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法國現代中國研究中心
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    CEFC

    2 April 2012

    CHINA – POLITICS

    Chongqing Politics

    Brief Chronology

    • (3/9) Bo Xilai’s press meeting: dismissed allegations that he was under investigation, defended Chongqing model of anti-mafia campaigns and singing redsongs
    • (3/13) SCMP, Wang Xiangwei: “public press meeting shows party’s not over for Bo”, “Bo’s political career looks safe for now”
    • (3/14) Wen Jiabao chided Chongqing at press conference: “但是，现任重庆市委和市政府必须反思，并认真从王立军事件中吸取教训。”
    • (3/15) Announcement of Bo’s removal from office. Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang to take on post.
      • Professor Mao Shoulong, SCMP: Zhang Dejiang’s move to Chongqing is temporary; his next step would be direct entrance into the Politburo Standing Committee.
      • On PSC candidates, see Cheng Li’s “The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts” on the Washington Quarterly (winter 2012).
    • (3/16) Xi Jiping’s publication on “Seeking Truth” magazine urging “purity” (保持党的纯洁性) and urging leaders not to “play to the crowd or “seek fame of fortune”
    • (3/20) Leaked audio suggests that Bo demoted Wang when he was told by Wang of investigations into his family
    • (3/26) UK calls investigation into death of businessman with suspected links with Bo, news picked up by foreign media
    • (3/31) Six people were arrested and 16 websites shut down by the State Internet Information Office for spreading rumors of coup that has “very bad influence on the public”

    Media censorship and other stability measures

    • Leftist websites (e.g. 乌有之乡、毛泽东旗帜网、红色中国 ) blocked for a period of time after announcement
    • Users on Sina Corp’s weibo claimed heightened security presence in Beijing and possible coup against Hu Jintao government; search for word “coup” blocked on Weibo. “A wide range of user-invented code words” for Bo (e.g. “not thick”) were blocked in addition to his name.
    • At Chongqing locals were warned against singing or dancing (red songs) in People’s Square citing excessive noise as reason

    Official response?

    1.     Global Times, 3/22: “重庆调整后的中国社会理性”: “Trust in Zhongyang, this is the rationality amidst the many voices in the Chinese society”. “We trust that Zhongyang is quickly working at the political concerns of the public. We hope that some conclusions can be formed quicker”

    VOA: An exception act (非同寻常、非同小可的事情); an indirect criticism and a direct complaint launched by Global Times against the “deafening silence” of the centre at such critical moment.

    Why was Bo ousted?

    1. Different set of governing vision between leftists and reformists: SCMP, HKET, etc
    2. Bo shattered façade of unity: Susan Shirk: His open campaigning for power, rather than the things he did in Chongqing, was the reason to get rid of him. Bruce Gilley: His exit was a negotiated sacrifice, not a coup.
    3. Bo’s challenge to one-brain model caused resentment: He Qinglian in Open: In the CCP tradition only party leaders could put forth “theories” (理论) – There can only be one brain, one mode of thinking (中共的理论传统是只允许一个大脑、一种思维). Bo’s ardent promotion of the Chongqing Model is a provocative challenge. Mao Shoulong to SCMP: Bo attracted resentment from top party leaders by branding his work in Chongqing as a model that should be promoted nationwide.
    4. Cumulation of power struggle: Xu Xing in Open: Hu Jintao has planned on Tuanpai taking over Chongqing as early as 2009 when he “landed” (空降) Li Yuanchao there as district party secretary (区委书记).

    What will happen to Bo?

    1. Soft landing (Yang Baibing)
    2. Jail (Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu)
    3. Wang Litao to Deutsche Welle: Political life of Bo has only just begun. By being ousted Bo has completed his transformation into the spiritual leader of the leftists. Given current fragmentation within the rightist camp, Bo could rise up again in the coming few years.

    Whither Chongqing Model? 重庆脱红？

    1. Criticisms:
      • Open: Bo’s brutal campaigns against reporter Jiang Weiping, lawyer Li Zhuang, businessmen Li Jun, Chen Mingliang, Peng Zhiming. Chongqing under Bo was the nightmarish world of 1984.
      • Ming Pao: Rule of man instead of rule of law, party overriding civil society (推行人治而非法治,强化政权而非民权). The danger of Mao and Hitler is latent in the Chongqing model.
      • Sing Tao: Bo’s way was too radical, but his popularity reveals deeper social tension latent in the Chinese society
      • Economic Observer: Criticize undemocratic nature of “singing red” as undermining the freedom of choice
    2. SCMP: The fate of Bo (and the model) touches on “one of the most acute challenges the party is facing over its legitimacy”: “If Mao’s thoughts are still one of the party’s guiding principles, what is wrong with campaigns to praise Mao with red songs and other forms of culture?”
    3. DW: “Who received money from Bo Xilai?”
      1. Kong Qingdong: After Bo’s purge Kong was still laxing lyrical over Chongqing Model at No. 1 Channel. Program was later removed; March 24 Kong published essay on blog said he was investigated by national security for receiving 1 billion yuan from Bo to sell the Chongqing model.
      2. Wang Shaoguang (CUHK): strong proponent of Chongqing Model as “the blueprint of Chinese socialism 3.0” (中国式社会主义0蓝本). Interview with Nanfang Renwu Zhoukan on March 23: still affirmative of Chongqing Model
      3. “金钟向德国之声表示，近年中国大陆在”官商勾结”之外，又出现官商将一些知识分子拉入”共同利益”团体中，为其政策、商业形象等著书立说；特别是一些知识分子，以成为”政府智囊”而自抬身价。”
      4. Ming Pao: The incident causes further split among the leftists. Yang Fan (杨帆，founder of Utopia, professor of Economics)’s blog post criticizing the extreme leftists (极左) for radicalizing the Chongqing model by bringing in cultural revolution elements. Contrast with moderate leftists (中左)

    Reconfiguration of power relations?

    1. Open, Xu Xing: Who gets Chongqing will be the result of power struggle between Zhou Yongkang and Hu Jintao. Zhou has support from Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, He Guoqiang, Li Changchun, and Jiang Zemin. The Wang Lijun incident and the ousting of Bo Xilai disturbed the invisible balance (虚形平衡) within the central leadership.
      1. Zhou Yongkang seeking common ground? Widely circulated letter published on March 23 by Zhou.
    2. Open, He Xinglian: Princeling party on the move to fight their marginalized position, using meetings and the Internet to publicize criticism of current government. Attribute present malaise not to one party rule but the inability of the current administration.
    3. Open, Xia Wensi: Divisions within the princeling party: Democratic forces such as Ma Xiaoli (马晓力) more vocal; spoke of Jiang Jingguo’s Taiwan experience and the contribution of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang at princeling party meetings.

    Make-up of coming 18th National Congress?

    1. Want China Times: Report “The Chinese Communist Party and its Emerging Next Generation Leaders” by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission released March 23: The fifth generation will be headed by two opposing factions
    2. Open: According to sources from Beijing, new power centre will be “One Xi Two Lis” (一习两李): Xi Jiping, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao. More soft-line than current administration, but need to guard against the ousted Bo Xilai.

    Annual Sessions

    Political Reform

    1. Wen Jiabao’s farewell speech
    2. Wang Yang: Reform must start with the ruling party and the People’s Government (首先要从执政党和人民政府头上开刀). The Wukan experience will be promoted across the province. Zhu Xiaodan: The biggest obstacle to reforming the government comes from the government itself.

    Observations and commentaries

    1. Apple Daily: Relaxing censorship over June 4 and Zhao Ziyang – a “temperature test” for pushing forth reform in the 18th National Congress (為政治改革試水溫)
    2. Trend Magazine: The current call for reform as the third great ideological battle (意识形态大交锋) since reform. Rare for media to demonstrate such support for political reform prior to the sessions.
    3. Suggestions on how to begin reform
      1. Caixin Op-ed “The Age of Political Reform”: The biggest obstacle is an irresolute leadership that fears instability brought by political reform, but Wukan provides just the counter-evidence.
      2. Ming Pao’s interview with Yang Jixing, deputy head of Yanhuang Chunqiu: The best way to begin reform is to make public and transparent divisions and factions within the Chinese Communist Party in order to pave the way for political competition.
      3. Pei Minxin for SCMP Insight: NPC is a much less lively institution today than it was before Tiananmen. To correct its elitist nature free and competitive election should be partially introduced, otherwise its inability to reflect the will of the people will further perpetuate political radicalism.

    Political Conduct and Corruption

    1. Efforts to crack down on embezzlement and bribery stepped up: Procurator-General Cao Jianming investigated 2,524 officials above the county head level in 2011, including 7 provincial or ministerial level officials.
      1. Wen Wei Po: Academic proposed learning from Hong Kong to set up independent supervisory body to govern corruption. Based on China’s current situation, the legislation of the much-anticipated anti-corruption law is still an unknown.
    2. Commission for Discipline Inspection’s clearing up of little coffers (小金库) ongoing: 8,202 were cleared up in 2011 involving an amount of 2.8 billion yuan. 60,722 were discovered in the past three years involving a total sum of 31.5 billion yuan. Official called it “white corruption” (白色腐败).
    3. (3/26) Wen Jiabao’s speech at State Council’s fifth anti-corruption meeting: The biggest threat to the Party is corruption; nature of political power (政权的性质) facing danger of “人亡政息”. HKEJ: Wen’s warning reflects political will to introduce supervision from society and legislation, but strongest resistance will come from officials. More and more officials with “double faces” (两面人) within the CCP.
    4. “Luo guan” (裸官) phenomenon: A “luo guan”, literally naked official, is a Chinese government official whose spouse/children immigrate for personal reasons. The number has rose to 1.18 million in 2005, and select local governments are clamping down by introducing new appointment rules.
      1. Century Weekly reports on Guangdong Province’s controversial decision.
      2. China Newsweek ran a three-article in-depth report:
        1. Luo guan transferred illicit capital overseas, easier to escape and prevent loss if caught.
        2. Becoming a luo guan involves a significant sum of investment and hence increases the chance of corruption.
        3. Reveals deeper problem of insecurity and loss of faith in government.

    The latter issue speaks to a wider social problem of migration and “brain drain”:

    1. Century Weekly: NPC introduced law to tighten control on Chinese seeking to travel and move abroad. More Chinese seeking to migrate through illegal channels: Case of illegal Chinese agents setting up shell companies in Sweden and “transferring” Chinese “workers” there to qualify them for work permits.
    2. Another Century Weekly report: More middle-class Chinese families sending their children abroad; number of students taking SAT or ACT increased by 100 times between 2005 and 2011. Relate to February 28 news on three mainland students being jailed for cheating.

    Military and public security spending

    1. Following an almost unbroken string of double-digit increases over the past two decades, China will boost military spending by 11.2% this year. Aside from dedicating 670.3 billion yuan (US$110 billion) to defense (compared with US’s $662 billion budget) China has also committed to a number of “big-ticket military weapons”. The increase is interpreted as being in line with China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China seas. Hong Kong Economic Journal says the raise is “no surprise”. Reacting to the news, the Philippines was “unfazed” while Taiwan was “decidedly upset”.
    2. Controversy over “stability expenditure” (维稳经费): Public security spending to increase by 11.5% to about 700 billion yuan this year
      1. SCMP: “700b yuan bill to guard against enemy within”. Spending is for police, state security, armed militia, courts, jails, and other law and order agencies. Number of unrests has increased; fear that leadership succession will fuel instability.
      2. Last year individual foreign media observed that China’s budget for domestic security is higher than its defense spending, demonstrating the leadership’s fear of “unstable factors”.
      3. Refutation by Ministry of Finance: Conceptual error; the budget of public security includes crisis management, public health, etc.
    3. Controversy over Bain Capital (and Mitt Romney)’s involvement in surveillance:
      1. Bain Capital: private equity form founded by Mitt Romney
      2. The Bain-owned company Uniview Technologies produces infrared anti-riot cameras and software and was involved in a project for an emergency command center in Tibet.
      3. IHT: “Bain’s decision to enter China’s fast-growing surveillance industry raises questions about the direct role that US corporations play in outfitting authoritarian governments with technology that can be used to repress their own citizens.”
      4. Nicholas Bequelin, Human Rights Watch: The government is seeking to create an omniscient monitoring system; totalitarian ambitions.
    4. US to restructure its high-tech export regime which may relax restrictions of exports to China. Export Compliance Working Group, a subgroup of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, was founded in 2006 to facilitate civilian high-tech trade. A 2009 study estimated the value of “lost sales” at over a billion dollars annually.

    Criminal Procedure Law

    Passed on March 14 with 2,639 votes for, 160 against, 57 abstaining. Caixin provides links to important documents.

    Welcome revisions

    1. Article 43: Evidence obtained through violent means to be excluded (非法证据排除：用刑讯逼供等非法方法收集的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的供述), cannot force suspect to admit his or her own guilt (不得强迫任何人证实自己有罪).
    2. Stronger hearing procedures for death penalty cases
    3. New protection to suspects: police required to video and audio tape interrogations of suspects who face death sentence, life imprisonment or a prison term of 10 years or more.
    4. Judicial oversight of compulsory psychiatric treatment for criminal suspects; eligible recipients for legal assistance enlarged to include the mentally challenged.

    Controversial provisions

    1. Article 73: Residential surveillance
      1. “监视居住应当在犯罪嫌疑人、被告人的住处执行；无固定住处的，可以在指定的居所执行。对于涉嫌危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪及特别重大贿赂犯罪，在住处执行可能有碍侦查的，经上级人民检察院或者公安机关批准，可以在指定居所执行。”
      2. Dubbed “disappearance clause” or “KGB clause”: Allow police to secretly detain citizens for up to six months on suspicion of “endangering state security” and “terrorism” at secret residential locations without notifying their relatives.
      3. The article “would legalize a pernicious practice that has recently been used against the artist Ai Weiwei, the lawyer Gao Zhisheng and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo”
    2. Article 83: Notifying family
      1. 1979/1996: “拘留后，除有碍侦查或者无法通知的情形以外，应当把拘留的原因和羁押的处所，在24小时以内，通知被拘留人的家属或者他的所在单位。”
      2. Revision: defines “有碍侦查” as “涉嫌危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪”; removes “或者他的所在单位”
      3. Yazhou Zhoukan statistics

    Commentaries

    1. Chinese media positive
      1. 人民日报：刑诉法“大修” 十亮点瞩目
      2. 光明日报：人权保障的宣示程序正义的呼唤
      3. 法制日报：喜看“尊重和保障人权”有望载入刑…
      4. 经济日报：推进民主法制进步的重大举措
      5. 中国青年报：“小宪法”里大写的人权
      6. 京华时报：程序正义追诉犯罪更正当
      7. People’s Daily Overseas edition: Specific defense of Articles 73 and 83
    2. Chinese media critical
      1. Yangcheng Evening News: Respect Public Opinion and Eliminate Regrets over the Criminal Procedure Law
      2. Century Weekly: “No little increase in rights protection rhetoric, no little increase in expansion of public security power” sums up general social opinion.
      3. Yazhou Zhoukan: The newly revised CPL is still a “blackhole” – once you fall into it, there is no human rights protection.
      4. Southern Metropolis Daily: call upon the public not to relent its vigilance. Clever game of diversion: media and the public (partly led by the media) focus their attention on various “highlight items” (亮点) and the numerous changes made to various drafts, resulting in speculation (围观) but no in-depth discussion.
      5. Both Caixin and Ming Pao ran respective interviews with Jiang Ping, China’s leading law reformer:
        1. Caixin excerpts: Things have mostly regressed. Many talks of judicial justice and judicial reform but none of judicial independence. More regulations now governing the legal profession. Change can only start with political reform, i.e. separating party from government.
        2. Ming Pao: CCP’s current concern for popular opinion stems from the mentality of “stability trumps all”. The right way to go is “rule of law trumps all”.
      6. HKEJ interview with law specialist Shi Yanan: Did not deal with problem of integration with China’s Criminal Law and Lawyers Law. Adjustments need to be made accordingly or the laws will “fight with each other”.
    3. Foreign media
      1. Stanley Lubman for WSJ: “How will it be enforced by a legal apparatus which has not even enforced the existing law in a manner consistent with the procedures of the current criminal process?”
      2. Mike McConville interviewed for IHT: The Chinese system puts a huge amount of trust in the police, prosecutors and judges while giving individuals too few tools to defend themselves. Serious doubts that revisions would translate into change.
      3. Nicholas Bequelin for NYT: The revised CPL bore the imprints of both camps, the more progressive-minded factions versus the powerful security apparatus and more hard-line and conservative elements. The adoption of 73 would solidify the supremacy of the security state.

    Procedural and censorship concerns

    1. Human Rights in China:
      1. Many NPC deputies did not receive the proposed draft until they arrived in Beijing, when it was stated in the Legislation Law (Art 15) that draft bills should be distributed one month in advance.
      2. Online public discussion was censored and search results blocked.

    Most recent law-related news

    (3/22) Guangxi rights defense lawyer puts under residential surveillance at a designated place after nine months in detention.

    (3/21) China’s Justice Ministry orders lawyers to pledge allegiance by taking loyalty oath to Communist Party. Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang: “baffling”.

    (3/12) Soaring number of lawsuits involving IPR, up from 27,876 in 2008 to 66,000 in 2011. Recent cases include Shenzhen’s Proview Technology trademark dispute with Apple, and Michael Jordan suing Qiaodan Sports Co.

    Capital Punishment for Financial Crimes?

    1. 13 non-violent economic crimes punishable by death (19.1 percent of all capital crimes) were abolished.
    2. Ex-tycoon Wu Ying death sentence controversy sparked public discussions over informal lending. Wu Ying was charged with “illegally absorbing deposits from the public” and “fraudulent fundraising”.
      1. China Reform: Capital punishment should be abolished for non-violent crimes – it is an international exception.
      2. Century Weekly covered the case twice in a month: The phenomenon on the rise of private and informal lending reveals deeper structural problems caused by Beijing’s fear of loosening its monopolistic control over financing. Wu Ying is merely the “sacrifice”.
      3. Open Magazine: Death penalty used to sustain “anti-market, highly corrupted and low efficiency” financial monopoly
      4. Wen Jiabao: the case will be handled “based on facts and carefully”

     

    CHINA – ECONOMY

    Tax Reform

    1. Calls for tax cut (结构性减税)
      1. Century Weekly: Revenues for all of China’s governments were 1.4 trillion yuan above fiscal budget estimate. Critics: local governments low-ball projections since they can retain and freely use revenues that exceed budget estimates.
      2. Economic Observer: Fu Jun’s proposal to cut corporate tax
      3. China Economic Times: “Cutting taxes is a social consensus”
      4. People’s Daily Overseas Edition: “It is right time for tax cuts in China”
    2. Cutting import tax
      1. China Daily’s exclusive interview with Wei Jianguo, former deputy commerce minister: Tariff reductions last year had not gone far enough. Cutting import tax on luxury consumer goods will help promote domestic consumption and fend off trade friction with partners.
      2. Wall Street Journal: Consensus will be difficult to reach. Ministry of Commerce supports the idea, but the Ministry of Finance argues that taxes benefit domestic producers and promote social fairness by targeting rich consumers.
      3. The Guardian: Following the China Daily report Burberry climbed in the stock market. Burberry recently enjoyed a 39% jump in revenues from Asia Pacific, with store growth in China up 30%.
    3. Property tax reform: Finance Minister Xie Xuren announces plan to further property tax reforms and expand property tax trials beyond Shanghai and Chongqing, to restrain irrational home purchase and contain asset bubbles. The reform will be promoted “actively yet steadily”, and the expansion “on a proper scale”.
      1. Liu Kegu, member of the Committee for Economic Affairs: Trials have been effective, but expansion of property tax scheme will require a transparent social information system, including an urban housing information system and an evaluation system for property prices, which China is far from attaining.
    4. Overall tax reform direction:
      1. For less developed western regions with rich mineral resources, resource tax reform should be put in place so that resource tax can become the key pillar of local revenue
      2. For economically developed eastern regions, property tax (fixed asset tax) can gradually replace revenue from land transfer to become the new source of local revenue
      3. Push for province directly administering county’s finances
      4. Aim to complete Budget Law revision in 2012: all revenues and expenditures to be included in budget, including land revenues.

     

    CHINA – DIPLOMACY

    China-US Relations

    A series of trade disputes:

    1. (3/7) Passage of bill by US senate to empower Department of Commerce to impose countervailing duties on goods from non-market economy countries.
      1. Commerce Minister Chen Deming: “can’t understand”, “no obligation to abide by any domestic laws and regulations not in line with rules of international organizations”
      2. HKEJ commentary
    2. (3/14) US joined with EU and Japan to challenge China on rare earths at WTO. They accused China of limiting exports and pushing up prices. China produces over 95% of the world’s rare earth metals.
      1. Global Times and IHT: China seldom popular during US election years
      2. China Daily: “reveals US hypocrisy”; environmental concern ignored
    3. (3/21) US imposed duties on Chinese solar panel manufacturers for the “unfair subsidies” they received.
      1. China Chamber of Commerce: ruling was “unfair and in contravention of international trade laws”; it will only harm US solar power industry.
      2. People’s Daily overseas edition commentary: China again made scapegoat of American domestic politics games. The problems facing US manufacturing is of their own making.
    4. (3/22) US exempted Japan and EU nations from sanctions for importing oil from Iran, but left penalties in place for China, India and South Korea.
      1. Global Times: “If the US is determined to stop China from importing oil from Iran and will do so at any cost, what shall China do? Is it worth starting a larger-scale conflict with Washington, even running the risk of sparking serious clashes? We believe so. The significance of Iranian oil trade to China is comparable to that of blocking Hormuz to the US. There is no reason for China to trade its key national interest just for the sake of getting along with the US.”

    Media and Society

    1. China agreed to significantly increase market access to US movies, a concession made following US victory in a film-related WTO dispute. Joe Biden: “make it easier than ever before for US studios and independent filmmakers to reach the fast-growing Chinese audience”
    2. (3/17) Republican Dana Rohrabacher attacked the Washington Post for assisting the CCP in its overseas propaganda by publishing the China Watch without clearly indicating that it is an advertising collaboration with the China Daily. Hong Kong academic: Source clearly shown; US overly sensitive.
    3. Ann Lee’s “What the US can learn from China” controversy

    Others

    1. (3/28) US announced suspension of food aid plans to North Korea after Pyongyang announced new rocket launch. Global Times: The decision is a “quick stop to good progress”: “It is impossible for North Korea to make a strategic adjustment if South Korea, the US and Japan continue their policies toward Pyongyang.” But at the same time, “North Korea should realize that any actions it takes that baffle China would bring trouble on itself.”
    2. (3/30) BRICS summit: examined possibility of setting development bank for the bloc and other developing countries. HKEJ: A move to break free from “IMF colonialism” and to challenge financial hegemony of the West, but unlikely to succeed: fundamental interests differ, too much second-guessing. Global Times: The bloc flexing its political muscle (展示政治肌肉).
    3. (4/1) Hu Jintao’s visit to Cambodia: Xinhua: “ever-lasting friendship”. People’s Daily Overseas Edition: Criticizes one-sided report by foreign media; Asia does not need outsiders’ pointing fingers as they deal with internal conflicts of interest (不用外人指手画脚). Indeed China’s help reduces Cambodia’s heavy dependence on western countries.

     

    HONG KONG – POLITICS

    Hong Kong Chief Executive Election

    Prior to the election on March 25, the University of Hong Kong launched a “civil referendum” (3.23民間全民投票) to gauge how the public would vote if given the chance. People could vote at various poll stations or by mobile phone/Internet, but the website crashed due to “high-level cyber attacks”. Two suspects were arrested; the voting period was extended to 4pm, March 24. A total of 222,990 persons voted: 54.6% abstention, 17.8% CY Leung, 16.3% Henry Tang, 11.4% Albert Ho. The popular vote received little press in the mainland but was closely watched by netizens on Weibo, according to Apple Daily.

    CY Leung eventually won the election: Of 1132 votes cast, Leung received 689, Tang 285, Ho 76.

    Controversies surrounding CY Leung

    1. Earlier on: Statement that Deng Xiaoping should be awarded Nobel Peace Prize instead of Liu Xiaobo; appeared to show disrespect for June Fourth; West Kowloon; alleged involvement in black gold politics and triad ties
    2. More recent:
      1. An underground communist? Leung Mo Han’s claim that CY is a party member: Cites fact that he was chosen to serve as Basic Law Consultative Committee’s secretary general, a position that must be held by a party member according to internal rules, at just age 34.
      2. Accusations by Tang at debate: Brought up idea of sending in riot police and using tear gas in 2003 demonstration against Article 23 (?) Proposed reducing RTHK license from 12 to 6 or 3 years (?)
    3. HKEJ: “Why be afraid of CY Leung?”: Lack of experience, no accountability, unclear attitude towards Article 23, busy pleasing Beijing and not Hong Kong, “scheming”.

    Critical commentaries on the election

    BBC compiled two lists of Hong Kong and Taiwan media reports/commentaries the election.

    1. High-profile intervention by Liaison Office
      1. Press freedom:
        1. Rumors on Liaison Office pressuring HKEJ and Sing Pao to support Leung
        2. Commentator Johnny Lau (劉銳紹)’s column piece in Sing Pao amended by “invisible hand”: from “both Tang and Leung are not worth supporting” to “between the two I would rather pick Leung”
      2. Voters switching to Leung: Federation of Education Workers, New Century Forum, DAB, two days before election Federation of Trade Unions (60-vote bundle)
      3. Emphasis on so-called “public poll” (民調): Agenda-setting, framing, attempting to guide and control public opinion, engineering and manufacturing “support”
    2. Simon Shen: rules broken by the election
      1. No agreement on rules of the game: The Tang camp miscalculated played it as if it was “小圈子選舉” (favors Tang) when the game was “民調主導式小圈子選舉” (favors Leung)
      2. Allows illegal means of obtaining black materials: exposing Leung’s private emails, disclosure of high-level meeting details
      3. Candidates’ “official supporters” (官方支持者,競選辦外支持者) were not held accountable to the candidates themselves
      4. Fragmentation and shadows of cultural revolution (敵我矛盾,非唐即梁,文革帽子文化)
      5. Legitimacy of candidates based solely on so-called “public poll”

    What to read in Leung’s victory

    1. Relations to power struggles within CCP
      1. Apple Daily: Tang’s defeat a severe blow to Jiang Zemin (sphere of influence: Hong Kong and Macao Office of the State Council, business elites) and a victory for Hu Jintao (sphere of influence: Liaison Office, 亲共人士/土共)
      2. Allen Lee (李鵬飛): Tang camp is backed by Liao Hui, former director of HK and Macao Office, also member of princeling party. Recent ouster of Bo Xilai undermines Liao and hence the Tang camp.
    2. Zaobao: Leung has begun to work for this since 2008 when he visited Taiwan following the advice by Xi Jinping to increase exchanges between Hong Kong and Taiwan (an advice ignored by others in Hong Kong). Won him considerable praise within the CCP leadership.

    What will happen to Hong Kong?

    1. Beijing’s expanded influence
      1. Choi Tsz Keung: One Country, Two System now a mere illusion. The “second governing team” (第二支管治隊伍) will take over Hong Kong affairs and maintain its hegemony, even by undermining the DAB
      2. Willy Lam: Liaison Office and those close to the CCP will be at the power centre of Hong Kong; 党人治港. Economy-wise, red capitalists will expand influence at the expense of local capitalists (hence the Tang camp’s fear of CY victory). The CCP encroachment can be reverted if popular election is installed by 2017, but unlikely to happen.
      3. Johnny Lau: That Beijing has spent so much effort only to garner 689 votes shows brewing resistance within Hong Kong’s pro-establishment camp (建制派)( 開始「不聽話」 ，對抗情緒正不斷上升)
      4. Wong Wai Lun: “Will the Tang camp reflect?”: The Tang camp’s strategy of “making profits in Hong Kong with hearts tied to Beijing” (心繫北京、搵錢香港) is no longer sustainable as the rules of the game are changing. Local capitalists must decide whether to side with Hong Kong citizens to resist “the north wind”.
    2. Difficulty of governance:
      1. Apple Daily editorial: Fragmentation brought by election planted seed of instability in Hong Kong. June and August as high-risk period: 18th National Congress will keep Beijing’s attention away from Hong Kong; Legco election.
        1. Wen Wei Po: Call for the participation of moderate forces within the opposition party (e.g. Albert Ho and Democratic Party) to participate in “the big reconciliation” (大和解) and join the “Hong Kong camp”. Reconciliation with radical forces a fool’s hope.
        2. HKEJ: Rethink of “core values” of Hong Kong
      2. Johnny Lau: Conflict with entrenched corporate interest (大財團) most tricky: Leung can only gain popularity by attacking hegemony of landed interests, but this will cause conflict that may invite Beijing’s intervention.
      3. An Yu: The difficulties may bring forth a strong-handed approach in government (超強勢統治); ascendance of neo-authoritarianism already under way in China.
      4. Zhang Tiezhi, Taiwanese critic: Hong Kong as the next Chongqing? Stronger enforcement of stability targeting demonstrators (加大“维稳力度”)
    3. The role of pan-democrats
      1. Hong Kong Standard: Fragmentation within the pro-establishment will benefit pan-democrats
      2. Long Hair: Fail to see (admit?) the increasingly important role of Beijing, sees the CCP as something vague.
    4. Society: Demonstrations on both Sundays: pepper spray; red riding hood; “The Wolf is here”; “We are the 82.2%”; 反英抗暴

    Others news on Hong Kong:

    1. Longhair Leung Kwok Hung sentenced to two months in prison for four criminal charges (criminal damage of museum property, acting in disorderly manner at public gathering); four co-accused also convicted of disorderly conduct including two university students.
      1. CUHK Vice-chancellor Joseph Sung issued public letter offering financing support to one student upon her three-week sentence.
      2. Socialist World: Leung’s sentence “severe by any standards of natural justice”, “clearly a politically motivated judgment to remove him from the legislature”. 2011 recorded highest number of political arrests made since 1967; police taking more aggressive action with appointment of “hawkish” Andy Tsang Wai Hung.
    2. Decision reached on March 28 over maids’ residence case (Vallejos v. Commissioner of Registration), Court of Appeal ruling in government’s favor and overturned ruling of Court of First Instance in September 2011. Dispute centered on definition of “ordinarily resident”.
      1. Alex Lo in SCMP: Helpers treated as refugees, prisoners, undesirables rather than ordinary expats, “logically absurd and morally offensive”. “Next stop – the Court of Final Appeal!”
      2. Commentary: Separation of three powers to cooperation of three powers

    ICAC arrest of former chief secretary of the civil service Rafael Hui and two Kwok brothers of Sun Hung Kai Properties for investigation into violations

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