CHINA – POLITICS

Gu Kailai trial

• 3/15: Gu Kailai and Zhang Xiaojun put under residential surveillance on suspicion of intentional homicide
• Investigation, during which, according to China Daily, “the public security department formulated a meticulous investigation plan, conducted 394 interrogations of the witnesses and people involved in the case and put together 212 evidence documents totaling 1,468 pages in 16 volumes.”
• 7/6: Procuratorate body approved the arrest
• 7/10: Public security organ transferred case to the procuratorate on the same charge upon completing investigation
• 7/26: Procuratorate issued indictment to the Intermediate People’s Court of Hefei City
• 8/9: Trial opened in Hefei. They were charged with intentional homicide according to Article 232 of the Criminal Law. Joint offense, with Gu as principal and Zhang as accessory to crime. Gu accepted the indictment in her final statement. According to Reuters, two Bo supporters were dragged away during the trial after appearing outside the courthouse singing patriotic songs.
• 8/20: Announcement of death sentence with two-year reprieve for Gu, and nine-year imprisonment for Zhang. Four reasons given for a suspended sentence:
  • Heywood used “threatening words” against son Bo Guagua, but no evidence he acted on those words
  • Gu has full criminal responsibility but her psychological impairment weakened her ability to control her behavior
  • Gu has subsequently played a constructive role as an informant during investigations
  • Gu pleaded guilty and showed repentance in court
• Four former Chongqing police officers also received jail sentences for helping Gu avoid prosecution by fabricating, hiding and destroying evidence. They also persuaded Heywood’s family not to have autopsy performed: 郭维国、李阳、王鹏飞、王智; 徇私枉法罪

The narrative

1. 香港执业大律师张耀良:”这个背景肯定没有那么简单，首先我们不相信这个英国人对她的儿子有威胁，当时薄瓜瓜根本不在英国，而是在美国；而且即使有人威胁，应该报警而不是杀他。这里面有太多的事情没有弄清楚。”
2. Washington Post, citing “a person with ties to the family”: The testimony that Bo Guagua wrote on behalf of his mother was not used by the court. In the testimony it was asserted that Bo Guagua did not meet with Heywood and did not engage in anything with Heywood in recent years.
3. It is rumored that Bo Guagua himself had helped transfer a huge amount of family assets overseas, hence he would benefit from the court not probing further into the alleged dispute with Heywood.

The trial

1. IHT:
   1. Foreign reporters were blocked from attending the August 9 trial although it was declared “public”; the two British diplomats allowed in were barred from recording the proceedings or taking notes.
   2. Choice of location demonstrates concern “to minimize anything surprising”. Distance not only factor: Wang Shengjun, president of the Supreme People’s Court, has deep ties to the province.
2. Reuters: Gu was denied the use of a family lawyer, but was instead represented by “a state-appointed lawyer with meager experience in criminal cases”: “Despite British calls for the case to be handled fairly and to unearth the truth around Heywood’s death, her defense was entrusted to two provincial lawyers”
3. SCMP: Trial did not go into allegations of financial crimes, although evidence shows that Gu’s law firm has continued its operation after Bo rose to prominence to Chongqing despite Bo’s claim to the contrary.
4. IHT: A detailed account of the trial was posted on renren.com by an Anhui student who claimed to be inside the courtroom. The post was deleted in a few hours; most of the details were confirmed with two lawyers present. Account: Heywood demanded $22 million from Bo Guagua last year after real estate ventures failed due to political interference.

The suspended death sentence (SDS)

1. British embassy in Beijing: “We wanted to see the trials in this case conform to international human rights standards and for the death penalty not to be applied.”
2. Dui Hua Foundation, San Francisco group monitoring China’s criminal justice system: The vast majority of SDS are commuted to life imprisonment after two years. In Gu’s case, who according to her prosecutors “had been treated for chronic insomnia, anxiety and depression, and paranoia in the past” and “developed a certain degree of physical and psychological dependence on sedative hypnotic drugs, which resulted in mental disorders”, could serve just 9 years as she is eligible for medical parole after 7 years. The average is 18 years in prison.
3. SCMP: Sentence reflects anti-execution trend. Senior corrupt politicians more likely to receive SDS in recent years. In 2010, 7 of 11 ministerial-level officials who confessed to corruption received SDS (e.g. former mayor of Shenzhen Xu Zongheng) while others received life sentences.
4. New Yorker: “Let’s be clear: nobody should wish for another execution in China. But this case set back the cause of rule of law by demonstrating that when politics are on the line—and they most certainly were in the trial of one of China’s most powerful families—the law can wait.”
5. Ray Kwong, HKEJ: “Bottom line, Gu escaped the firing squad and ended up with what amounts to a slap on the wrist. By all accounts, she will be checking into China’s version of Club Fed: Qincheng Prison”

Reactions from the mainland

1. State media reports: mainly “low-key approach”:
   6. Chongqing Satellite TV’s 6.30pm news gave 20-second coverage followed by 14-minute report on conference promoting industrialization chaired by Zhang Dejiang
   7. CCTV gave three minutes of airtime on the sentencing, completed with footage of Gu saying the verdict is just and shows respect for the law, reality and life.
   8. Most followed the Xinhua report: Chongqing Commercial Times and Beijing Times reprinted Xinhua report; China Daily, Global Times and Shanghai Daily printed rewritten versions. Jinghua Shibao and Southern Metropolis also followed the Xinhua script on Page 20 and 19 respectively.
      
      
2. Caixin, Hu Shuli: “The story spun about a mother sacrificing herself for her own can hardly deceive anyone.” “Her brazen sense of immunity from the law was supported by a network of high-level officials in the Chongqing Ministry of Public Security.”
3. Mainland critics cited by newspapers:
   1. He Weifang, law professor at Peking University: a political show trial, “a satire of justice”
   2. Liu Xiaoyuan, lawyer: key witnesses absent; true intent is to cover up the truth
   3. Chen Youxi, lawyer:

 “‘刑不上大夫’，不是光指对高官不判刑，而是指所有法律规则对他们都不起作用，用另外的标准去处理，法律约束不了政治人物。一旦涉及重大高层事件，法律就可以随意搁置。在中国法律是管不了真正的政治大人物的。最后都是权力对权力的斗争，没有一个国家法度的标准，成则为王，败则为寇，赢的没有法理，输的也不服气。这就导致了人民用”路线斗争“、”权斗“来解读这些现象，完全没有是非观，只有权力观，树立不了法治的权威，同时也损害了人们敬畏法律的基本价值 观。”

2. Sina Weibo: Gu was compared to Xia Junfeng (夏俊峰), a peddler on death row who stabbed two urban management officials to death after they beat him. “A lawyer who commits premeditated murder gets a suspended death penalty, and a peddler who defends himself gets death.”
3. China Media Project noted the removal of a post by author Zhang Yihe:
   1. 一位朋友写道：刘翔的奥运表现是在做戏吗？叶诗文到底有没有服药？法庭上的谷开来是本人吗？被打死的是周克华吗？等等。这不禁让人联想起一则古老故事狼来了！孩子只说了一次谎，就没有人相信，最后喂身于狼。中国宣传机器命大福大，说了六十多年的谎，现在终于到了每说一句话，都被人怀疑的阶段了。

Bo Xilai: Sinking into obscurity or resurgence?

1. IHT: A confession by Gu and leaks from attendees of the trial show that Bo’s most trusted aide had a hand in the cover-up of the murder, but this was not mentioned in the official narrative released by the state media. Bo was “the biggest elephant in the room”.
2. Kerry Brown, SCMP Insight: De-linking as the main strategy as Bo’s name went unmentioned during Gu’s trial. The way the case was handled demonstrates that the party leaders “are going to desist from all-out character assassination against their ex-colleague. They can just let this once-populist figure sink into obscurity.”
3. Zhang Lifan, political commentator: Bo would escape criminal charges; most severe punishment is having his party membership removed. Bo and supporters also hold evidence of wrongdoing against his challengers, to use against the latter if Bo’s case is handled too severely.
4. Trend Magazine: Bo likely to be given 13 to 14-year jail sentence, and by the time he returns the Xi Jinping administration would have secured two smooth transitions and the 20^th Congress would be over.
5. Reuters: Leftist supporters of Bo “digging in for an unusually defiant defense of their hero”, viewing Gu’s sentence as “a conspiracy to derail him and discredit his mix of populist economic pledges and Mao Zedong-inspired socialist revivalism”.
   1. Xiao Gongqin, Shanghai Normal University historian: “Originally, the leftists were to some extent ideologically accommodated by the political centre, and seen as a political tool to counter right-wing forces. But now they feel disenchanted in the system.

“They think their chances to realize their leftist egalitarian ideals inside the system through someone like Bo have faltered, even been lost, and so they’re becoming a force outside the system.”

6. “If Beijing deals harshly with Bo, it risks deepening the divisions; if it treats him leniently, it risks being seen to vindicate Bo and his left-leaning agenda.”
7. Red China: 薄谷开来死刑判决无效！

Wang Lijun

1. According to attendees of the trial, Wang schemed with Gu to murder Heywood. Wang and Gu intended to lure Heywood to Chongqing, where Wang would shoot Heywood in a drug-related arrest attempt. Upon Wang’s withdrawal from the plot, Gu poisoned Heywood and later confessed of the murder to Wang, who secretly recorded the conversation. This account was not reported in the Xinhua official narrative.
2. 中國時報: 如果郭維國等人涉嫌包庇谷開來，那麼當時的重慶公安局長王立軍呢？ 王立軍的「包庇」刑事責任如何？
3. IHT: Wang could go on trial soon for his escape to the US Consulate. The charge against him could be treason, though more lenient punishment could be expected.

Liu Zhijun trial

1. Trial of ex-rail minister Liu Zhijun (刘志军) expected to commence next month in Liaoning province. The internal ministry issued a notice on 8/3 listing six disciplinary violations committed by Liu, including corruption and sexual misconduct. Also under investigation is Shaanxi businesswoman Ding Shumiao (丁书苗), who, as a middleman, “used her access to Liu to function as a low-profile but well-paid link between the ministry and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) vying for rail projects”.
2. Liu took office as minister in 2003, and launched into a furore of high-speed railway construction. The central government’s 4-million-yuan stimulus package in response to the 2008 financial crisis provided the opening needed for an investment surge.
3. Liu initiated the so-called “Technology for Market Share Exchange” strategy: opening up China’s market to foreign companies that transfer valuable technology. Critics: China never got critical, core technology.
4. As of March 2012, the Ministry of Railways had assets totaling 4 trillion yuan and gross liabilities of 2.4 trillion yuan (debt ratio 60%). Liu’s campaign has been criticized as being “neither economically sound, nor technologically feasible”. Blamed for Wenzhou crash.

Related to the high-speed rail construction rush:

1. The collapse of 100m section of bridge in Harbin, Heilongjiang on 8/24, killing three.
2. At least 18 bridges have collapsed on the mainland since 2007, killing 135. Most had been in use for less than 15 years. The real number should be higher as some collapses are categorized under natural disasters.
3. Construction rush: from 500,000 bridges a few years ago to the present >700,000. Philosophy of bridge designers have changed, from less confident and more cautious to finding smart ways to cut cost while meeting minimum safety requirements.

18^th congress line-up

1. “Dark horse” Ling Jihua (令计划): Previously head of the Central Committee’s General Office (colloquially referred to as 大內總管), chief of staff to China’s leader. A close ally of Hu Jintao, it was speculated that Ling might enter the Politburo, even the Standing Committee, in order that Hu maintain his influence. However, it has been announced that Ling will take up the less influential position of head of the United Front Work Department (统战部长).
2. Narrative behind his “surprise” demotion: son, Ling Gu, allegedly involved in a scandalous Ferrari crash in March 2012, an event that was covered up until recently through the forging of a death certificate.
   1. Global Times, 2012/3/19: “Sina deleted all microblog posts which mentioned the accident, and blocked online searches of the word “Ferrari.” The Global Times also found that news reports about the crash were deleted from many web portals, such as Tencent’s QQ online chat service.”
3. Ling was succeeded in his General Office post by Li Zhanshu (栗戰書)
   1. Ta Kung: Li has extensive experience working in the four provinces of Hebei, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang and Guizhou; “red” family background: “栗戰書的祖父、父親、叔父均為中共老革命，根正苗紅”
   2. The Sun: “栗戰書與習近平有相似的從政經歷，早在三十年前他們分別擔任河北無極縣與正定縣縣委書記時，就結下了政治友誼，時至今日終於開花結果，哥兒倆一起治國平天下。不過，栗戰書比習近平年長三歲，而且有豐富的地方黨務與行政經驗，相信他在這個位置不會呆很久，待習近平穩定局勢樹立權威後，他很可能在短期內更上層樓。”
4. Analysis:
   1. WSJ: Promotion of Li likely to enhance the authority of Xi Jinping when he takes over as party general secretary and president. Reduces Hu’s influence after he steps down. Li also acceptable to Hu, however, as Li also came up through the ranks of the Communist Youth League.
   2. NYT: “Mr. Ling’s downfall could hurt the transition. With Mr. Ling now essentially sidelined, Mr. Hu and his faction may feel slighted, implying that carefully shaped compromises intended to ease Mr. Xi’s rise may be unraveling.”
5. Line-up of Politburo Standing Committee?
   7. Both SCMP and Ming Pao cited sources that the number of seats will be reduced from 9 to 7.
   8. SCMP: Jiang Zemin’s influence may eclipse that of Hu Jintao: “Unlike Jiang, Hu is going to retire from the power centre completely. He is expected to give up control of the military, instead of holding on to the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission for another two years, as his predecessor did. Hu, always a believer in the importance of the party’s institutional integrity, wants to establish a good precedent. The scandal surrounding his trusted aide Ling Jihua has also left him exhausted.”

HONG KONG – POLITICS

National education debate

April 2012: Education Bureau (EDB) announced Guidelines, encouraging all primary schools to teach Moral and National Education (德育及國民教育科) as an independent subject beginning in September. Subject to be introduced in a “progressive manner”, provided with a three-year “initiation period”, before it becomes compulsory in primary schools in 2015 and secondary schools in 2016.

7/17: Education secretary Eddie Ng headed to Beijing to meet with head of Education Ministry Yuan Guiren. The meeting was only “discovered” by the media from reports by the mainland press. Excerpt from China Education Daily: “教育部将在“一国两制，港人治港，高度自治”的大框架下，坚定不移地落实中央政府的要求，为内地与香港的繁荣稳定和两地教育事业的发展进步服务。” “表示香港教育局愿意与国家教育部紧密合作，继续推动香港与内地多方面、多领域、深层次的教育交流与合作，为国家教育事业的发展和香港的繁荣稳定发挥更大的作用。”

7/29: Anti-national education demonstration. Organizers 90,000; Police 32,000. 黨民教育， 政治洗腦， 教材被「染紅」

8/22: EDB announced the setting up of the Committee on the Implementation of Moral and National Education to allay public concern over the curriculum. Chairperson Anna Wu Hung-yuk, Chairman of the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority.

Background

2007/6/30: Hu Jintao in Hong Kong: 「我想特別強調的是，青少年是香港的未來和希望，也是國家的未來和希望。我們要重視對青少年進行國民教育，加強香港和內地青少年的交流，使香港同胞愛國愛港的光榮傳統薪火相傳。」

2007/10: Donald Tsang’s 2007-8 policy address:

• “The future lies with our young people. In the interest of our country’s development and the continued success of “One Country, Two Systems”, the HKSAR Government will make every effort to promote national education. In particular, we will attach great importance to promoting national education among our young people, so that they grow to love our motherland and Hong Kong, aspire to win honour and make contributions for our country, and have a strong sense of pride as nationals of the People’s Republic of China.”
• “We will give more weight to the elements of national education in the existing primary and secondary curricula and the new senior secondary curriculum framework to help students acquire a clearer understanding of our country and a stronger sense of national identity. The Government will also encourage more schools to form flag guard teams and to stage more national flag-raising ceremonies, and subsidise more Mainland study trips and exchange programmes for youths.”

Budget for national education: increased sixfold from 5 million in 2006 to 35.3 million in 2007. The current amount stands at 96.2 million; 18 times increase in 6 years.  

2008-9 policy address:

• “Currently, we subsidise about 5 000 secondary students to participate in such trips and programmes each year.  We will increase the quota to 37 000 to include junior secondary and upper primary students.”
• Creation of national education platform “passing on the torch” 「薪火相傳」國情交流團
• Launching of a National Education Funding Scheme for Young People to subsidise and support large-scale national education activities targeting mainly youngsters

2010-11 policy address: Proposed the development of moral and national education as an independent subject. Consultation announced in May 2011. 

The curriculum

The China Model《中國模式國情專題教學手冊》

1. Compiled by Baptist University’s Advanced Institute for Contemporary China Studies (香港浸會大學當代中國研究所), under the appointment of the National Education Services Centre (國民教育服務中心). The NESC has received 27.33 million during 2008-2010 from the Education Bureau. The current head of the Advanced Institute, Victor Sit, is a former member of the National People’s Congress.
2. Consists of teaching handbook, posters and worksheets; distributed to all secondary and primary schools for free in mid-June.
3. Criticisms:
   1. 進步、無私與團結的執政集團， 中國當代政制的「民主性」與「優越性」
   2. 「理想型」 美國的政黨制「政黨惡鬥，人民當災」
   3. Fails to mention events including the Cultural Revolution and the June 4 crackdown. It does talk about the forceful appropriation of land by local states, Wukan incident, contaminated milk powder, high speed rail crash, etc.
4. Responding to criticisms:
   1. 「進步、無私與團結的執政集團」一詞，不是指「中國共產黨」。有關概念是指包括整個中國政制、尤其是「以表現和考核為本的官員遴選制度」下的包括中共、非中共黨員、民主黨派成員、獨立人士所組成的執政集團。今天的這個團隊和20年前及30年前是十分不同的。
   2. 個別政治團體在公眾未了解整本手冊的內容之前，利用選擇性手法，進行偏頗、失實、政治化的批評，扭曲、和抹黑，欲將手冊演變並成為一件社會關注的政治事件。這種運動式批判，對學術及言論自由並無好處。
5. Online petition: 反對浸會大學政治諂媚；抗議校方犧牲學術誠信完成政治工作 Referenced the Zhao Xinshu episode in the 2012 chief executive election

《匯通國民教育課程》

1. Compiled by Active and Independent Education, an affiliated company of City University Enterprises (香港城市大學的屬下企業「毅恆教育」), on receiving 8 million sponsorship from the Quality Education Fund. Already being implemented in 18 primary schools starting from 3 years ago.
2. Criticism: 建議二年級學生在中文課聆聽《歌唱祖國》以感受祖國的「錦繡河山」，被質疑是「洗腦」課程。

《少年心──家事、国事、天下事》

1. 由書商導師出版社出版、供初中生使用的教材
2. Criticism: 內容亦偏向唱好，例如青藏鐵路、發展航天科技、政府拉近城鄉差異、中央解決房屋問題、外交國力提升。 負面國情最突出是探討貪腐問題，但沒有觸及中共高層貪污和中共體制助長貪腐。在論述計劃生育衍生人口老化和男女失衡問題，也沒提及幹部強迫超生孕婦墮胎。 教材內所引用的數據，部份更來自國民教育服務中心。

“香港新一代文化协会《中国情教育教案结集》要求学生放下历史包袱（相信是指对“六四”事件的坚持）、放下不良印象（对中共历年错误形成的不良印 象），重新认识国情。教联会的《香港国民教育的新焦点：理解香港与内地合作的关系》则指出香港老师未够爱国，故必须参加国情班培训国情。”

Assessment Program for Affective and Social Outcomes (APASO)「情意及社交表現評估」

1. According to Fact Sheet on APASO-II, Scales of Secondary School (S1-7):
   1. Scale (1 of 12): National identity and Global Citizenship
   2. Objective: To obtain an index on the Duty to the Nation, Emotional Attachment to the Nation, Global Citizenship and Attitudes toward the National of Hong Kong secondary school children.
2. Measurements:
   1. 「為了保障中國的就業情況，我們應該購買中國製造的產品」
   2. 「即使人民認為國家所做的不對，我們也應該支持國家」
   3. 「中國國歌對我來說是重要的」

Official responses

1. Wong Chi Man, director of National Education Services Centre: “It’s impossible to be brainwashed. Hong Kong people still have access to a lot of information. All education is, to some extent, designed to brainwash. I think the word ‘brainwash’ is too negative. It evokes something out of ‘Clockwork Orange.'”
2. Eddie Ng: 「教育歸教育、政治歸政治」
3. People’s Daily Overseas edition: “有多项调查显示，香港青年对国情的认知并不理想。例如，回归15年后，比例不低的青年人仍然不知道“五四”精神的代表，也有人不知道国家主席姓甚名谁。特区政府推出道德和国民教育专科，正是为了弥补国情认知的缺失，帮助年轻人适应时代的变”
4. 8/24: Appointment of Rock Chen as the Chairman of the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority, replacing the promoted Eddie Ng. Chen is the president of the Hong Kong United Youth Association, the local subsidiary of All-China Youth Federation (中华全国青年联合会), to which Chen was elected vice-president in 2010. Chen also supervised in 2009 the production of a highly controversial promotional film (心繫家國).

Reactions from citizens

1. The Catholic diocese, Hong Kong’s largest school-sponsoring body, issued a “strongly worded” guideline to all its 197 schools (including 110 primary schools) instructing them not to introduce the subject.
2. Activism:
   1. Scholarism: 在香港，社會運動是屬於成年人的事，到反高鐵首次有80後出來帶領社運，但亦只是大專生層面的事情，到學民思潮出現才真正有中學生主導的社運出現。三名90後中學生在2011年5月29日，即教育局推出國民教育諮詢稿後一個多月，在社交網站facebook群組發起「學民思潮反對德育及國民教育科聯盟」，即時吸引數百名中學生加入。「學民思潮」現時有200名會員，活躍的有50人左右，全是像黎汶洛一樣的中學生，發起人之一的黃之鋒僅有15歲。學民思潮的200名成員義工，分成政策組、文宣組、音樂組、行動組。去年8月份舉行反對國民教育大遊行之前，他們在不同地區每天擺三個街站，呼籲巿民反對政府硬推國民教育，維持了一個月，總共擺了100多次街站，兼為學民思潮籌得一千多元。

The group’s funding comes from members’ own pocket money and donations from supporters. One teacher donated a large amount after one member was pepper-sprayed at the June 30 rally.

The group started a three-day “long march” on 8/26 during which student activists will visit a dozen government schools and call on them to refrain from starting the curriculum.

1. National Education Parents Concern Group
2. Professional Teachers’ Union

3. Alternatives? Hong Kong Alliance for Civic Education「公民教育聯席」於2002年由多個民間團體與人權組織聯合組成，主要團體之一為香港基督徒學會
   1. 聯席於2004年首次出版《貧窮體驗學習手冊》及《國民教育教材套》、2005年更因應社會討論，出版內容更全面的《中國經濟發展教材套》及《「誰 的全球化？」教材套》，並在民間團體的網絡和一些教育主題的研討會活動上售賣，最近其中一份教案獲教育局查詢版權以列作參考教案
   2. 聯席亦會邀請 學校舉辦工作坊與分別針對中學生和教育文憑學生的「通識教育體驗營」，探訪籠屋、紅燈區及少數族裔社區等等。
   3. 公民教育聯席成立至今十年，但礙於資源限制，要抗衡官方洗腦活動，實有困難。 聯席的長遠目標，是希望結連更多的民間力量，籌組「民間公民教育中心」
4. Effect on LegCo election:
   1. All major political parties have objected to immediate launch, with Democrats calling for the scrapping of the plan and the DAB saying that schools should be given the choice on how the subject is introduced to the curriculum.
   2. Pro-establishment candidates including New People’s Party and HKFTU have thus far refused to state their positions.
   3. Education functional constituency candidates, Ho Hon-kuen (Education Convergence) and Ip Kin-yuen (replacing the ill Fung Wai-wah to represent HK Professional Teachers’ Union, which initiated《教師良心約章》), both voiced opposition to national education. However, Ho was criticized for refusing to participate in the 7/29 demonstration and for avoiding the questions of brainwashing and academic independence in his “opposition” to national education.

*Note on the teaching of Chinese history in Hong Kong secondary schools: In the curriculum reform initiated in 2000-1, Chinese history is no longer required to be taught as a standalone subject but can be a part of a broader subject. Four proposals: 一、中西史合併；二、將中史以學習元素的形式融入綜合人文科內；三、校本發展；四、繼續現存的獨立科的形式存在

• According to the EDB, as of 2008 about 70% of secondary schools still retain Chinese history as a standalone subject.
• Criticisms on disintegrating the subject. See links.
  • 2008: Education Convergence calling on government to make Chinese history compulsory in junior secondary, on finding that one school in four does not teach it as a standalone subject.
  • 2008: “United action group on the popularization of national history education” (關注普及國史教育聯合行動組)
  • 2011: Pan-democrats called on government to resurrect Chinese history as compulsory subject, instead of introducing national education. The tabled amendment was rejected by the pro-establishment camp.

Legislative Council election

The new format, under the constitutional reform packaged passed in 2010:

• District Council (Second) candidates nominated by District councilors and to be elected by all registered voters who are not eligible to vote in ordinary FCs.
• 16 of 30 of ordinary FC candidates set to be reelected uncontested.

Commentaries

1. Relaunch on 8/20 of New Evening Post, affiliated to Ta Kung Poa, as a free evening publication. Dr Sung Lap-kung: Likely to give more voice to the government and the pro-establishment camp in view of upcoming election.
2. Ming Pao editorial: Two key issues:
   1. Moral and national education
   2. Interaction between pan-democrats and Beijing: the election results will provide a clear indication of the coming political ecology of Hong Kong. Competition between moderates and radicals in the pan-democratic camp. Democratic Party’s approach of “discussing political reform with Central Liaison Office should need arises” is “appropriate and responsible”.
      1. Competition between People Power and Democratic Party
      2. Albert Ho on PP: Violent, highly exclusive, ultra leftist, full of hate, impossible to cooperate with.
   3. Ming Pao: Background checks for “independent” candidates
   4. Mainland reporting:
      1. China Daily HK edition, by Joseph Yeung, president of Hong Kong Industry Commerce and Professional Association: “Experience shows the public has little interest in the election topics used by the opposition camp to defame the central government. That is because during the past 15 years after Hong Kong’s return to China, the citizens of Hong Kong have seen with their own eyes that the central government is not the “evil creature” as painted by the opposition, but a kind benefactor that has given Hong Kong many tangible benefits. It comes as no surprise that the election prospect of the opposition camp is dimming.”
      2. Another China Daily article titled “Reject ‘home wreckers”, support rational and pragmatic forces”