CHINA -POLITICS

1. Liu Zhijun charged with corruption. He was removed from office in Feb 2011 after reports that he had embezzled $152 million over the years.
2. Commemorating Hu Yaobang:
   1. Xinhua: “胡耀邦是改革开放后中国最高领导人中第一个穿西装的。他是在以身作则地鼓励人们穿西装，看来他把这视为培养开放意识并向世界展示中国开放形象的一种手段。”
   2. Liberation Daily: “改革开放让中国迸发了前所未有的活力，堪称脱胎换骨，经济总量跃升到世界第二把交椅。不过，有一点和耀邦当年力促改革时颇为相似：改革同样面临巨大阻力， 同样需要进一步解放思想。所不同的是，耀邦面对的，是意识形态方面的抱残守缺，是发展之初面临的突破旧体制的种种困境；而如今我们面对的，则是发展起来以 后更巨大、更多元、更深层次的矛盾堆叠和利益冲突。在中国改革到了需要狠推一步、击一猛掌的新的历史时刻，缅怀耀邦，有很强烈的现实意义。”

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

Eurasian transportation network and regional security

Pin marked location of Gwadar Port

1. The network aims at deepening economic ties in Central and South Asia and providing a foundation for regional security interests.
2. Pakistan: important partner in China’s effort to construct “new silk road” through Eurasia, a key conduit linking China with Central Asia and the Middle East
   1. Gwadar Port as latest focus of heavy Chinese investment, which could serve as a beginning of a new southern route for trade: China took over management in early March to finance more than 80 percent of the $248 million development cost of the port.
   2. “A warm-water, deep sea port, Gwadar could serve as a major trading hub. Strategically, it could serve as a means of allowing energy supplies from the Persian Gulf to go overland through Pakistan rather than by sea through the Straits of Malacca, circumventing any naval blockade or other interruption in maritime traffic between the Persian Gulf and China. A direct transportation corridor between Gwadar and Xinjiang also could boost the economy of that troubled province, which has a large population of Muslim minorities like the Uighurs.” For Pakistan, investment would generate revenue, as well as jobs and commerce for Pakistan’s Baluch minority.
   3. Construction and modernization of the Karakoram Highway, the main road between China and Pakistan
   4. Pakistan’s potential role as a “natural energy corridor” linking China to Iran’s oil. Both countries are helping Pakistan to construct a 785km gas pipeline: “China can import Iranian oil more cheaply and safely than through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, through which more than 80 percent of China’s imported oil passes”
3. Strategic concerns? Foreign analysts see China as building a “string of pearls”, or Chinese funded ports, spanning China’s sea lanes of communication to encircle India. The PLA may use these facilities to support operations in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and East Africa, although China did refuse an earlier request from Pakistan to build a naval base at Gwadar.
4. Iran: China at the same time attempting the integration of Iran into its transportation networks through Pakistan, by helping Iran construct a $1 billion high-speed railway that may extend to Xinjiang (approved by State Council in Feb 2013).
5. “This massive transportation infrastructure network of railway, highway and maritime shipping routes—which extends through Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and other regions—will enhance economic ties between China and its western neighbors and provide the foundation for future Chinese strategic options in Eurasia and South Asia.”
6. Reaction: Baloch representative to the UNHRC alleged that Balochistan’s resources are being exploited by Pakistan with the help of China: “Saindak copper mines were being already “milked” by China and “now Gwadar port has been handed” to China and it will be soon that China will build a military base there too.”

Working with Nepal to curb Tibetan presence

1. China increasing its influence in Nepal through offering financial incentives in order to stem the flow of Tibetans fleeing across the border. There are about 20,000 Tibetans in Nepal. In the first eight months of 2012, about 400 refugees escaped to Nepal, half as many as during the same period in 2011.
2. China’s campaign picked up pace in 2008 after widespread Tibetan uprising. Nepalese authorities also more anxious about the issue as self-immolation has spread to their territory: arrest of Tibetans during anti-China demonstrations, clampdown on religious celebrations such as the Dalai Lama’s birthday.
3. Background: “The earliest Tibetan refugees arrived in Nepal in 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled Tibet, and they settled in refugee camps, of which there are still 13. A Tibetan enclave sprang up around Boudhanath. Some Tibetans became rich by making carpets and handicrafts, and prominent Tibetan monasteries amassed wealth and purchased prime real estate in the Katmandu Valley. The population was bolstered by more recent political refugees […]. The Tibetans used to be given refugee cards that guaranteed them some rights, but Nepal ended that practice in 1998.”
4. Fall in number of refugees: “These days, refugees pay about $5,000 to smugglers to get them to Nepal. They generally stay six to eight weeks at a transit center in the Katmandu Valley run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, then board a bus for India… Before the Tibetan uprising five years ago, 2,000 to 4,000 refugees reached the transit center each year. That dropped to 500 to 600 in 2008, as Chinese security forces locked down Tibetan towns, and crept back up to 850 the next year. It has remained low ever since.”

National defense; public security; discipline inspection

Defense white paper

1. China publishes white paper on China’s armed forces on April 16. Full text available online.
2. Highlight recent territorial spates:
   1. “On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands.”
3. Criticism of increased US presence:
   1. “There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. Local turmoils occur frequently.”
   2. “Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser.”
4. Structure of military units revealed, deemed a first by domestic media:
   1. The PLA Army (PLAA): The PLAA mobile operational units include 18 combined corps, plus additional independent combined operational divisions (brigades), and have a total strength of 850,000. The combined corps, composed of divisions and brigades, are respectively under the seven military area commands (MACs)
   2. The PLA Navy (PLAN): The PLAAF now has a total strength of 398,000 officers and men, and an air command in each of the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. In addition, it commands one airborne corps.
   3. The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF), etc etc.

Public security informatization construction (公安信息化建设)

1. Increased spending on intelligence-related information technology may account for the much-debated increases in internal security budgets. Informatization of the police force has been a continual theme in the past five years, as public security bureaus at all levels invested in integrated databases.
2. Latest advances: Inputs to MPS databases increasingly hold financial, personal and travel data: “informatized police operations have moved from investigations toward preemptive warning and providing specific location data for arresting officers. One such example was the use of an economic intelligence tracking system, which tracked financial data, that alerted to the MPS to the possibility of a counterfeiting operation.”
3. Expanded organizational scope: “The boost in capabilities and budget appears to be expanding the MPS’s institutional scope and influence, possibly at the expense of the Ministry of State Security.” The MPS may be given back a mission against external threats in a domestic context. “Many of those functions were given to the MSS when it was created in 1983. Up through the 1990s, especially during the tenure of Jia Chunwang (1984–1998), the MSS seemed to be organization in ascendancy. The MPS’s importance for national security seems to complete the power shift that began with Zhou Yongkang as an MPS chief with Politburo standing.”

Allegations of rights abuse

1. Wenzhou official died under shuanggui. Official autopsy claimed that Yu Qiyi “suffered an accident”, but families contested that based on photos showing Yu to have bruises and that he appeared to have been bitten. Yu was arrested in March on suspicion that he broke the law during the approval process of a local land project.
2. Tang Hui, the mother of a rape victim who was sent to laojiao for “disturbing social order”, is suing the local authorities for her detention. She demanded a compensation of just over 1,400 yuan. SCMP: Tang demands written apology, dames amounting to 1,000 yuan and compensation of 1463 yuan for taking personal freedom.

CHINA – SOCIETY

H7N9 and other deadly illnesses

Century Weekly: Who pays?

1. For the patients? “4月3日，国家卫生和计划生育委员会要求人感染H7N9禽流感患者的“医疗救治费用按照规定渠道解决，严禁因费用问题延误救治或推诿患者”。在实际操作中，目前暂时没有发现这种现象。高昂的治疗费用几乎把患者家庭逼入绝境。在未发生人感染H7N9禽流感的广东省，已经设立了防控救助专项资金，首期3000万元资金已经准备到位。同时，广东省也明确了在该省已购买城乡居民医保的H7N9禽流感患者，其治疗费用纳入医保报销范围。可是，在已有人感染H7N9禽流感病例的地区，这笔治疗费用最终由谁来支付，却不明确。目前正在治疗的病例中，不少费用是由医疗机构垫付。”
2. “政府对传染病要有界定，明确什么样的情况由政府出钱、怎么出、从哪里出。例如，2003年“非典”时期，政府要强制患者接受治疗，就需要考虑医疗费用问题。”
3. For the keepers? “目前国内禽流感扑杀补偿的主要依据为《重大动物疫情应急条例》第33条，“对因采取扑杀、销毁等措施给当事人造成的已经证实的损失，给予合理补偿”，以及从2004年1月开始实施的《高致病性禽流感防治经费管理暂行办法》。根据《办法》，禽流感扑杀补助标准为鸡、鸭、鹅等禽类每只补助10元，另外各地根据实际情况对不同禽类和幼禽、成禽的补助有所区别。《办法》还规定，按照上述标准，中央财政对东、中、西部地区分别补助20%、50%、80%，地方财政分别负担80%、50%、20%。专家指出，《办法》下发已经接近十年，物价已经翻了几番，一直未有新补偿标准出现。”

China Newsweek: This week’s feature on H7N9: “面对如此变化多端的病毒，中国现有的家禽免疫政策与监控体系，似乎显得力不从心。”

Previous week’s feature on cancer, all quotes below:

1. 《2012中国肿瘤登记年报》：“全国每6分钟就有一人被确诊为癌症，每天有8550人成为癌症患者，每七到八人中就有一人 死于癌症。”“全国癌症发病形势严峻，发病率与死亡率呈持续上升趋势，每年新发癌症病例约350万，因癌症死亡约250万。” 预计到2020年，中国每年的癌症死亡总数将达300万左右，患病总数将达660万。
2. 随着癌症发病情况的日益严重，2003年，卫生部发布《中国癌症预防与控制规划纲要(2004—2010)》，把加强肿瘤登记列入癌症预防控制的主要内容。自此，肿瘤登记工作开始全面受到重视。截至2012年，全国的肿瘤登记点达到222个，覆盖人口约两亿。
3. 从上世纪90年代开始，鼻咽癌已经不再是中山地区发病率最高的癌种。这并不是因为鼻咽癌的病例减少了，相反，它的发病率一直稳中有升，但是它的增幅，已经赶不上肺癌、结肠直肠癌等肿瘤的蹿升速度。
4. 今年2月，国家环保部印发了《化学品环境风险防控“十二五”规划》，其中明确表示，因受有毒化学品污染，个别地区出现‘癌症村’等严重的健康和社会问题。这被认为是承认存在“癌症村”现象的首次官方表态。 尽管如此，翻开300多页厚的《2012中国肿瘤登记年报》，并不能从这份来自官方的权威资料里找到任何有关“癌症村”的描述。

China’s battle with autism

1. There is no official data on the prevalence of the disorder in the mainland, although surveys released in other countries suggest that the disorder has exploded in the past few decades. One in 38 children in South Korea aged between 7 and 12 is found to be autistic.
2. Fudan Children’s Hospital in Shanghai to launch a three-year project to determine the prevalence of autism in China. The project, carried out in conjunction with seven hospitals, is funded by 32 million yuan granted by the ministry of health before its recent merger.
   1. Three phases, with the first consisting of staff training and the second a nationwide survey of up to 200,000 middle school pupils.
3. Based on existing sample, 1.5 percent have autism, far outpacing the official estimate in 2005, 0.11 percent.
4. Enduring issues:
   1. Chinese children have nine years of compulsory education, but few public schools have facilities or teachers to accommodate autistic pupils. Most children have to go to facilities run by NGOs.
   2. Central government has promised social welfare stipends to support families with autistic kids, but actual implementation rests on local governments. While Beijing residents receive up to 2,000 yuan a month, families in inland cities receive far less.

Reforming China’s pension system

At the Boao Forum on April 7, director of the National Council for Social Security Fund Dai Xianglong made the public confession that the Chinese pension system is on track to produce a major deficit. An analysis of the system on Tea Leaf Nation:

1. The basic design: A worker’s contribution to the Chinese national pension fund is made up of two components:
   1. 8% of income – required to be saved in his individual account. Get back all the money plus interests at retirement
   2. 20% of income – contributed to the social pension fund (社会统筹基金). This fund:
      1. Pays pension to seniors who retired before 1997 or shortly after 1997 (when the system was founded), who do not have sufficient accumulation in their personal accounts
      2. Pays every retiree who have contributed pension payments for over 15 years a basic pension, weighted to average incomes in a given province for redistributive purpose
   3. The 8% is taken from employees and is a uniform rate nationwide; while the 20% is from employers and the rate varies across regions, being substantially lower in some cities such as Shenzhen, Hangzhou and Ningbo. The distinction between employer and employee contribution is set out in the new Social Insurance Law implemented in July 1, 2011. The new law also stipulates that employees who move from one jurisdiction to another can transfer their pension funds.
   4. Total pension one receives upon retirement = sum of accumulation in individual account + basic pension
   5. According to CASS, by the end of 2011 the overall pension fund had an accumulated surplus of 1.95 trillion yuan. During 2011 fiscal year, the sum of all inflows outnumbered payments by 413 billion yuan.
2. The lack of sustainability of the system as it is now:
   1. System held together by increasingly large government subsidy, e. paying out to retirees through taxpayer money: “In 2002, the government spent 45 billion RMB (or about US$7 billion) to subsidize the fund. In 2011, the number grew to 220 billion, making up 53 percent of the total balance of the year.”
   2. Social security agencies using funds in individual accounts to finance social pension fund, against prohibition: “By the end of 2011, the cash actually in individual accounts was only 12 percent of what it should be, falling short by 2.22 trillion RMB (or about US$359 billion) and putting almost all workers at the risk of finding that there is no money left in their individual accounts when they retire.”
   3. An aging population: In the future, an even smaller workforce will shoulder pension payments for a larger elderly population.
3. Possible solutions: Seek more inflow for the funding pool
   1. Increasing rates of mandatory worker contribution to above 28%
   2. Delaying retirement age: One-year delay would bring additional 4 billion yuan and lessen payments by 16 billion. Current legal retirement age is 60 for men and 50 for women.
4. Inequality as key to widespread discontent: Those working in public sectors and sectors financed by public expenditure are exempt from the system. Their pensions are paid for by government spending using taxpayer money, rather than their own contribution. They also receive more: “According to CASS, 92.3 percent of retirees in public sectors receive monthly payments higher than 4,000 RMB (about US$647); while 75.4 percent of retirees covered by the social pension system receive monthly payments lower than 2,000 RMB (about US$323).” A fairer way ahead, to most citizens, would be to abolish the privileged system enjoyed by the public sector.

PUBLICATION HIGHLIGHTS

Annie Nie, JOCC, on gaming, nationalism and ideological work:

1. Online games about China’s resistance war against Japan highlights “interplay of the state’s political agenda, business interests, and nationalistic sentiments”
2. China’s digital game industry as “highly involved in the rise of popular nationalism”: Emergence of Chinese patriotic games as a reaction to Japan’s own militaristic war games.
3. No evidence that games developed between 1998 and 2005 had government support, but important policy shift in 2003: Previously, policies were centered on issues of addition and exposure to violence and pornography. From 2003, these aspects have been downplayed and online games development was encouraged. Creation of a policy environment advantageous to domestic gaming industry; provision of financial support to domestic game companies.
4. Online games classified as “cultural products”, and patriotic online games “became a joint enterprise between the Party-state and private companies” such that “popular nationalism and official nationalism merged and worked together” (p. 508). Killing two birds with one stone: ideological agenda and enormous economic potential.
5. Resistance War-themed games “strictly based on the officially sanctioned narrative”, intending to indoctrinate while they entertain, but they may in fact be failing their purposes: internal feuds between forces trumping unity against the common enemy, Japan.

Two JOCC papers on China’s environmental policies:

1. Wanxin Li and Paul Higgins: controlling local environmental performance. In light of the disparity between central agenda and local interests, three national environmental management programs deployed by central authorities to encourage a change of political will in local actors:
   1. Quantitative Examination of Comprehensive Control of Urban Environment
   2. Model City for Protecting the Environment
   3. Green GDP
2. Xiumei Guo et al.: Emerging trends in China’s development model suggests a “clear shift towards sustainability”
   1. Implementation of environmental protection regulations strengthened significantly in 19^th Five Year Plan period, followed by the introduction of disciplinary sanctions, civic liability and even criminal liability.
   2. China is “already well advanced” in three major components: continuous encouragement of low-carbon economic projects; educational outreach; strengthening of environmental protection

Journal of Asian Studies February 2013 issue:

1. Paper on class and protest propensity by Yang Su and Shizheng Feng:
   1. “Those who are better connected are not only more likely to adapt but also more inclined to voice”. Those with social ties to people in power are actually more rather than less likely to engage in protest.
   2. “Citizens in the lower class categories show higher levels of protest propensity”.
   3. Adapt and voice: Adaptation: Falling back on guanxi networks, rather than private-realm pursuits, as alternatives to protests. Pursue life-changing goals through informal favors, backdoor dealings, even illegal activities. “The arenas for adaptation and for voice are intertwined and overlapping: the two options of coping strategy are not mutually exclusive” (p. 61).

Paper on “detraditionalization” and attitudes to sex outside marriage, by six scholars in Zhejiang University and UCL:

1. 在三个经济发达程度不同的省（浙江、云南、贵州）一共抽取了两百多名20-39岁的志愿者回答这些问题，其中53%来自农村地区，55%是女性
2. 在1990年的一则研究里，有73%的男性和78%的女性认为处女贞洁是一个女孩最重要的财富，这个数字如今已经下降。
3. 研究者们发现，婚前性行为在当下中国十分常见。 92%的农村居民和94%的城市居民表示他们认识有婚前性行为的人。 多于三分之一的人对此现象表达了负面评价：略年长者中53%认为这是不好或不能接受的，略年轻者中则有44%持有这种观点。在这个问题上，地域和男女差别都不大
4. 人们对婚外性行为也持有较高的容忍度： 三分之一（32%）的参与者说他们认识已婚外遇人士，并有49%的人不直接反对婚外性行为，甚至表示同情
5. 01年和02年的研究表明有57%-77%的大学生完全不接受同性恋。在此次调查中，有七位参与者说他们不知道什么是同性恋；24人说他们认识身边的同 志，其中18人是城市居民；64%的参与者认为同性恋是不能接受的，农村居民和女性尤甚（72%和71%）。 有30%的参与者对同 性恋表示了宽容和接受。
6. 有将近一半的参与者表示他们听说过参与过性交易的男性。所有的女性对性交易皆表示不赞同，但表示反对的男性只有80%。

A selection of articles from Chinese journals and blogs:

1. 胡伟：中国的民主政治发展应有顶层设计
   1. “近年来国内有一种日渐强大的反民主声音，甚至有种观点认为，对于中国来说“民主化是一个祸国殃民的选择”。本来，“民主是个好东西”是一条不言而喻的公 理，但在我国，原本的一个常识性命题却变成了一个扑朔迷离、争辩不清的难题。因此，谈论中国的政治发展问题，不得不首先为民主进行“正名”，弄清中国为什 么需要民主。”
   2. “遗憾的是，在当前的中国，不仅对于民主是好是坏争论不休，而且对于什么是民主以及中国需要什么民主在学界内外也是众说纷纭，凌乱不堪。民主理论在中 国陷入了前所未有的混乱，不但起不到指导实践的作用，反而产生了诸多误导；民主实践更是无所适从，五花八门，收效甚微，陷入了巨大的困境。目前，学界内外关于中国民主政治发展的理论主张和流派众多，各执一词，缺乏共识。概括起来，至少有自治民主 （重点是推进村民自治和基层自治）、宪政民主（重点是加强人民代表大会的权力）、党内民主 （重点是以党内民主为突破口带动国家民主）、经济民主 （重点是实现劳动者参与生产决策并分享经济成果）、法治民主（重点是先推行法治再实行民主）、行政民主 （重点是通过行政民主化推进政治民主化）、社团民主（重点是发展公民社会作为民主的基础、协商民主（重点是发展中国的政治协商制度）、网络民主 （重点是通过互联网的政治参与来推动民主政治）、纵向民主（重点是国家自上而下的领导与民众自下而上的参与相统一）、预算民主 （重点是实现政府预算公开透明）等不同的主张。”
2. 朱海就：中国需要来一场撒切尔式大改革
   1. “当下的中国所面临的经济形势和撒切尔上台之前的英国非常像，也就是说，我们 也正面临着滞涨的威胁，也就是所谓的“英国病”。我们也有非常庞大的国有部门，我们的通货膨胀很严重，市场活力在下降，这和改革之前的英国很相似。因此， 我们非常迫切地需要来一场“撒切尔式”的大改革”
3. South Reviews: 阶层结构：僵化与突破
   1. “知识分子在与官和商的联盟中起到了他们的作用。知识分子不能独立运用自己的文化资源赚钱，只能依附于官和商而获得自己的利益。”
   2. “在这个过程中，官、学、商三者形成了顽固的同盟关系，掌控了社会的很多资源，造就了一个赢家通吃的利益集团。相应地，农民的生活水平略有改善；工人阶 级则分化了，在大型国企工作的工人和下岗工人的处境不可同日而语。在两个群体之外，还生产出一个庞大的农民工群体，他们的未来最具有不确定性。”
   3. “围绕国有企业、资源、地产、金融等重点领域建立起来的、受到体制内贪腐势力保护、并与外资有着千丝万缕关联的“特殊利益集团”形成并站稳了脚跟，其他利益群体更像是这片大树底下的“花花草草”。 这种阶层结构的形成和固化花去了一代人的时间，如今这种格局已经开始了自身的再生产。这便产生了“富二代”、“官二代”、“学二代”、“穷二代”等各种“二代”。”

A selection of titles published, from CN Politics book review:

1. Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China: “通过研究一系列改革“样本”，揭示基层政权的运作方式以及各级地方官员的行为动机，傅士卓指出：此类改革会深刻影响执政党的组织结构，因为它要求地方官员 更多地对公众负责，而非上级部门。全书共分为五章，分别是中国政府治理的问题、自下而上的改革与自上而下的发展、党内民主、温州模式和温岭模式。”
2. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power: “虽然中国的全球化存在更为广泛深入，但中国只是一个全球事务的参与者，没有掌握真正的全球权力——他因此把中国称为“不完全强国”（partial power）。”
3. Donald Gross, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War: “美国不应该过多地受到“中国威胁论”的影响，而应该按部就班落实政策。中美关系应该出现新范式，来建立“稳定和平”这一基石”
4. Timothy Hilderbrandt, Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China: 中国的NGO怎样适应中央和地方政府不断变化的利益需求，甚至为国家服务，解决社会问题。因此，中国NGO的成长壮大等于助政府一臂之力，而非削弱它的权力。作者对比分析了中国的环保、预防艾滋及HIV、同性恋组织等三类NGO
5. Doug Young, The Party Line: How the Media Dictates Public Opinion in Modern China
6. 彭丽君编， 边城对话：香港中国·边缘·边界： “13位学者和专业人士从各自领域剖析了“边缘化”之于香港的含义，探索中港关系的多元性”
   1. 第一部分的四篇文章，都是从历史和地理的宏观角度探讨中国边界的构成，关注边缘论述的历史性
   2. 在第二部分当中，潘毅写的富士康、陈顺馨写的中国农村，则关注国内弱势群体的状况，借此分析边缘和中心的关系。
   3. 第三部分：中港关系

HONG KONG – POLITICS

2017 Chief Executive Election

1. Comments of Qiao Xiaoyang, chairman of the NPC Law Committee: Next CE must not be a person who would oppose the central government; must love Hong Kong and the nation. Calls for a broadly representative nomination committee to put up candidates for universal suffrage, according to Article 45 of Basic Law. Benny Tai: Focus on how to form this nomination committee.
   1. Pro-establishment member: Audrey Eu may be able to enter the poll: “該名建制人士認為，泛民推余若薇做特首候選人，已經是比較溫和務實的做法，至少余若薇沒有參與過八九民運及支聯會的工作，跟北京沒有什麼過節，她過去專注法律執業，跟外國政壇也沒有什麼聯繫，屬於背景清白。”
2. Martin Lee’s controversial proposal which he later labeled as a “rash decision”
   1. Commentary by 王慧麟：“公開提出一個鳥籠選舉方案，背後應不是一時衝動，多多少少是有巨大的政治計算。這些計算，其實也是他們同代（或上下一代）民主派，一直信守的政治遊戲潛規則：只要忍一忍，入到北京定下的入閘門檻（如立法會、特首選舉等），就可以楔入去，慢慢地將個夾縫拉大，最終會達到真正的民主。 究竟為什麼上一代的民主派前輩，會有如此想法？這個想法的論述基礎又在哪裏呢？ 這是與當時民主派提出及信奉之「香港中產階級」的論述，有密切關係。”
   2. “這套論述的基本前設，是香港社會的穩定力量，不一定來自工商界，更多的是來自香港社會各行各業之中產階級，特別是專業人士。在九七過渡期間，假如這些中產階級出現人心不穩，甚至大規模的中產移民潮，香港必然產生社會混亂，影響繁榮穩定。”
   3. “對這班民主派前輩而言，爭取民主必須照顧雙現實﹕香港中產階級其實是相當保守，怕死怕亂；其次，香港政治前途掌握在別人手上，九七年前是英國及中國，九七 年後是北京，後者把權力看得非常重要，怕民主開放會帶來動亂，甚至遭到奪權。因此，爭取民主只能「寸土必爭」，其定義就是：「人哋畀幾多你就攞幾多」。”
   4. “不過，在激進派眼中，「香港中產階級論述」的死穴，或者是盲點，就是所謂「失敗主義」，即是民主派只佔道德高地，不願意硬碰硬，遇上北京（或九七年前之英國）強硬反對，立即龜縮，由爭取八八直選到現在的2017年普選均如是，次次失敗次次退卻。”
   5. “現在的民主派前輩，風光了三十多年，是不是倒過來被這套論述綁架，面對愈來愈激進及對立的外部環境，不肯轉型求變呢？當然，你可以進一步問：究竟七十後或八十後的世代，還有多少人是中產階級呢？民主之父所提的方案，其實是代表哪一班人，或者是哪一個階層的利益呢？是過往享受論述紅利的民主派人士及其支持者，還是現在捱到水深火熱，七八十後的所謂「中產階級」呢？ ”
   6. From the other end of the spectrum, commentary by SCMP Alex Lo: “So far, Lee has been the only democrat who has offered a concrete proposal for the chief executive election in 2017 to counter the bottom line being spelled out by a succession of senior mainland officials for the election. For this, he has been denounced and shouted down by his fellow pan-dem colleagues… They have objected vociferously, but proposed nothing serious in return. Many are in danger of becoming true nihilists rather than democrats.”

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