Keywords: Crackdown on protest in Wukan Village, Lin Zuluan, personnel re-shuffle in Tianjin, Huang Xingguo, Li Hongzhong, Legislative Council Election in Hong Kong, rise of localists.

CHINA – POLITICS

1. Wukan Village leader Lin Zuluan convicted of bribes and villagers protest

Lin Zuluan (林祖恋／林祖銮) who was publicly elected as the head of the Wukan village party committee in 2012, was taken away by the police in June. On 08 September, he was convicted of bribery and sentenced to 3 years in jail with fines of 200,000 yuan. Villagers in Wukan protested for the release of Lin for almost three months since June. Failing to stop villagers from protesting by persuasion, the anti-riot police moved into Wukan Village on 13 September. Clashes and bloodsheds were reported.

• //The elected leader of a Guangdong village that made headlines for anticorruption protests five years ago, was sentenced on Thursday to more than three years in jail and fined 200,000 yuan (HK$233,000) for taking bribes. Lin Zuluan, 70, pleaded guilty to two corruption charges in the Chancheng district court in Foshan, Southcn.com, a provincial online portal, reported. Lin was found guilty of taking more than 440,000 yuan in bribes in relation to building projects in Wukan and 150,000 yuan in kickbacks in other deals on behalf of the village committee, according to the report. The court found Lin not guilty of a separate charge of rigging bids for official contracts.// Source: SCMP, 08 September 2016.
•  //法院早前稱「公開開庭審理」，但只有3名家屬獲准旁聽。林家人透露，旁聽席上有30人，其中20人是被「請過來」的，聽審期間有人打瞌睡，另有5名「當局指派的」村民，還有兩名國保在家屬旁監視，他們批評庭審其實是「不公開」。林祖戀穿白衣黑褲上庭，家人向他揮手，他點頭回應，家屬形容他「精神尚可」。南方網報道，林祖戀被控擔任村委會主任期間，為承建商提供幫助，直接或通過他人多次收受賄賂共3萬元；在烏坎經濟聯合社對外購買抽沙船等船隻的經濟往來中，收取回佣15萬元；在烏坎村民生工程招投標過程中，違規設置門檻，為特定投標人提供幫助，串通投標並使其中標。林祖戀承認受賄，但不承認串通投標，在最後陳述時，他感謝司法人員文明公正辦案，「我要向烏坎鄉親們懺悔，向朋友、親人為我而牽掛道歉，我會汲取教訓，依法做人，依法做事，相信法院判決，不上訴」。最後，法院裁定林「受賄」罪成，判囚3年，罰款20萬元；「非國家工作人員受賄」罪成，判囚10個月，合併執行監禁3年1個月，罰款20萬元，串通投標罪名則證據不足。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 09 September 2016.

Lin was not allowed to be represented by the lawyer of his choosing:

• //Lin’s sons tried to hire lawyers to represent him, but they were forced to step down from the case by Guangdong judicial authorities. Lin ended up being represented by two lawyers referred by the government, a move that was criticised by his family.// Source: SCMP, 07 September 2016.

A weiquan lawyer went to the court where Lin was tried in Foshan and observed that the court was heavily guarded, saying the security level is usually applied to cases of national security. It is also observed that the Guangdong Province has been leading the case, and the treatment to Lin has been similar to other cases of rights protection, which is unexpected in this “bribery case”.

• //陸豐烏坎的林祖戀案在佛山開審，當局稱是「廣東省高級人民法院指定管轄」，烏坎事件由始至今，均由廣東省一級主導。不過，指定律師、攝錄認罪、當庭不上訴，這些近年常見於維權、民運案件的現象，也在這宗「受賄」案上出現。廣州一名維權人士昨日到佛山襌城區法院觀察事件，他對本報稱，從未見過對一宗普通的貪污案件如此嚴密佈防，這種規模通常應用於危害國家安全案件，是不希望更多人關注。他還說，林祖戀親人長期受威脅，相信林是被迫認罪，不讓外人旁聽是當局不想威脅林認罪的事曝光。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 09 September 2016.

Villagers protested against the government’s capture of Lin and pressed for his release:

• //Villagers in Wukan in Guangdong province are stepping up their demonstrations as their leader, Lin Zuluan, was set to stand trial for corruption on Thursday. Wukan made headlines around the world five years ago after staging a series of defiant protests against land seizures. Local authorities have warned villagers, who have staged marches for 79 days calling for Lin’s release, to stop protesting. Upon hearing the news that Lin would stand trial in Foshan this morning, Wukan villagers posted a notice announcing their plan to step up their marching efforts. A photo of the notice was posted online. It read: “It is a unanimous move of the entire village body to launch mass demonstrations twice a day at 9.30am and 4.30pm from September 8th to September 11th.” “All of Wukan’s fisheries, shops, markets and construction projects will be suspended [during the period].” Villagers have marched around Wukan’s perimeter ­almost every afternoon since Lin’s arrest, chanting slogans and waving banners calling for his release. A warning letter was sent to most villagers on Monday from the Lufeng city public security bureau, saying they would face legal consequences if they did not stop the marches by Saturday. “Most of us have received it, but we will press ahead anyway until [Lin] is released. The more warnings they send us, the more we are doubling our marching effort,” one villager said.// Source: SCMP, 07 September 2016.

Southcn.com (南方網) reported that party officials are in communication with the Wukan villagers in order to resolve the issue. It also mentioned that villagers’ demand for Lin is unreasonable:

• // 据悉，为进一步完善政府与村民的沟通机制，更好地推进乌坎问题的解决，汕尾、陆丰两级政府已制定沟通联系乌坎村民的工作机制。在今后一段时期 内，汕尾、陆丰两级政府的领导将每周定期到乌坎村面对面接待群众，认真听取收集群众反映的问题和诉求。对群众合理合法的诉求，将按事权由汕尾、陆丰两级政 府落实解决，落实责任人，限定办结时间，确保群众合理合法诉求落到实处。 在解决村民合理诉求的同时，针对村民提出的释放林祖恋、48万“份子钱”、全部归还争议土地等诸多不合理诉求，汕尾、陆丰两级政府也耐心细致做好解释工作。// Source: com, 11 September 2016.

Some protesting villagers said the government-led consultation only allowed government loyalists to attend. Villagers have no trust in the government now.

• //廣東陸豐烏坎村民自6月19日起，除7月1日中共黨慶日外，每日風雨無阻舉村遊行，要求政府歸還霸佔的土地，以及聲援6月18日凌晨被強制帶走、上周四（8日）判囚3年1個月的原村支部書記、村委會主任林祖戀，截至昨日已累計84日。南方網昨報道，汕尾、陸豐兩級黨委、政府「不推諉、不迴避，依法依規推 動烏坎村民提出的問題妥善解決」。報道指，對於烏坎村民提出的解決有爭議土地問題、對已交回土地進行確權、分配宅基地等訴求，當地政府已安排烏坎代表與相 鄰7個村代表和土地問題專家、政府相關人員等協商。昨日烏坎村民仍堅持遊行，警方早前發出「告誡書」稱，9月10日若再不停止遊行，會追究非法集會的法律 責任，但並未採取行動。有參加遊行的村民批評，政府所謂的協商只安排當局信任的村民為代表，而村民早已不信政府，不拿回土地誓不罷休。// Source: Ming Pao Daily, 12 September 2016.

In the early morning on 13 September, anti-riot police raided the houses in Wukan Village and caught 13 village protestors on the charges of disturbing the public order. There were also violent clashes between protestors and the police. Civilian injuries were reported. The village was said controlled by the authority and entry or exit require permission.

• //9月13日，陆丰警方依法采取措施，将涉嫌聚众扰乱公共场所秩序、交通秩序等犯罪的乌坎村民蔡加粦、张向坑、杨锦贞等13名嫌疑人抓获归案。自今年6月19日以来，陆丰市东海镇乌坎村村民蔡加粦、张向坑、杨锦贞等少数不法分子，不断以制造谣言、恐吓辱骂、威逼利诱等手段蛊惑煽动、策划和要挟组织部分村民非法聚集，扰乱公共场所秩序和交通秩序，扰乱学校教学秩序，拦阻村内渔民出海打渔，阻碍商铺正常营业，严重危害当地生产生活秩序，社会影响恶劣。 当地党委政府和公安机关耐心劝阻、教育警示，蔡加粦、张向坑、杨锦贞等人仍置若罔闻，目无法纪，一意孤行。为维护广大群众利益，恢复正常的生产生活秩序，当地警方依法采取行动，将其缉拿归案。// Source: The Paper, 13 September 2016.

• //Villagers have clashed with riot police in Wukan in southern China after officers forced their way into homes in the remote fishing village and arrested more than a dozen villagers early on Tuesday. The arrests came after the village leader Lin Zuluan, who headed protests against land seizures, was jailed last week on corruption charges. Villagers were injured by rubber bullets and tear gas shells were seen scattered on the ground, according to witnesses and video footage obtained by the South China Morning Post. Some villagers were also seen throwing stones at the police in one video clip. Villagers said the village was now controlled by the authorities and everybody wanting to enter or leave had to go through ID checks. The public security bureau in Lufeng in Guangdong province announced on Tuesday morning that police had arrested 13 suspects from Wukan for allegedly disturbing public order.// Source: SCMP, 13 September 2016.

• //警方指他們以製造謠言、恐嚇辱罵和威逼利誘等手段，煽動和策劃組織部分村民非法聚集，擾亂公共場所、交通、學校和教學秩序，阻礙村民出海捕魚和影響商舖營業，嚴重影響生活秩序。警方亦指，當地黨委政府和公安機關曾經耐心勸阻，但村民仍然目無法紀，一意孤行。警方為維護廣大群眾利益，恢復正常生活秩序，依法採取行動。有村民表示，仍然有約三千名警察在村內拘捕村民，警方更一度發放催淚彈驅趕群眾。 // Source: Now TV, 13 September 2016.

2. Tianjin’s Mayor Huang Xingguo probed for “serious disciplinary violations”

Mayor and the acting municipal party committee Huang Xingguo (黄兴国) was caught by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection for “serious disciplinary violations”. He has been an acting Tianjin party head for unusually long 20 months. On 13 September, the position of Tianjin’s party chief was filled up by Li Hongzhong (李鸿忠), who was the provincial party secretary of Hubei. Analyses suggest that he has a very high chance to enter the Politburo when the personnel reshuffle takes place at the 19^th CCP National Congress.

• //Huang’s unusually long 20-month stint as interim Tianjin leader took in the massive warehouse fire and chemical explosions in August last year that killed at least 165 people and caused almost $1 billion in economic losses. He retained his posts even as scores of local government officials and port executives were punished for allowing the large stockpile of hazardous chemicals so close to a residential area, in violation of safety rules. Huang’s career overlapped with at least three Standing Committee members, including Xi. Huang, 61, spent more than three decades in the eastern province of Zhejiang, where he worked under Zhang Dejiang, who’s now chairman of the National People’s Congress and the party’s No. 3 leader. Huang was party chief of the port city of Ningbo in 2002, when Xi began a five-year stint in the Zhejiang leadership, first as governor and then party secretary. After being sent to Tianjin in 2003, Huang worked under Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, who was municipal party chief until ascending to the party’s No. 7 position in 2012.// Source: Bloomberg, 12 September 2016.

Prof. Qiao Mu from Beijing Foreign Studies University and Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based political commentator, offer their views:

• //“Tianjin is an important battle ground and the position of its party chief is directly decided by the central leadership,” said Qiao Mu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University and a political commentator. Huang’s case pointed to jostling going on before the party congress, Qiao said. […] “Huang didn’t lose his title in the aftermath of the Tianjin explosion, which showed there was some sort of ‘protective umbrella’ covering him,” said Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based historian and political commentator. “It’s hard to say at this moment whether his case was too severe to paper over, or whether Xi wanted to use it to show that he’s ready to punish his own people if justice demands it.”// Source: Bloomberg, 12 September 2016.

• //“The political network in Tianjin is extremely complex and close-knit. If one major official falls, it’s likely others will follow ,” Beijing-based political analyst Zhang Lifan said.// Source: SCMP, 11 September 2016.

The Tianjin’s Municipal Party Committee was quick to support the decision on removing Huang, and the Tianjin Daily’s editorial was also swift to write that the removal of Huang demonstrated the Party’s determination to discipline the Party and to fight corruption resolvedly.

• //天津日报9月12日消息，9月11日，天津市各区各部门各单位迅速传达市委常委会和全市领导干部会议精神。全市广大党员干部表示，坚决拥护中央对黄兴国涉嫌严重违纪进行组织调查的决定，切实增强政治意识、大局意识、核心意识、看齐意识，在思想上政治上行动上始终同以习近平同志为总书记的党中央保 持高度一致，以高度的政治责任感和使命感，全力做好改革发展稳定各项工作，让党中央放心，让人民群众满意。全市广大党员干部认为，中央决定对黄兴国涉嫌严重违纪进行组织调查，充分体现了中央从严管党治党鲜明态度，无论什么人，无论担任什么职务，只要触犯党纪国法，就要受到严肃查处，党内决不允许有不受党纪国法约束、甚至凌驾于党章和组织之上的特殊党员，党内决不允许腐败分子有藏身之地。我们坚决拥护和服从中央决定，用中央要求统一思想行动，守土有责、守土负责，确保社会大局安全稳定，确保各项工作沿着正确方向前进。// Source: The Paper, 12 September 2016.

• // 有腐必惩，有贪必肃。中央关于对黄兴国涉嫌严重违纪进行组织调查的决定，充分表明了我们党全面从严治党、坚决反对腐败的坚定信心和决心，我们对中央决定坚决拥护和服从。全市各级党组织和广大党员干部，一定要把思想和行动统一到中央决定和要求上来，始终与以习近平同志为总书记的党中央保持高度一致，坚决贯彻中央要求，切实增强“四个意识”，特别是在大是大非面前坚定政治立场，严守政治纪律和政治规矩，保持政治上的清醒，以实际行动确保全市大局平稳和改革发展的好势头。// Source: Tianjin Daily, 11 September 2016.

• //Hubei provincial party secretary Li Hongzhong has been appointed Tianjin’s party chief – making him a strong contender to become a member of the ruling Communist Party’s Politburo in the upcoming power reshuffle. Li, 60, the former party chief of Shenzhen, was named the municipal party secretary in Tianjin, succeeding Huang Xingguo, who was the acting party head for almost two years and also mayor of the northern municipality, Xinhua reported on Tuesday. A major reshuffle is expected at the party’s National Congress, due to be held in autumn next year. The announcement came after days of speculation, following Huang’s detention as part of a party probe, because whoever gains the job will be seen as a new political rising star as President Xi Jinping appoints his favoured candidates to key posts before the congress. Aside from Gao Dezhan between 1993 and 1997, all party chiefs of Tianjin have been given a seat on the powerful Politburo since Ni Zhifu was promoted as the municipality’s top party official in 1984. […] Li also grabbed the headlines in 2010, when he was governor of Hubei province, at that year’s annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, when he criticised a state media reporter and seized her digital recorder when she asked him to comment on an issue involving the rape of a young woman by local officials in the city of Shishou, which was under Li’s control. Li, a former secretary to Li Tieying, a former member of the Politburo, refused to make any apology over his controversial actions, despite repeated demands by hundreds of journalists and editors from China and abroad.// Source: SCMP, 13 September 2016.

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. The new “Advertisement Law” after a year of implementation

After the Wei Zexi incident in April this year, the “Temporary Measures to Manage Online Advertisement” (互联网广告管理暂行办法) was rolled out to tackle the grey zones regarding what is advertisement on the Internet. Baidu’s search results paid by sponsors are now regarded as “advertisement” and must be shown clearly to the information searchers.

• //作为新《广告法》的配套法规，今年7月，国家工商总局出台了《互联网广告管理暂行办法》，其中明确付费搜索也是广告，需明确标注为“广告”，并与自然搜索结果显著区分。虽然《暂行办法》今年9月1日才正式生效，但其对市场的效应早已提前显现。今年8月中旬，记者发现今日头条等客户端已将原来的“推广”改为标注广告，百度也在8月31日将付费搜索由“商业推广”改为“广告”。百度相关负责人表示，自今年5月份整改起，百度便已对医疗、药品、保健品、食品四大关乎老百姓生命健康安全的行业下发极度严苛的资质审查标准，强制推广企业提交包括营业执照、主体资质证明、银行对公账户验证和ICP备案等10余种资质证明，保证百度平台的信息安全。“《互联网广告管理暂行办法》正式实施后，百度承诺遵守法律规定严格把关广告主资质审查。”该负责人还表示，欢迎广大网友和媒体积极举报，提供线索，任何人一旦发现虚假、违法信息或企业，均可进入百度举报平台（baidu.com）进行举报。此外，新《广告法》还针对互联网广告的一些特殊形式量身定制，例如规定不得以电子信息方式发送广告，弹出广告应当确保一键关闭等，已基本在9月1日前落实。 “新《广告法》为切实规范互联网广告发布行为提供了重要依据。”张国华透露，一年来，全国工商、市场监管部门共查处互联网广告案件约3200件，罚没款约 6700万元。// Source: The Paper, 11 September 2016.

2. China’s baby bump and the relaxation of one-child policy

• //While demographers still assess the effects on population from the full relaxation of the one-child policy announced last year, pregnant women are feeling the squeeze. China forecasts that an extra 17 million babies will be born throughout the country within the next five years due to the policy change. In some of those years, there are expected to be more than 20 million births. With this year the year of the monkey, traditionally considered an auspicious year for giving birth, the competition for a bed is even fiercer. […] Fudan University demography professor Ren Yuan said the increase in pregnancies showed the relaxation of the birth control policy was having an impact, especially in big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai with many migrants. But he did not expect to there to be a big bounce overall in fertility. “Even taking the extra monkey year births and policy factors into consideration, the fertility rate in China remains low. The increase was not much given the base of 16 million babies born each year,” Ren said. The bump in babies would not change the population structure in the near future, he said, but might slow society’s ageing a little in the long run.// Source: SCMP, 11 September 2016.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Further analyses of the Legislative Council Election result

After the election, a number of analyses were published to offer different observations and interpretation of the election. For a detailed account of what happened during the election district by district, you may find here for the election trail notes by Susanne Pepper.

a. Accused involvement of Mainland officials in the election

Prof. Hung Ho-fung from Johns Hopkins University a long-time observer of Hong Kong Politics pointed out that another change of the election is the more obvious involvement of the Central Liaison Office in coordinating who gets to win:

• //Another change in the establishment camp is the rise of a group of hardline conservative professionals who are believed to be directly cultivated and favored by the Liaison Office, the highest body representing Beijing. Over the years, Beijing has been relying on the “old patriots” (who originated from the local underground Chinese Communist Party under British rule) and local business magnates to govern Hong Kong. But in the last four years, cleavage between Beijing’s old allies and Chief Executive C.Y. Leung, as well as the Liaison Office keenly supporting him, is growing. Establishment business political leader James Tien and senior “old patriot” Jasper Tsang openly criticized C.Y. Leung’s hard-line approach repeatedly, and Tsang indicated the possibility of his running against Leung in the 2017 Chief Executive election. Many see this cleavage as an extension of factional struggle in Beijing. In this election, six new favorite underlings of the Liaison Office won seats with a 100 percent success rate, in some cases at the expense of Beijing’s old allies, who lost or were forced to withdraw before or during the election by some invisible hands. While the establishment’s monopoly of the semi-democratic legislature remains unchanged, the rising hardliners and radicals from the establishment and opposition camps are set to clash with each other, in the legislative chamber and beyond.// Source: China File Conversation, 07 September 2016.

Alvin Yeung also observed that a number of incidents suggest the involvement of the Central Liaison Office, which was forbidden by the Basic Law:

• //Former Law Society President Junius Ho publicly thanked the Beijing government’s Liaison Office for its support, and former Secretary for Security Regina Ip is suspected to have paid a visit to the Liaison Office shortly after her own victory. (Support from the Liaison Office is forbidden under Article 22 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law.) More ominously, one of Ho’s opponents, Liberal Party member Ken Chow, dropped out of the race after individuals “from Beijing” threatened him and his close friends at a meeting in Shenzhen.// Source: China File Conversation, 07 September 2016.

Ken Chow, who was a candidate from the pro-establishment Liberal Party, suddenly dropped out of his electoral campaign, citing there was pressure upon him. He revealed what happened to him after the election result came out. In a meeting in Shenzhen, he had been told to abandon his electoral campaign and leave Hong Kong until the election was over by the ‘middlemen’ sent from Beijing. The reason for such threat was to allow another candidate, Junius Ho Kwan-yiu who has similar background as he does but with the blessing of the organization which the ‘middlemen’ represent to win out. The ‘middlemen’ had detail information about the background of his family and supporters, threatening to do harm to them if Chow refused to follow what had been told. He also revealed that the pressure was from Beijing, beyond the level of the Central Liaison Office.

• //選舉工程進行一個月，直到8月25日周永勤公布棄選前，中間人再次找上門，向他展示其支持者往返內地的出入境紀錄及內地行蹤，以及其家人和支持者的照片，要求他停止出席選舉論壇、停止選舉工程及在投票日前離港。他一臉憂心地說：「支持者如果繼續幫我的話，（中間人）表明要他們付出代價，或會惹上麻煩。這不是任何私家偵探，任何團體可以做到的事。仔細的程度，是你身邊有甚麽人在幫你，他們背後所有背景、收入來源及生活習慣。」訪問期間，記者幾次追問誰是中間人，周永勤卻始終不肯透露。「那些人名我真的不能說，我不方便說，你知道我說出來會有什麼後果，你想我死嗎？」外界猜測事件背後由中聯辦主導，周永勤卻為中聯辦「平反」，說「其實不單止中聯辦，中聯辦只是執行部門」，但他認為不可以簡單說是北京主導，因為裏面「有很多條線」。儘管拒絕透露詳情，但周永勤暗示壓力並非香港執法部門可以處理，「如果廉署可以去北京拉人，回國內拉人，維護社會公正當然是好，但大家都知他做不到」。周永勤更斷言這樣赤祼的干預，不會是最後一次，「你寵壞了他，下次會變本加厲，但同時間又有股無力感。」[…] 輿論認為，自2008年立法會選舉開始，中聯辦就開始挑選「政治代理人」。這班「契仔契女」，大多來自法律界。剛在九龍西勝選、準備當第三屆立法會議員的經民聯梁美芬，本身是執業大律師。她今次報名參選時，在記者追問下，承認有就競逐連任一事知會中聯辦，最後她以多於上屆1萬5千票之勢順利入局。而早在2012年立法會選舉期間，已承認獲中聯辦助選的律師謝偉俊，今屆在報稱獨立下，同樣取得比上屆多近1萬票的情況下，成功在九龍東連任。過往一直與中聯辦關係密切的，在得票增長下順利連任，同時，中聯辦亦有捧新人入局。報稱獨立、但被外界稱為「西環契仔」的律師會前會長何君堯，在12年、未得中聯辦支持時以10805票落敗。但他自從跟中聯辦關係變得密切後，便扶搖直上，在今屆選舉嶄露頭角，取得新界西取得最後一席。他在當選後被記者問到要感謝的支持者是否包括中聯辦時，他坦言「當然」，並指與中聯辦的「友誼」是他多年來從事法律工作培養的。至於出戰新界東的新民黨容海恩，本身是大律師。她在2016年初才加入新民黨，短短半年已獲安排出選立法會，縱使被批評在選舉論壇表現欠佳，但仍獲得各大社團協助拉票，宣傳攻勢冠絕新界東，其他候選人紛紛質疑她是「西環新契女」。// Source: The Initium, 07 September 2016.

 b. Analyses of the impacts of election on China-Hong Kong relations and other areas

Alvin Y.H. Cheung from the Baptist University argued that this election exposed the fact that the electoral institution can be easily manipulated. Also, the stand of the Beijing Government towards the localists is hardly to change after the election.

• //[B]ut the more insidious message of the LegCo elections—and the one that the Hong Kong Central Government and Beijing are more likely to take to heart—is how vulnerable Hong Kong’s civic institutions are to manipulation. The saga surrounding the exclusion of “localist” politicians from candidacy—explained in detail by my colleagues at the Progressive Lawyers’ Group—is the most widely-known example. The Electoral Affairs Commission’s last-minute addition of a “confirmation form”—and the exclusion of candidates who signed these forms on the basis that their declarations were not “genuine”—cannot be seen as anything but a ham-fisted attempt to exclude political “undesirables” from the ballot. As Reuters later revealed, the Hong Kong authorities’ exclusion of six politicians from LegCo candidacy was the result of political pressure from Beijing. Any legal challenge to the exclusions is likely to take years to resolve. […] A sensible administration in Beijing would recognize this year’s Legco results as a warning that they have interfered too much with Hong Kong. Unfortunately, Chief Executive C.Y. Leung’s blasé reaction, and the all-too-predictable “resolute opposition” to pro-independence legislators from the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, suggest that Beijing has concluded it has not interfered enough.// Source: China File Conversation, 07 September 2016.

Dr. Edmund Cheng from the Baptist University argued that the departure of veteran legislators and the arrival of young ones with activist background could bring a different culture to the Legislative Council. He also proposed that there are two theses to explain the hardliner approaches by the Beijing Government towards the localists.

• //The exodus of veteran legislators further disrupts seniority in the legislature and makes coordination unmanageable. As long as the localists define their identity by working against the pan-democrats and their success by practicing progressive repertoires, the Legco is likely to become an extension of the movement front. To analyze how Beijing would respond to this trajectory, one must first explain why a hardline approach was adopted from the onset. There are two main theses. The first one refers to Beijing’s self-imposed instability targeting a wider audience. The rise of localism provides an ideal opportunity to frame Hong Kong’s democracy movement as separatist. It serves growing nationalist sentiments at home, helps create fragmentation within, and checks organized resistance from Hong Kong’s opposition. The second thesis stresses the entrenched central-local mistrust. Where Hong Kong’s pro-democracy supporter considers mass mobilization a necessary means to exercise freedoms and improve governance in an undemocratic regime, Beijing perceives protests as signs of disloyalty, inferring that the “people’s hearts and minds have not returned” to the new sovereign. The party mouthpieces and its grassroots agencies have supplied evidence of foreign interference to consolidate such threat and to justify further repression of the regime’s enemies. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy.// Source: China File Conversation, 07 September 2016.

Samson Yuen from the Open University concurred that the new localist legislators would be inclined to turn the Legislature into a social movement front:

• //[B]ut even though the democrats managed to keep the critical minority and even gained additional seats, they are still way short of a simple majority for voting down unpopular government bills, such as the soon-to-be-raised-again national security legislation. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect the new Legislative Council to “get things done” or “get things undone.” Moreover, given the election of a number of protest activists and pro-independence candidates, the LegCo is likely to become a full-fledged social movement front, ending its pretense as a half-baked lawmaking body. The success of these newly-elected lawmakers will be measured not by their policy achievements, but by their ability to galvanize issues through the civil society.// Source: China File Conversation, 07 September 2016.

Commentary from the Financial Times argued that the rise of localism/self-determination in the Legislative Council is a result of Beijing’s inflexible policy towards Hong Kong.

• //China’s growing problem with Hong Kong separatism is mainly self-inflicted. The Basic Law, the territory’s mini-constitution, stipulates that the legislative council and the chief executive should eventually be elected through universal suffrage. By effectively ruling this out in 2014, Beijing triggered the umbrella revolution: the name derived from the use of umbrellas as a defence against police pepper spray. China’s subsequent hardline actions have allowed a growing self-determination movement to take root. Until now, advocates of Hong Kong’s separation from the mainland had been regarded mostly as fringe radicals. But now that legislators favouring eventual independence have entered the council, their ideas may become more mainstream. The intransigence shown by China’s ruling Communist party may reflect what its leaders perceive to be in their interest. After all, more democracy in Hong Kong might encourage Shanghai or Beijing to demand the same. The rise of an independence movement is a dangerous result of Beijing’s inflexibility. Large parts of China’s territory, notably ethnically diverse Xinjiang and Tibet, are home to separatist movements that go back decades, if not centuries. The rise of one in a territory that is ethnically, if not linguistically, the same as most of the rest of China should be a wake-up call to Beijing. // Source: Financial Times, 05 September 2016.

 c. Eddie Chu’s victory as the “King of Vote” and threat to his life after election

• //The activist burst into tears after enjoying a brief moment of joy as he bagged 84,121 votes in New Territories West, the highest number obtained by any candidate in all five geographical constituencies. “On the collusion between the government, businesses, rural forces and the triads, there are things only I myself know,” he said tearfully, before thanking his wife for her support. “Not only myself, [but] my family have also been, and will be, facing a storm of ­political violence.”// Source: SCMP, 05 September 2016.

• //Eddie Chu Hoi-dick confirmed on Thursday night that he was staying at a secret location he had arranged for himself and was under constant police watch. His daughter had also stopped going to school as a precaution, he said. The threats against Chu, a long-time environmental activist, could be linked to people he might have upset while campaigning on issues such as changes in land use in the New Territories and an illegal dumping case in Tin Shui Wai, according to sources.// Source: SCMP, 08 September 2016.

In an interview with Eddie Chu, he mentioned that the reason he participated in the Legislative Council Election after years of involvement in the social movement is that the change from below takes too long and a higher platform is needed for reform. Being labelled as a localist, he also proposed the notion of “democratic self-determination” (民主自決) in contrast to other right-wing localists who advocates the right to “national self-determination” (民族自決).

• //2016年5月開始，朱凱廸嘗試在東涌逸東邨舉辦墟市，對抗領展的街市霸權，當地生活着不少新移民、非洲和南亞裔人士，朱凱廸的策略也是盡可能組織他們，一起參與到墟市之中，嘗試自己搞活地區經濟。「如果右翼本土派要發展族群意識，講『民族自決』，我就要發展『民主自決』。」朱凱廸說，在他看來，「民族自決」的提法是一個危險的信號：「你將來自中共的壓迫，轉化成香港不同族群之間的壓迫，不make sense（合理）。右翼本土派是將族群放先於民主，去畫一些十個人有十個人標準的線，對我來說，如果香港要民主的話，這條路是不通的，它會令我們下一代忘記民主，多於相信民主，因為我們不會再用溝通去說服大家。」他希望能夠組織盡可能多的市民，一起在學校、教會、工會、鄉村，實現一個個「民主的時刻」。一直不肯「在中環開會」的朱凱廸，在雨傘運動之後改變了心意。他已經無法再忍受一個「順從的」抗議狀態：跟着北京的時間表去推進，被動的，「別人給多少我們就拿多少」。他說很少人意識到這一點，自己也是慢慢才有感受，「這也是我為什麼出來參選，而不是投票支持泛民、社民連。」另一個更實際的原因是，他年近40，越發覺得時不我待。在地區層面對抗一個又一個的議題「是很花費青春的」。「菜園村，我們10個人搞了三年才重建了。」他說，自己現在更迫切希望從更高的體制層面帶來更大的變革。// Source: The Initium, 07 September 2016.

• //Chu said he hoped the bottom-up approach would spread political awareness and lead to more lawmakers being elected on a self-determination platform. Talk of self-determination would not be confined to him and five other newly elected localists, he argued, as some pan-democrats from major parties had declared their support for the cause. “It’s not impossible that our camp would form the majority in Legco one day, hold a referendum and have enough power to bargain with Beijing,” he said.// Source: SCMP, 07 September 2016.

TAIWAN – DIPLOMACY

1. Former Foreign Minister Tien Hung-mao to head the Straits Exchange Foundation

Tien Hung-mao (田弘茂) was nominated by the President Tsai Ing-wen to be the only candidate for the head of the Strait Exchange Foundation in Taiwan. He will in the next few years lead talks with Beijing.

• //Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation is set to elect a former diplomat to head the quasi-official agency, responsible for negotiating with the mainland China, on Monday afternoon. The foundation’s board members will hold a provisional meeting to elect new members, including Tien Hung-mao as chairman and Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Chang Tien-chin as the vice-chairman, who will then be appointed by Tien to double as the secretary general. Monday’s meeting was organised after President Tsai Ing-wen named Tien as the only candidate for the position on August 31. The position has been left vacant for nearly four months since Tsai, of the Democratic Progressive Party, took office in May – a sign the president, who leads a party that traditionally has been sceptical of closer ties with the mainland China, has had a hard time finding the right person to carry out her China policy and be accepted by Beijing. Tien, 77, was recruited by the former DPP administration, which ruled the island from 2000 to 2008, first as foreign minister and then de facto ambassador to Britain.// Source: SCMP, 11 September 2016.

• //田弘茂曾任陳水扁總統執政時期的外交部長，被認為是較老一倍的「獨派人士」，許多台灣偏獨派的政治人物對此表示歡迎，但也有偏統派人士對此表示不樂觀，甚至直言「蔡英文邁向台獨之路已啟程」。台灣中山大學政治研究所副教授王群洋，在接受BBC中文網記者訪問時就表示，田弘茂的任用「是要給獨派人士交代，因為他是綠營內的最大公約數，而且民進黨現在找不到適用的人選，蔡總統的口袋大概沒什麼人了」。王群洋補充：「田弘茂的任用是要讓獨派人士安心，蔡總統也放心，因為他們共事過一段時間，是有經驗的，不會給他出亂子。」台灣師範大學政治研究所教授范世平則說，這個人選就是最後排除很多「不安因素下」才決定的。「我覺得他不算深綠，但也會被算綠營的，這樣看我覺得兩岸要互動的機率不高，可能未來4年兩岸都會冷互動」。// Source: BBC (Chinese Edition), 01 September 2016.

• //田宏茂出生於1938日本統治時期的台灣台南，並於美國威斯康星州大取得政治學的碩博士，並曾任史丹佛大學的訪問學者，專長是中國近代政治。2000年民進黨首次執政，被聘請回台灣任職，曾任外交部長與駐英國代表。台灣總統府表示，田弘茂在美國求學及任教時期就已投入中國大陸研究，對對岸發展有深入了解。發言人黃重諺也表示：「田弘茂熟稔兩岸關係及亞太戰略等議題，更對推動台灣民主化、拓展台灣國際參與不遺餘力。」范世平表示，「田弘茂跟中國大陸有一些交往，以前在美國教書時，也有跟中國有互動，但中國大陸應該還是認定他是獨派」。王群洋也認為，「田弘茂以前的經歷很豐富，他也曾經拜會過江澤民」，她不認為田弘茂是填補「過渡時期」，反而認為田弘茂會在蔡英文背書下做個幾年。田弘茂本身在決定出任後也表示：「上任後將會站在增進台灣全體國民同胞共同利益的立場上，來處理兩岸交流的議題。」// Source: BBC (Chinese Edition), 01 September 2016.

 2. NGO to push for greater room for Taiwan on the international stage

The current Foreign Minister in Taiwan David Tawei Lee (李大維) was reported not to pursue the UN membership while continuing to push for meaningful participation in global affairs. an NGO, the Taiwan United Nations Alliance (台灣聯合國協進會) said they have the encouragement from the President Tsai.

• //The 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly opens on Tuesday, and 45 members of the Taiwan United Nations Alliance are heading to New York and other cities in the United States, including Washington, Boston and Philadelphia, to make the case for Taiwan’s representation in the world body. […] This is the 13th time that the alliance, a civic organization founded in 2003, has run a campaign for Taiwan’s return to the United Nations, but the first time since President Tsai Ing-wen, whose Democratic Progressive Party has traditionally favored Taiwan’s formal independence from China, took office. The new foreign minister, David Lee, said last month that his government would not pursue United Nations membership, while continuing to press for “meaningful participation” in United Nations-affiliated agencies. Still, the alliance’s president, Michael Tsai, said that, after eight years of Ma Ying-jeou, the former president and a Kuomintang member, who pursued more conciliatory relations with China, the time is right for a new push for Taiwan’s full participation in global affairs. In an interview, Mr. Tsai, who is also a former D.P.P. legislator and defense minister, discussed the alliance’s plans. […] What do you think of Taiwan’s current status? Taiwan used “Chinese Taipei” as its name in both this year’s World Health Assembly [the decision-making body of the World Health Organization] and the Olympic Games. Taiwan is just Taiwan, not “Chinese Taipei,” a thing that has no real existence anywhere in the world. That’s just a name Taiwan has used under pressure from China. It’s unfair to 23 million Taiwanese people if we can’t use our own name, our own national anthem or our own national flag in international events. I hope that one day Taiwan and China will be two friendly countries that can cooperate in business and trade, and work together on security, prosperity and development in the Asia-Pacific region. If China opposes Taiwan’s pursuit of U.N. membership, that’s just China’s position. It’s not a global principle that everybody else has to comply with. China has not ruled Taiwan since 1949. We hope that one day the Chinese government and the Chinese people will be able to respect the opinions of Taiwan’s people. […] Ms. Tsai’s government has said it will not pursue U.N. membership. Did that disappoint you? I appreciate that the government has to consider all possible consequences of any action it takes. It must think not pursuing this this year is the right decision. Tsai Ing-wen’s government is cautious about promoting Taiwan’s U.N. membership, because Tsai Ing-wen doesn’t want to provoke China. But Ms. Tsai does encourage civic groups’ efforts. I hope Ms. Tsai will talk with Ban Ki-moon as Taiwan’s president to express the Taiwan people’s wish to join the United Nations, as [former President] Chen Shui-bian did in 2007. Ms. Tsai has said she would maintain the status quo. I personally think that’s acceptable for now, because the status quo includes peace and stability, preserving Taiwan’s democracy and freedom as well.// Source: New York Times, 08 September 2016.