CHINA – POLITICS

1. Bo Xilai’s five-day trial closed on Monday

   1. Summary of Bo’s defence
      1. Bo said he was within his legal right to retract earlier confession. He rejected the charge of receiving bribes from Tang Xiaolin. He denied the two other charges of embezzlement and power abuse.
      2. Wang Lijun had a secret crush on Gu Kailai. Wang is a bad person. He and Gu are close as glued together. He infiltrated Bo’s family through Gu.
      3. Gu Kailai used her powers to make Bo feel Bo Guagua is good but Bo Wangzhi (Bo’s other son) isn’t.
      4. Bo says his major mistake was to have exercised poor judgment and not to have disciplined his wife and son: 王立军叛逃在中外形成了恶劣的影响，给党和国家带来了影响上的损失，我在这个过程中严重误判，深感愧疚，但没有滥用职权之心。起诉书对我贪腐的指控是严重失实的，我没有管好家人和下属，我有大过。我自知我是很不完善的人，我主观主义，脾气暴躁，我有严重的过失和错误，我深感治家无方，给国家造成了不良影响。我诚恳地接受组织的审查，也接受司法机关的审查。过去16个月，办案部门工作人员对我的生活是照顾的，谈话文明，多数人有素养，当然在这个过程中我是有压力的。这次审判，让控辩双方都有机会充分发表意见，还有微博传送了信息，使我对中国司法的未来增添了信心。
      5. Prosecution closing words: Bo “had committed extremely serious crimes, and refused to admit guilt. … There are no legal reasons for a lenient verdict. He must be severely punished as per the law “
   2. Several notable observations on China’s new show trials
      1. Explosive allegations and heated confrontations – too what extent was it scripted?
         1. Quite unusual according to legal experts: “This is quite unusual for Chinese criminal trials,” Lan Rongjie, a professor at Zhejiang University’s Guanghua law school, said. “Usually there are no witnesses – there are written statements, or just transcripts of previous question and answer sessions.”
         2. Mo Shaoping, a lawyer who defended imprisoned Nobel peace prize winner Liu Xiaobo and other prominent dissidents, said he was surprised that the judge in Jinan allowed Bo to speak uninterrupted. “This is good because in other sensitive cases, such as Liu Xiaobo’s, the judge will often interrupt the defendant’s speech and say, ‘OK, there’s no need to continue,'” he said.
      2. Bold, “dignified” defence? Bo admitted mistakes, but defiantly denied charges, defended his principles and ridiculed witnesses
         1. Just in case for future return? “The trial is Bo’s last chance, and he’s making full use of it to project an indomitable and unyielding personality and to defend his image,” said Li Weidong, former editor of China Reform magazine. “Even though he will go to prison without a doubt, he wants to depart as the standard-bearer of his cause.”
         2. Appease the left? NY Times: “One clear indication the party’s strategy seems to be succeeding is that according to a family associate, Mr. Bo’s most loyal supporters — relatives who are watching the trial firsthand — seem appeased simply because he has been allowed to defend himself in court.”
      3. Only minor crimes were “exposed”: bribery, embezzlement and power abuse…nothing about human rights abuse or the crime crackdown in Chongqing
         1. Contain collateral damage? NY Times: “Chen Ping, a Hong Kong publisher who knows party leaders, noted that officials were exposing only narrow crimes by Mr. Bo, not the wider abuses liberals accuse him of encouraging during the “strike black” anticorruption campaign in Chongqing. “The party wasn’t willing to try Bo Xilai on the charges that he should have faced — trampling on human rights, trampling on rule of law.” he said. “That’s because those mistakes are also the party’s mistakes.”
         2. SCMP: ‘Even though Bo is widely seen as being a victim of political infighting, the trial avoided politics altogether. “The government was actively avoiding major charges and pursuing trivial ones because they want to continue with some of the policies that he espoused,” said Li Weidong, writer and former editor who has followed the case closely.’
      4. Unexpected and “remarkable” transparency: Bo’s testimony largely released; real-time updates via Jinan court’s weibo…but foreign correspondents not allowed in courtroom
         1. First mover advantage: acting as a guide to public opinion; SCMP: 中山大學傳播與設計學院副教授張志安公開評論稱，微博直播庭審這種直播方式，「既實現了庭審報導的形式，也實施了輿論引導的策略，技術高超」。張強調，直播並非真正的全程直播，而是選擇性報導，其「即時性、影響力和覆蓋面比報紙、電視更強更大」
         2. Showcasing China’s own version of the “Rule by Law”: open and fair trial, procedural justice
            1. People’s Daily published editorial on 26/8《 用法治思维和法治方式反腐败》
               1. 整个庭审过程公开、透明、依法，程序和实体都经得起事实、证据和法律的检验。这再次表明我们党和国家“用法治思维和法治方式反对腐败”的鲜明态度和坚定决心。
               2. 济南市中级人民法院依法准许媒体和各界人士旁听，新闻媒体做了及时充分的报道，同时法院积极探索司法公开方式，设立新闻发言人、开设官方微博、向媒体及时披露信息，确保案件审理公开透明。
               3. 对检察机关起诉的三项罪名，法庭严格遵照法定程序，深入调查了大量证据，并经过当庭出示、辨认、质证等法庭调查程序查证，彰显了忠于事实、忠于法律的司法理念，体现了对程序正义、实体正义的追求。
               4. 用制度约束权力，使权力正确规范地行使；在法治框架下查处腐败，使反腐败走向规范化、制度化，这是我们党反对腐败、建设廉洁政治的根本方向。
            2. Wenweipo said Bo’s trial realized openness and fairness in the entire process of prosecution and defence. The trial wasn’t just a scripted show. There was a full and comprehensive debate and it gave Bo the rights to defend himself. Bo was also free to “choose” his own lawyers, whom he has met more than 20 times. (Note: A lawyer appointed by Bo’s sister ultimately denied permission to represent him in court.) “案件從起訴送達、開庭公告和公開審理的全過程來看，很好地體現了司法審判公開公正的原則。庭審全過程嚴格遵循法律程序進行，公訴意見、辯護意見和被告人辯解都得到了充分表達，法庭辯論是充分的、全面的。關鍵證人出庭作證、接受質證，這對保證案件公正審理，防止庭審流於形式起到了重要作用。案件審理依法保障了被告人的訴訟權利，審判公開、程序公正，特別是通過微博及時向社會發佈庭審情況，反映了我國法制建設的長足進步。經薄熙來本人同意聘請的辯護律師接受委託後，會見被告人多達20餘次。…法庭上，我們依據事實和法律為薄熙來辯護，依法維護被告人的訴訟權利和其他合法權益”
      5. Disappearance and omission shows officials meticulous control
         1. Transcript of the prosecution’s statement temporarily deleted (later found that it was deleted because in first version the last two characters were covered by the weibo watermark)
         2. NY Times reported on Saturday that details of Bo’s interrogations appeared to have been omitted
         3. China Real Time pointed out on Sunday that Bo had referred to testimony absent from the previous day’s transcripts
         4. SCMP Keith Zhai reports more details and context missing from the official releases, citing “three people who have either attended the trial or been briefed on proceedings”
            1. “Censored testimony included (1) Bo’s account of the five letters he wrote to the Communist Party’s central leadership, pleading for his wife’s pardon in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood. Also omitted were (2) his descriptions of the less-than-subtle tactics by investigators from the party’s anti-graft watchdog, who told him of the corruption trials of two officials – one who confessed and lived and the other who fought and was executed.”
            2. “The transcripts also left out (3) some of Bo’s more sympathetic remarks about his wife, Gu Kailai , who was convicted of murder last year and has testified against him.”
            3. “Similarly, the transcripts took (4) some of Bo’s more negative remarks about Gu out of context, including his description of her as “insane”, according to a source briefed on the testimony.”
      6. Progress or retrogression?
         1. Sydney Morning Herald John Garnaut: “China’s nascent civil society network, now woven together by microblog, did not build a credible legal system but they did raise the political cost of committing grotesque judicial abuses. Eventually, the pressure they created by exposing Bo’s methods in Chongqing forced open cracks in the political elite. Bo’s courtroom persecutions of his rivals were so perverse and so public — despite his prodigious propaganda efforts – that enemies sharpened their hatchets and allies found it harder to defend him. Indirectly, I argue in The Rise and Fall of the House of Bo, this is what brought Bo crashing down.”
         2. Legal scholar and activist He Weifang praised the unprecedented transparency and relative neutrality of the court: 令人欣慰的是，濟南中級人民法院沒有「以其人之道還治其人之身」，法庭表現出很好的中立性。從該法院官方微博所展示的庭審過程看，公訴人、辯護人都有很職業化的水準，尤其是被告人自我申辯的權利得到了相當程度的保護。儘管對於民眾和媒體旁聽的自由還是有明顯的限制，但是，最令人意外的是，法院通過微博把庭審中的基本情況都顯示出來。從文字數量與庭審時間的比例看，有所篩選，但似乎大多數法庭言辭都發佈出來了。這在同類案件中是史無前例的。當然，能夠這樣公開不會是濟南中院自己決定的。決定的力量來自何方，其初衷是什麼，目前尚無法判斷。
         3. Guardian’s Five Things We’ve Learned: Some things stay the same — Theatrics aside, the party has left no doubt about who is in control. The outcome of the case has almost certainly been determined well in advance – Bo will be convicted on every charge, and go to jail for at least a decade.
   3. Sentencing? Expected some time in September/October. SCMP suggested there might be a heavy sentence, but limited by the openness of the trial: “[T]he unprecedented openness of his five-day trial, approved by those at the top of the Party, may ironically limit the ability of the court to mete out the tough sentence many of those same leaders favor, analysts said. “Bo is the biggest threat to Xi. If Bo is not executed or does not die of illness, the possibility of Bo staging a comeback one day cannot be ruled out,” a source with ties to the leadership, who asked not to be identified, said.”
   4. A day after the end of Bo’s trial, Xi announced the commencement of the Third Plenary Session of the 18^th CPC Central Committee in November.  Questions about deepening reform will be mainly discussed.

2. More on the ideological rift within the party

   1. Xi urges propaganda officials to present a more cohesive message to cadres and the public. Xi said that ideology should ensure the “correct political direction” is followed when major issues involving political principles arise. But he did not elaborate. He emphasized 意識形態工作是黨的一項極端重要工作, urging on several important direction: 要鞏固馬克思主義指導地位, 堅持團結穩定鼓勁、正面宣傳為主, 黨性和人民性從來都是一致的、統一的, 講好中國故事，傳播好中國聲音 People’s Daily commented on Xi’s speech in an editorial entitled 意识形态工作事关党的前途命运 . It also reiterated the renewed leading role of Marxism in CCP’s ideology: 这就是要巩固马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位，巩固全党全国人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础。实现这“两个巩固”，关键是要解决好对马克思主义和共产主义的信仰、对中国特色社会主义的信念问题
   2. China’s leaders issued a memo in April known as Document No. 9 to warn cadres of seven forces threatening the party’s domestic legitimacy, according to The New York Times, including “Western constitutional democracy” and other liberal policies such as “universal values” of human rights. Chris Buckley reports that the directive has the “unmistakable imprimatur of Xi Jinping.

3. In the wake of a fresh “strike-hard” campaign against online rumours, several prominent whistleblowers were arrested. Similar campaign took place in 2011. What is new is that the new campaign targeted microblog celebrities.

   1. Wide propaganda effort on state media
   2. Chinese-American investor and social media celebrity Charles Xue, a.k.a. Xue Manzi 薛蛮子, was placed under “administrative detention” after allegedly being caught with a prostitute in Beijing.  He is also one of the most prominent liberal voices on Chinese social media, with a following of more than 12 million on the popular social media platform Sina Weibo.
   3. Xue was accused having invested in a company where the suspected rumour-monger Qin Zhihui was employed. Qin Zhihui and his business partner Yang Xiuyu were arrested for “deliberately fabricating rumours” — about propaganda hero Lei Feng. They were said to be the two major players in China’s “black PR” industry: a thriving trade of online reputation management often utilized by businesses, celebrities, and officials to bolster their images or harm those of their competitors.
      1. Danwei looked at Chinese-language reporting about their business: “[their company, ERMA] is one of the over 15,000 Chinese “water army” (shuijun 水军) companies paid by other companies to artificially generate grassroots online activity for their benefit. Erma’s client services include web marketing, creating online scandals or events, damaging the reputations of rivals or competitors, deleting negative comments from online forums, and generally creating and spreading rumors. All this is done in cooperation with online “opinion leaders” with large numbers of social media followers, who are be paid to re-post or forward particulars news or stories.” One allegation of these Chinese sources is that ERMA was responsible for manufacturing the Guo Meimei scandal.
   4. At the same time, probably in connection, other whistle-blowers were also arrested
      1. Chongqing-based New Express reporter Liu Hu was detailed by local police on Friday after he openly alleged that senior official Ma Zhengqi was involved in “serious misconduct when he worked in Chongqing.”
   5. CMP’s David Bandurski examines the “Seven Base Lines” (七条底线) recently defined to help guide “mutual building of a favorable [online] environment”. He argues that it would be wrong to think that it is about the concern about the truth and accuracy of information. In the Seven Base Lines, The Base Line of Information Accuracy ranks last. Above it are 1) The Base Line of Laws and Regulations; 2) The Base Line of the Socialist System; 3) The Base Line of National Interests; 4) The Base Line of Citizens’ Legal Rights and Interests; 5) The Base Line of Public Order; 6) The Moral Base Line.
   6. However, in response to the recent crackdown against weiquan activists (e.g. Guo Feixiong and Xu Zhiyong), Global Times commented that the existence of such group of “social activists” is already a social reality. These people staged their actions because they believe they have the moral high ground. The newspaper acknowledges that their actions are not ENTIRELY NEGATIVE, but still stresses that such radical behaviour are harmful for governance and social stability, and should be punished by law. Hence, reducing contentious action has “humanitarian benefits” for individuals and society (减少对抗对个人以及对社会都具有重要的人道主义意义).

4. Tight cultural control shown as the 10^th Beijing International Film Festival was banned again. Last year the festival was disrupted due to power outage.

   1. Police reportedly struck a deal with organizers. According to Time Out Beijing’s Simon Zhou, “The directors, jury, and invited guests of the festival, among them those who had taken the train from Xinjiang or been flown in all the way from Sweden and Iran, would be handed out DVDs containing the entire programme of films. We would be permitted to watch them, on computer screens or televisions, in groups of two or three, but no more than five. We would have to sign contracts promising to abide by these conditions, or face the consequences. If the organisers didn’t agree these conditions, and tried to go ahead with the festival anyway, the electricity from the entire village of Songzhuang would be cut, and Wang Hongwei would be put in prison.“ “After the announcement, there was an impromptu funerary march, with the poster of the 10th Beijing Independent Film Festival standing in for a photograph of the deceased. It was led by a woman in her fifties or sixties; she staggered and laughed, perhaps so that she would not cry: here lies the death of independent cinema. It did not die of natural causes. “
   2. This is hardly an isolated incident. Apart from last year’s disruption of BIFF, Nanjing’s 9^th 中國獨立影像年度展 was postponed. In March 2013, 雲之南記錄影像展」in southwest China had to be cancelled. Art critic and BIFF funder Li Xianting 栗宪庭  had his film school, the Li Xianting film school, shut down by authorities earlier in July 2013.

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

1. China’s foreign minister urged a “political resolution” to the conflict in Syria on Monday and said China backs an independent U.N. investigation into the alleged use of chemicals weapons However, China, and Russia, warned against military intervention.

2. China Defence Minister Chang Wanquan 常万全 took his first trip as minister to the US

   1. Chang reiterated China’s pledge not to make concessions on its core interests, warning US not to target China. “No one should fantasise that China would barter away our core interests. And no one should underestimate our will and determination in defending our territory, sovereignty and maritime rights.” He also struck a positive note, vowing, after three hours of talks with US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, to boost military ties with the US.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

1. Speaking on the 2017 CE election, executive councillor Fanny Law Fan Chiu-fun opposes arbitrary screening of CE candidates

   1. Favoured a three-horse race when the “one man, one vote” system is introduced for the 2017 election
   2. “It would be practically impossible to screen out some candidates arbitrarily.” This is believed to be a response to Qiao Xiaoyang, the chairman of the National People’s Congress Law Committee, who said in March 2013 that the chief executive must not be confrontational towards the central government. Pan-democrats saw Qiao’s comment as the clearest hint yet that a screening mechanism would be set up to bar candidates deemed unacceptable to Beijing from running in 2017”
   3. Yet she said, “Law said many pan-democratic politicians were not confrontational towards Beijing. She said the nominating committee should assess the calibre of candidates based on criteria such as competence, public acceptance and ties with Beijing, before short-listing candidates for a one man, one vote ballot. Candidates should pledge allegiance to Beijing when they sought nominations for the race, she said.”

2. China’s Foreign Ministry Commissioner to HK warns the new US consul-general Clifford Hart on 27/8

   1. Song emphasized that Hong Kong affairs allow no foreign intervention. “Song stressed that political system reform is Hong Kong’s internal affair, which bears no interference from foreign governments or officials.” This is believed to be a response towards Hart’s frequent public appearance in HK after coming to office in late July.