CHINA – POLITICS

Wang Lijun trial

1. 9/17: Trial began
2. 9/22: Wang sentenced to 15 years in jail. He faced up to 20 years in jail but the sentence was reduced due to his “meritorious service” in cooperation.
   1. “以徇私枉法罪判处有期徒刑七年；以叛逃罪判处有期徒刑两年，剥夺政治权利一年；以滥用职权罪判处有期徒刑两年；以受贿罪判处有期徒刑九年，数罪并罚，决定执行有期徒刑15年，剥夺政治权利1年。”
3. Xinhua’s detailed report of Wang Lijun case:
   1. Reference to Bo Xilai: “Relevant testimonies from witnesses showed that on Jan. 28, Wang Lijun reported to the then leading official of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Chongqing Committee that Bogu Kailai was highly suspected in the Nov. 15, 2011 Case. On the morning of Jan. 29, Wang Lijun was angrily rebuked and slapped in the face by the official. Guo Weiguo, who was present when Wang Lijun was slapped, said in the interrogation record that ‘the conflict was made public after Wang Lijun was slapped.’”
   2. “After the conflict had intensified, Wang Lijun on the same day ordered Li Yang and other individuals to re-obtain testimonies from witnesses, properly protect key material evidence, including the blood extracted from Neil Heywood’s heart, reorganize the evidence and documents regarding Bogu Kailai’s suspicion in murdering Neil Heywood, and provided his secret recording materials.”
4. Analysis
   1. Li Zhuang, Beijing lawyer against Bo’s anti-corruption campaigns: “That was a slap around the ears that changed history… Otherwise, Bo might still be in power and hoping to rise higher.”
   2. Shanghai Daily: “The virtually unmistakable reference to Bo increases the chances of him facing criminal charges, possibly for covering up a crime or corruption.”

Bo Xilai

9/28: Announcement by Xinhua that Bo was expelled from the Communist Party. Criminal proceedings are launched against him for taking bribes, abusing power, engaging in improper sexual relations with several women.

1. WSJ: Citing party insiders, suggests that powerful figures including former President Jiang Zemin have until recently argued that Mr. Bo should be disciplined within the party for limited wrongdoing in Chongqing rather than face criminal charges. He and Wen have convinced them otherwise.
   1. “There is also the issue of lingering support among the public for Mr. Bo and the populist style of government he pursued as party leader in Chongqing. There, he presided over a Maoist revival movement and heavy state spending on infrastructure and social programs. By accusing Mr. Bo of extensive wrongdoing, over his entire career, the party appears to be determined to crush that support.”
   2. Zhang Ming, Renmin University:
      1. Friday’s announcement as politically significant as that of a failed 1971 coup attempt against Mao by Lin Biao.
      2. Link to recent anti-Japanese protests: Protestors appeared to be showing support for Bo by carrying Mao portraits: “If they didn’t take Bo Xilai’s actions and announce them to the people, he would just turn into a populist leader”
   3. The Economist: “As he was being promoted, from mayor to governor to minister of commerce and at last to his seat on the Politburo, he was also accruing serious vulnerabilities (and wealth) along the way. Others among his peers have done some of the same things (a fact that will loom uncomfortably over his trial), but they have not challenged the established order, as Mr Bo appeared to be doing with his campaigning. If he had served out his years in Chongqing more quietly, it is possible he would have escaped scrutiny and eased into retirement.”
   4. Hu Shuli:
      1. “他的所作所为，一时造就了政治狂热为表、践踏法治为里的局面，与极“左”路线登峰造极的“文革”时期有很多相似之处，不能不令人震惊和担忧。”
      2. “而此一事件的发生也是一个严峻警告，提醒我们必须时时提防个别野心家利用民众对现实的不满情绪，把中国引向歧途；而那种试图通过践踏法律、否定改革来回应民众关切、解决社会矛盾的“模式”，是一条通向浩劫之路。”
      3. “薄熙来事件并不孤立，而是与一定的政治、经济和社会背景紧密相关。在转轨的中国，对“一把手”的约束和监督仍存在巨大漏洞，社会主义市场经济体制尚不完善，与之相应的法治基础远未夯实。有此背景，加上薄氏本人骄傲自大的心理、不断膨胀的野心和贪欲驱使，使他最终走上了堕落的不归路。”
      4. “薄熙来的堕落和毁灭提示我们，倒退没有出路，停滞也没有出路。只有把改革引向深入，才是惟一的长治久安之道。”
   5. Guangmingwang:
      1. 政治人格化:“政治人格化相较于政治制度化之不可取，就在其以人格弱化和替换品格与政格，以人格抽空和虚置制度及其约束，最终借以人格的“魅力”把自己凌驾于法律之上，由此导致社会大众人格和整个政治结构的“无格”，引发社会政治灾难。”
      2. “毫无疑问，无以制约的权力是薄熙来崛起于政坛、跌落于政坛的根本原因之一。此正所谓“成也权力，败也权力”。”
   6. Ming Pao: Comparison with Chen Liangyu and Chen Xitong
   7. IHT citing Li Zhuang: “This is great news” There is more hope for those attacked during Bo’s strike black campaign to get justice.

CHINA – SOCIETY

Golden Week

1. Some impressive statistics:
   34. Over 100 scenic spots received a total of 34.25 million visitors, up 20.96% from the same period last year. Tourism income surged by nearly a quarter from 2011 to 1.77 billion yuan. On 10/2, 186,000 people visited the Forbidden City, the largest single-day number of visitors ever.
   35. A record of 80.87 million people traveled by road each day during golden week. Beijing Railway Station witnessed a single-day passenger peak that was 20 percent more than that during the Chinese New Year holiday.
   36. Tens of thousands of travelers were stranded atop Huashan Mountain in Shaanxi province on 10/2 night due to overloaded cable cars. Over 300 policemen and government officials were deployed to climb up the mountain to help trapped visitors.
2. Xinhua: Better local planning including emergency plans, opening up more tourist sites, etc.
3. China Daily: “While there is no moral or legal ground to discourage people from joining the army of holidaymakers during peak seasons, guaranteeing people’s legal rights to paid vacations will inspire voluntary decisions of when to take a vacation and so avoid the travel frenzy that occurs every Golden Week. If government decrees are too feeble to ensure this, we need more explicit stipulations in law.”

Political Participation

1. 2012 China Political Participation Report (中国政治参与报告), CASS
2. “权利与参与途径认知”、“政策重要性认知”：超过50%，“实际政策参与”:11.00%。
3. 接受型的政策参与模式: Seeking to address problems engendered by state policies, rather than aiming at policy change (政策参与是以解决问题为导向的，而不是为了改变政策).
4. When unsatisfied with a certain policy: “向人大代表和政协委员”、“向政府有关部门(包括信访部门)反映”、“找熟人帮助解决问题”或“向媒体反映”，而“参加听证会反映意见”则排在倒数第二的位置上。

Wukan one year on

1. 9/21: 100-people march on the anniversary of the Wukan protests, voicing displeasure over the pace of land recovery. The new village government has thus far recovered only a quarter of the over 3,000 acres seized by officials and sold to developers.
2. Disillusionment with elected officials:
   1. Local critics: New village committee “lacked administrative experience, failed to engage the public and allowed itself to be manipulated and out-manoeuvred by higher authorities within the party”
   2. Reuters citing villager: “They were people’s heroes… But now we see them differently. We don’t have any new hope. What’s the point of electing them if they can’t solve the (land) problem.”
   3. Ming Pao citing villager: “Lin Zuluan is just a Song Jiang (先造反后接受招安)”
3. The Atlantic: Wukan grappling with an expectations gap: “On the one hand are the villagers who accuse the new leadership of moving too slowly. On the other hand are those former dissidents who joined the elected council only to find themselves faced with the challenges of governing. These individuals stress that it’s only been a year since the initial protests began, and just six months since the election that brought them to power.” A matter of “whether Wukan’s elected officials deserve more time”
4. Leadership: Fu Hualing, HKU: deeper structural problem
   1. “During the rebellion and immediately after, Wukan benefited from the goodwill of Guangdong province Communist Party chief Wang Yang, a powerful politician and noted reformer. But as jockeying between party officials intensifies ahead of an impending leadership transition, Mr. Wang appears to have stopped paying close attention to his pet projects at home, which explains why Wukan’s new government has struggled to recover its land.”
   2. The prospect for Wukan would be even worse should Wang Yang be promoted or reassigned out of Guangdong: “Without Wang Yang, it would die.”
   3. Wukan benefited from widespread media coverage and from Wang Yang’s desire to score points by producing “political achievement”. A general apathy among provincial authorities towards Wukan now prevails.
5. Lingering connections: Disgraced former village leader, Xie Chang, still have allies within the village. Ming Pao: The most active members of the 9/21 protests were in fact relatives and friends of the old village committee.
6. Corruption:
   1. Reuters: Higher officials in Shanwei county still remain tangled in shady deals involving hundreds of hectares of Wukan land in a new economic development zone.
   2. Ming Pao: Detailed map of land parcels still in government’s control.

Violent chaiqian; property-related activism 

1. 9/21: Panjin, Liaoning province: Policeman allegedly kill a villager.
   1. People’s Daily: “盘锦当地有关部门并未与村民达成拆迁补偿协议，在没有法院判决的情况下违法强拆，导致矛盾激化。”
   2. Report by Panjin prosecutor and government legal department: Policemen were sent not to assist in demolition work but to keep order after the victim (Wang Shujie) and his family threatened construction workers by spraying gasoline and lighting a lighter. Policeman fired shots to protect himself because he felt his life was threatened. Blame event on Wang family’s demand for “excessive compensation”.
   3. Doubts shed on official narrative
2. Caixin: List of 9 incidents of violent chaiqian that has taken place since the implementation of “国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例” in January 21, 2011. One woman was buried alive in Jilin, Changchun; others harmed themselves (self immolations, jumped from top of house) in resisting chaiqian.
3. 10/1: Group of three dozen protesters gathered outside UN offices in Beijing on National Day, wearing identical T-shirts and chanted about human rights and land rights. Flier dropped by protesters indicated grievance against bloody and violent chaiqian in Wuhan; it also called for authorities to discipline Ruan Chengfa, Wuhan’s mayor.

CHINA – ECONOMY

China’s powerful SOEs

1. The retreat of SOEs that began in the late 1990s has slowed, and has in fact reversed in some industries. Liberal reforms received a boost with China’s WTO entry in 2001, but slowed after 2006. The stimulus spending in the past few years have gone to SOEs. In 2004 the average industrial output of SOEs was six times that of the average private firm; by 2010 it had shot up to 11 times as much.
2. SOEs also enjoy unfair advantages: tax breaks, subsidies, no need to pay for land they occupy: not having to pay for the land SOEs sit on was a subsidy worth some 4 trillion yuan ($640 billion) in 2001-09.
3. Introduction of new law in 2011 that imposes fresh national-security reviews on foreign investment. Economic security and social stability is on the list of “security” concerns. The Economist: “easy cover for protectionism”

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Frank Hsieh’s visit

1. Former head of Taiwan’s opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Frank Hsieh (谢长廷), paid a private five-day visit to China. He met with State Councillor Dai Binguo (戴秉国) and Wang Yi (王毅), director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.
2. BBC: “The party has little choice but to try to formulate a policy on China that will appease Beijing, calm voters, and enable the island to continue to enjoy strong economic ties with China, its biggest trade partner and military threat.”
3. Global Times: “Cross-straits visit narrows political divide”. Citing Li Fei, Xiamen University professor: “a small step from Hsieh means a big step for the DPP.”

HONG KONG – POLITICS

Northeast New Territories development plan 

Project area: 787 hectares, Fanling North, Kwu Tung North and Ta Kwu Ling, Ping Che

Plan: Provide 53,800 homes for 152,000 people

Estimated affected population: 10,000 residents (1,700 households)

Estimated cost: HK$40 billion to assemble land ownerships from developers and rural landlords, since half of the planned area is in private hands

1. Evolution of plan:
   • Plan took shape in 1998, but due to slowdown in population growth and housing demand, shelved in 2003.
   • Reconsidered again in 2007; first public consultation period in November 2008
   • Met with increasing opposition only this year as there was mounting insecurity about “economic integration” with the mainland. Final consultation period ended in late September 2012.
2. Parties involved
   1. Big land owners including Henderson Land, Sun Hung Kei Properties and New World Development want to share profits by co-developing the land with the government, instead of seeing the sites acquired by the government at a cheap rate
   2. Indigenous villagers want more compensation and resettlement
      1. 上水鄉事委員會主席侯志強: 如果賠償合理，村民可原區安置的話，什麼都可以談，甚至「村內的古廟可以拆掉重建，祠堂亦可送予政府」
      2. 「他們都不是原居 民，又不是住在新界，我們這邊要發展與他何干？他們都是來搞事的吧。」
   3. Non-indigenous residents living in affected area: Renting homes or occupying government land (佔用政府土地), will not benefit from land sale and will only receive relocation compensation.
      1. 「被滅村」
   4. Land availability in Hong Kong
      1. Development Secretary Paul Chan on consultation: 2100 hectares of vacant land, of which 1200 was designated for building village houses.
      2. According to report from Development Bureau to Legislative Council in July: 2154 hectares of vacant land for residential developments, mostly in Yuen Long, Sha Tin, Sai Kung and Tuen Mun. Paul Chan: most of the vacant land was unusable because close to 60 per cent was designated for village-type development under the New Territories small house policy and some was road or man-made slope.
   5. Population and housing estimates
      7. In 2002, government predicted that Hong Kong’s population would reach 7.53 million by 2011. But today it is at 7.14. Hence no justification for large-scale development.
      8. Project plans to provide 21,600 public housing flats, which will become available in 2022, but this doesn’t satisfy target of building 15,000 public housing homes per year. “We have to ask – is getting rid of all this precious green space worth it?”
   6. Concern for integration with mainland
      1. Before he became CE, CY Leung has already proposed turning part of border area into a special economic district with visa-free arrangements for mainlanders for shopping, investing, studying and receiving medical services.
      2. Criticized plan as selling out Hong Kong (割地賣港)
   7. Government concessions:
      1. Adjustment of private to public housing ratio
      2. “Hong Kong property for Hong Kong residents” scheme could be introduce to the sites for land sale in the future, but still at stage of consideration.
      3. Proposal for including Ta Kwu Ling in a planned rail project. According to original Railway Development Strategy 2000, new Northern Link will connect to Kwu Tung but does not extend to Ta Kwu Ling-Ping Che.

Development of Hong Kong conservation movement

1. Beginning: Anti-high speed rail protests and movement for protecting Cai Yuan Village
2. Tse Hiu-yeung (謝曉陽), Hong Kong social movement observer:

「非常粗糙的划分，本土派可分为左右两派，『右派』具有强烈本土意识，遇到敏感议题，常常以族群来区分敌我，学者陈 云与他提出的『香港城邦论』较接近这派思想；『左派』则强调本土保育、不『反蝗』，也不强烈『反双非』，他们争取的是一个公义的社会，为弱势发声，而非以 族群、地区来区分敌我，社运人士朱凯迪较接近这种思维。但按照新界东北发展争议来说，目前左右两派都处于合作阶段。但必须说明的是，两派人不是截然二分 的，在某些情况，他们是相互流动的。」

「从「D&G事件」、「反自驾游」到「反国民教育」，本土派支持者似不断向右走，当中部分「右派」人士极为敌视大陆，不仅痛恨中共，也排斥大陆社会及人民。他们的立场日趋强硬甚至拒绝讨论，官民堕进「撤」与「