CHINA – SOCIETY

Natural disaster and crisis management

Response to emergency

1. ISun Affairs: The PLA has reacted to the disaster much more speedily compared with 2008 due to the current administration’s fuller control over the army. However, the speed of reaction by no means implied that there has been qualitative improvement in rescue efforts: The PLA still rely on inadequate tools.

The “silent” China Earthquake Administration

1. CEA’s function of earthquake prediction has been greatly diminished over the years:
   1. 从2008年的汶川地震，到2010年的青海玉树地震，再到如今的芦山地震，地震局没有一次预报。 《瞭望东方周刊》2011年的一篇报道指出，截至目前，中国地震部门预测7级以上地震的短临预测成功率仅5%左右。
   2. 新中国的地震预防工作开始于1953年。地震局曾经有过不错的成绩，准确预报过20多次地震，尤其是1975年的海城地震。但1983后，国家地震局召开了一系列会议，对地震预测方法进行验证，所有的地震预测方法都不精准，基本都被否定了。 此后，地震不可预测的思潮逐渐占了上风，群测群防的政策也基本停止。 2006年7月15日，国家地震局局长陈建民在《中原减灾》报上发表署名文章… 这篇文章的发表，为地震不可测论调奠定了理论基础，成了地震局工作日后的指导思想。
2. Yet the budget assigned for the bureau remains substantial, although most of its other functions overlap with those of other departments:
   • 中国地震局公布的长达40页2013年度预算报告显示：在其高达40亿元的预算支出中，用于地震业务的项目支出只有9亿元，仅占总预算支出的41%;而主要用于人员经费和日常公用经费的基本支出高达22.57亿元，占比达到55%
   • 中国政法大学法学院副院长何兵教授：“地震局现有的职能中，救灾是民政部的事，建筑抗震标准制定是建设部的事，剩下最核心的地震监测预报职能纯粹是科研性的，完全不必单设一个地震局。”

Civil Society

A beleaguered Red Cross

1. The after-effect of the 2011 Guo Meimei episode and close ties to state. Red Cross receiving a much smaller share of donation compared with 2008:
   • As of April 27, “the RCSC had recorded 570 million yuan (HK$711 million) of the just over one billion yuan donated to help survivors of the April 20 quake centred on Lushan county… The remainder of the donations was split among 115 other charity groups. By comparison, the RCSC received roughly 90 per cent of the 13.8 billion yuan donated in after the earthquake struck Wenchuan in 2008, the report said. Back then, private groups accounted for 1.4 billion yuan.”
   • “The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation topped the smaller charities, reporting 230 million yuan in donations. The One Foundation (107 million yuan) and the China Primary Health Care Foundation (100 million yuan)followed.”
2. Beijing News: The need to revise the regulations governing Red Cross: Current regulations (《红十字会法》) are enacted in 1993: 最近两年，先后有上百人次的全国人大代表，提出“尽快修改《红十字会法》”的议案和建议
3. Proposals:
   1. 要清晰厘定红会和政府之间的关系。在二者关系上，当前法律更强调红会对政府的“协助”作用。修法有必要进一步明确红会的独立法人机构的地位，并赋予自治的权力与责任；同时明确其法定任务，实现政社分开，在机构、人员、财务等方面与政府脱钩，厘清二者责任权限。
   2. 要完善红十字会的治理结构。《红十字会法》中只有一句“上级红十字会指导下级红十字会工作”:通过准确梳理各级红会的职责、权利、义务等，改变以往松散的治理结构，使各级红会真正凝成一家；同时要完善第三方社会评估制度，以优化红十字会的治理结构。
   3. 要完善运行监管机制。对各种经费的使用和管理要有明确规定，要求必须建立公共信息平台，确保经费使用的透明。对于经费使用违规，当前法律只有“任何组织和个人不得侵占和挪用红十字会的经费和财产”一句，应该进一步细化。同时，要有明确条文，保障其公益性和纯洁性，严禁利用“红十字”品牌牟利营利。

Donation from other private/civil society efforts

1. ISun Affairs, Yazhou Zhoukan, and 南方都市报 on bottom-up efforts: 知名网友“肉唐僧” 及其“送饭党”:
   1. “雅安地震发生后的第一时间，肉唐僧和他的“肉铺”，用“一种完全通过微博、淘宝等网络平台发起、并最终完成的救灾善款募捐形式”，受到了众多网友认可，甚至引来张靓颖等明星参与转发，在六个多小时时间内募集善款30万元。”
   2. “一個高效的民間救援團隊形成了，前方是李承鵬帶領一班專業人員深入一線，後方是肉唐僧與一幫人籌錢籌物”:“肉唐僧的籌錢程序完全公開透明，他向亞洲週刊介紹了後方籌錢的全部流程：由他的淘寶網店「肉鋪」負責拍賣，所得款項交由一個名為「寶格麗委員會」的集體決定款項用途。「寶格麗」是肉唐僧決定「送飯」後，收到的第一件用於拍賣籌款的捐贈物品——寶格麗女包的品牌名。寶格麗委員會再由全體參加送飯黨捐助的人員中，每湊夠十二萬元人民幣（約一萬九千三百美元）就隨機抽取九位組成，民主決定送飯黨款項用途和其他事宜。”
   3. “李承鵬的「專業救援隊伍」中，部分人員是與壹基金合作的「V救援」成員，這些成員中，有些是退役的解放軍官兵，有些是專業保鏢，有些是長年做戶外運動、具備專業救援知識的野外生存教練。”
2. Another prominent NGO being One Foundation:
   1. “壹基金是由功夫巨星李連杰於二零零七年四月發起成立的公益組織，專注於災害救助、兒童關懷、公益人才培養三大公益領域，但因中國對NGO的嚴格管理，當時 壹基金沒有獨立法人資格，只能掛靠中國紅十字會，啟動「中國紅十字會李連杰壹基金計劃」，也即當時它只不過是中國紅十字總會下屬的一個籌款計劃。二零一零 年十二月三日，深圳壹基金公益基金會在深圳市民政局的大力支持下正式註冊成立，擁有獨立從事公募活動的法律資格，是中國第一家民間公募基金會。”
3. Global Times on the rise of online charity platforms based on the microblog service
   • Sina Micro-charities, a platform launched in February that allows the public to donate money with debit cards, credit cards or the online payment platform Alipay: initiated 29 quake relief projects, gathering nearly 80.4 million yuan ($13.01 million) from more than 60,000 Internet users:
   • “Among the projects initiated by Sina, the “Hope project of financing students in Ya’an,” which was launched by the China Youth Development Foundation, had gained some 38 million yuan by late Sunday. Sina Micro-charity’s “Donate to the stricken area in Ya’an” project gathered nearly 13 million yuan.”
4. WSJ on donations from domestic and foreign companies:
   1. Tencent and Alibaba said they had donated 5 million yuan to the quake effort. Samsung: 60 million yuan. Apple: 50 million yuan. Taiwan’s Hon Hai (Foxconn): 50 million yuan.
   2. “Most notably, China’s largest Internet companies —  which have spent years battling it out for precious users and advertising dollars, and contested easily a dozen lawsuits between them–  joined together to create a single site that consolidated their various products to help locate victims and also connect families and friends disconnected by the disaster.The companies cooperating include Alibaba, Baidu, Qihoo 360, Sina, Sohu and Tencent, as well as Google. The odd group provoked sarcastic responses of disbelief.”

Hong Kong’s 100 million proposal

1. 5/3: 立法會財務委員會以37票贊成、23票反對、 1票棄權，通過撥款一億予四川省政府，援助雅安地震善後工作。建制派全數支持撥款通過；泛民在場23人全部反對，李卓人（到法庭應訊）、湯家驊、葉建源缺席會議。泛民議員提出的多項監察捐款的動議，包括「不得被內地官員用於支付社交活動開支」、「確保賑災基金委員會有效監察捐款」等，均不獲討論。
2. 新京报: 港人“疑捐”内地当反思什么
   1. “在“增加透明度”的要求如此普遍的环境下，内地一些地方政府及个别慈善基金会，确实在做法上与时代落后一个节拍，在出现信任危机时，未做好修复公众信任的果决行动，导致了一场公共关系“灾难”，让部分人士的“疑捐”找到了合理的借口。”
   2. “香港特区立法会不论最终通过特首赈灾拨款案与否，都不会影响内地人对大部分港人一如既往的善心的印象。内地地方政府和个别慈善基金会，也应从中诚心吸取教训，因为一场赈灾的失灵，最终伤害的是灾民的切身利益。”

Anti-corruption controversy

1. 5/2: Zhao Hongxia, woman who taped sex videos with government officials was formally charged with blackmail in Chongqing. She was charged with extorting 5 million yuan from two officials, including Lei Zhengfu who paid her 3 million yuan to keep the video private. Her tapes have led to the sacking of 11 local officials and managers.
2. Caijing:
   1. “反对腐败成了中国人的共识，上层官员把腐败视为可能导致“亡党亡国”的大弊端，中间阶层把反腐看做推进改革的突破口，底层民众从反腐案件的围观中发泄心中的不满，可惜的是，在反腐的手段上，三者并没有形成共识… 由于权力得不到有效制约和监督，既得利益者编织的网络错综复杂，官员腐败的链条纵横交错，使得上层所依赖的反腐手段达不到有效的反腐目标。换句话说，底层民众对体制内的反腐效果不满意，于是青睐体制外的，甚至是非法的反腐手段。”
   2. “重庆赵红霞拍摄的不雅视频被曝光，掀翻了多名重庆高官，客观上起到了一定的反腐作用，但是，她的行为却伤及了宪政理念、法治规则、自身合法权利，由此可说，她不是“反腐英雄”，她只是非宪政制度理念下催生的悲剧性的牺牲者。”
3. Southern Metropolis Daily editorial:
   1. “在充满戏剧感的网民版故事中，赵红霞忍辱负重、受尽蹂躏，终成一位扳倒厅官的“巾帼英雄”。而在中国的民间历史文化中，人们对于“侠”的期待和青睐毋庸置疑。每当社会正义遭受破坏之时，国人很自然地倾向于一位除暴安良的侠义之士能够出现，赵红霞恰恰担负了这一角色。”
   2. “只有告别了“侠文化”的崇拜，中国社会才能真正成长起来；而反过来，对于治理腐败的主体——— 中央和各级政府，应当看到公众反腐的激情难挡，面对如此喷 涌的民意，如果不能释放更多的现实监督空间，那么“桃色反腐”势必成为一个持久的现象，推出赵红霞这样的“侠女”，也将会是公众舆论的无奈之举。”
4. Beijing News:
   1. “赵红霞不是“侠女”，她理当为自己的行为依法承担相应的法律责任。不过，这并非问题的关键。公众更关心的还是“雷政富们”的罪与罚。相比起赵红霞被移送起诉的公开与神速，“雷政富们”似乎还神隐于“立案调查”之中”

Of automobiles and license plates

1. The coming into force on May 1 of the military’s new ban on issuing license plates to luxury vehicles priced over 450,000 yuan. New regulations prevent military personnel from purchasing sedans costing over 450,000 yuan or with an engine larger than 3.0 liters.
   1. Aims to crack down on misuse of military vehicles, abuse of power and neglect of duty; and to improve public trust
   2. NYT: “Police officers generally do not stop cars with military plates. Drivers with the plates can also avoid paying road tolls and parking fees. Because of the privileges attached to them, military officers have been known to sell them or pass them on to friends and relatives. An entire industry has arisen devoted to the creation and sale of counterfeit military plates.”
   3. WSJ: About 750,000 cars were sold in 2012 for the so-called government fleet. Over 70% of these were foreign brands. Passenger car sales in 2012 is around 15.5 million cars.
   4. “The tighter rules come at a time when industry players warn of slowing growth in sales of more expensive cars in China. BMW AG recently forecasted growth in the “high single digits” for 2013—a far cry from the 40% growth in sales it had in 2012 that brought its total sales in China to around 326,000 vehicles.”
2. First controversial case emerged on May 2: Netizen spotted a Volkswagen Touareg valued between 645,000 and 1.18 million yuan. Officials said the car was previously purchased for a high-ranking military officer and is not on the list of restricted vehicles (大众途锐轿车不属于奔驰、宝马、林肯、凯迪拉克、大众辉腾、宾利、捷豹以及路虎、保时捷卡宴和奥迪Q7等明确规定的高档豪华车辆之列). Autos purchased in the past would continue to be used on limited basis to prevent waste (为避免浪费以前购置的途锐轿车可有限制地继续使用). Public’s concern: “previously purchased” may become excuse to circumvent new rules.
3. China’s homegrown luxury cars:
   2. Red Flag (Hongqi) limos as “new diplomatic weapon”: on Friday China donated 20 Chinese-made Hongqi sedans worth $2.3 million to Fiji. Hongqi as “no stranger to politics”: First produced in 1958, “synonymous with Chinese power trips in the Mao era and the early reform years, used to transport top Chinese politicians and foreign dignitaries visiting China”. Production ceased in 1981 and re-started in 1995 though sales have been modest.
   3. However, sales may improve in light of curb on foreign brands. 10 provincial governments and some central government departments are planning to begin using Hongqi cars.

Feature report on pension system (continuation of previous press meeting)

Three different schemes (三大养老保险)

城镇职工基本养老保险制度（职保）:

• 每月工资的8%将缴纳形成个人账户，雇主则缴纳工资总额的20%至统筹基金。待其退休时，他将领取到从统筹基金里支付的、与当时社会平均工资挂钩的基础养老金，以及根据个人账户总额按月发放的个人账户养老金。
• 当前，中国的城市就业群体普遍要求参加职保，到2012年三季度末，职保已覆盖近3亿人

新型农村社会养老保险制度（新农保）:

• 参保人每年缴费额可在100到500元之间选择，地方政府同时给予至少每人每年30元的补贴，以此形成个人账户，积累至退休时按月支付；同时中央政府和地方政府再以财政补贴形成基本养老金，目前的标准仅为每人每月55元。
• 从2009年开始试点，面向农村户籍人口，逐年扩大试点范围。至2011年底，全国已有27个省、自治区的1914个县（市、区、旗）和4个直辖市部分区县，开展了试点工作。参保人数达到26亿人，其中实际领取待遇人数8525万人

城镇居民社会养老保险制度（城居保）:

• 设计和待遇标准與新农保基本一致
• 从2011年开始试点 , “针对城镇无业人员的城镇居民社会养老保险由于刚展开试点，当前仅覆盖了539万人，其中实际领取待遇人数235万人。而按照制度目标，该项制度期望覆盖2000万人，他们当中包括家庭妇女、灵活或间断就业等城镇居民”

Overall situation: “三大基本养老保险的参保人数仍在不断上升，当前已覆盖6.16亿人。但这一数量与“人人享有养老保障”的目标相比，仍有一定距离。”

Issue of transfer between the three schemes

2012年11月26日，人力资源和社会保障部（人社部）就《城乡养老保险制度衔接暂行办法（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见：针对城镇职工基本养老保险制度（职保）、城镇居民社会养老保险制度（城居保）、新型农村社会养老保险制度（新农保）三大制度之间跨制度转移的情况而制定

Case I: Rural migrant workers

Problem: “农民工在城市正式就业期间，按照规定应参加职保… 但农民工的就业往往不稳定，他在进城前可能已在老家参加了新农保；打工期间也有可能返乡务农、待业，而进入新农保制度。新农保的缴费及待遇标准与职保差距巨大。” 职保的待遇水平相对较高

Proposed solution: “到退休前，如果参保人已经在职保制度内缴费满15年，则按照职保的相关规定领取养老金待遇。此前在新农保内的个人账户，一并转移至职保的个人账户，但在新农保内的缴费年限，不再计入职保。如果参保人在职保制度内的缴费年限不足，则最终转入新农保。职保个人账户内的资金随本人转移，但统筹部分则不再划拨。同时在职保制度内的缴费年限与新农保缴费年限合并计算。”

Still problematic:

1. Coverage incomplete: “农民工在城镇就业，也应参加城镇职工基本养老保险，但实际参保人数仅有4140万人，约占农民工总数的16%。据了解，有不少农民工事实上是回老家参加了新农保，但新农保与城镇职工基本养老保险待遇悬殊，进城务工者的实际保障水平与城市户籍人员差距巨大”
2. Unfair demand of 15 years: “去年年龄在40岁以上的女性农民工，或45岁以上的男性农民工，即使他们能连续在城市工作，他们在达到退休年龄时无法达到参保15年（享受社会统筹待遇） 的最低年限，参加城保的社会统筹缴费只能为他人作嫁衣裳。即使较年青的农民工，由于他们的流动性较大，所以他们能连续参加职保15年的概率可能也比较低”
3. Unfair treatment of those failing to reach 15 years: “由于职保的统筹基金不能转移，所以回乡农民工由职保转入农保后，他们将失去在城市工作期间由企业缴纳的统筹基金（一般占工资总额的20%）的相应权益。这些缴费将由城里人享受，实质上是由农民工来补贴城市职工的养老，也就是收入较低的人群来补助收入较高的人群的养老”

Case II: Urbanization of rural areas

Problem: “由于各地城乡一体化的工作推进，新农保和城居保之间的界限也越来越模糊。农民可能从农村迁居进入城镇，其保险关系也就需要从新农保转入城居保。”

Proposed solution: “由于两项制度的设计和待遇标准基本一致，因而新农保和城居保的转移接续相对简单，实行“随走随转”的实时衔接，个人账户全额转移，缴费年限合并累加计算”

Issue of sustainability

1. National survey: 中国社科院世界社保研究中心2012年底发布的《中国养老金发展报告2012》
   • 全国养老金总缺口达到5亿元。其中，辽宁和黑龙江缺口均超过100亿元；天津、新疆兵团和吉林缺口在50亿到100亿元之间；河南、陕西、江西、湖南、广西、上海、海南以及重庆的缺口在10亿到50亿元之间；河北的缺口最少为1.62亿元。
   • 在中国一些地区，由于统筹基金不足，社保部门用个人账户补足统筹基金，用以支付已退休人员。这导致全国大部分地区出现养老金个人账户的巨额亏空。
2. The Guangdong experiment: 广东省人力资源和社会保障厅于3月20日在官方网站公布《广东省城乡居民社会养老保险实施办法》: 将广东省此前实行的新型农村社会养老保险和城镇居民社会养老保险制度合并为一，并提高个人缴费额度，鼓励个人延长缴费年限: 防止未来可能出现的养老金收不抵支的状况。

Caring for the elderly

1. “地方政府随即提出“9073”或“9064”的养老服务体系，倡导90%的老人居家养老，7%或6%的老人在社区日间照料所等机构养老，3%或4%的老人则在养老院、护理院等机构养老”
2. Increase in wages for private helpers: “农家女居家养老服务社负责人方为芳介绍，最普通的家政工，在2010年时每月1200元－1400元就能请到，到2012年已经涨到了2000元－2100元，今年春节一过，普遍要价在2400－2600元。”
3. Towards institutionalization: “到目前为止，全国已有18个省份建立了高龄老年人补贴制度，22个省份建立了养老服务补贴制度。”
   1. What it is: “地方政府前期投入大量资金建立起社区的信息平台，包括养老服务机构在内的诸多商家入驻。老人有需求后，拨打信息平台电话，信息平台的运营者根据具体要求安排服务商的服务人员上门服务，老人以养老券支付，商家再向政府部门兑换”
   2. Problems: “由于缺乏对老人需求的科学评估，各地投入的有限资金较为分散，难以满足一些弱势老人的长期照护需求。 养老券北京政府一年要花大概5个亿，90%多都是在餐饮上，“老人拿着券买糕点、包子，并没有购买服务。”
4. Development of high-end private services: 高品质养老社区

Catholicism and religious freedom in China

1. Passing away of Bishop Aloysius Jin Luxian on April 27: Jin attended a Jesuit high school in Shanghai and was ordained as a Jesuit priest in 1938. He studied in Rome in the 1940s, returning to China in 1951, upon which he was jailed for nearly two decades under Mao until 1976 when he was formally released. In 1985 he was appointed a bishop by the state-run church, and in 2004 he was recognized by the Vatican.
2. Jin’s life as a struggle to strike a balance between Beijing and the Vatican: “The government thinks I’m too close to the Vatican, and the Vatican thinks I’m too close to the government. I’m a slippery fish squashed between government control and Vatican demands.”
   1. Jin served on the official advisory body to the NPC as well as the Patriotic Association
   2. By cooperating with authorities he persuaded them to allow prayers for the pope to be said during Mass and helped to develop the liturgy in Chinese
   3. Adam Minter, the Atlantic: “Whether or not one agreed with his methods and accommodations, there’s no denying his tangible, even quantifiable, accomplishments on behalf of the nation’s Catholics. Of these, the one that most impressed the Vatican over the years (according to two individuals in close contact with the Holy See on China issues) are the 407 priests who’ve been trained at Shanghai’s government-authorized and run Sheshan Seminary since it re-opened in 1982. Of these priests, at least 12 are Vatican-recognized bishops (and seven others who haven’t been recognized, or have unresolved statuses).”
3. Continued persecution of the Church: As in 2007, “the underground Church continues to be targeted by local governments wary of any social movement that refuses to recognize their authority (the national government is more tolerant). The harassment is most pronounced in rural areas, where many Catholics don’t have access to priests or registered churches. But Catholics are sometimes still persecuted in the cities, and today more than two dozen underground priests and bishops are reportedly in government custody.”
4. His first anointed successor, Joseph Xing Wenzhi, resigned in 2012 for unclear reasons. His replacement, Thaddeus Ma Daqin, was placed under house arrest in Shanghai’s Sheshan Seminary after he renounced his membership in the CCP-controlled Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CPCA):
   1. Rift between Beijing and the Vatican over who has the right to consecrate bishops in China: In July 2012 the Vatican and CPCA agreed on Ma, but during his ordination at Xujiahui Cathedral Ma publicly announced his withdrawal from the CPCA. The CPCA immediately removed Ma from his post and stripped him of his title.
   2. Caixin: “The animosity that divides the PRC and the papacy is deep-rooted, a power struggle that pre-dates the current era and can sometimes seem intractable.” Detailed historical account.

Short news update

1. Liu Xia appeared at court for her brother’s trial over a business dispute in late April. Human Rights Watch: Liu Hui’s fraud allegation “clear fits the pattern of harassment of activists’ families”, “to intimidate family members and to isolate activists from their own community of support”.
2. (4/24, 4/27) Two suicides in Zhengzhou’s Foxconn:
   1. “4月初，郑州富士康推行起所谓的“静音模式”，即员工自进入车间后，不得说任何与工作无关的话，否则可能被开除。此举饱受诟病，被质疑是“二连跳”的直接原因。”
   2. “三年以来，富士康时常被诟病的管理模式，并未有明显的改善。比如，每月加班超过100小时，并未绝迹；劳动法的执行情况不尽如人意；职工协商机制依旧是奢望；等等。2010年“N连跳”之后，所采取防范措施，现在看来，亦不过是临时的“补救”措施。”
3. (5/4) Environmental protests in Kunming against the building of a chemical plant in Anning, which will produce 500,000 tonnes of PX annually. State media puts the protest figures at at least 200 while bloggers estimated 2,000 participants.
4. Caixin: Two individuals in Guizhou detained for spreading rumors online that bird flu cases had been confirmed in the province. National Internet Information Office official: “China’s Criminal Law stipulates several kinds of rumors which are punishable by jail term: Rumors intended to incite subversion against state power, false information that aims to affect the securities market, false information about terrorist activities or unfounded allegations directed at smearing business reputations or products.”
5. Global Times: 904 people arrested by Ministry of Public Security during three-month campaign involving meat-related crimes such as producing fake beef and mutton from rat and fox. Since January, 20,000 tonnes of illegal products seized.
6. Southern Metrpolis Daily on fake dictionaries: “中央为解决农村小学生缺字典的问题，按每名学生14元的标准，从中央财政划拨了17个亿，为2亿农村小学生每人发一本《新华字典》。这笔专项资金分到 教育大省湖北是6500余万元，本来应该为在校的470万小学生订购最新版的《新华字典》，目前的情况是，只有320万小学生拿到了一本错谬百出的山寨版 《学生新华字典》… “湖北字典案”不是字典有质量问题，是相关官员质量有问题，是政府采购制度有质量问题，是公共财政的监督有质量问题。”
7. China Media Project:
   1. Economist Mao Yushi as “latest liberal figure this year to be heckled by leftists” during a public appearance. During a talk in Shenyang in late April, two scholars dissented to statements they felt were slights against Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and had to be carried away by security. Mao has previously been the target of public denouncement in May 2011 following his criticism of Mao Zedong’s legacy in Caixin.
   2. Passing away of Southern Weekly censor (审读员) Zeng Li: Farewell letter to colleagues admitted faults.

HONG KONG – POLITICS

ICAC

• Ming Pao editorial: “特首梁振英宣布成立獨立檢討委員會（下稱「獨檢會」）處理，乍看之下，以為政府以果斷手段整飭廉署，但是細看獨檢會的成員和職權範圍，實際上只在廉署的制 度與程序醬缸中打轉… 基本上由自己人查自己人”
  1. “主持檢討的4名獨立人士，其中3人是負責監察廉署工作的諮詢委員會主席，另一人是廉署事宜投訴委員會主席，他們都與廉署有關，湯顯明被揭發的不當行為，嚴格而言，他們在監察崗位未及時發覺，實際上不能完全脫離關係。”
  2. “在在顯示湯顯明的不當所為，只是以他為主的「團隊」結構性行為，涉及的廉署中人，相信現在仍然大權在握，正在履行梁振英所謂的職責，然則，他們會調查出自己參與了不當，甚至不法的做法，自請按法律規定處置？廉署查案，按其一貫密密實實的行事作風，根本毋須公開交代，所以，公衆將無從知道真相。”

Dockers’ Strike

Latest developments:

1. 5/3: “和黃旗下香港國際貨櫃碼頭的4間外判商，包括永豐、現創、聯榮及培記，晚上發表聯合新聞稿，宣布與沒有參加罷工的工人達成協議，所有工種的員工劃一加薪8%，比永豐一直聲稱是上限的5%+2%方案稍高”
   1. “外判商永豐負責人黃志德表示，新方案已是他們的上限，不會再返回談判桌”
   2. HIT’s strategy of divide and conquer: “繼早前向未有參與罷工的員工發放5000元紅包後，會再在本月中及月底發放合共4000元的紅包，向維持港口運作的工們致謝。而曾參與罷工的工友，假如在下星期一前復工，也可享有新一輪紅包”
2. 5/4: “碼頭業職工會今日下午舉行會員大會，逾500名罷工工人一致議決不接受外判商單方面提出的8%加薪方案，堅持繼續罷工爭取雙位數加幅，強調一切協議要在談判桌上達成，要有白底黑字的協議，不容外判商提出細節不清不楚的方案蒙混過去。”
3. 5/6: Proposal of 9.8% accepted. Strike officially over but issues remained:
   1. “李卓人直言事件未完全解決，因逾百名碼頭吊機手未能復工。他指，如果其他外判商未能全數吸納將結業的「高寶」工人，會繼續在長江中心及葵涌貨櫃碼頭留守。”
   2. Ongoing negotiation over returning to work: “外判商永豐昨晚「擺和頭酒」，與工人就復工日期及復工後待遇進行談判，但由於永豐不願在8%加薪以外提供額外的拉纜錢和飯鐘錢… 工人一度不滿離場，工人今天將再開會商討復工意向”
4. For details reports on the strike, see http://horsepaper.wordpress.com/, a blog opened by activists dedicated to recording the labor strike.

Problematic lack of progress: ISun Affairs’s comparison of Hong Kong and Shenzhen

1. Increasingly ubiquitous practice of sub-contracting (外判)
   1. Rick Glofcheski on sub-contracting: “工人只是商品；企業家不願意應付工人這元素，只管將工人推給外判公司去應付。你聽過企業社會責任吧，如果你將一切都外判出去，像HIT一樣，它根本完全沒有與人的連繫，怎麼能有任何相關的企業責任？它還能對什麼人付上責任？”
2. Lack of collective bargaining power (集體談判權): “香港由於彭定康一九九五年加大立法會選舉民主成分，多名民主派成員晉身立法會，成功於一九九七年六月通過《僱員代表權、諮詢權及集體談判權條例》，惟回歸後迅速遭小圈子選舉產生的「臨時立法會」廢除。”
   1. Close ties between Tung Chee-hwa and capital; continued need of capitalists’ support for weak SAR government
3. Dominance of pro-establishment forces in labor representation
   1. Legislative Council: 勞工界採用全票制
   2. FTU becoming a tool of stability maintenance for the SAR government and capital interests

Other news update:

1. ISun Affairs: Articles on Taiwan in recent issues
   1. Taiwan’s civil society’s battle to put an end to the death penalty
   2. DPP member’s participation in effort to bring attention to the case of daughter of mainland rights activist Zhang Lin as demonstration of cross-strait collaborative effort in civil society
   3. CCP use of folk rites related to the worship of Mazu as a platform of “united front” policy
2. Vicsforum: Articles on the flaws of Occupy Central
   1. 葉健民 – 心死——「佔領中環」的最大殺傷力
   2. 黃之鋒 – 重回起點剖析佔領中環