CHINA – DIPLOMACY

China-Japan relations

赵楚：钓鱼岛的虚假危机

1. America:
   1. 说美国利用钓岛危机有意打乱现有权力格局和秩序，制造殃及鱼池的地区大国对抗，那是太低估了美国霸权的智慧含量。
   2. 假如中日因主权争端处于安全敌对和军事对抗的境地，从而导致关系全面后退，这种前景对于美国绝对是有百害而无一利的 。
   3. 含蓄的压力并非为围堵和遏制中国，而是希望通过压力控制局面，从而影响中国的决策，防止中国走向冷战式体系对抗的旧路。
2. Japan:
   1. 由于在经济上有赖于深化对中国的依赖性关系，日本缺少对华关系的筹码。小泉时代曾使用首相和阁僚参拜的招数，但事实证明，参拜牵涉国际社会对日本的基本认 知，会引发日本否认战后秩序的担忧，因此从安倍上一个任期起，日本开始尝试新的博弈手段。钓鱼列屿实际处于日本控制之下，又有潜在的巨大海洋经济价值，日本使用钓岛现状回应中国的战略崛起压力，这并不令人意外，更不是不可理喻的疯狂思维，与所谓军国主义复活更是毫无关系。
3. China:
   1. 在有关争议的中国国内意见当中，非常值得人们注意的是，一些军方色彩的学者和人士往往发出很强硬的“鹰派”声音，这里体现了一种真正令人担忧的趋势，军队对外交问题和国内政治问题表现出越来越大的参与热情。
   2. 钓岛危机持续延烧也与中国内部政治和社会的撕裂有关。以所谓“爱国主义”为号召的新极左势力一直在炒作此类话题，希望借助文革彻底意识形态斗争的思维动员社 会，从而复兴从抓走资派到抓汉奸、特务的内部政治斗争运动。这种撕裂的内部社会环境也使得中国不仅不可能对危机进行有效管理，反而会在新极左思潮制造的 “民意”潮流推动下，经常走向极端的处置。

 Accusations of espionage

1. Reports on hacker activities in the NYT, WSJ, and the Washington Post. Lastest piece from Bloomberg on unmasking the identity of a Chinese hacker.
2. American response:
   1. NYT: secret legal review authorizing pre-emptive strikes in response to “credible evidence of a major digital attack looming from abroad”
   2. Associated Press: fear of a cyber war with China might help lawmakers to push through a legislation “that would make it easier for the government and industry to share information about who is getting hacked and what to do about it.”

Southern People Weekly on the world of official espionage: “a scathing exposé on the secret world of spying and backstabbing endemic throughout Chinese officialdom”. The piece details the work of an ex-wire-tapping detective, Qi Hong, who during his career had once dismantled 40 hidden wires and cameras in a single week. Excerpts from English translation by CDT:

1. “Officials commonly used spying equipment to eavesdrop on each other and gain the upper hand on their rivals in order to ascend from #2 to #1 at the office.”
2. Official cited in article: “Nowadays, we hug each other when we meet, taking the opportunity to feel around for spying equipment. Important conversations take place in bath houses.”
3. “After an apparatus is discovered, the official will immediately check to see if it was installed by the Committee of Discipline Inspection and inform their partners to seek collective security and protection,” Qi Hong said. The next official he mentioned reacted in a similar way to most. After the spying equipment for him was discovered, he tried his best to keep calm and analyze the different chains of interest with which he was involved, consulting with all kinds of channels to determine the origin of the threat.

House News on HK reporters in the mainland:

1. 不單是電郵，手機也是黑客的重要目標。呂秉權說，在內地採訪，短訊被監看情況已很普遍，他曾因Whatsapp被監看，而泄露行蹤。有一次，同事被國安拘 留後，懷疑電話被做手腳，很多同事電話接連被勾線，「兩個同事可能無互通電話，但電話就會互響。」他估計，國安可能嘗試騷擾記者的工作，又或者勾線的技術 不成熟，故亂操作。
2. 現在仍然跑中國新聞的某大報章資深記者Ken（化名），向主場表示，他的電郵戶口曾被黑客入侵。大約一年前，他在電郵瀏覽紀錄發現，有人從由西非國家登入電郵。

Huawei:

1. The Economist: Signs of Huawei opening up
   1. Firm’s chief financial officer, also the daughter of the secretive founder, vow to “honor our commitment to transparency and openness.”
   2. Is Huawei the perpetrator or the victim?
      1. Congressional committee claiming in October 2012 on flimsy evidence that Huawei may be a security threat to America
      2. John Suffolk, Huawei’s cyber-security tsar who used to be chief information officer for Britain’s government: on the contrary, his firm is itself the target of “tens of thousands of cyber attacks a week”

• Eric Anderson, of America’s National Intelligence University, concludes in a new book, “Sinophobia: The Huawei Story”, that the firm is a victim of China-bashing.

2. Meanwhile, mysterious death of a US electronics engineer in Singapore revealing co-development plan between IME and Huawei:
   1. “The plan lays out how, from 2012 to the end of 2014, IME and Huawei would “co-develop” an amplifier device powered by gallium nitride (GaN), a semiconductor material able to withstand extreme heat and power levels well beyond silicon. GaN devices have commercial use in lighting as well as high-powered transistors for mobile phone base stations. They also have tremendous military potential”
   2. “Shane, it turns out, had deep misgivings about the project he was working on and feared he was compromising US national security. His family wants to know whether that project sent him to his grave.”

CHINA – POLITICS

To reform or not to reform

1. Gao Yu, journalist based in Beijing, blog post in late January:
   1. “As if to clear up the political smog, Xi Jinping’s “new southern tour speech,” made in early December, began its circulation last week in the party.” “The most striking part of Xi Jinping’s “new southern tour speech” is his revisiting the topic of the Soviet Union’s collapse.”
   2. “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and beliefs had been shaken. In the end, ‘the ruler’s flag over the city tower’ changed overnight. It’s a profound lesson for us! To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism, and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the Party’s organizations on all levels.”
   3. “Why must we stand firm on the Party’s leadership over the military?” Xi continued, “because that’s the lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union where the military was depoliticized, separated from the Party and nationalized, the party was disarmed.”
   4. The speech, according to Gao Yu, shows that Xi “wants to revamp the house in the hope of restoring the kind of authority and legitimacy Mao Zedong enjoyed at the beginning of the communist China. Such are the guiding principles, and the destination, of his “road to renewal.””
2. Blog post picked up by newspapers:
   1. NYT article: “When China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, visited the country’s south to promote himself before the public as an audacious reformer following in the footsteps of Deng Xiaoping, he had another message to deliver to Communist Party officials behind closed doors.”“In a province famed for its frenetic capitalism, he demanded a return to traditional Leninist discipline.”
   2. China Digital Times: “Leaked speech shows Xi Jinping’s opposition to reform”
3. David Cohen, The Diplomat: “The analysis is dead wrong.”
   1. “For Chinese analysts, Gorbachev’s mistakes included ill-timed political reforms, but these come in a distant second to his party’s failure to provide economic growth and good government.”
   2. “The downfall of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union is remembered not as a victory for liberty but as a warning about having too much democracy too soon.”
   3. Hence Xi’s speech “much less sinister”: “For a Chinese leader, the Soviet analogy is an argument for the kind of incremental reforms that might actually take place within the current political system: serious efforts to rein in corruption, progress on encouraging consumption, or reversing the trend toward state domination of the Chinese economy.”

New police chief: Guo Shengkun taking up post of the Minister of Public Security

1. Peter Mattis, China Brief: “Guo, previously the Guangxi party secretary, may be one of the least-qualified picks to run the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—and not because he lacks legal affairs experience. He simply has not been a part of the political milieu of China’s $100 billion-plus internal security apparatus and accompanying social management issues. It appears Guo is a politically-reliable and experienced manager with a visible cap on his advancement that is more likely to keep the MPS focused on supporting the party’s priorities than those of any political clique.”
2. Before his posting as Guangxi deputy party secretary in 2004 and provincial party secretary in 2007, Guo spent most of his career in metals. He progressed through the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the state-owned China National Nonferrous Metals Industry Corporation, and the Aluminum Corporation of China: “In contrast to his most recent predecessors, Guo’s career is relatively monotone.”
3. “If anything, Guo is representative of the recent political turn in the ministry’s leadership selection”: “From the very first MPS chief, Luo Ruihuan, through the ninth minister, Jia Chunwang, every minister with one exception had substantial experience in policing, political-legal affairs, intelligence or clandestine party work pre-1949”
4. Reminiscent of Jia Chunwang’s rise to Minister of State Security in 1985: “chosen because of his political reliability with respect to the party while still without strong factional alignments or the likelihood of developing a strong, independent political position”
5. “The choice of Guo suggests further diminution of the domestic security apparatus in the corridors of power—even if not for the person on the street.” Guo may make it to the Politburo at the 19^th Party Congress at the age of 63, and could even take up Meng’s post at the Central Political-Legal Affairs Committee.
6. Cheng Ming magazine article: Guo hand picked by Xi-Li to go against candidate picked by established forces in the security apparatus.

CPPCC namelist: Overall: 1080 new members out of 2237

1. 俞正聲是唯一一名在政協名單內的政治局常委，預料他會接替賈慶林，出任全國政協主席
2. 新上任的統戰部長令計劃，預料亦會擔任全國政協副主席，一同領導新一屆政協委員。
3. 部份現屆政協副主席，包括中共元老鄧小平的兒子鄧樸方、前港澳辦主任廖暉，以及澳門的馬萬祺，都不在新一屆的名單之中。中共總書記習近平的太太彭麗媛，亦不再連任。

Hong Kong delegation: 124 members, two more than previous term. 42 new members added.

1. SCMP: “A broader group of representatives from Hong Kong has been named to the nation’s top political advisory body than in previous years.”
   1. “Sun Hung Kai Properties was a notable exclusion from the list of leading property developers. The tenure of Walter Kwok Ping-sheung, the company’s ousted chairman, was not renewed, and no-one from the company was appointed in his place.”
   2. “Six Hong Kong delegates are expected to become members of the CPPCC standing committee. Tang, the former chief secretary who lost to Leung in the chief executive election last year, is seen as a favourite for elevation.”
2. Ming Pao: Tang camp 60 versus Leung camp 25. 平衡「分餅仔遊戲」
   1. Johnny Lau: 中央有感梁振英在諮詢架構的「分餅仔遊戲」中，給了不少給梁粉，但此舉對社會和諧無好處，因此處理政協名單時較傾向唐營，務求在「梁、唐之間尋求平衡」。
   2. 前警務處長鄧竟成及前廉政專員湯顯明： 程翔： 令人感覺中央是向香港的執法系統招手、統戰，多於中央政法系統期望從本港前官員中汲取他們的肅貪經驗。他認為這做法令人擔心，或令本港執法部門有更大誘因與中央合作，「如果在任時與北京關係良好，便可做政協」
3. 羅永生: 政協雖非掄選「治港港人」但卻愈來愈是天朝所認可的「愛國愛港者」成就的最高典範，也是「治港港人」成績的頒獎禮。於是乎，政協名單亦成了天朝治港手段的一部分。
4. Notable omissions:
   1. Donald Tsang: “I considered the proposition thoroughly and subsequently replied that it would be inappropriate for me to join the CPPCC at a senior level while relevant investigations of the ICAC were apparently still ongoing.” Beijing loyalists suggested otherwise: The central government did not want to set a precedent of retired CEs gaining a position in the leadership. Tsang made excuse to hide Beijing’s removal of him from the list.
   2. Lew Mong-hung
5. Other controversial appointments:
   1. Jackie Chan on the proposed list of members: “another political vase” for decoration’s sake. “One of the incumbents, TV actress Liza Wang Ming-chun, was said to have kept her membership, while actor and director Stephen Chow Sing-chi was also recently appointed to the Guangdong chapter of the CPPCC.”

CHINA – SOCIETY

1. 100^th self-immolation protest within Tibet on February 3. In Qinghai, the police detained 70 “criminal suspects” in early February.
2. A court in Qidong city, north of Shanghai, charged a group of demonstrators with “gathering to assault state organs, damaging property and theft” during a July 2012 protest against a waste pipeline from a paper factory. The 16 defendants in Qidong were sentenced to 12 to 18 months in prison.
3. Corruption
   1. Latest exposed case: A member of CPPCC Liaoning Provincial Committee accused of fathering six kids with five different women and housing them in an “imperial harem”. The report was picked up by Xinhua from online reports. The official is also accused by possessing arms and involving in mafia activities.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

The Lew Mong-hung scandal

Excerpts of ISun Affairs interview compiled by HKEJ:《陽光時務週刊》訪問劉夢熊五大方面節錄

    行政會議、全國政協常委

    1. 言談中他說：「夢熊，你現在這麼落力支持我，如果我贏了，你打算在新政府擔任什麼角色呢？」……「這即是入行政會議？這個沒問題。」

    2. 他就開門見山說：「夢熊，關於你入行會的事，因為你的筆厲害，口才又了得，但是行會有保密集團負責制……我唯一的一封推薦信就是推薦你，出任全國政協常 委。」……那個朋友拿出一封信的副本給我看……是梁振英寫給彭清華主任推薦某人出任全國政協常委的信……CY約了我在禮賓府見面……「那是他自己寫了信， 夾硬來要我簽名的！」
    董建華

    當陪同習近平訪美的董建華，剛剛從美國回港，返港後即致電我說：「夢熊，你做得很好！幫了香港大忙，你支持振英，做得很好！……有你幫振英，我就放心了！」

    僭建

    最 重要問題是反對派不懂打他的要害。要害是什麼？要害是「交人」。因為梁曾在2011年5月說過，找過兩個專業人士、一個律師，來過他家檢查，說沒有僭建問 題。真實情況是怎樣？那是作出來的故事！絕對是子虛烏有！……張（震遠）致電給我：「夢熊，交人方面很頭痛，因為兩個專業人士和一個律師，根本沒有的，有 的只是十年前CY買房時，找了一個專業人士朋友去驗收，那時的驗收根本涉及僭建。」

    敵我矛盾

    當時我對 梁說：「大和解不應只是 唐營梁營的大和解，還應該包括泛民主派。」他聽後就說：「夢熊，我告訴你，建制派唐、梁之爭，是人民內部矛盾，但是我們（建制派）跟泛民主派是敵我矛 盾。」……第二天下午我電話給中聯辦研究部部長曹二寶，報告梁振英的講法……曹二寶說，你千萬別在報章上公開批評他，可以私底下找他談，糾正他的看法。

    挺梁、倒梁

    1. 2011年9月，我是第一個知名人士出來撐他……因為對方唐營一時說「腳頭好」、「神感召」等不成理由的理由，顯得很蒼白無力，我就從理論高度，系統性地撐他，從社會利益格局必須調整的角度去撐他。

    2. 我覺得他上台半年來，貨不對辦。對香港管治，可以分為務虛、務實兩大範疇。務虛就是能否堅持一國原則，是否尊重兩制差異，兩者不可偏廢。

    3. 水能載舟亦能覆舟，我從來不打無準備、無把握之仗……如果我這個頭號支持者和功臣出來反對他，就不同了。

Regina Ip: “It is probably true. It is not for me to determine whether it is true or not. But I, like other people, believe what he said.”

Alice Wu, SCMP: “There was a time when Lew dreamed a delirious dream. And then it all went wrong. Perhaps he still dreams that these seats of political power will come to him, and that he will live the years of power and influence. But there are dreams that cannot be. Lew has become a tragic political figure, and it is all his own doing. He ostracised himself from all circles of influence through bad taste, bad judgment, bad logic and bad acting.”

The HKEJ scandal

Jan 29: Joseph Lian’s article on HKEJ:

1. 唐家與上海幫首領江澤民關係密切，因此唐後面是江派勢力；梁營聲聲「求變」，撐腰的可能是有改革傾向的團派居多。現在看來，這個當時很普 遍的二分法錯得很厲害。關鍵是劉夢熊在訪問中提到董建華。
2. 唐、梁二人，當時都是他的重臣，董氏對待二人，理應無分軒輊。然而，劉在上述訪 問竟無意中透露了董氏的強烈派性。董支持梁，政界早有所聞，但劉提供的信息顯示，董這次不是簡單的表表態支持，而是全情投入、死命支持。 董氏此舉降格敗德不是重點，重點是證明了梁營背後也是江派
3. 董是江欽點上台卻給胡錦濤即團派打下來的；胡、溫對梁這位江點頭，大概 也沒很大好感，故梁得勝後首度上京面聖那次，胡、溫對他的態度半慍不火。若習上台而在江派與團派之間和稀泥，梁也許不難保住特首之位，做到2017。但顯 然，年來的情況並不這樣發展；薄熙來事件之後，江派與團派惡鬥，習很快站到團派一邊。
4. 梁氏取得政權，一半靠黑道， 未來的香港社會各方面必定因而逐步染黑。跟隨梁氏進入本屆政府的人，要知道自己在吃的是什麼飯，吐出來看看是什麼個顏色

Accusation of defamation:

1. Feb 7: HKEJ revealed that Leung’s solicitor sent a letter a week ago demanding an apology and the retraction of the allegedly defamatory article. Chief editor: “abnormal” action, will not retract article. “Bad thing” for Hong Kong; “silencing effect on the media”.
2. CY Leung’s response statement on Feb 7: “I have all along respected the freedom of speech and press freedom. But that article stated that I was linked to triads. This is a serious accusation. I must take it seriously.”
3. Response from Lian:
   1. 「他是不智的，社會將出現反寒蟬效應，市民會覺得言論自由受到很大威脅，會好好珍惜、捍衞、行使言論自由。」
   2. 「珍愛自由的年輕人，會愈來愈懷殖民時期。即是說，港人心態上會愈趨港獨。有人說，獨立運動不成氣候，我覺得不是，這樣下去動會興起。共產黨看得很準，知道心態是個苗頭，但他看不到自己在製造這個苗頭。當分離主義出現，再夾雜民主訴求，屆時香港將控制不住，或者可能如唐英年話梁振英『要出動防暴隊鎮壓』。」

Next steps for Hong Kong?

ISun Affairs editorial by Chang Ping: 香港在自殺

–  互聯網在給中共政權造成極大威脅的同時，也在幫助它維持統治。至少，它在鼓動人們上街的同時，也替代了一些街頭運動。

– 我不知道「吃花生」是不是香港的傳統，但是我相信隨着香港的日益「回歸」，它會大量從「新民謠」中吸取「營養」——既有積極的呐喊抗爭，也有消極的自我消 磨。因此，當劉夢熊爆出包括自己參與的種種政治醜聞之後，香江水頓時全部化作了「醬油」，大街小巷都堆滿了「花生」，既讓人看到了香港人「圍觀的力量」， 也讓我想到二十年前唱遍中國內地的「新民謠」。

Occupy Central and the Rule of Law debate

戴耀廷: 公民抗命的最大殺傷力武器; 非暴力公民抗命「佔領中環」

1.     Later elaborations:

1. 要求參加者「承擔」: 先簽誓言書：

運動的基礎是一個誓言書，那是證明你願意犯案的承諾。「最理想是有一個退休大法官監誓，可以舉辦多過一場的監誓會。每個人簽署誓言書都是莊嚴的事，不受法 律約束，但具政治道德的效力。你必須協議這是一個和平的佔領，不涉暴力，大會一號召你就要企出來，除非你到時已不在人世。」

2. 要出席一個「商討日」（deliberation day） 遲來者只可做物資支援，或稍後接受簡介會再加入第二輪堵路，不應接納他們「即場參與」： uncontrolled（失控）的激情好危險， 參與者最初被吸引是（佔領的）激情，但激情要被 structure（規範）
3. 最可能是介乎二零一四年七月一日至八月一日之間。 星期一三五一批；星期二四六另一批，保持一萬人在中環便可。
4. 「法治」發展階段論：Proposed by Tai back in 2005; sparked discussion in latest debate. Tai proposed four progressive levels to the rule of law:
5. 有法可依: 要有法治就必須先有法律
6. 有法必依：不單要有法律，而且法律是執政者的主要管治工具，以法律來達到管治的目標。
7. 以法限權：法律已不單是執政者的管治工具，它反過來要規限執政者的權力。 公眾亦可根據法律的條文清楚知道政府權力的界線和自己的法律權利；並可依據法律計劃自己的行為以避免觸犯法律。
8. 以法達義：「義」是指社會公義。
   1. 一，人們的基本人權如言論、結社、集會等自由得到保障；
   2. 二，市民享有選舉代表他們管治社會的政府官員的政治權利；
   3. 三，社會弱勢社群能享有最起碼的社會資源。
9. As such, the “illegal” act of Occupy Central is not wrong: 違反不義的法律以達到公義，是符合法治的做法。法規往往維護當權者，推翻舊制必然要犯法。

Responses to Tai’s proposal

1. 王慧麟： 認為「佔領中環」不合法，以此為由反對行動的人，對法治的理解仍停留在殖民地時不公義的「法治」論述之中
   1. 殖民地政府宣傳下的所謂「法治」觀念，實際上只是「守法主義」。在殖民地政府眼中，好市民就是要守法。由是，殖民地警察就可以用「不合法」的名義，任意拘捕及毆打市民，1970年代之威利警司，就可以在維園恣意怒打保釣示威者。
   2. 近兩年，政府看穿泛民行動之「合法主義」底線，知道泛民最多只是叫口號而已，不單不聽民意，更索性變本加厲，加強打壓，現在連示威擺街站也要管制。
   3. 「以法達義」之最高境界，就是透過法治來彰顯社會公義，而不是當社會公義不彰之時，還要大談「守法」