治团体中的高阶成员，如一般独裁政权的贪污和腐化。”
   3. “压迫的时刻”: “政治压迫距离民主转型的时间较久，对政治压迫和残酷行为的感情反应和道德愤怒也会降低，对转型正义的追求同时也会减弱。”
   4. Different historical memories shared by different groups in society

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Social action and the HK middle class

Latest episode in Hong Kong-mainland conflicts: New regulation coming into effect on March 1: Travelers banned from taking more than 1.8kg, or two cans, of milk powder out of Hong Kong. Mainland citizens: HK “biting the hand that feeds them.” Recent comments by Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Zhang Xiaoming on Hong Kong-mainland tensions, calling on the conflicts to be handled rationally.

練乙錚 – 港「毒」是怎樣煉成的？

1. “一國之內，為了嬰兒奶粉，竟搞得如此楚河漢界壁壘森嚴，文明世界無有，荒謬之餘，其政治效果則是加深港陸隔閡，意識上向社會大眾一再提示兩制基本差異不可調和，客觀上打造了港陸之間深圳河之外的又一道鴻溝。此策一出，分離主義的基礎在法制方面加固”
2. 分離意識只會愈打愈烈：
3. 1967年文革初內人黨(內蒙古人民革命黨)事件： 1997年，海外主張內蒙獨立的流亡分子成立了「內蒙古人民黨」，與藏獨疆獨連成一氣，傳播蒙族分離意識
4. Catalonia

林天悟 – 誰需要港獨？誰在散播港「毒」？

1. Tracing the development of the Hong Kong separatism discourse:
   1. 1998-2001: 40 articles mentioning 港獨
   2. July 2001: 在城大任教的美國華裔教授李少民，遭內地指控替台灣當間諜而驅逐出境，董建華准許李少民回港，而城大認為沒有足夠資料作出判斷，不作紀律聆訊即讓其復職。已故民建聯秘書長、港區人大代表馬力，當時直斥董建華的決定如同「宣布香港獨立」。那是首次有香港知名人士被扣上「港獨」帽子。
   3. 2003: Article 23 legislation: 建制派人士企圖以港獨罪套在反立法人士頭上，並指泛民人士勾結外國勢力。七一遊行亦有出現零星的龍獅旗和港英旗，但現實情況是香港沒有空間獨立，遊行人士亦無相關訴求，港獨議論還是泛不起多大的漣漪
   4. 2004: 梁國雄提交《全民投票條例草案》：全港市民在重要議題上有公投的權利：「公投」兩字觸動中共當權者神經，親中媒體發動空前攻擊，猛轟公投等於搞港獨，令一年內有多達885篇文章。
2. 每當有公投、政改或特首選舉時，港獨的文章數量就會大增，但一番吵鬧之後又極速歸於沉寂。這種現象正好說明，「港獨」是親中人士的備用工具，有需要時就拿出來揮舞，甚至把「港獨」跟「勾結外國勢力」連上關係，以「國土統一」的威嚇令社會撕裂，從而加強黨的統治性。
3. 梁振英上台後至今8個月，報章提及「港獨」的文章總數已達1143篇，比過去六年半的總和還要多：梁振英班子上任後醜聞纏身，誠信有問題，加上施政不濟令民望有跌無升，而港獨問題正好是一帖解藥，能夠把泛民或社會各界的攻擊，轉化成「是一群別有用心的人勾結境外勢力，企圖打 擊中央對特區的管治威信」。只要這個說法令中央信服，梁班子和中央就有了共同的敵人，形成沆瀣一氣，特首再不濟，但中央對其信任度爆燈，地位就穩如泰山。

陳雲 – 殖民遺恨——感懷呂大樂《那似曾相識的七十年代》

“香港過去的主場，是英國殖民政府聯合本地的上流社會操盤的，本地中產只是負責執行，故此心思都用在技藝之上、用在工具之上，而不是用在道德思考、戰略盤算等高級智能範疇之上，也由 於這些高級智能範疇被英國人代理了，華人的智力和道德障礙被英國人掃清了，香港的華人中產可以在職業範圍充分發揮技藝能力，可以拍心口將事情搞掂，做到又快又好，香港的專業中產對discipline、efficiency和streamlining有毒癮似的執迷，這種工匠尊榮（德文Handwerkerstolz），從中環的律師會計、尖沙嘴的洋服裁縫、飛機場的行李輸送到醫學院的外科手術，都是香港稱譽世界的絕學。這是工具理性的場域，can do和do it well and fast。至於價值理性，why shall I do it，what will happen if I don’t do it的問題，香港的中產是不夠膽問的。”

“香港所謂右翼是高級中產，邊緣化的小資產階級。香港所謂左翼是低級中產，邊緣化的波希米亞人。他們都是左傾的，有一點浪漫和激情，在抗爭的時候，高級中產為低級中產做一點技術補課，低級中產為高級中產做一點行動先鋒。故此香港的政治運動，出現罕見的左右翼合流的怪現象。至於香港現在的主流——中共霸權+政府黨+地產霸權，也是失語的、不言明的，只是他們沒有英國人那種統管香港、安定中下層的能力，沒有給予中下層生存空間的慷慨，更沒有給予中下層個人發展空間的雅量。他們也不是右翼。英國人走了之後，香港的右翼是真空的。”

“不論是民主黨還是社運人,他們都是自居於邊緣而不夠膽進入主流，不夠膽建構主場。香港的民主黨是不捍衛本土的，香港的社運人是不反對中共帝國的。民主黨做可持續的議會反對黨，社運人搞可持續的街頭社運。他們忌憚現在的中共，就好似他們當年忌憚英國殖民政府。要理解香港舉世無匹的怪誕政治，必須回溯到殖民地的歷史。”

“佔領光環令自己感覺良好，但面對中共，預計必會失敗，故此也毋須承擔成功之後的責任。佔領中環會成功，然後要普選、要執政，要承擔責任，要建設香港的主流社會，這是香港的中產unprepared的。他們一向是退出主流、空出主場，然後戴住邊緣的道德光環，吃一點有機蔬菜，喝一碗心靈雞湯，孤芳自賞。”

徐少驊– 香港中產搞不起社會運動?

“陳雲推索至英國殖民地統治下對香港中產階層之「奴化」（這字眼是我用的，陳雲沒有）來推演出今天潛藏在中產人士心中的自我「邊緣化」、小資產情懷、不肯站在政治中心的位置等等，無可否認，這些論述都有一定的參考作用，但過去二十年，世界實在變化很大，所謂的「中產意識」，是否就可以原封不動地拿出「殖民地時期」的中產意識來作政治預測？難道九七過渡和八、九十後社運新進和互聯網的普及對所謂的中產意識全無影響？”Proof: 反國教事件