CHINA – DIPLOMACY

China and the Arctic

1. The Arctic Council admitted China as an observer member after having turned it down twice before. The Council is a platform for determining territorial claims to the Arctic Ocean, whose rapidly thawing sea-ice cover has produced waters not previously navigable by ship that are not clearly covered by the international law of the sea
2. Interests of China:
   1. New fishing grounds: access to fishing supply
   2. Access to the Northwest Passage and Northeast Passage, which connect China to Europe, reducing travel by almost half of the distance.
3. Changing strategy adopted by China: From claims of sovereignty (“no nation has sovereignty over it”, “right to Arctic resources”) to emphasizing interest in research:
   1. The Atlantic: “In the last few years, China has stepped up its funding of Arctic research to investigate the effects of climate change on water levels, shipping routes and various other things. It now has a Polar Research Institute in Shanghai to train scientists in Arctic research, as well as the Xue Long (“snow dragon”), a (550 ft) research icebreaker . In 2015, China will launch three research expeditions to the Arctic. Though some of this seems based on plans for exploiting the new sea route, so far these projects have been launched under the aegis of environmental science.”

China in South and Southeast Asia

1. Li Keqiang’s visit to India
   1. Trade agreements signed and pledge to maintain peace and tranquillity in disputed border regions, despite India’s $US29 billion trade deficit with China and continuous tension in border areas.
   2. WSJ: Drastic security measures taken by Indian police in anticipation of protests by Tibetans during Li’s visit
   3. Wen Wei Po: “近年美國、日本等個別國家為了遏止中國崛起，別有用心地放大中印之間的分歧，突出兩國之間的矛盾，企圖拉攏印度、挑撥中印關係，達到包圍、遏制中國的目的”
2. In Pakistan, Li highlighted cooperation in power generation in Pakistan as a priority for both countries. Power shortages in Pakistan have sparked violent protests and crippled an already weak economy. China had provided Pakistan with two nuclear reactors and planned to build two more: US fears that these could be used to boost Pakistan nuclear weapons program.
3. China’s new pipeline in Myanmar amid scramble for influence with the US:
   1. Natural gas scheduled to start flowing this July through the newly constructed pipeline from wells in Bay of Bengal. Encountering increased opposition:
      1. Earlier, in central Myanmar, ancestral landholders and monks joined effort in preventing a Chinese-led conglomerate from leveling a fabled mountain embedded with copper.
      2. This month, guerillas of the Shan State Army attacked a compound belonging to a partner with the Chinese oil company
   2. Resentment remains, though China has now publicly embraced corporate social responsibility and agreed to pay more compensation for land as well as provide new roads and extra electricity

Latest maritime disputes

1. People’s Daily piece challenging Japan’s sovereignty over Okinawa
   1. Wrote by two CASS scholars: “It may be time to revisit the unresolved historical issue of the Ryuku Islands”. The Ryukus as “a vassal state” of China before Japan annexed the islands in the late 1800s.
   2. Willy Lam: “psychological warfare” to put pressure on Japan so that the administration will be forced to make concessions over the Diaoyu Islands.
   3. ISun affairs article on three blind spots in the Chinese press viewpoint and the embarrassed position of the Chinese foreign ministry
2. North Korea’s arrest of Chinese fishermen, causing outrage among Chinese netizens who accused the authorities for not reacting strongly enough. Global Times: “If North Korea continues to go rogue, China should take actions to push it toward a more measured response… If we don’t set rules for North Korea, our whole government’s image may be seen as being too weak to deal with maritime issues.”
3. Shooting of a Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippines while crew was operating in the overlapping exclusive economic zones. Philippines: “unintended” incident; Taiwan: “cold blooded murder”
   1. Ming Pao editorial: “菲律賓以「一個中國」撒賴，由於菲律賓與北京有邦交，而與台灣無外交，暗示若是道歉也只能朝向北京，以此向台灣施壓，「要麼就收貨，要麼我只與北京談」。菲律賓此舉，把台灣朝野最敏感的台灣國際地位，放在中國大陸管轄框架之下，這是台灣多年來追求國際人格的大忌，然而菲律賓便在這點施力，其心叵測之極。因此，有台灣傳媒稱，台方要求北京低調，為台北創造擠壓菲律賓空間，無謂被人以「一個中國」推卸罪責。”
   2. Ming Pao opinion: “台灣一連串的大動作，反而給了別人「台灣氣勢凌人」的印象。這起案件現在已進入國際宣傳戰的層次，台灣由於軍演制裁等大動作太多，這場宣傳戰，台灣未必會是贏家。此案一開始時，台灣原可有許多方式妥善處理，但馬政府為了轉移焦點，故意要把事情鬧大，大動作也太多，有理反而可能變成無理；菲律賓總統府發言人也表示馬英九民調太低，是此案鬧大的原因。馬英九的民調太低，已更加喧騰國際社會。”
   3. SCMP Taipei Briefing: “Diplomatically isolated Taipei appers to have few cards left to play to force Manila to comply”
4. Mainland press treatment of Taiwan-Philippine tension:
   1. Global Times: “The current political dynamics across the Taiwan Straits provide a crack for the Philippines to wedge itself into the issue of the South China Sea. The separate situation makes both sides less cooperative in safeguarding their common interests in the South China Sea, handing the advantage over to Philippines… The Chinese mainland and Taiwan should reflect on the lack of cross-Straits cooperation.”
   2. Nanfang Zhoumo: “1990年代初，台湾赴太平岛竖立国碑，并启动专门处理南海海权问题的南海小组。在政治架构上，南海小组由“外交”、“内政”、“国防”、“渔业” 等多个部门协同运作，并有专门处理突发问题的一套班子。不过，这个小组权责分散，更与台湾同期扩大和东南亚国家友好往来的南进政策相冲突，在运行中屡遭诟 病。此外，同期台湾关照的重点是避免介入大陆与南海岛屿争端国的军事冲突以及保卫太平岛。这一政策目标被认为缺乏通盘、整体之南海政策。至21世纪，南海小组一度销声匿迹。中国大陆与南海诸国在2002年发布《南海各方行为宣言》，台湾和东南亚诸国的海权谈判道路受阻。南海小组曾有 过短暂复苏，但始终无法形成一套稳定运行的常态机构。厦门大学台湾研究学者李金明也表示，台湾目前无设置专门处理南海突发事件的常设机构。大陆数次邀请台湾共同维护主权，在台湾受到认可的同时，也有人担心会使台湾地位下降。而两岸最大的合作成果，目前还是学者共同撰写的2010年度南海地区形势评估报告。2010年，台湾学者宋燕辉等即呼吁政府确立明晰的南海政策，并设立相关执行部门以显重视。至此次事件，或可推动台湾政府的南海政策进一步发展，但能否有更大的行动，显然目前还犹未可知。”
5. Adverse impact on Ma Ying-jeou’s government: Newest low in popularity on the first anniversary of his second inauguration: Dropping from 23% to 13% in the past year (more on Taiwan below)

CHINA – SOCIETY

Renewed ideological control?

1. BBC Chinese: “繼中共出台9號文件被披露規定「7不准」消息在網上傳出後，最近又出現一份最早於5月4日公布的「加強高校青年教師思想政治工作意見」（簡稱 「意見」），進一步突顯習近平新政試圖加強管控思想的意圖”
2. 中共中央組織部、宣傳部和教育部黨組5月4日發佈了共16條的《關於加強和改進高校青年教師思想政治工作的若干意見》
   1. “要求全國各級有關單位「為深入貫徹落實黨的十八大精神，加強高校青年教師隊伍建設，提高青年教師思想政治素質」”
   2. “「少數青年教師政治信仰迷茫、理想信念模糊、職業情感與職業道德淡化……不能為人師表」… 分析人士指出，這是習近平政府積極推動嚴格管控思想政策的新證據”
3. 七不講 : “要求高校教師不能講普世價值、新聞自由、公民社會、公民權利、黨的歷史錯誤、權貴資產階級和司法獨立”
4. 兩個不能否定: 光明日報
   1. “不能用改革開放後的歷史時期否定改革開放前的歷史時期，也不能用改革開放前的歷史時期否定改革開放後的歷史時期”
   2. ““不能用改革开放后的历史时期否定改革开放前的历史时期”，要求我们站在历史的新高度、以历史唯物主义的观点充分认识改革开放前的历史时期在中国特色社会主义发展进程中的重要地位，坚守住党在这一历史时期对中国特色社会主义的探索成果和成就”
   3. ““不能用改革开放前的历史时期否定改革开放后的历史时期”，最根本的要求就是不能用改革开放前那种僵化的观点看改革开放后出现的新事物。用僵化的观点看改 革开放的现实生活，必然像鲁迅笔下的九斤老太一样，这也不顺眼、那也不顺眼，“一代不如一代”，什么都是过去的好，甚至站在改革开放的对立面，怀疑和否定改革开放”
5. Critic Wu Zuolai on BBC: “兩種力量在習身邊博弈，習的語言也就忽左忽右，但「不能以改革後三十年否定前三十年」，則完全是為了縫合自己身邊兩派兄弟觀點，結果是使自己滑向了歷史虛無主義泥坑… 我們沒有看到習對前三十年反思與懺悔，反而為了滿足極左勢力心願，將前三十年與後三十年縫合起來，使對他抱有政治改革期待的人們，陷入失望與絕望之中”
6. Law professor at People’s University, Yang Xiaoqing, writing that Western constitutionalism is not appropriate for China. Excerpts from the article:
   1. “西方宪政的欺骗性在于，以表面上全民的自由民主掩盖其实质上只是资产阶级的自由民主，只是资产阶级的专政”
   2. “宪政不符合我国的国情，党和国家领导人对此一再提醒全党”
   3. “因为党的事业至上、人民利益至上和宪法至上是不可分离的整体，在党的领导下，为了人民的利益，通过法定程序，宪法和法律都是可以修改的。单独提“宪法和法律至上”，容易掉入“宪政”的话语圈套，这也是“宪法和法律至上”口号的局限性”
7. WSJ: “Return of ideological attack threatens reform in China”
8. Renewed attack on Mao Yushi: “In a campaign that some have likened to the political persecution that took place under the Cultural Revolution, the 84-year-old scholar has been the target of abusive, late-night phone calls, a wave of attacks on microblogs as well as disruptions of his lectures. He has been denounced as a traitor and targeted by demonstrators.”
   1. SCMP: “The campaign against Mao Yushi is part of broad effort by leftists to revive Maoism, a movement which has fallen out of favour over three decades of economic reform by the Communist Party. The campaign has gained momentum as the new leadership seeks to tighten ideological control and crack down on dissent”
   2. Qiao Mu: “the recent leftist revival had much to do with a sense of anxiety among leaders over a theoretical void in ideological control”

Police power

1. China: Human Rights Watch report on rough treatment of sex workers
   1. Attempt to crack down on illegal prostitution has led to increased police brutality. Based on interviews with 140 sex workers, clients and experts focusing on Beijing’s parks, salons and massage parlors, the report argues that police abuse of workers is often so severe that it constitutes torture under China’s domestic law.
   2. Low awareness of rights among victims: none of the women interviewed filed a complaint or criminal charges against police; unaware that they could hire an attorney for protection.
2. Hong Kong:
   1. Demonstrators complained about abuse of police power in dealing with students protestors
   2. Arrest of Melody Chan, volunteer secretary for the Occupy Central movement

Land and Urbanization

1. Reuters: China’s plan to spend 40 trillion yuan on urbanization to bolster the economy encountered internal opposition as top leaders fear that another spending binge would push local debt levels up further Li Keqiang has reportedly rejected the plan proposed by the NDRC. Others doubt that urbanization may not help soon enough to bolster growth.
2. “To fund the urbanization plan, local governments would issue long-term bonds to finance spending on roads, housing and social safety nets… But a fiscal overhaul is needed because local governments don’t have steady tax revenues to back the issuance of bonds… To support the process, Beijing needed to overhaul its land and tax codes as well as free up the rigid residency registration”
3. The mathematics of it:
   1. Official urbanization rate: 53%, but real level around 35% as millions of migrant workers are artificially included in the urban population (“fake urbanization”)
   2. Government’s goal: 60% of population to be urban residents by 2020
   3. Plan: Spend 40 trillion yuan to bring 400 million people into its cities
      1. Calculation: “If 400 million people are added to the nation’s urban population in the next 10 years and each new urban resident requires 100,000 yuan ($16,130) in fixed-asset investments, total investment demand from urbanization would be at least 40 trillion yuan”
   4. Local government debts: Official figure 10.7 trillion; ratings agency: 13 trillion

South Reviews: New wave of upgrading counties to cities

1. History of administrative rural-urban adjustment: Fever of upgrading counties to cities (县改市) in the 1980s and 1990s. Last lot of counties to be upgraded was in early 1997, after which the practice was put on hold due to emerging issues:
   1. “整县改市模式违背了设置城市型行政区的基本宗旨，失去了设市的意义；市区农村人口比重过大，城郊比例严重失调，城乡概念模糊，不利于城乡分类统计及与其他 国家的横向比较，“假性城市化”造成城市化水平的混乱；市县在地域上趋于一致，市政府在管理对象上与县没有区别，无法突出城市这个中心，集中精力强化对城 市的规划、管理、建设，甚至会造成城乡两方面管理的顾此失彼”
   2. “在“建制城市化”、“假性城市化”的发展模式下，为“县改市”而走后门、拉关系、上报假材料等情况时有发生”
2. Signs of reviving the practice emerged in the early 2000s as urbanization continued at breakneck pace: “2004年，民政部提出了新的撤县设市标准建议，对地区生产总值，财政收入，二、三产业占地区生产总值的比重，城区自来水普及率，污水处理率，城区绿化率 和从事非农人口占就业人口的比例等指标均有大幅度提高。尽管如此，“县改市”的阀门并没有完全打开，直至2010年，民政部只批复了云南蒙自、文山两个县撤县设市，江西德安县部分区域设立共青城市的申请”
3. Since 2010, discussion revived on new strategies of urban development. A balancing act:
   1. “在全国2206个中小城市中，县级市经济总量和财政收入占据半壁江山，未来，县级市将成为中国城镇化发展的中坚力量. 扩权强县无疑是城镇化的下一个增长点”; “学界普遍认为，撤县设市已经到了必须重新开启的时候…今后增设大量的市是大势所趋”
   2. ““撤县设市”的口子一开，势必带来行政区划的大规模调整。如何避免新的行政层级的设置带来官僚机构的自我膨胀也是学界所担心的风险。易鹏表示，“撤县设 市”可能会增加行政成本，会扩大县级改市以后发展城市的冲动，进而导致投资大跃进或者“人为造新城”，必须警惕“撤县设市”变成政府扩权。”

Caixin: New reports on land resources

1. Publication of new reports by Ministry of Land and Resources in April: 《2012年中国国土资源公报》 《保发展保红线工程2013年行动方案》
   1. “提出更加严格地保护耕地，严格土地用途管制，“坚守18亿亩耕地红线”。这意味着，中国严控耕地非农利用的政策不会变。但是，对中国目前究竟有多少耕地，官方一直没有给出明确的答案” “财新记者注意到，该《公报》没有公布截至2012年底中国耕地保有量数据。这已是2008年以来中国耕地保有量数据连续四年缺失”
2. NDRC also released its opinions on protection of farmland and proposed re-evaluation of the policy of “staunchly defending the red line”: 《土地制度改革与新型城镇化》征求意见稿
   1. “报告建议首先要改变严守耕地红线的思路。多年以来，中国坚守18亿亩耕地红线的政策在保护耕地、确保粮食安全等方面发挥了重要作用，但严控土地供给、严控市场需求的管理方式造成土地资源价格扭曲，既不利于优化土地资源配置，也导致人地矛盾突出，城镇建设用地供给紧张”
   2. “坚守18亿亩耕地红线的政策，只是对耕地总量的控制，缺乏对耕地质量的保护。目前中国26亿亩耕地中，中低产田13亿亩，70%的耕地由于农田使 用过量化肥、农药、工业污水排放等原因已受污染，影响了国家粮食安全；另一方面，过去十年城市化占用耕地多达242万公顷，而且都是质量比较好的土地”
   3. “城镇建设用地供给增加，可有效减小土地供需缺口，降低土地价格，从而对降低房地产价格起到明显效果”

PUBLICATION HIGHLIGHTS

1. Nanfang Zhoumo: Training for young cadres: ““青干班”是国家行政学院青年干部培训班的简称，目标是为国家培养战略储备人才，即从长远看有发展潜力的、在关键岗位、关键时刻能够担当重任的青年骨干”
2. Century Weekly: Evaluation of nutrition improvement schemes for rural students: collaborative effort between state and NGOs:
   1. ““农村义务教育学生营养改善计划”，又称“免费午餐”，由中国发展研究基金会发起，先在广西、河北等地进 行供餐试验，论证营养干预的必要性和可行性。研究成果得到了中央领导的肯定。终于，高层决定，从2011年秋季学期起，中央财政投入160亿元，为全国 680个贫困县、10万所农村义务教育学校里的2300万学生，提供每人每天3元的补助，用于免费午餐”
   2. 中国发展研究基金会: “调研结果显示，孩子们的饥饿感已有大幅度下降，以前实行两餐制的农村学校，已经全部改为三餐制，其中有超过1300万的学生在学校能够天天吃到肉。贫困地区学生的低身高与低体重比率有明显下降，家长与学生对营养改善计划的满意度均超过95%”
3. ISun Affairs: Cover story on Uyghurs in China, timely report after the 4.23 violent clashes
4. New Weekly: Cover story on sense of security (安全感) in contemporary Chinese society
5. S Weekly:
   1. Cover story on roommate relations in mainland universities
   2. Cover story on the triumph of online authors

Media, the Arts and Censorship

1. ISun Affairs suspending and reorganizing publication:
   1. 信報 : “雜誌本來的主編長平、總編 輯程益中及執行主編張潔平，都有豐富的傳媒經驗，多年來以敢言及專業見稱，近月卻先後辭職，不禁令人憂慮是否涉及政治干預。老紀就此問過《陽光》前員工及 現職員工，他們都不同意政治打壓之說，反指雜誌的環境自由。「基本上，我們有權選擇做什麼題目，從來沒有受過政治壓力。不過，陳平（董事長兼社長）是一個 很有想法的人，他有自己的一套中國價值觀，所以當見到文章有不合心水之處，就忍不住要『表達意見』，甚至有時會執着一些莫名其妙的地方。」”
   2. Apple Daily: “同事也知道陳平與習近平有交情，其辦公室放着二人合照，但暫沒有確實證據顯示他為了習而影響編採方針。不過，《時務》曾以習高調要求徹查江系谷俊山涉貪作封面，引起同事不滿，「故題好似serve for someone，唔夾時務平時風格。」”
2. Publication on June Fourth encountered censorship from Hong Kong publisher: “珠海學院學生會編輯委員會新一期會刊《海聲》，因有六四專題，被印刷商e-print指內容敏感，需要請示主管，並把領取藍紙的日子延遲一天，編委會對此感憤怒，為保編審自主，已找其他印刷商承印”
3. Insider from Caixin magazine said that the legal section has been suspended due to pressure requiring the magazine to focus on economic reports rather than legal affairs. Speculation that this is related to a report on the deputy party secretary of Jilin province, Zhu Yanfeng, who Caixin suggests as being under investigation for a case of missing assets.
4. Outspoken internet celebrities targeted by censors: Murong Xuecun (real name Hao Qun), who had 1.85 million followers, found his Sina Weibo account deleted. He Bing, the vice president of the law school at China’s Political Science and Law university was also suspended in early May “for deliberately spreading rumours”.
5. Ai Weiwei released heavy metal single reconstructing his 81-day detention in 2011. Ai: Found in music a therapeutic way to break through the memories of his ordeal.
6. Mainland director Jia Zhangke awarded best screenplay at Cannes for “A Touch of Sin”, on the struggles of ordinary people in contemporary China told through four separate stories.

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Five years under Ma

1. A further pall cast over Ma’s government: the relatively light sentence pronounced for Lin Yi-shih, former cabinet secretary general and close aide of Ma. Lin was involved in a graft scandal but instead was only found guilty of extortion and failing to explain the source of his wealth: 7.25 years in jail and fine.
   1. Almost all Taiwanese media regardless of political stance ran editorials criticizing the verdict: as setting a legal precedent for Taiwanese legislators and officials to demand funds from others without needing to worry about being charged with corruption.
   2. Doubts over impartiality of the island’s judicial system
2. Editorials and commentaries on the Ma administration
   1. Liberty Times: “就任五年沒有一項及格”: “馬總統執政最大的錯誤，就是在國家整體發展方向上，墮入一中陷阱，全面向中國傾斜，以中國為核心、解藥，造成台灣走入死巷，找不到出路。向中國傾斜的結果，就是安於現狀，不再尋求突破，就是外交休兵、主權淪喪、經濟敗壞、產業未能轉型、薪資倒退、失業率居高不下。”
   2. Apple Daily: “如果經過台灣經濟的中國化過程，把台灣經濟大部分封鎖在中國籠子裡，以致後來影響到上層建築─政治領域，使台灣政治倒退回被迫接受威權統治的下場，那麼馬現在兩岸政策看似成功，其實是衰敗的開始。”
   3. 經濟日報: “徹底改變 馬總統可以超越安倍”: “施政滿意度迭創新低，最關鍵的因素在經濟施政和人民期待落差過大”
   4. China Times: “馬總統執政五年雖有好的開始，但隨後由於內閣頻頻改組，五年間閣揆四易其人，內閣人事動盪，以致馬總統上任之初銳意改革的政策難以持續創造更大的經濟效益，而為馬政府加分。”

HONG KONG – POLITICS

June Fourth vigil debate

Special feature on ISun Affairs: Chen Yun elaborating on why he does not support the vigil

徐承恩: 本土論戰與世代之爭

1. “近幾星期，民主支持者的內部就是否參加六四燭光晚會，意見分歧。支聯會以「愛國愛民，香港精神」為口號，令不少本土意識較為強烈的朋友嘩然。一些本土派的中堅分子，亦於面書或網上媒體中呼籲民主支持者不要再參與六四晚會。”
2. Exposing conflict between different sub-groups within the democracy movement: “近年，在香港民主派的支持者中，出現了一場因本土論述而引起的論爭。本土派認為，香港是一個與中國大陸有異的城邦，在過去六十年兩地長期分隔，走上了兩條不同的發展道路。是以，兩地的文化差距越來越遠，而中港的利益亦不再一致。因此民主派需要做到中港分隔，以香港的利益為優先，而不會動不動就以民族主義衡量中港關係。對於大陸的事，他們則認為香港應獨善其身，主力要放在防止大陸 介入香港人的政治社會生活。而比較愛國的老一輩民主派，則堅持香港的民主，無可避免要建基於中國民主運動的成功。他們亦有著強烈的中華民族感情，認為爭取民主是愛國的表現。”: “這可能是民主運動發展以來最嚴重的一次撕裂。不過細心觀察，我們可以發現這也可能是一場世代之爭。這是嬰兒潮一代的民主派，與在麥理浩時代之後長大那代熱血青年的首度交鋒。”
3. “兩代人在人生經歷上的分別，令他們在身份認同的問題上產生了分歧。嬰兒潮民主派也認同本土，但他們始終認為香港人也必然是中國人，縱然那只是一種與其他中 國人格格不入的中國人。他們相信只要堅持民主自由的價值，會有機會感動到其他仍然接受專制的中國人。新一代則對中國人身份沒有概念，他們看到自己珍惜的香 港文化及制度在中國統治下漸漸被侵蝕，因而感到中國是掠奪殖民者而非祖國。他們相信若要爭取自由民主，就必須要與中國抗衡，爭取香港的自主空間。”

Updates on Hong Kong political scene

1. Scandal surrounding Barry Cheung
   1. Willy Lam on Apply Daily: 中央港澳領導協調小組啟動Plan B
   2. “北京已作了換人的決定，梁振英何時步董建華的後塵只不過是時間問題… 據北京消息人士透露，由人大委員長張德江率領的中央港澳領導協調小組已啟動所謂Plan B，即準備在適當時候換特首，CY已完全喪失北京的支持。”
   3. “本來支持唐英年當特首的地產與工商界已或明或暗地向北京發「最後通牒」，即以杯葛CY政權變相要脅北大人換馬”
2. Raymond Wong’s exit from People Power
3. Survey a blow to Occupy Central? Poll conducted by the HK Institute of Education shows that 46% of 1,032 persons surveyed opted for maintaining order over protection of freedom of speech, while 41% holds the opposite view.