CHINA – POLITICS

18^th Party Congress

Evaluation of the Hu-Wen era

1. Damien Ma, Foreign Affairs, “Before and After Hu”
   1. “On the whole, Hu and his premier, Wen Jiabao, are handing the new Xi administration an economic legacy that is far from stellar and a society that is shakier than the one they inherited. More important, they are leaving behind a political environment that is likely more corrupt and stifling than the relatively entrepreneurial and liberal era of the 1990s. ”
   2. Presided over “decade of hyper-industrialization” since WTO entry in 2001, but at a cost. “In its haste to stimulate economic growth, Hu and his associates sacrificed the Chinese people’s quality of life in the process.”
      1. Environmental deterioration; alarming appetite for energy
      2. Heightened social tensions: rise in number of mass incidents
      3. Scarcity of public goods: healthcare
      4. “Investment addiction”
   3. Foreign policy:
      1. Positive: drastic improvement in relationship with Taiwan; patronage of space program
      2. Negative: “In Hu’s last two years in office, China flashed its teeth in a show of regional assertiveness, unnerving its neighbors and prompting the United states to rebalance its strategic priorities to Asia.”
2. David Shambaugh: “Ten years ago, when he took power, everybody was wondering what kind of leader Hu would be. Now we know the answer. He is an arch-conservative, cautious, risk-averse, stability-obsessed apparatchik.”

New Leadership

Unique background of incoming generation of leaders

1. Sent to the countryside and worked as farmers for many years: Developed a “unique combination of idealism and pragmatism during their formative years”, as well as “a risk-taking attitude” that is uniquely linked to their generation
2. In college in the late 1970s and early 1980s (particularly in Li Keqiang’s case): a very liberal period, exposure to Western ideas. Both Xi and Li has legal background. Comparison with Taiwan: “in the 1970s, when it was predominantly led by technocrats, then in the 1980s and 1990s there was a transition to a new generation of leaders with a legal background.” Chen Sui-bian, Lu Hsiu-lien, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen all trained as lawyers.
3. Nonetheless, their past performance has remained conservative: Pei Minxin: “They may be capable local administrators, but they did not do anything that would suggest they were very bold reformers. Both are relatively cautious people, and as they should be, because the Chinese system today does not encourage risk-taking. We know what happened to Bo Xilai because he was a risk-taker.”

Li Keqiang as new reform advocate?

1. Unlike Xi, Li came to the top without a revolutionary pedigree, his father being a mid-level county official in Anhui province.
2. Seeds of a reform agenda?
   1. At the university, Li formed friendships with many outspoken pro-democracy advocates, many sent to jail or exiled after June Fourth. He kept in touch with friends who were jailed.
   2. He co-translated “The Due Process of Law” by Lord Denning, a book brought to China by professor Gong Xiangrui, one of China’s then few British-trained lawyers, who taught his students ideas of liberalism and constitutional law.

Grooming of sixth-generation leaders

1. Hu Chunhua tipped to take over in Guangdong; Sun Zhengcai in Southern Chongqing: Both are younger officials of humbler backgrounds: “shown a keener sense of the inequalities facing China, from environmental devastation to the rich-poor divide, factors that will shape the future”. If they perform well they will become top leaders following path of Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping.
2. Hu spent two decades in the restive and remote Tibet where he came under the wing of Hu Jintao. His work in Inner Mongolia was also praised: rapid economic growth and successful management of protests by ethnic Mongols. Moving him to Guangdong will present a different set of challenges.
3. Sun is an agricultural expert who became agriculture minister in 2008. His challenge is to clean up the “mess” in Chongqing.

“Gerontocratic” or “elders politics”

Continued influence exerted by old leaders (老人政治,老人回朝,老人干政):

1. Jiang Zemin “發揮餘熱” (which many calls “發揮餘孽”):
   1. According to sources, Jiang strongly backing protégé 67-year-old Yu Zhengsheng and 66-year-old Zhang Gaoli to enter PSC, justifying their entrance by age (no more chance, whereas Wang Yang is still young).
   2. Jiang’s grand entrance at the opening ceremony: “領導人進場出現了令人驚訝的一幕，胡錦濤和江澤民首先進場，然後是拉開一段距離之後的政治局常委和其他已經退休的領導人。江澤民處於這樣突出的位置，必定是經過精心策劃而且極有可能是江本人的意見。”
   3. Jiang’s high-profile appearances throughout the year: Meeting in Beijing with Howard Schultz (visiting CEO of Starbucks Corp) in April a week after purge of Bo Xilai; attending performance at “The Egg”.
2. 95-year-old veteran revolutionary and communist kingmaker Song Ping, who “frequently dozed off” during proceedings.
3. “The clout of Song and Jiang reflects the party’s traditional deference to its elders, but also its lack of transparency and failure to institutionalize its succession processes through open elections or other steps. The power of the elders, a largely conservative group, is also seen as inhibiting reforms that might erode their influence or harm their economic interests in the state-controlled economy. Ensuring the promotion of protégés burnishes the credentials of retired leaders, ensures them some say in affairs of state, and — perhaps most importantly — protects them and their families from being investigated over corruption or other improprieties committed while in office. The practice of elders exercising influence behind the scenes was established by Deng Xiaoping, who remained paramount leader even after relinquishing his official titles.”
4. Competition between Hu and Jiang?
   • “Hu has lost at least one major fight, failing to see his protege Li Keqiang named as his successor. Instead, Xi, a compromise candidate with Jiang’s approval, was chosen for the job in 2007.”
   • Other suggestions:
     1. Hu playing a deeper game: “Bargaining away slots on the Standing Committee for seats on the less powerful but more plentiful Politburo”
     2. Hu genuinely wanting to leave new leadership less vulnerable to machinations of elders: sees himself as “a selfless representation of the party, its integrity and institutionalization”
   • SCMP: Hu will be launching the “first clean transfer of power”: The image-conscious Hu wants to avoid controversy of factional rifts and intense horse trading.
5. For provincial party leaders, only 4-5 provinces satisfy the standards set to make party members younger. In many provinces and municipals 65-year-old senior leaders (so-called borderline leaders “壓線領導”) stayed on.
6. Instrumentalism of elders politics? Professor Yao Shujie: “当政治局常委集体领导，不是一个人说了算以后，有时有些人需要政治老人作为一个筹码已达到平衡权力的目的。”
7. “老人政治也可以说是中国的政治文化。中国继续这种文化， 已退休的中共领导人的影响无法去掉。由此， 以习近平为首的领导班子起码在近五年很难有什么重大突破， 在政改方面十分有限， 在经济上改革可能有大幅度推进。”

Analyzing elite politics

Johnny Lau: Factional struggle no longer an adequate lens to analyze elite politics (不能只停留在「派系鬥爭」來看今天中共的權力遊戲)

1. No clear standard to distinguish between different “factions”: For example, Li Yuanchao and Liu Yandong are both “princelings” given their family background, but they have both worked for long years in the Communist Youth League with deep ties to Hu (tuanpai).
2. Compromise as the new mode of political interaction due to the passage of strongman politics: 中國已沒有像毛澤東、鄧小平那樣的政治強人，江澤民不是，胡錦濤也不是，日後的習近平更不是。在「十八大」的領導班子裏，無論什麼人擔任政治局常委，他們都是妥協的合成體。

Prospect of Political reform

Qian Gang’s tifa analysis

1. Overall preliminary conclusion: Conservative forces within the Party are still very powerful. Based on the report alone, there is very little prospect that substantive moves will be made on political reform.
2. Findings based on 10 watchwords:
   1. Both the “Four Basic Principles” and “Mao Zedong Thought” continue to appear
   2. The term “stability preservation” does not appear in the main points (要点).
   3. “Cultural Revolution” does not appear, in either its full or shortened forms (文革/文化大革命).
   4. “Political reform” is written into a section header. We do not see terms in the report like “opposing Westernization” or the “Five Will Nots”. But we do see the appearance of “[we will] resolutely not follow Western political systems” (绝不照搬西方政治制度模式), which did not appear in the 2007 political report. We also see a new term: “[We will] not take the wicked [or “heretical”] way of changing our banner” (不走改旗易帜邪路)
   5. “Intraparty power separation”: does appear, but there is no further language to suggest powers operating independently of one another.
   6. “Power is given by the people”: no mention
   7. “Self-governance according to the law” (依法自治)
   8. “Intraparty democracy” appears less frequently than in the report to the 17th National Congress. There is no mention of “open nomination and direct election,”
   9. “Scientific View of Development” makes a strong showing. Most importantly, this term’s rank has been elevated. Along with “Deng Xiaoping Theory” and the “Three Represents,” it has become a guiding ideology (指导思想) of the Party.
   10. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” has become a common banner term including three generations of leaders — Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Party Constitution Amendment (中共党章修改)

Intra-party democracy

Reuters, citing sources: Hu and Xi were attempting to introduce voting for the Politburo. Under their proposal, there would be up to 20% more candidates than seats in the Politburo (currently 24 members chosen by 200-member Central Committee). Hu could leave a good legacy and Xi could boost his image, and overall party legitimacy would be improved.

1. Since the Politburo chooses the Standing Committee, such a vote could lead to “surprises”. Jean-Pierre Cabestan: Voting would benefit reputed reformers such as Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao if they are included on the candidacy list.
2. Chen Ziming: Propaganda chief Liu Yunshan would be most disadvantaged and “have the most to fear from a more democratic vote”.
3. In the Central Committee there were 8% more candidates than seats in 2007, up from 5% in 2002. Under the Hu-Xi proposal, the figure could rise up to 40%.

Cheng Li: “China’s “one party, two coalitions” experiment, despite its limitations, may gradually overcome the system’s deficiencies, thus paving the way for a systemic transition to a Chinese style of democracy.”

1. “This bifurcation has created within China’s one-party polity something approximating a mechanism of checks and balances in the decision-making process. This mechanism, of course, is not the same as the system of checks and balances that operates between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches in a democratic system.  But this new structure […] represents a major departure from the all-powerful strongman model that was characteristic of the Mao and the Deng era.”
2. Limitations:
   1. Factional balance with the Politburo may not always hold, and the defeated faction could use its political resources and socio-economic constituencies to undermine the legitimacy of the political system.
   2. Even with balance of power preserved, emerging “bipartisanship” still at risk: controversy over personnel appointments, policies, etc. may make it difficult to achieve consensus.
3. Criticism of Li: Pei Minxin:
   1. Still a rule-by-man system not a rule-by-procedure system, no rules at the very top of the Chinese decision-making system
   2. If one has to talk about coalitions, a bifurcated division does not capture the entire complexity: At least a third coalition, the technocrats. “This is a rather independent coalition if you look at people like Zhu Rongji and Zhou Xiaochuan – the economic technocratic managers who are more independent, whom the party really needs to make the machine run.”
4. Downsizing of PSC significant:
   1. The move will likely remove two specific positions, “the propaganda czar and the police czar” that have been the main obstacles to economic liberalization and political reform
   2. Smaller size will enhance top leader’s power
5. Li’s proposal for intra-party democracy: “The full Central Committee can elect seven from the eight candidates on the ballot for the standing committee, which will in fact not change the factional balance of power (as four candidates can be chosen from each camp). Or alternatively, the full Central Committee can elect the 25-member Politburo with more candidates on the ballot.”

People’s Daily editorial

1. 既不走封闭僵化的老路、也不走改旗易帜的邪路，这是中国共产党人的坚定信念，是对当今世界格局、人类社会发展史的准确把握。
2. 环顾世界，一些国家盲目照搬西方政治体制，水土不服，破而不立。经济停滞、民生凋敝、社会动荡，不仅损耗国家实力，甚至扼杀对未来的憧憬。一系列反面教材告诫我们，政治体制事关安危存亡，容不得一丝一毫的浮躁和盲动。
3. 需要看到的是，一些西方国家仍在固守“制度性傲慢与偏见”，为推行其所谓的普世价值，对他国政治体制乱贴标签，妄加非议，甚至直接干涉。面对形形色色的诱惑和压力，发展中国家需要足够的定力，更需要办好自己的事情。

“Hong Kong separatism”

1. Recent debates
   1. Protestors: “反對中國對香港實行殖民統治”, local movements
   2. Academics: “去中國化”
   3. Mainland officials on Hong Kong affairs: Lu Ping, Chen Zuo’er
2. Hu’s 18^th Party Congress report: Two new expressions (兩個新表述):
   1. First, on Hong Kong and Macau affairs: “根本宗旨是維護國家主權、安全、發展利益,保持香港、澳門長期繁榮穩定” versus the previous emphasis on “一國兩制、港人治港、高度自治、繁榮穩定”. Hu also mentions the need to prevent interference by foreign forces (防範和遏制外部勢力干預港澳事務).
   2. Second, Hu calls on Hong Kong and Macau citizens to share in the integrity and glory of being Chinese (同全國各族人民一道共享做中國人的尊嚴和榮耀). Demand the governments to unite the people (促進香港同胞、澳門同胞在愛國愛港、愛國愛澳旗幟下的大團結).
3. CLO director Peng Qinghua (彭清华): Email reply to Hong Kong media questions on comments on 18^th Congress report
   1. 一国两制是一个完整概念，一国是前提，没有“一国”，“两制”就失去了基础。
   2. 香港只有积极适应回归祖国这一历史性变化，加快与内地各领域的交流合作，不断提高自身竞争力，才能在日趋激烈的国际竞争中立于不败之地。
4. Commentaries:
   1. Ming Pao editorial:

“針對港澳同胞，把「做中國人的尊嚴和榮耀」寫進中共的政治工作報告，使人百感交集，因為這句話，無異於把港澳同胞視為異類。” “內地一些人對香港的事態，經常說三道四，「港獨論」是這類批評和說法的極致表現，也是極左思維的極致表現。”“特首梁振英身為特區之首，是中央與港人之間的最正式橋樑，我們認為梁振英有責任就所謂「港獨論」向中央反映真實情，捍衛「兩制」的利益，不能讓一些人繼續舞弄港獨議題，毒害香港。”

5. Apple Daily commentator Ng Chi-sum: “胡錦濤總書記說，香港人「一定能在國家事務中發揮積極作用，同全國各族人民一道共享做中國人的尊嚴和榮耀」。當然意有所指，顯然是針對近日蓄意誇大的所謂「港獨」意識。但在這種一黨專政，權力交接毫不文明的政治體制下，還有甚麼尊嚴和榮耀，可以給我們共享？”
6. Willy Lam: Central Liaison Office exaggerating situation in Hong Kong in order to get more power and resources from China.
7. Leadership change: Li Yuanchao tipped to head Hong Kong affairs
   1. More liberal minded: Combination of Li and Wang Guangya would mean a more relaxed atmosphere
8. Johnny Lau: not too optimistic: The central government is gradually “losing patience” with the intractable city. Members of the powerful Politburo have developed an “antagonistic mentality” and are ready to put the city “in a tighter Beijing grip”.

Other reports

1. Security regime
   1. No rolling down cab windows, pigeons confined (and other flying objects), no purchase big knives, purging of street vendors
   2. HRIC: Just days before the 18^th Party Congress, at least four petitioners ordered to serve re-education through labor in Shanghai for “disturbing social order”.
2. China’s next first lady
   1. Names likely to go unmentioned, no Michelle-Obama-style advocacy: In China women and power “mix like oil and water”: traditional warnings against the dangers of beautiful women and powerful men; stereotypes embodied by Jiang Qing and most recently Gu Kailai.
   2. The next first lady, Peng Liyuan, is the most likely thus far to break out of the mold. Peng is one of China’s most recognizable folk singers: “[H]er fame has eclipsed his. A civilian member of the Chinese army’s musicale troupe, she was admired by hundreds of millions for her annual performances on state television’s New Year’s Eve shows. And according to people who have met her, she exudes an easy grace, a confident grasp of conversational English and a seemingly sincere heart for charitable causes.”
   3. First ladies’ names blocked from searches: Peng began lowering her profile since 2007 as Xi emerged as likely appointee to the presidency.
   4. Robert Kuhn: “It’s a terrific thing for China to have someone with that glamour, culture and prominence representing them abroad […] It humanizes China a little and breaks them out of that stereotype of the stiff, gray soviet suits behind a podium.”
3. Officials challenged by an 11-year-old reporter from Beijing on food safety.
4. Beijing News editorial: Focus on “happy society” (幸福社会)
   1. CCTV interview: Are you xingfu? There are 18 provincial-level units and 100 cities that make “xingfu shehui” their goals.
   2. 建设“幸福社会”，首先要树立正确的政绩观，回到社会公平与公正，回到公民的基本权利本身——社会的发展、国家的进步需要“将人作为目的”，一切公共政策理当把“以人为本”作为根基。虽然，很多公众和地方政府对“幸福社会”的理解，还在“跟着感觉走”，但是，只要尊重公民权利、维护好社会公正，“幸福社会”并非遥不可及。
5. IHT: “Shut Out of Party Congress and Power Transfer, Chinese Citizens Turn to Humor”

Military Leadership

1. Willy Lam: Hu expected to stay on as CMC chairman for at least two years, following precedent set by Jiang Zemin. Xi Jinping will meanwhile remain vice chairman. Others suggest that he might hand over as soon as next March. SCMP: Sources suggest that he will formally relinquish his position as military chief at the end of the Congress this week.
2. Willy Lam: “new generation of professionally savvy officers”:
   1. Best exemplified by the newly appointed Chief of General Staff General Fang Fenghui
      1. “Much-published author on military strategy, particularly in the areas of computer-aided war games and the synchronization of different branches of the military forces. One of General Fang’s favorite mottoes is that “radically changing times demand innovation in strategic theories.”
      2. Impressed Hu with his orchestration of the 2009 military parade in Beijing to mark 60^th anniversary of the PRC.
   2. Peter Mattis: Intelligence taking on greater relevance for the PLA: Rising importance of intelligence posts; More efficient and effective means of collecting, processing and distributing intelligence needed to fight under informatized conditions.
3. Factional dynamics:
   1. General Liu Yuan (Political Commissar of the Second Artillery) and General Zhang Haiyang (Political Commisar of the Second Artillery) did not get the post of General Political Department Chief due to close association with Bo Xilai.
   2. Since Bo’s detainment in March, PLA disciplinary authorities ran numerous campaigns to promote the idea of “the party’s absolute leadership over the army”. An August 1 commentary in PLA Daily warned against “cunning and ambitious careerists” hoping to use the army to realize conspiracies.
   3. Jiang Zemin’s residual influence: Probable promotion of Fan Changlong to CMC vice chairman: “General Fan is the protégé of soon-to-retire CMC Vice Chairman General Xu [Qiliang], who is deemed Jiang’s “unofficial representative” in the CMC.”
4. Prospect for Xi Jinping
   1. New York Times: Xi “boasts far closer ties to China’s fast-growing military than the departing leader, Hu Jintao, had when he took office. As Mr. Xi rose through the ranks of the Communist Party, he made the most of parallel posts in the People’s Liberation Army, deeply familiarizing himself with the inner workings of the armed forces.” Xi is thus seen as “a formidable leader for Washington to contend with”.
   2. Willy Lam: “Xi’s influence in the PLA has been adversely affected by the fact that the career of several princeling generals has been hurt by their association with Bo Xilai. New Air Force commander General Ma Xiaotian and GAD Director General Zhang Youxia, however, are notable princelings. General Zhang is thought to be particularly close to Xi. The fathers of Xi and General Zhang, respectively Xi Zhongxun and General Zhang Zongxun were close allies when both worked in northwestern China before the CCP came into power in 1949.”
5. Problem of corruption remains rampant: Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor at the National Defense University: “corrupt generals” an even more serious problem than “corrupt cadres.”

Wen Jiabao’s family assets

1. NYT report on Oct 25: Relatives of Wen have “a knack for aggressive deal making” and controlled assets worth at least US$2.7 billion. They have “accumulated shares in banks, jewelers, tourist resorts, telecommunications companies and infrastructure projects, sometimes by using offshore entities.”
2. Ping An Insurance, one of the world’s biggest financial services companies: The State Council exempted Ping An Insurance and other companies from rules that limited their scope, and the company subsequently raised US$1.8 billion in IPO of stock in 2004. Overall market value now at almost US$ 60 billion.
3. Wife Zhang Beili, a jewelry and gemstone expert (known as “diamond queen”) and businesswoman: “By managing state diamond companies that were later privatized […] she helped her relatives parlay their minority stakes into a billion-dollar portfolio of insurance, technology and real estate ventures.”
4. Son Winston Wen: “his deal-making has been extensive and lucrative, even by the standards of his princeling peers.”: Has formed start-ups with China Mobile, in talks with Hollywood studios over financing deal, set up private school in Beijing, set up/has stakes in technology and electric companies (some sold to Li Ka-shing)
5. NYT had meetings with Chinese government representatives before the piece went to press.
6. Reaction:
   1. People’s Daily alleges that NYT has a history of faking news: “This century-old newspaper claims its news is authentic and reliable, yet there have been quite a few [cases of] plagiarism and fake news in recent years”
   2. Censorship: Both Chinese and English website censored. Similar case in June: Bloomberg report on family wealth of Xi Jinping, boycott of its financial data by Chinese banks and continuing censorship of website within China.
   3. Statement on SCMP saying that “hidden riches” does not exist. The family were active in business but “did not carry out any illegal business activity” and “do not hold the shares of any companies”.
7. Chen Jieren, nephew of He Guoqiang, revealing to American diplomats in 2009 through cable, released by Wikileaks: “It was ‘well known’ that former premier Li Peng and his family controlled all electric power interests; Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) member and security czar Zhou Yongkang and associates controlled the oil interests; the late former top leader Chen Yun’s family controlled most of the banking sector; Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin was the main interest behind major Beijing real estate developments; Hu Jintao’s son-in-law ran Sina.com; and Wen Jiabao’s wife controlled China’s precious gems sector.”

Bo Xilai scandal

1. WSJ: Neil Heywood had “spy links” and had been communicating with an MI6 officer about Bo Xilai at least a year before he died.
   1. Reuters: Source confirmed that Heywood was a “willful and knowing informant”.
   2. UK Foreign Office did not comment and Foreign Secretary said Heywood was not a government employee “in any capacity”.
   3. BBC: Unsurprising, but Heywood definitely “not a particularly high-profile source”: He was never tasked with discovering any specific information, hence just someone “an intelligence officer would chat to every now and again”.
2. New light on the life of Neil Heywood? The Sunday Times: Heywood “a lazy chancer out of his depth”: “Far from being a top-level fixer or spy, he was a failed businessman who found himself caught up in a situation he could not control. He then made a fatal miscalculation that led to his murder.”
3. Reuters: Lawyers had no idea when Bo’s trial will begin

The US election in China

1. Reaction to US election
   1. Global Times editorial: “Be wary of populism led by democracy”
      “The election has just been about getting votes, and this is gradually becoming a popular political rule throughout the world. Politicians should try their best to please the voters and make various promises. The demands of voters will continue to increase, while their patience for setbacks grows weaker. The electoral system encourages populism. Parties and politicians are slowly turned into its captives.”
   2. People’s Daily Overseas edition: 民主的新路
      “如何实现民主，许多发展中国家都在探索，主动或被动地充当西方民主制度“实验品”的都有，结果政治动荡、经济停滞、民不聊生。一系列严酷现实告诉人们，选择适合本国国情的民主新路，是一个民族走向成熟的标志。”
2. The leaders: “election fatigue with Chinese characteristics”? (China Brief analysis)
3. Mock election in China held every four years by the US Embassy in Beijing:
   1. The Chinese prefer Obama: pre-election polls never showed him getting less than 63% support: “Mitt Romney’s transformation from avid China-investor to one of its most ardent critics cost him (not that it mattered) the vote of the People’s Republic. Chinese students jostled for photos beside a cardboard Obama, but the ersatz Mitt stood in a corner, smiling solo.”
4. Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Foreign Affairs, “How China Sees America”

Short updates

1. China Passes First Mental Health Law (WSJ): “China adopted the nation’s first mental health law to protect the rights of the mentally ill on Friday [Oct 26], a move that human rights activists say is a step forward for the country but may fall short of halting its use of psychiatric facilities to silence political and social outliers.”
2. China to phase out organ harvesting from prisoners (Telegraph): “Chinese officials acknowledge that a transplantation system that uses mostly organs from death-row prisoners is neither ethical nor sustainable, Wang Haibo said in an interview in the November edition of the World Health Organisation’s journal Bulletin. An organ donation system run by the Red Cross Society of China has been piloted for two years in 16 regions and is scheduled to be rolled out nationwide by early 2013, Wang said.”
3. Two million to be moved in one of largest relocations in Chinese history (Telegraph):
   “Between now and 2020, two million people are to be moved from their isolated mountain homes in Guizhou province as part of one of the single largest relocations in recent Chinese history.”
4. Mass Protests:
   1. Ningbo protests over expansion of a refining and petrochemicals facility run by unit of state-controlled China Petrochemical Corp., officials announced the expansion will be suspended. WSJ: “The Ningbo protests are the latest example of increasingly well-educated urban residents aggressively resisting the heavy industrial expansion that many local governments are encouraging to keep China’s economy humming. In addition, it highlights how local government bids to lure lucrative investments to their cities are meeting increasing scrutiny from concerned residents.”
   2. Three immolations by Tibetans followed by large-scale protest in Rebgong, Qinghai province on Nov 9. RFA suggested that 5000 people took part, and that tighter security is being enforced in Lhasa.
5. Youths in China
   1. 《2012年中国大学生就业报告》
      1. Among 2011 university graduates: 570,000 are currently unemployed, over 100,000 dependent on their parents (啃老). Among those with a job only 47% satisfied with their job. “An army of the unemployed graduates” (大学生失业军团)
      2. In 2012 there will be some 6.8 million high school graduates. At least 13 million new jobs are required to satisfy basic demand.
   2. Report on the post-90s generation in Nandu Weekly (2012/10/1)

Report on yidi gaokao in Nanfeng Window (2012/9/11