CHINA – POLITICS

1. Strike hard crackdown on prostitution in Dongguan

   • The state news broadcaster ran an exposé last week on the southern city of Dongguan, China’s “sex capital.” Undercover reporters secretly filmed inside hotels and karaoke clubs. The reporter calls the police to report prostitution, but none show up.
   • The program kicked off an anti-prostitution campaign in Dongguan. According to state media, the city responded by dispatching 6,525 police officers in a raid, arresting 67 people and closing 12 entertainment venues. Pictures posted online showed lines of men and women kneeling on the floor in the middle of a hotel lobby, their heads down and their hands cuffed, surrounded by scores of uniformed police.
   • “Guangdong authorities will soon launch a three-month, province-wide crackdown on prostitution. Local police officers who are found protecting the sex industry or who organise sexual services will be severely punished,” said Li Chunsheng, the province’s vice-governor, according to the newspaper. Eight officers have already been suspended.
   • Why is this happening? According to RFA:
     1. Periodic strike-hard against vice? Guangzhou-based writer Ye Du said China periodically launches anti-prostitution and anti-pornography campaigns, but that these are similar to political movements, and do little to address the roots of the industry in official corruption
     2. Power struggle? “A lot of people think this raid had to do with a political power struggle [within the government],” he said, adding that those who ordered the raid might have intended to strike a political blow against the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Guangdong provincial secretary Hu Chunhua, whose political faction linked to the former president has been on the wane since the leadership transition of November 2012. “The princelings [linked to current president Xi Jinping] don’t want to see any of these Communist Youth League or grassroots officials make up to leadership rank in the sixth generation,” Ye Du said. “So it’s quite possible that this was all aimed at Hu.”
   • The campaign is heading north, spreading to Heilongjiang and Qingdao and many other provinces.
   • Sonny Lo wrote on SCMP, arguing that “the high-profile anti-prostitution campaign and arrest of sex workers in Dongguan has highlighted the intertwined relationship between the central and local governments in crime control while illustrating how Beijing is tackling the proliferation of vice establishments.”
     1. Once CCTV aired a programme on Sunday (Feb 9) that uncovered the seriousness of the prostitution problem in Dongguan, the Guangdong provincial leadership came under tremendous pressure from the top to act. Some said Guangdong party secretary Hu Chunhua was pressured to immediately deal with the prostitution industry. Another explanation was that he had to show some consistency in dealing with crime, given the recent crackdown on drugs in Lufeng. It is clear that Beijing used its official mouthpiece, CCTV, to highlight the vice industry in Dongguan and push provincial leaders to clean up the mess…. It is also worth highlighting the prominent use by the central authorities of official media to exert pressure on provincial governments as a way to tackle excessive local autonomy. Clearly, provincial-level officials in Guangdong, and elsewhere in China, will have to be far more sensitive to central-level sentiment than ever before.
     2. We should also examine the media criticism that targeted the “protective umbrella” in Dongguan, implying that local police were responsible for the situation. Notably, the media also reported on the involvement of a member of the National People’s Congress, as the owner of a five-star hotel accused of offering sex services.

• • Dongguan’s local economic prosperity depended on these vice establishments; as its textile and manufacturing sectors have shrunk, the city has failed to diversify its economy in any meaningful way. Without a long-term economic plan, the effect of the anti-vice campaign is likely to be short-lived. The prostitution business will return once the heat has died down, albeit in a subtler manner.

• • The anti-prostitution campaign also reflects the governing mentality of Xi Jinping’s leadership. … Increasingly, these vices are being targeted in clean-up campaigns. Last year, officials took a zero-tolerance approach to Macau-style open gambling in hotel casinos in Hainan province. While underground casinos may be allowed in some parts of the country, as long as they keep a low profile and are protected by corrupt local authorities, any high-profile gambling is destined to be eliminated.
  • * In short, the Dongguan campaign against prostitution is part of the bigger picture showing how Beijing is mapping out its economic modernisation strategy in the coming years. Although vice establishments might have contributed to local economic prosperity, they cannot be allowed to proliferate and operate openly in a way that could undermine the positive image of the central government.

• But the anti-prostitution campaign has backfired on the Internet.
  1. Some netizens replied with a big “so what,” while many showed sympathy for the prostitutes as victims of an exploitative system.
  2. Some created slogans such as 東莞不哭、東莞挺住, which mimicked the official slogans used in the 2008 Sichuan Earthquakes.
  3. Southern Media Group argued on Weibo that “far more worthy of attention are the violence in this oldest profession, the prostitutes’ living conditions and how, despite repeated crackdowns, all this continues under the protection of the powerful.” This post was soon deleted.
  4. More weibo lampooning CCTV and pointing to the indiscretions of government officials have also been river-crabbed (censored)
     1. 一群自己裤裆都管不住的人，试图管住民众的裤裆
     2. 新闻联播道出的真相是：这个年代，连小姐都是选出来的，只有领导人不是。
     3. 去广州，在广深高速上遇到从东莞上来的央视采访车，应该是刚刚成功扫黄载誉而归呢，前后都没有车牌。看来法律对于满身道德正能量的央视记者们是不需要了。

• Some netizens looked into the prostitution boom from a socioeconomic perspective, pointing to the decline of the Guangdong manufacturing industry, and the broader problem of economic transformation – Will China become the future Dongguan?
  1. 作为以加工业起家的“世界工厂”，东莞因其地理优势，吸引了大量来自周边贫困省份的女工。倚仗外贸加工的支柱产业，往往由于外部经济形势风云变幻，缺乏抵御风险能力，以致出现工厂的大规模裁员。固然存在“赚快钱”的物质诱惑，但更多的是，在生计艰难之中，常常有女工被迫沦落风尘。与此同时，东莞的乡村治理困境也在扯下这一层灯红酒绿的虚假繁荣之后暴露人前。
  2. 正如很多财经界人士所说，东莞所面临的困境是中国现代化的困境，也是中国城镇化所面临的深层次问题。从工业经济向服务业经济转型，却因为东莞的经济具备天然缺憾的逻辑体系，导致长期形成的外来加工产业经济，以及建立在外来加工产业经济基础之上的房屋租赁、民间信贷和娱乐服务业，构成了东莞经济的主体。
  3. 2月11日，中南财经政法大学法学教授乔新生在《上海商报》发表署名文章认为，近些年来，由于用工成本不断增加，大量外资企业撤出东莞，进入中国中西部地区乃至东南亚国家，“这就使得当地收取厂房租金的农民不得不掉头转向，将自己的主要精力用于经营服务娱乐业”。而随着工业经济增速下滑，投资者和工人纷纷撤出，服务娱乐业为了摆脱困境，渐渐走上了扭曲之路，甚至孕育了具备ISO标准化服务的性产业。

• The SCMP looks at business in Dongguan after the crackdown: “While state media have hailed the crackdown as essential to clean up morals and curb corruption, most people in Dongguan’s service and retail sectors said they had never realised until now just how important the sex trade was to their business. From taxi drivers to beauty salons, apartment landladies to mobile phone sellers, almost everyone said their takings had dropped since the crackdown earlier this month.”
• An article written by ex-iSun affairs journalist Jia Jia examined the dynamics of how central government chose to begin the campaign, and why it symbolize the triumph of public opinion over state media.
  1. 在我看來，中國的官方媒體在這次事件中，首次失去了過去多年來對政治議題的主導能力 （lost agenda setting power），民間輿論在對官方輿論的抗爭中首次取得了絕對的優勢地位。
  2. 在2月9日到2月10日晚間的一天半時間內，輿論走向完全與央視當初期待達成的恰好相反。我認為這是在中國新聞管制當中極少出現的「管制空窗期」，且長達一天半之久。央視設置了議題，但已經無法主導議題的走向，而且成為人人喊打的過街老鼠。央視自以為這是一個極為安全的選題，誰知道卻引爆了一隻火藥桶。
  3. 2月10日晚間的禁令表明，主管機關對於線民支持東莞這件事憤怒至極。從來沒有人膽敢在公開場合發表言論旗幟鮮明地支援性交易合法化。也從來沒有發生過央視的報導被人如此抨擊。「出賣靈魂的人一般都瞧不起出賣肉體的人。」但我以為，主管機關最憤怒的只是這樣一件事：中國的輿論失控了。
  4. 其次，輿論主管機關何以震怒？對央視出身未捷身險死，輿論主管機關看在眼裡，怒在心頭。這可以由微博和推特上被體制內媒體人士發表的禁令及指令所證實。不僅如此，在2月11日早晨，風向驟變。許多市場化媒體的微博昨天還在調侃央視，今天的社論就擺出一副衛道士的模樣，對那些支持東莞的人大加撻伐，其火力之猛，為近年來罕見。
  5. 其實在主流媒體還在抨擊人民道德的時候，在微博上卻有非常率真難得的討論。比如性交易的非罪化，性欲與幽暗人性的關係，女權主義者對身體與情感的闡釋，東莞產業的升級，國外的性產業經驗等，許多人唇槍舌劍地在認真討論——我不得不說，主流媒體在這一輪又輸了。因為民眾在討論真問題，他們卻還停留在假問題上面幹譙。議程再一次被民間輿論主導了。

• On SCMP, Chang Ping looks at the gender side of the campaign: “The men opposed the government’s intrusion into the sex market, and called for the legalisation of prostitution. The feminists, on the other hand, criticised the objectification of women’s bodies in the sex trade, and the unequal power relations between the sexes. They say the sex trade is a microcosm of society, reflecting the biases common in our daily life. At the same time, the trade fuels the inequalities and discrimination. Many sex workers were victims of deception, trafficking and threats, under the control of gangsters and police officers in cahoots. Even those sex workers who appeared to have freely chosen this work in fact had little choice, because of a lack of opportunities. … It should be said that in China, liberal-minded men rarely support feminist causes. In recent years, feminists campaigning against domestic violence and calling for equal opportunities in education and equal rights for sexual minorities have not only received no support from men, they have also been ridiculed and attacked on occasion. Needless to say, CCTV, the government and police officers, too, were not looking out for the women in their crackdown on the sex trade. Perhaps the protection of women is written into the law books but, in reality, prostitution is seen merely as a vice in society. Being branded a prostitute is far more humiliating than being known as a customer who pays for sex. For these women, every crackdown on vice is one more occasion for public humiliation. … Sex scandals were used as a tool to discipline the so-called “Big V” bloggers. In the same way, many suspect, the government is using the prostitution crackdown to keep the trade in line. Dongguan’s sex businesses may just be victims of a power struggle. In all of this, the issue of gender equality remains invisible, in official as well as popular media.”

2. Journalism and Press Freedom in China and beyond
   • The Nieman Foundation published its 2014 report: “The State of Journalism in China”, featuring articles from Paul Mooney, Qian Gang, Evan Osnos, Luo Changping, David Barboza.
   • A recent report from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) looks at how Beijing’s influence is increasingly encouraging self-censorship in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and beginning to alter their relatively free media environments. The report pointed at self-censorship in both places where media tycoons have business interests in China. The view is echoed in the 2014 World Press Freedom Index report published by Reporters Without Borders.
     1. The most recent suspicion of media self-censorship and China’s intervention in Hong Kong is the dismissal of the Commercial Radio host Lee Wei-ling, a popular host with a reputation for combative criticisms of the territory’s government. Austin Ramzy reported on this: “The radio station gave no explanation for Ms. Lee’s removal in a terse statement that was quoted by other Hong Kong media, including the Web site of the Ming Pao newspaper. But her supporters accused the station bowing to political pressures, and colleagues called for a candle-light vigil to protest what they called a blow to free speech. Late last year, the station already moved Ms. Lee from her morning show to a less listened-to evening spot, and critics said then that Commercial Radio Hong Kong was seeking to mute her influence.”
     2. Last Saturday, thousands of runners in Hong Kong’s Standard Chartered Marathon wore blue ribbons to show support for press freedom. And yesterday, as many as five thousands took to the street to protest against media censorship in Hong Kong.
   • In this index, China, which always inhabited the very bottom ranks, fell from 173 to 175 (out of 180, the last ten in descending order is Cuba, Laos, Sudan, Iran, Vietnam, China, Somalia, Syria, Turkmenistan, DPRK and Eritrea). CMP noted that the result became forbidden from mainland media discussion just after the report’s publication.
   • Council on Foreign Relations also has a useful backgrounder on Media Censorship in China.
   • Gary King and his team published a new journal article about media censorship in China. To tackle the limitation of knowing about censorship that occurs before submissions are posted, such as via the often-used automated review, the team used randomized experimentation “by creating accounts on numerous social media sites spread throughout the country, submitting different randomly assigned types of social media texts, and detecting from a network of computers all over the world which types are censored”, and participant observation by setting “up our own social media site in China, contract with Chinese firms to install the same censoring technologies as their existing sites, and — with direct access to their software, documentation, and even customer service help desk support — reverse engineer how it all works”.
     1. Our results offer the first rigorous experimental support for the recent hypothesis that criticism of the state, its leaders, and their policies are routinely published, whereas posts about real world events with collective action potential are censored.
     2. Extend the hypothesis by showing that it applies even to accusations of corruption by high-level officials and massive online-only protests, neither of which are censored.
     3. Reveal for the first time the inner workings of the process of automated review, and as a result are able to reconcile conflicting accounts of keyword-based content filtering in the academic literature. We show that the Chinese government tolerates surprising levels of diversity in automated review technology, but still ensures a uniform outcome by post hoc censorship using huge numbers of human coders.

3. The first official cross-straits meeting after 1949
   • The first official meeting between Taiwan’s minister of mainland affairs Wang Yu-Chi and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang Zhijun took place on Feb 11 in Nanjing. According to the Washington Post, the WSJ and the NY Times:
     1. Wang called the meeting a “new chapter” in relations between the two sides, and “truly a day for the record books”. He said both sides exchanged views on setting up respective representative offices on each other’s territory. They also spoke about the need to create a “more convenient” environment for Taiwanese journalists in China, as well as Taiwan’s bid to join global trade groups such as Trans-Pacific Partnership, he said. The meeting “has a positive significance in promoting the normalization of interactions between the two governments.” But Wang said the two sides had not discussed the possibility of a meeting between the two presidents.
     2. Zhang said the two negotiators could “definitely become good friends” but would need to show imagination to achieve breakthroughs in the future “We absolutely can’t let the relations between the two sides be turbulent again, and even more, we can’t backtrack,” Zhang said. He two sides “agreed to promote cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and expect the communication mechanism to improve exchanges, understanding and mutual trust.
     3. NY Times highlighted that both sides generally avoided using titles that explicitly endorse this view: “Just how Mr. Wang would be addressed during the meeting was closely scrutinized in Taiwan. Beijing is loath to take any steps that might be seen as conferring legitimacy on Taiwan’s government, one reason previous talks were carried out by semi-official organizations. Calling the head of the Mainland Affairs Council “Minister” rather than “Mr.” Wang could signal recognition of his governmental status.” Ahead of his opening statement, the head of mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhang Zhijun called his counterpart “Minister Wang Yu-chi” but did not name his ministry, The Taipei Times reported.”

• The WSJ article reports that, while the meeting in Nanjing produced few concrete results as expected, it did much to set the stage for higher-level talks to come, and to signal Beijing’s motivations to engage in a cross-strait dialogue.
• So during a “tea chat” at Shanghai’s Fairmont Peace Hotel, Wang and Zhang from China and Taiwan discussed the way forward, including the possibility of a summit between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou. “The two sides have expressed their respective stands on the issue,” said Wu Mei-hung, a spokeswoman for Wang’s Mainland Affairs Council, after the nearly three-hour discussion.
• But in a speech at Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum on Feb 12, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council head Wang Yu-chi made a potentially controversial reference to Taiwan as the Republic of China. Speaking to an audience that include Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang said “the Republic of China, the first democratic republic in Asia established by Dr Sun Yat-sen, has existed for 103 years,” which seem to contradict Beijing’s official line. China did not protest.
• The Diplomat writes that “[t]he most significant result of the February 2014 cross-strait talks is just how much Beijing gained in propaganda terms”: “But throughout the visit, Chinese officials consistently went out of their way to “correct” Wang on Taiwan’s designation by framing it as the “Taiwan area,” with the implicit notion that Taiwan is part of China, as per official PRC policy.”
  1. As we assess the success of Wang’s visit, it becomes clear that Beijing didn’t give, or risk, much. At most, it gave a much-needed boost domestically to the struggling Ma administration ahead of important year-end municipal elections and two years before the next presidential elections. It gave a semblance of official relations, without actually modifying its “one China” policy and ultimate “reunification” goal, which remains a core principle of the CCP.
  2. The return on that investment, on the other hand, may have been much greater. Besides giving ammunition to the KMT, its preferred partner in negotiations, Wang’s official visit could prove extremely useful as a propaganda tool overseas …By depicting the visit as a political breakthrough and encouraging international media to refer to it as “peace talks” and yet another sign that relations in the Strait are at their best in the past 60 years, Beijing will be in a better position to pressure Washington on the matter of U.S. arms sales and security guarantees to Taiwan. After all, under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which is celebrating its 35th anniversary this year, the scope of U.S. defense assistance to the island is predicated on the level of threat from China. If Beijing succeeds in convincing U.S. officials that peace talks have been initiated, with both governments acting as willing participants, we can expect calls for the cessation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan — long seen as detrimental to U.S.-China relations — to turn into a louder chorus.
  3. By convincing the world that peace is at hand in the Taiwan Strait, that the Civil War has finally come to an end, with both sides embracing a political resolution, Beijing could succeed in pushing Washington to end arms sales to Taiwan, which would further compound the military imbalance in the Strait, and make capitulation all but inevitable.

• Last week, Xi Jinping met honorary Kuomintang chairman Lien Chan in Beijing on Tuesday over cuisine from their shared home province of Shaanxi. From the SCMP:
  1. The report said the pair spoke in Shaanxi dialect over the banquet.
  2. This was the second meeting between Xi and Lien since Xi took the helm of the Communist Party in October 2012. The two leaders first met in February last year, when Lien visited Beijing with his family and a business delegation, and Xi welcomed him at the Great Hall of the People.
  3. In his latest visit, Lien received a special gift from Beijing party chief Guo Jinlong prior to the banquet, Taiwan’s Central News Agency reported. The politician and his wife were presented with two mainland-made Xiaomi mobile phones. Inscribed on the back of the devices was the phrase: “The mainland and Taiwan join hands to earn the world’s money.”

• There are several analysis about cross-straits relations recently:
  1. The Economist looks at the delicate balancing act between the two sides’ respective agendas and cross-strait stability: “So China is in a bind. If it pushes too hard, then the Taiwanese push back. If it does not push, there is a risk that Taiwan will assert a separate identity more clearly… So, for now, Chinese leaders will have to make do with symbolism.”
  2. Foreign Policy asks whether China’s use of economic strategies to draw Taiwan closer will eventually lead to reunification: “Cross-strait interdependence has been an irreversible process, at least in economic, social and cultural terms,” notes Titus C. Chen, an associate research fellow at the National Chengchi University in Taipei. He adds, “The prospects of Taiwan can no longer be separated from those of China.”… For Taiwan, the greatest danger is not military attack, but that Beijing “might exploit its growing power to ‘intimidate Taiwan into submission’ on China’s terms,” Richard Bush, a former head of the American Institute of Taiwan “
  3. Jonathan Sullivan, Taiwan expert, wrote on the NY Times that he expected continuity in Taiwan’s policy towards China even if DPP won the next election (despite a brief period of uncertainty). He concludes: The Taiwanese people desire the peace and prosperity that positive relations with China could bring, yet they do not want to give up their sovereignty or democracy to achieve it. But Beijing’s position is implacable, and its power and influence is inescapable. As it ramps up the pressure on Taiwan in different ways, there is an inevitable drift toward the unification that China craves.

4. Rising ethnic tensions in China?
   • In light of continuing Tibetan self-immolation and violent clashes in Xinjiang, ChinaFile hosts a discussion on whether “ethnic tensions”—itself a disputed term—are on the rise in China. The panel includes SOAS’ Enze Han, Rachel Harris and Nathan Hill; James Palmer, author of a recent exploration of Uyghur-Han tensions; Columbia University Robert Barnett; Human Rights Watch’s Nicholas Bequelin; Georgetown University’s James A. Millward; La Trobe University’s James Leibold; and Cambridge University’s Uradyn E. Bulag.
   • This came as China’s two-pronged approach to pacifiying the regions has also been on display with the announcements of a $10 billion boost to government spending in Xinjiang and harsh punishments for relatives of self-immolators in one Sichuan county.
   • In the ChinaFile conversation, Nicholas Bequelin argues that these current policies are fundamentally misguided.
   • While most of the discussion has focused on Xinjiang and Tibet, James A. Millward suggests that the Han, in fact, are China’s most unruly minzu. Part of this, he writes, is because they are allowed to be; and by denying Uyghurs and Tibetans the same license, the authorities only ensure that the pressure continues to build.
   • Chris Buckey at the New York Times pointed to the diverging accounts on recent Xinjiang violence.
     1. “According to the Xinjiang police, the violence was the latest example of a terrorist assault inspired by Islamist extremism and separatism. The police said the attack had been mounted by “a group of 13 terrorist suspects” established in September 2013 by Mehmut Tohti, “who started to spread religious extremism three years ago,” according to Xinhua, the state-run news agency…. But advocates of Uighur self-determination say the Chinese authorities’ own overbearing security measures have fueled primitive convulsions of violence by dispossessed Uighurs. The government has distorted and exaggerated the ethnic violence to undermine legitimate Uighur demands, the advocates say.”
   • In a recent and lengthy article (full text available in Chinese and English) posted on China’s state-run Tibet.cn website, vice-minister of the United Front Work Department Zhu Weiqun expressed confidence that Western opinion on Tibet and Xinijang will inevitably fall into line with Beijing’s, both in Chinese and English.
     1. Both Tibet Independence and Islamic Republic of East Turkestan are weapons of imperialism imported from the West: “西藏独立”和“东突厥斯坦伊斯兰国”这两个分裂中国的概念，都不是中国本土产生的，而是伴随帝国主义对中国的侵略从外国输入的。… 从那时到现在，美国一直是达赖集团最大政治后台和金主，而达赖集团则一直充当美国搞乱西藏的打手和在中国版图上制造裂纹的楔子。二战结束后，美国开始将目光瞄向新疆，设置领事馆，从事间谍活动，拉拢支持有反共倾向的新疆上层人物。
     2. Universal values are the wrapping paper of the West’s self-interest, the variant of military forces: 西方在历史上更多是直截了当使用武力，而现在则首先依靠其在国际上的话语霸权，将他们的私利装扮成“普世价值”。
     3. 所以人们看到某些规律性现象：当中国平稳发展时，西方领导人登门示好唯恐落后，而西藏、新疆一旦发生一点儿事，这些人立即翻脸不认人，恶言相加，同样唯恐落后，当然这并不妨碍西藏、新疆恢复常态时，他们的愤怒马上又转回到温和，态度转换之快速，往往达到匪夷所思程度。
     4. 美国把世界上的国家分为“民主国家”和“专制国家”，表面以是否实行多党竞争式的“民主选举”为标准，实际上就是看听不听美国的话，符合不符合美国的利益。
     5. Long time brain-washing by the West: 这种长期系统的“洗脑”极大误导了西方公众，使他们不能了解真实的达赖，当然也就不能正确了解中国政府对达赖集团斗争的正义性和必要性。
     6. Han-nationalism, national self-determination: 通过“民族自决权”实行“一个民族一个国家”，似乎成为西方认识世界各国国家构建问题的“通用标尺”。而用这把“标尺”来衡量中国是根本行不通的。自秦汉开始中国就成功实现了中央对全国的有效集权管理；几千年来中华各民族共同缔造了统一的多民族的国家；中华各民族长期相互交往、交流、交融，形成从经济、政治、文化到血缘关系上全方位你中有我、我中有你、休戚与共、相互依存关系；中华各民族近代以来在捍卫祖国统一、抵抗西方殖民侵略中，凝聚力和向心力空前增强，形成了“中华民族”的认同自觉。国家统一就能强盛，国家分裂就遭欺凌，成为中国人从自己历史中得出的最重要教训。这样的政治、文化传统和人民的现实利益，使得包括藏族、维吾尔族在内的中国人视国家统一如生命，绝对不能容忍任何人以任何名义从事任何分裂中国的活动，绝对不允许在中国内部搞什么“民族自决”、“民族分离权”。
     7. Accusing the West of using the concept of nation-state to create troubles for Beijing: 西方与中国在国家的民族构建理念上的分歧，给中西方关系造成一个潜在的爆点，这就是一方面现在所有西方国家均承认“西藏、新疆属于中国”，没有一国与达赖集团、“东突”势力建立外交关系；另一方面，这种情况并不妨碍西方势力认可达赖集团及“东突”势力拥有要求“西藏独立”、“新疆独立”的权利，并从各方面予以支持。
     8. Development is a basic right; if you disagree, try going back to nomadic life: 这种认识同西方传统上的优越感结合，使西方社会不仅在政治上几乎一面倒倾向于达赖，而且在所有涉藏问题上变得情绪化，包括反对西藏的任何发展，所有道路、矿业、水利、城市建设及民生改善，都被视为中国人对西藏传统文化和生态环境的蓄意破坏，只要达赖没有回到西藏恢复其旧有权力，中国政府在西藏所做的一切都是邪恶的。近年来，笔者多次遇到西方记者当面指责中国政府帮助西藏农牧民改善居住条件是蓄意限制藏人游牧自由，破坏他们的游牧传统文化。笔者的回答是：且不说这种指责完全没有事实根据，众所周知，人类的发展从游牧到农业定居，再到现代城市，这是一种进步。如果一些人自己享受着现代城市、现代文化的生活，却要求我们的藏胞过那种没有自来水、没有电、缺少学校和医院的游牧生活，是完全违反人权的。你们自己可以先退回到游牧生活试试！”
     9. Whatever we do, it’s none of your business: 除非中国同意西藏、新疆分裂出去，是不可能使他们满意的。因此，中国第一位的任务是丢掉一切不切实际的幻想，把中国自己的事办好，把西藏、新疆的未来放在自己力量的基点上。该发展就要发展，该维稳就要维稳，完全不必在意西方说些什么。中国在涉藏涉疆国际斗争中要摆脱单纯防御状态，敢于打进攻仗，以西方国家为重点，主动开展预防性外交，主动对媒体阐明中国的原则立场。

• Despite China’s repeated warnings, US president Barack Obama held a low-key, one-hour meeting with the Dalai Lama at the White House last Friday.
  1. It was the third time Obama had met the Dalai Lama, who the White House calls “an internationally respected religious and cultural leader.”
  2. In what appeared to be a small concession to the Chinese, the meeting was kept private, and the visit was held in the White House Map Room, a historically important room but of less significance than the more prestigious Oval Office, where he normally meets visiting leaders. During the meeting, Obama reaffirmed his support for Tibet’s unique religious, cultural and linguistic traditions and human rights for Tibetans, the White House said in a statement. Obama also said he does not support Tibetan independence from China and the Dalai Lama said he was not seeking it, the White House said.
  3. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said in a statement ahead of the meeting : “The United States’ arrangement for its leader to meet the Dalai would be a gross interference in China’s internal affairs and is a serious violation of the norms of international relations”. Previous meetings between Obama and the Dalai Lama drew similar criticism from China, but did not have serious repercussions.

5. Falling housing prices in Hangzhou sparked protests
   • Price of a number of new properties in Hangzhou plummeted 20% recently. Homebuyers who purchased prior to the fall gathered at the sales hall and protested against the price reduction, putting up banners such as 還我知情權，還我血汗錢，我要退房
   • Real estate experts are foreseeing the possible busting of the housing bubble. But Xinhua argued that the bubble phenomenon might be local after all, because land prices in many first-tier cities are still rising and loans are still expanding.

CHINA – CULTURE

1. Chinese detective thriller Black Coal, Thin Ice (白日焰火) won the Golden Bear prize, the highest prize awarded for the best film at the Berlin International Film Festival

• The film was directed by Diao Yinan (刁亦男). The story revolves around an overweight detective and a series of murders in a remote mining region in northern China. See synopsis and trailer. Black Coal, Thin Ice is the fourth mainland Chinese movie to win the Golden Bear, after Xie Fei’s Women from the Lake of Scented Souls 香魂女 in 1993, Zhang Yimou’s Red Sorghum 红高粱 in 1988, and Wang Quan’an’s Tuya’s Marriage 图雅的婚事 in 2007.
• Meanwhile, a Silver Bear prize went to Lou Ye’s Blind Massage推拿, which is acclaimed for its visually impaired actors. Lou is a former problem child for the film authorities, and was banned for five years for Summer Palace.
• BIFF has been an important festival for Chinese films. Director He Ping described the Berlin Film Festival as “the first window and international platform for Chinese movies going abroad after the Cultural Revolution,” referring to the turbulent period of ideological extremism in China between 1966 and 1976.
• “The initial response in state-run media to the success had been one of pride, but less emotional, presumably because the subject matter of the films examines contemporary Chinese issues, not always a favored theme for the country’s censors.” But the initial caution soon gave way to nationalistic joy. The Global Times newspaper, which is part of the publishing group under the Communist Party newspaper, the People’s Daily, ran a glowing tribute to the films’ success, describing the Chinese sweep of the awards as a “stellar night for Chinese film.”
  • Global Times congratulates Chinese films, but takes no mention of the fact that Lou Ye is the director of the Silver Bear winning film: “金熊、银熊都回到大熊猫的故乡了!”当中国影片《白日焰火》及其男主角廖凡爆冷斩获第64届柏林电影节最佳影片及影帝桂冠后，德国《图片报》发出如此感叹。当地时间15日晚，传出捷报的不仅有《白日焰火》，另一部中国电影《推拿》也摘得最佳艺术贡献奖。由曹保平执导的《狗13》还获得水晶熊单元国际评委会“特别推荐奖”。德国媒体惊呼，“中国电影成为柏林当之无愧的主角。”
  • 比之高傲的戛纳、庞杂的威尼斯，柏林是最早向中国电影人张开怀抱的国际顶级影展。不过对于西方影展的口味，国内一直有种批判声——外国人就是喜欢东方式的“猎奇”。这种声音从张艺谋的《红高粱》到王全安的《图雅的婚事》都不曾消失，但这一次有所不同。德国国际媒体研究所电影专家克里普在接受《环球时报》采访时表示，《白日焰火》和以往获奖的3部中国文艺片相比，无疑更主流、更商业，也更具艺术探索性精神。这说明中国主流电影进一步受到西方认可。在中国城市里发生的刑事案件，也可能发生在世界任何一个角落，因为人性总是相似的。

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Mounting HK-China tensions and anti-mainlander protest last Sunday

• About 100 protesters gathered in Tsim Sha Tsui, calling on the government to curb the number of mainland visitors. They called tourists “locusts” for overwhelming the city and hogging its resources and were referred to as Shina 支那, a derogatory term used by the Japanese against the Chinese after the first Sino-Japanese war ended in 1895. The protesters marched from the Star Ferry pier to Canton Road, a street lined with luxury stores popular with mainland tourists. Police intervened after scuffles broke out between the demonstrators and passers-by opposed to the march.
• A number of top government officials have attacked Sunday’s “anti-locust” protest, saying it humiliated mainland visitors and tarnished the city’s image.
  • Chief Secretary Carrie Lam condemned the protesters for disrupting public order, “directly affecting” the relationship with the mainland and harming the tourist industry. “We will absolutely not tolerate it if such events happen again. I believe such behaviour belongs to only a few extremists and definitely does not represent most citizens’ opinions and their values.”
  • Commerce minister Greg So and security minister Lai Tung-kwok also condemned the demonstration, while constitutional and mainland affairs minister Raymond Tam said the “barbaric and uncivilised activities” ran against Hong Kong’s values. So said: “The government understands that growth in the number of tourists has a certain level of impact on the lives of Hongkongers. But tourism has contributed a lot in creating job opportunities. It makes up 4.5 per cent of our economy.”
• Protest convenor Ronald Leung Kam-shing, 37, said he would not be intimidated by the criticism. He said: “I will continue to organise such campaigns because the ministers’ remarks today have shown they have ignored the public’s demand for a curb on mainland tourists.” He admitted calling the mainland tourists “locusts”, but said he did not refer to them as Shina. He did not think either term was discriminatory.
• But a spokeswoman of the Equal Opportunities Commission said the “locusts” and Shina remarks fell outside the purview of the Race Discrimination Ordinance, as Hongkongers and mainlanders are of the same race.
• Last year, similar protests were targeted at parallel-goods traders in Sheung Shui.
• Tea Leaf Nation reviewed HK’s rise of anti-China sentiment and the recent comments by actress Ella Koon that drew criticisms. More on the in Hong Kong