CHINA – POLITICS

New foreign policy team

1. Wang Yi as new foreign minister:
   1. 59-year-old son-in-law of late leader Zhou Enlai’s secretary Qian Jiadong; Diplomat experienced in Asian affairs. Was a sent-down youth, spending eight years on a farm in northeastern China.
   2. Career path: Joined foreign ministry after graduating from university in 1982, where he studied Japanese, a language he speaks like a native.
   3. In 1983, wrote speech given by Hu Yaobang on his historic trip to Japan. Worked in Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was a visiting scholar at Georgetown University in 1997.
   4. Made deputy foreign minister in 2001; became China’s ambassador to Japan 2004-2007: “Wang’s job was difficult due to the deterioration in Sino-Japanese ties following then Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to Tokyo’s controversial Yasukuni Shrine… Wang showed he could deal with difficult issues in a flexible manner and helped ease tensions by arranging for Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, to visit Beijing soon after he became the prime minister in 2006, followed by a reciprocal visit by then premier Wen Jiabao in 2007.”
   5. Wang was China’s representative in the first-round of six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program in 2003.
   6. From 2008 appointed head of State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office
2. Yang Jiechi, departing foreign minister, will become state councilor, replacing Dai Bingguo
3. Wang Yi’s post at the TAO will be taken up by Zhang Zhijun:
   1. Before assuming the post of deputy foreign minster in 2009, Zhang spent most of his time as “a relatively unknown official” at the International Department of CCP’s Central Committee. He was “a totally new face to the Taiwanese people”.
   2. Nantong, Jiangsu native; began career at International Department in 1975, “promoted to director of the department’s division responsible for American and North European affairs, and in 1991 was posted to the Chinese embassy in London for three years before returning to the International Department”.
   3. Seen by pundits as “highly capable replacement for Wang”, given familiarity with US affairs and experience in negotiations with Japan over Diaoyu Islands.
   4. Related Taiwan news: Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan accused China of being “unfriendly” and its request “unacceptable” in asking the Vatican to sever ties with the ROC on the eve of President Ma Ying-jeou’s visit to the Holy See.
4. Cui Tiankai as new ambassador to the US, which the NYT describes as “a genial diplomat, well versed in American affairs and a graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington”.
   1. Kenneth Liberthal: Cui is very good to have, “not because he’s pro-U.S. but because he’s a subtle and wide-ranging thinker. He represents China’s interests and then understands what might be accomplished”
5. Appointment of Wang Yingfan as first envoy for Asian affairs, “in a sign China is trying to improve relations in the region”.

Analysis

1. NYT: Saturday announcement unveiled a team with officials “whose records suggest the government will concentrate on consolidating what it considers the country’s rightful place at the center of Asia.”
   1. Citing Jin Canrong, Renmin University professor: major issue remains that there is no figure in the Politburo handling foreign policy. The original plan to appoint Politburo member Wang Huning, longtime adviser of Hu Jintao, was dropped. New vice president Li Yuanchao may play a role in foreign policy, but he has little experience in the area.
2. BBC citing David Shambaugh: Like Dai Bingguo, Yang holds a relatively low rank in the CCP depite his spot near the top of the state hierarchy. “Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi must push to be heard when attending meetings of the powerful Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group, the elite committee in charge of China’s international agenda. Headed by Xi Jinping, the group includes political heavyweights such as Premier Li Keqiang and the Minister of Defence, People’s Liberation Army General Chang Wanquan.”
3. Reuters: China seeking to cool row with Japan under Xi, citing Liu Yuan’s public call for calm and the sidelining of Luo Yuan.
4. The Economist: Appointment of Wang “suggests that Mr Xi is emphasising the management of prickly relations with America and Japan.” Also notes Xi’s decision to visit Russia first, before continuing on to Africa: “with tensions between China and Japan rising alarmingly over island disputes, Mr Xi may want to reaffirm smooth relations on China’s long Russian flank.” Contestation over oil and arm sales to India and Vietnam.

The 13 NPC vice-chairpersons (副委員長)

Zhang Dejiang elected chairman of the NPC

1. Ming Pao: 文宣幹將冒起： 國新辦主任王晨、黑龍江省委書記吉炳軒
   1. 吉炳軒在上世紀80、90年代兩度在共青團系統工作，其中1993至 1995年擔任團中央書記，當時的第一書記為李克強，因此被視為團派。但他同時也是劉雲山舊部，1995年離開共青團後，他歷任吉林省委宣傳部長、廣電總 局副局長、中宣部副部長，直到2008年都在宣傳系統任職。在中宣部期間，吉作從旁協助了劉雲山7年。
   2. 國新辦主任王晨則從1995年任《光明日報》總編輯開始，就受劉雲山直接領導，直到去年劉在十八大晉身常委。
2. 沈躍躍： 預料她將兼任全國婦聯主席
   1. 沈躍躍自1983年起任共青團寧波市委副書記起，在共青團系統做了10年，位至共青團浙江省委書記，因此也被劃為「團派」。沈躍躍後來歷任中共杭州市委副 書記、紹興市委書記、浙江省委組織部長、安徽省委副書記等職，2002年胡錦濤在中共十六大上接班後，沈奉調進京任中組部副部長，被稱為胡總的「人事大總管」
   2. 沈躍躍以黑馬姿態跑出，毫無疑問是胡總力推的結果，但由於她沒有地方和部委「一把手」經驗，未來發展較受局限，最多是走劉延東路線。
   3. Her successful promotion points to the sidelining of Ma Wen, which may signal the declining influence of Wen Jiabao: “她被指與總理溫家寶關係密切，又據說是審查薄熙來案的主要指揮，去年十八大時本來傳說有望更上層樓，但卻連中委都未選上。今次兩會開幕後，有報道指她將出任人大副委員長兼全國婦聯主席，以作為補償，但14日名單出來，卻被沈躍躍取代。由此看出溫總的影響力下降。”

Communist Youth League appointment

1. Qin Yizhi (47) appointed the league’s first-ranked secretary. He has served as a vice-chairman of Tibet’s regional government
2. Possible signal that Hu Jintao is strengthening his influence on the future leadership: Hu built his power base as head of the league and party chief of Tibet in the 1980s.
3. Officials with similar career patterns:
   1. Hu Chunhua: became a vice-chairman of Tibet’s regional government in 2003 before becoming league head in 2006
   2. Li Keqiang and Zhou Qiang also served as league head in the 1990s
4. Tsering Woeser: Qin a hardline party official who was very tough on religious issues; had persistently pushed for patriotic education of monks during his time in Tibet. His promotion “could give a very bad indication to the current Tibetan officials that only hardliners can get promoted”.

Economic Reform

1. Reuters: China to launch “most serious economic reform drive since the 1990s” with the appointments of several close aides of Zhu Rongji at the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy.
   1. These include Vice Premier Ma Kai, Finance Minister Lou Jiwei and central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan
   2. Seen as “pro-business economic reformers able to finish the work started by arch-reformer Zhu when he was premier in a way that meets the different economic conditions of today”: about to bring on structural reform that will “ultimately reduce the old SOEs to ashes.”
   3. Citing analyst with ties to the NDRC’s State Information Centre think-tank, CCP increasingly views economic reform as central to its ability to remain in power for the long term. The economic agenda is designed to ensure political survival.
2. In the banking sector, Xiao Gang, former deputy governor of the PBOC under Zhou, was appointed China’s top securities regulator on Sunday
   1. Vowed reform, setting “a worrying tone for the vested interests at state-backed banks – one of which Xiao used to run – that have earned fat margins from China’s fixed deposit and lending rates on largely risk-free loans to SOEs.”
   2. Caixin: “Xiao Gang considers international standards important, sought to put more women in management positions and started learning English in his mid-40s.”
3. Caixin: “China’s economic policymakers turning a page”
   1. “Contrary to the expectations of many investors, policymakers have decided not to seek any big increases in government investment this year. Rather, they want to prevent any possible financial trouble tied to local government debt and the off-balance-sheet operations of commercial banks. That means regulations covering local government financing platforms are likely to be tightened.”

SCMP report on the China Development Bank

1. The 2008 financial crisis provided the chance for CDB to aggressively expand loans abroad: At the end of 2011, the size of CDB’s outstanding loans reached 5.52 trillion yuan (HK$6.88 trillion). About a quarter to one-third of CDB’s total loans were US dollar-denominated offshore loans.
2. Comparison in numbers:
3. As of June 2012: Asian Development Bank outstanding loans US$71.4 billion
   136. As of 2012 fiscal year: World Bank’s outstanding loans US$136.3 billion
   137. As of March 2012: CDB’s outstanding foreign exchange loans about US$220 billion, according to chairman Chen Yuan.
4. CDB has focused on natural-resources-related loan business:
   1. Oil rich Venezuela: largest foreign borrower of CDB with more than US$28 billion in loans issued so far
   2. Massive government-backed loans also for Russia, Brazil, Turkmenistan and Ecuador
5. But its ambition is going beyond the resource sector: As part of Beijing’s go-out strategy to support China Inc. to expand business outside the mainland, the CDB has played leading role in major merger and acquisition deals:
   1. g. backing HKEx acquisition of the London Metal Exchange, beating HSBC and Deutsche Bank to fund the deal
   2. CDB agreed to loan US$1.7 billion to fund two San Francisco housing development projects, with the precondition of getting a state-owned Chinese construction company to build the projects.

CHINA – SOCIETY

The future of farming

China Newsweek feature report: Transition from traditional to modern farming. Two main changes:

1. 农业综合生产能力大幅提高：2012年，全国范围内农业综合机械化率的水平已经达到55%，比起三十年前提高了一倍多，耕种同样面积的土地，需要的劳动力已经大大减 少
2. 农村空心化日益明显：2012年中国城镇人口占全国人口的比例超过50%，在过去三十多年，差不多有5亿人口，从农村迁徙到城市，村庄空心化的问题已经不再是个别现象。

这实际上也给政府提出了两个难题：以后怎么种地?谁来种地?

New attention on family farming (家庭农场)

The concept formally appeared in the No. 1 Document of 2013. What are family farms, and how are they different from traditional farming practices?

1. Definition:
   1. China Newsweek: 家庭农场是指以家庭成员为主要劳动力，从事农业规模化、集约化、商品化生产经营，并以农业收入为家庭主要收入来源的新型农业经营主体
   2. China Daily: in the 1980s and 1990s, farmers were confined to a small patch of land and the fragmentation of farmland made use of large machinery problematic. In recent years, as more farmers migrated to urban areas, a lot of land was deserted and left to fall fallow. Under new pilot schemes, qualified rural family could sign a contract with village authorities to rent the management rights to a large patch of land from other families for more than three years. The sizes of family farms are quite big, around 7-10 hectares.
   3. SCMP: This is a move from agriculture dominated by small family operations to larger scale family operations, rather than to business-dominated production, which is seen less sustainable. The family farms concept is proposed against the backdrop of the exodus of young rural laborers to urban areas and increased concern for national food security.
      1. Also against the backdrop of vast migration the government is pushing for what some called “an organic agriculture revolution” to increase profits and the attraction of farming: “From 2000 to 2006, China has moved from 45th to 2nd position in the world in number of hectares under organic management. China now has more land under organic horticulture than any other country. In the year 2005/2006, China added 12% to the world’s organic area.”
   4. Nanfang Zhoumo on the conceptual ambiguity: “由于中央并未作出明确规定，家庭农场依然是一个很模糊的概念，而各地兴起的热潮，主要分为三种，一是农民自己成为农场主，二是城里人下乡圆农场梦，三是城市资本下乡”
2. Geographical distribution: 已有家庭农场6670多个：上海松江、湖北武汉、吉林延边、浙江宁波、安徽郎溪
3. China Newsweek report on family farming in Songjiang, Shanghai:
   13. Widespread use of family farms in Songjiang: “2012年末，松江家庭农场总数达到1206户，经营面积66万亩，占全区粮田面积的80%。同时，粮食生产率获得了提高，水稻亩产比“十五”期末提高了38公斤。家庭农场已承担了松江区大部分粮食生产职能。”
   14. Productivity of family farms: “一个家庭农场生产的粮食，可以养活344人，一个家庭农场生产的猪肉，可满足3191人的吃肉需求”
   15. Income of family farm households exceeds that of regular farmers, even that of local officials: “2012年一般农民收入不到8万元。家庭农场去年人均3万元，而种养结合的家庭农场，种粮加上养猪的收入，人均收入5万多元，已经大大超过普通农民收入，家庭农场主已经获得比较体面的收入。”
   16. Degree of mechanization: Establishment of cooperatives for sharing machines among households 机农互助社
   17. Issue of sustainability and replicability:
       1. Ageing population of farmers: “12年统计，在松江区的1173户家庭农场中，50岁以上的农场主占61%。同时，初中以下文化程度的农场主占93%。农业人口的高龄化、低学历，体现了一代年轻人对农业的远离。尽管有高收入诱惑，但加入家庭农场的年轻人仍然很少，原因是农业多是高强度体力活，又脏又累，工作环境差。”
       2. Massive subsidies required for their profitability: “2011年各级政府向松林家庭农场提供的农业补贴2607万元，其中来自中央财政的占14%，来自上海财政的占40%，剩下的46%来自松江区财政。在地方财政投入巨额补贴这一点上，松江家庭农场模式很难被国内其他地区复制。财政补贴占家庭农场净收入的3/5。据统计，若取消全部补贴，家庭农场月薪仅有1500元左右”
   18. Nanfang Zhoumo report on the problems with family farms: lack of financing, lack of rights (林权和地权), inability to hire enough workers on farms (ageing population), risks engendered by agricultural cycle, capital turning land to commercial uses. “家庭农场，一个充满着美好生活想象的词语，在现实中却面目模糊，并遭遇产权、资金等诸多难题。”
   19. org.cn opinion: In the long run, rural land policy must change. It is necessary to fully clarify the term “land ownership” as more families are farming on their own lands and are willing to increase investment into their lands.
   20. One recent step towards clarifying ownership is reported by Reuters: Using satellite positioning to map tiny plots of land as farmers’ land holdings. The mapping will replace current deeds that are often ambiguous and imprecise, e.g. “X’s field borders Y’s field to the east.” The information goes to searchable centralized registries and allow farmers to confirm what they own. Nonetheless, the costliness of the project for cash-strapped local governments may limit its extensive usage.

Social capital entering agriculture (资本下乡)

1. Another keyword in the No. 1 Document of 2013 is ziben xiaxiang, “capital entering the countryside”, to address the persistent problem of the lack of investment in the agricultural sector. 社会资本:工商企业、非农业个体经济和民间投资机构等经济主体投资农业的资金
2. The entry of capital has nonetheless raised the issue of non-agricultural uses of land through conversion of land use and land enclosure movements: “由于权属不清，也有一些公司企业单方面违反合同约定，擅自改变土地用途管制规定，使流转的土地呈现“非农化”“非粮化”等现象，有的还在土地上修筑砖混建筑物，给耕地造成永久性破坏。”
   1. “江夏区就曾经叫停过一个项目，该公司把集体土地流转到手之后，以发展休闲农业和度假村的名义，盖上木房子以十几万二十几万的价格对外销售。武汉市农村经济 经营管理局还发现，也有一些城市社会资本下乡的目的，并不是开发农产品，而是资本运作，即寄希望通过今后的土地增值盈利。”

       

From marriages, family planning, to burying the dead

1. NYT: The rise of “a new breed of matchmaker that has proliferated” since China’s economic boom – “premier love hunters” that cater to China’s nouveaux riches willing to pay tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars to search for ideal spouse. “Diamond Love, among the largest love-hunting services, sponsored a matchmaking event in 2009 where 21 men each paid a $15,000 entrance fee.”
2. FT: Some 336 million abortions have been performed since the implementation of the one-child policy 40 years ago, according to data released by the Health Ministry.
   1. “The Chinese data also show that the number of medical procedures to prevent births has been steady since the late 1990s, despite repeated calls for a softening of the one-child rule. Every year Chinese doctors abort roughly 7m pregnancies, sterilise almost 2m men and women, and insert 7m intrauterine devices.”
   2. Recent ministerial restructuring: relaxation of policy likely? One likely change: allowing two children for parents who were both single children themselves. This practice has been put on trial basis in some cities, and could be implemented nationwide.
3. Tea Leaf Nation report on the one-child policy:
   1. Today less than 40% of Chinese couples are strictly limited to one child. Many sidestep the policy – there is an estimated 3 million babies every year hidden or in custody of relatives. These “black-permit” children are often not eligible to receive free education and healthcare.
   2. 2012 report by the China Development Research Foundation: “urged the implementation of a two-child policy in certain provinces starting in 2013, moving toward a nationwide two-child policy by 2015, and dropping all birth limits by 2020. It sparked hopes that change was underway” as the nation deals with declining workforce.
   3. 2010 report by the School of Foreign Language and Literature of Nanjing Normal University: most ordinary families spent on average 100,000 RMB raising a child to university age, while wealthier families spent about 300,000 RMB. Another study by the SASS found that an average household spends 40-50% of total income to raise one child.
4. Tea Leaf Nation on worldwide milk powder flows: As in Hong Kong tensions surrounding milk powder shortage in local supermarkets are rising in Holland and some other European countries, with new limits being imposed on customers.
5. Shanghai Daily reports new technology that allows visitors to find out about the late person’s life as families upload photos or videos to commemorate the deceased: “There are plans to incorporate a QR (quick response) code on graves in Shengjing cemetery if relatives request the service. By scanning the code using their phones, visitors can find out about the late person’s life.”
6. Lack of land for burial: “Shanghai government recently increased subsidies it pays for sea burial fivefold, from Rmb400 ($65) to Rmb2,000, leading to an explosion of would-be seafaring corpses.” There is apparently a backlog of 2000 urns of ashes waiting to be scattered as sea. “Shanghai Daily says so far 25,000 urns have been emptied at sea, saving more than 75,000 square meters of burial land. The city wants to boost sea burial to 2 per cent of total burials, up from 1.5 per cent now.”

Other updates

1. 1. 1. March 18: “China’s No. 1 village”, Huaxi, mourns the death of controversial leader Wu Renbao who, during his four decades in office, “turning farmers into millionaires by setting up 12 corporations ranging from textiles to steel”. “The village’s 2,000 registered residents live in villas and drive luxury cars bought with profits from collectively-owned companies”, but these benefits are not enjoyed by the 33,000 non-residents living in Huaxi. His approach was controversial: some said he “combined strict political control with get-rich-quick economics” while others described his “patriarchal, migrant-dependent system as feudalism.”
      2. The Independent: “Farmscrapers” in Shenzhen, China proposed at Asian Cairns by French architecture firm Vincent Callebaut famous for his Lilypad floating ecopolis. The design consists of six towering structures with wind turbines, water recycling systems and solar panels.
      3. The Telegraph: Investigative report on the production sites for the UK’s Poundland in mainland China. In the UK, budget retail outlets have seen growth in business as recession drives demand for cheap goods. “But without places such as Yiwu – a landlocked trade hub in China’s eastern Zhejiang province – such success would be impossible” – Yiwu is reputedly “the largest and cheapest wholesale market on earth”. Its “4-million-square-metre bazaar consists of some 62,000 outlets that sell an estimated 1.7 million different products, largely produced in factories across south and southeast China”. People from around the world go to Yiwu to source products. However local factory owners said overheads were rising and that staff is increasingly difficult to find. Manufacturing is moving to SE Asia.
      4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: China surpassing Britain to become fifth largest arms exporter. Its exports grew by 162% during 2008-2012, primarily driven by large-scale acquisitions by Pakistan. Myanmar, Bangladesh and Venezuela are also importers of Chinese arms. US (30% of market shares) and Russia (26%) still the main exporters. China is the second largest arms importer after India.
      5. BBC: China to create “home-grown” operating system, working with software firm Canonical on an open-source OS customized for Chinese users. “The move is widely seen as an attempt by China to wean its IT sector off Western software in favour of more home-grown alternatives.” The first version is called Ubuntu Kylin. Future versions will include tools that allow users to use Baidu maps, Taobao shopping services, etc.

CHINA – ENVIRONMENT

Underground water

1. Recent news coverage:
   1. The pig carcasses episode in March 2013
   2. The Shandong, Weifang episode in February 2013: Public outcry as web users accused factories in Weifang of pumping their waste underground. According to one, “children suddenly came out in red blotches and cancer rates have spiked in the counties of Diaozhai and Shuizhai in Zhangqiu, Shandong.  But villagers are not rich enough to drink bottled water or they are just not fully aware of how serious the pollution is.” Authorities forced to concede and offered to give tip providers 100,000 yuan if clues pointing to polluting factories were found to be true.
   3. Also in March, a garbage mountain was found covering an area 23,000 square meters in Hebei province, located upstream from a lake that serves as a major water source for Beijing.
2. Ministry of Environmental Protection: “underground water in 57 percent of monitoring sites across China is polluted or extremely polluted. In addition, 298 million rural residents do not have access to safe drinking water.”
3. See table of regional conditions in South Reviews, 2013/3/13.
4. See also feature report in Nanfang Zhoumo, 3-22世界水日专题.

Soil secrets

1. A Beijing-based lawyer Dong Zhengwei made a request in January 2013 with the Ministry of Environmental Protection for national soil pollution data. The Ministry replied by saying that the information was a “state secret”. The response attracted strong criticism even from party mouthpieces such as the People’s Daily and Global Times: “State secrets is the magic phrase for rejecting disclosure of information. Is it because it involves secrets that it can’t be revealed, or is it simply because you’re afraid of triggering dissatisfaction?”
2. China Newsweek report on citizen action and the State Secrets Law 保密法

HOONG KONG – POLITICS

Thatcher’s 1982 visit

1. Thatcher’s negotiation strategy:
   1. “根據會議紀錄，戴卓爾夫人提出的策略，是要游說中方接受，必須由英國管治，香港才能保持繁榮穩定”
2. On discussion of sovereignty:
   1. Zhao Ziyang: “面對戴卓爾夫人多次提出，若香港回歸會引起投資信心危機，趙一方面稱中國也可令香港繁榮穩定，另一方面則稱「如果要在兩者選擇其一，中國會視主權優先於（香港）繁榮穩定」”
   2. “鄧小平發言時，指主權問題毋須討論，中國一定會在1997年收回香港主權，否則難向中國人交代，「如果未能收回主權，新中國將如清朝般，現在領導人就像李 鴻章……市民將不會再信任他們的領導，中國政府將要退出政治舞台」。他說不會立即宣布收回香港的決定，但最遲一兩年後宣布。戴卓爾夫人反擊，投資者考慮到 中國過去的歷史，會覺得投資香港太高風險，應讓英國在1997年後繼續管治香港。鄧小平回應說，「非常抱歉」，中國對收回香港主權，別無他選，又強調中國 會維持香港繁榮穩定和資本主義制度，並以新加坡獨立後繼續繁榮為例子。”
   3. “文件提到鄧小平說，若97年前出現嚴重混亂，「中國政府將被迫考慮在何時用什麼形式收回主權」。他闡述「混亂」不是政府造成，但是「由一些中國人、英國人造 成，例如香港匯豐銀行，沒有人知道它發行了多少貨幣。（港督尤德插嘴﹕我們知道。）我同意你們知道，但與我對話的香港人不知道。在這情况下，有些人很容易 製造混亂」”
3. Role of Sir Yue-Kong Pao (包玉剛): Meeting with Thatcher four days after her meeting with Deng
   1. “包玉剛稱北京無意派人管治香港，「打算委任香港華人（Hong Kong Chinese）出任最高職位，並計劃把『低層的香港華人』（low level Hong Kong Chinese）帶入未來的政府；香港的法治制度不會有變，但不包括上訴至英國的機制；繼續維持自由港及保持港元制度」”
   2. “戴卓爾夫人在會上請包玉剛清楚向中方表明，沒有英國管治，香港將難以運作（unworkable），英方有一至兩年說服中方，其計劃不可行，若中方一意孤行，將會在國際蒙羞。”

Land supply in HK

Ming Pao editorial on proposal for reclamation and the construction of artificial islands:

1. “先不論港人蝸居的各種因素，人均居住面積若要追上新加坡，理論上就需要多一倍土地，所以，若梁振英的「住得寬敞些」成為政策目標，則現在規劃的土地供應就 不足夠。所以，填海和人工島的規劃不妨更進取，特別是人工島，應該以夢想式的規劃，盡量與海爭地，爭取以30年時間，逐步改變港人蝸居的局面。財政司長曾 俊華就財政儲備的「愈多愈好」說法，備受批評，不過，土地儲備不嫌多，真箇是愈多愈好，因為不但政府因而重掌供應的主導權，還可以改善市民的生活，所以， 政府應該大膽一點，以擁有更多土地儲備為政策目標。”
2. “香港總面積約1100平方公里，約有七成劃歸郊野公園，現在約超過700萬人居住的空間，約只佔總面積的7%，若按現在的居住環境，只要郊野公園釋出約 2%土地，就可以容納約100萬人居住。不過，郊野公園在港已經等同「聖地」，向這些土地打主意，肯定招來強烈反彈，在社會都「深明大義」，願意釋出少許郊野公園土地之前，居住、基建和經濟發展是現實需要，填海和建造人工島就成為唯一取得大幅土地的方法。香港在二次大戰後的發展，與填海造地分不開，若有人反對填海和建造人工島，我們希望反對者不要純粹反對，而是可以提出其他可行的增加土地供應辦法，讓大家一起來思索解決香港的居住問題。”
3. “即使落實5個近岸填海，也僅夠兩年之用，可以說細眉細眼。政府建議研究的人工島，從地理環境而言，有不少組合，例如可以把喜靈洲與坪洲連起來，或是喜靈洲 與長洲連起來，甚至是喜靈洲、坪洲和長洲都連起來；若更積極進取，由南丫島向西海域填海，盡量接近與喜靈洲和長洲，然後以橋樑或隧道連接起來，並適當發展 大嶼山，若做到這樣，屆時香港的發展迴旋空間，可以大大增加。”

Ming Pao Weekend Life: 姚松炎：「填海造地，讓你住得寬」是一道偽命題

1. “香港至今仍然沒有人口政策，一直只有人口估算，而且年年估錯，一改再改。香港亦沒有選擇和限制新移民條件和數量的權力，誰會來、來不來、幾時來，一切不知，所以政府亦沒有任何相對應的土地房屋政策、教育政策和醫療政策等等，只可聽天由命，因此亂象頻生。”
2. “今次政府建議的五處填海選址，即使全部成真，亦不過提供600公頃土地，而且造價高昂，需時極久，破壞生態無法補救；所增土地面積遠不及馬上釋放800公 頃新界棕土，或者1300公頃丁屋空地，以及善用現時大量空置的1500公頃工業地（其中300公頃為空置官地），甚至考慮只減少5%的郊野公園，就 可騰出600公頃土地”
3. “最後，到底填了海，增加了土地供應是否就能讓市民住寬些？這是一道偽命題，看似合理，卻從無實證，兼且邏輯有誤。土地多了，環境改善了，生活成本下降了，外來人口自然增加，直至供需平衡，租金自然又回到土地最高租值，達至薪金中位數難以負擔水平。”

Other updates

1. Court of Final Appeal decision on domestic workers residency reached: “admission is not for the purposes of settlement”. The 2011 High Court ruling said that domestic workers should not be excluded from a rule that allows foreigners to settle in the city after seven years of uninterrupted residency. In March 2012 the government won an appeal against the ruling. In the March 25 decision the top court also rejected request to seek advice from Hong Kong government: court able to reach ruling through reading Basic Law alone.