CHINA – POLITICS

Release of Xu Zhiyong

Leading legal activist Xu Zhiyong was granted bail on Aug 23, a rare event for human rights campaigners on the mainland. One of Xu’s lawyers said the granting of bail could mean that the court was less likely to send Xu to jail as long as he could pay the fines. Xu said that he would be compassionate to people with different opinions, including those responsible for social injustice, and might take a more low-profile approach to handling sensitive issues. Despite the seemingly non-political cause behind the case, many believe that the arrest of Xu was a gesture to restrain a booming civil rights advocacy movement on the mainland in the run-up to the 60th anniversary. A HK-based political commentator said that Xu’s comments might indicate a compromise of some sort behind his release on bail; but what really matters is what he will be allowed to do after returning to freedom. The future of Gongmeng remains unclear as Xu would not say whether he would reopen it after the fines were paid. Giving space for NGOs to operate is an official policy in the 17^th Party Meeting. But the sense of crisis, reinforced after a series of incidents occurred this year, gave the Political and Legal Affairs Commission a legitimate reason to override that policy. Apparently, the Commission uses its power in security and judicial departments to crackdown on NGOs. (SCMP, Aug 24; HKEJ, Aug 27) Mainland press, both English and Chinese, was again silent on Xu’s case.

Uygur scholar freed after disappear for more than a month

Ilham Tohti, a professor and widely considered to be among the more moderate Uygur rights advocates on the mainland, was freed without charge on Aug 22. He had been put under house arrest two days after ethnic riots in Urumqi on July 5. His Chinese language website was criticised by Xinjiang governor Nur Bekri for allegedly helping to orchestrate the violence and spread propaganda. He said that police questioned him for up to 20 hours at a time, but did not otherwise mistreat him. Professor Tohti said he did nothing wrong and added that he planned to continue to speak out about problems in Xinjiang, particularly policies that had disadvantaged and marginalised native Uygurs. (SCMP, Aug 27) 

Corruption key on the agenda of the upcoming CPC meeting

The 4th plenum of CPC’s 17th Central Committee meeting will be held in mid September. The key item on the agenda, as expressed in the official language, is ‘to study issues on strengthening and improving party building in the new situation’. The language of the meeting may be as bland as it sounds, but, as pointed out in a SCMP commentary, the meeting ‘can carry significance for the future of the party and China if the elite muster the political courage and wisdom to map out a clear path for reforms.’ Showing the political will to reforms would be an important response to the mounting challenges – rampant official corruption, widening income gaps and widespread social discontent- faced by CPC.

Several leading state mouthpiece magazines – including Outlook (瞭望) and China Commentary (中國評論) – carried several articles on the subject, saying that the meeting will focus on discussing ways to improve the so-called ‘intra-party democracy’ to strengthen internal checks and balances, and strengthen the mechanism to fight rampant official corruption. A scholar said that the steps the party leadership could take would be to promote more direct elections and take more forceful measures to combat corruption, including ordering officials to declare their personal assets. But the democracy in question isn’t the one in Western concept. What the party is trying to achieve is to strengthen internal checks and balances and boost the transparency of its decision-making; so the aim is to strengthen the party’s totalitarian control. It is argued that the changing nature of mainland politics has also helped calls for the direct election of senior cadres, even the top party leaders. How to institutionalise the succession process should be a top priority for the party if it wants to stay in power. The SCMP commentary said that ‘for many party members, the best option available is to allow competitive elections for top leadership positions at the 18th congress in 2012.’ (SCMP, Aug 24)

Gangster and corruption crackdown in Chongqing, genuine or a show of achievement?

Began in June, Chongqing (重庆) has launched a high-profile operation that snared more than 1,500 people, including gang bosses, billionaires, senior officials and hundreds of police officers. The biggest catch is Wen Qiang, director of the municipality’s justice bureau and deputy chief of police. The results revealed the shocking scale of the tentacles of the crime syndicates and their economic and political influence. The campaign is led by Bo Xilai, Secretary of Chongqing CPC Committee and a princeling politician with a populist touch. Given the complicated relationships between mainland officials, Bo’s war on organised crime is a bold move, yet he has the full backing of ordinary people in Chongqing, who had been complaining about crimes in the city. Bo pledged to tackle the problem soon after he was made party boss in late 2007. But he did not make much headway until his close allay Wang Lijun was transferred to lead the campaign as Chongqing’s chief of police. The crusade against the gangs and their protective umbrella within the municipal government is still under way, with more heads expected to roll.

Its timing is intriguing, as the 4th meeting of the Central Committee will be held soon in Beijing. It is said that the fourth meeting of a Central Committee traditionally kick-starts a period of intense political jockeying in the run-up to the next major reshuffle of senior personnel in three years’ time. For instance, vice-President Xi Jinping is expected to be the centre of attention at the meeting. If, as expected, he is appointed a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, it would be a crucial step to consolidating his status as heir apparent to President Hu Jintao. Many ponder, will the success of crackdown on gangs bring him back to Beijing? People’s Daily posted an article that even compared his campaign to that by the late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping to wipe out bandits in the southwest in 1949. SCMP said that Bo is no doubt the biggest winner in the municipality’s war against organised crime gangs, which has won him public praise and political capital ahead of a gathering of top officials this month. (SCMP, Sept 3)

New rules on petition ahead of 60^th anniversary

Political and Law Affairs Commission issued new guidelines (《中央政法委员会关于进一步加强和改进涉法涉诉信访工作的意见》) on petitions to address the issue of cross-level petitioning. The ultimate aim, as clearly expressed in the guidelines, is to resolve conflicts and maintain stability. The significance of the new rules is that, law and political departments at the central level will send officials to provinces where petitioning are prevalent to receive the petitioners. More importantly, it is the first time that the central government proposed a ‘final petition’ system. It means, after a petition case is reviewed and decided by the government at provincial or above level, it is considered as the final decision of the case; all levels of government departments would deal with the case no more. The guidelines also indicate strict punishment of illegal petitioning agent – referring to those who assists petitioners for persistent petitioning. It apparently signals renewed efforts to clear up petitioners in Beijing.

The guidelines are a response to meet the goal – ‘solving problems without coming to Beijing (不到北京也能解决问题)’ – emphasised in the National Conference on Petition Works in early August. Nanfang Weekend reported that an internal reporting system on the work of maintaining stability is in order. Provincial governments will rank the achievements of city and county level of governments with respect to their efforts in maintaining stability on a quarterly basis. Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee would hold ‘private talks’ with major officials of the municipal city that ranks last and counties that ranks bottom ten in the performance table in 4 quarters. The officials would then be asked to resign. (Nanfang Weekend, Aug 19) This performance check reinforces the new guidelines that aim to strengthen local government’s capacity in dealing with petitions, especially at a sensitive time.

China’s angry youth

Oriental Outlook ran a cover story on how western people see China’ angry youth. The phenomenon of angry youth drew attention of western media and China researchers. In the views of the a group of 12 American university students who come to China for a research study on China’s angry youth, they said that emergence of China’s angry youth was perhaps resulted from the west’s lack of understandings to China and their people. The face-culture, insecurity and the growing confidence of Chinese are seen as the key elements that reinforce the phenomenon of the angry youth. A guest writer, who was a professor at John Hopkins University, shared this view and pointed to western media’s out-dated and superficial understandings of China that reinforces the phenomenon. Particularly, he said that the west often unfairly made a link of the angry youth to nationalism. He said nationalism should be understood as identity awareness and should not be described as an evil ideology equivalent to extremism. He emphasised, as also pointed out by the American students, there is genuine needs to understand the Chinese youth better because their world view, attitudes, and value judgement to the west will have significant impact on China. (Oriental Outlook, Aug 20). However, the magazine didn’t discuss the angry youth who are also unhappy about their own government.

Local government’s slush funds to be checked

The Communist Party’s Central Committee for Disciplinary Inspection issued a statement (〈設立「小金庫」和使用「小金庫」款項違紀行為適用「中國共產黨紀律處分條例」若干問題的解釋〉) on their latest efforts in curbing corruption. It said officials caught with the accounts, called “small coffers” or slush funds, would be punished according to party supervisory regulations published in 2004. “Small coffer” is defined as a fund, securities or assets that should be but are not listed in party or government agencies’ account books in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. The practice of keeping slush funds by party and government agencies has been rampant in the past decade, as organisations reserve unmonitored funds in private accounts to pay for extra consumption or employee dividendses. The central government has launched 12 campaigns against the practice since the late 1980s, but it has persisted. The National Audit Office has said it found 140.6 billion yuan (HK$160 billion) in small coffers from 1998 to 2006. But Economic Observer put the estimate at 500 billion yuan a year, about 2 per cent of the mainland’s gross domestic product.

An HKEJ commentary said the move sent a strong message to official and the public. It is part of a comprehensive campaign advocated by Hu-Wen administration. But the commentator interpreted the motivation behind is to alleviate rising public discontent against government officials. Yet, it is doubtful if the campaign would be effective in real practice, given that similar campaigns were launched without success. The success of this initiative lies with the rule of law. The government is urged to revise the budget law and criminal law, as well as establish stringent laws and regulations and sanction mechanism to address the slush funds disuse. (HKEJ, Aug 24) Mainland legal expert also places doubt over the initiative, the root problem, in his view, is the lack of both supervision and a power-balance mechanism relating to major officials who set up the slush funds. (SCMP, Aug 24)

A mainland commentary said that the government should look at the root problem of slush funds. He pointed to fee charges (illegal, legal, and legal but unreasonable fee charges), which is a main source of slush funds. It is reported that in 2004, government departments at all levels received 937 billion yuan. However, not even a small portion of the fee charges was included in the fiscal budget, and less than 50% is put into the extra-budget funds. Lack of transparency and monitoring in fiscal accounts gives incentives to officials to keep the slush funds. If this issue is not attended, any imitative to stop slush funds would be ineffective. (Yanzhao Evening News, Aug 24)

China sets to pilot new basic old-age insurance scheme and medical reform

Retirement and healthcare are the key issues of concerns for most Chinese people. There are huge disparity of retirement schemes and healthcare facilities in urban and rural areas. In early August, Standing Committee of the State Council examined and gave in-principle support to adopting a new piece of legislation entitled Guiding Opinions on the New Rural Social Old-age Insurance Pilot. The new old-age pension will include both a basic pension and a system of individual retirement fund accounts. The major difference of the old and new insurance scheme is that the basic pension (now at 55 yuan per month) is funded directly by the central government. Individual’s compulsory contribution is about 4-8% of their income, and volunteer contribution is set at a ceiling at 15%. The scheme will be piloted in 10% of Chinese counties by Oct 1. It aims to have nationwide coverage by 2020. While the scheme receives positive supports from the society, there are concerns over the implementation of and responses of rural residents to the news scheme. That raises the questions of (1) is it safe to put the money under the government’s supervision; and (2) is it worth to pay that amount. The former is a trust issue and the latter is a more technical issue of the proportion of contribution. (Xinmin Evening Post, Aug 20) China Newsweek worried about local government’s financial viability to fund the scheme, especially in time of financial crisis, and rural residents’ enthusiasm. Particularly, the magazine is concerned about the further delay of the legislation of the social insurance law, which provides legal framework for strengthening monitoring power to the authorities to ensure the implementation of all social insurances, including the old-age insurance. (China Newsweek, Aug 17 Issue)

After the State Council announced the implementation plan for healthcare reform in April 2009, provinces have eventually announced their implementation plans accordingly. In late August, the Guangdong government said in a draft document for consultation that, it would invest 42 billion yuan to provide medical insurance to most of its population, as part of the efforts to the medical reform. It aimed to provide medical insurance schemes to cover 95 per cent of its urban residents not covered by employers’ schemes, and 98 per cent of rural residents in three years. The schemes also would cover retired people from bankrupt state enterprises, university students, vocational school students, private-sector employees and rural migrants holding steady jobs in cities. Guangdong has been leading the way in many medical reforms because of its relatively strong financial positions. Experiments to scrap the surcharge on medical fees by hospitals have been carried out in Shenzhen and Shaoguan. More experiment measures are expected to carry out. (Xinhua, Aug 26)

In Brief:

• A dissident (Xie Changfa) was given 13 years sentence by a Changsha court in Hunan for attempting to organise a national meeting of the banned China Democracy Party (SCMP, Sept 3)
• A closer look of the post-90 generation: a distinct Chinese group, but they are the future of China (New Weekly, Aug 15)
• Guangzhou authority is looking into the feasibility to set up a government unit to deal with foreigners in Beijing, in response to increasing ‘three illegal (三非) – illegal immigration, residence and employment’. This prompted to the discussion of the needs to set up an immigration bureau in China. (China Newsweek, Aug 17 Issue)
• China should be serious about refugee issues, starting from looking into specific laws for dealing with international refugee issues (Nanfang Weekend, Sept 2)

CHINA – ECONOMY

The aggressive growth of SOEs and SOEs reforms

The incident of Tunghua Steel (通化鋼鐵) and the aggressive growth of SOEs have brought SOEs to the center of debate. A number of Chinese media ran articles and commentaries that looked into the fast expansion of SOEs, especially through overseas merger and acquisition to consolidate its monopolistic power, and reviewed the policy of SOE reform. Nanfang Weekend said that the National Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (國資委) played an important role to guide the SOEs reform, since its establishment in 2004. It adopted a strategy that led to an oligopoly market in favour of giant SOEs. Such policy is effective to transform SOEs from debt-ridden and loss-making companies to ones that dominate the market and make good profit; but has also raised concerns over the future development of state enterprises. As SOEs have greater monopolistic power, will it lure them to become profit-maximising companies, ignoring the fact that they are invested with public fund? If so, how to control their aggressive growth? (Nanfang Weekend, Aug 19)

Caijing magazine and Economic Observer said that labour protests to block privatization of two state-owned steel companies in Jilin and Henan signal that SOEs reform remain a complicated and sensitive process, even after a decade of implementation. Economic Observer said that employees, as one of the main stakeholders whose interests are tied up in the issue of industry reform, ability to stand up and express their concerns does, to a certain extent, reflect on China’s political development. The opposition of the participants of such protests to reform is based on a fundamental mistrust in the legitimacy of the reform process. Part of the reason for this distrust is the fact that the employees’ rights to both know and also their right to participate in the negotiations have been ignored. While there is a genuine need to SOEs restructuring, the only way to reduce resistance to and the cost of reform is to communicate with all the players, to conduct comprehensive negotiations before making any moves and to strictly follow a legal process that acknowledges the rights of all stakeholders, including ordinary workers. The article advocated granting employees shares in the restructured enterprise as a way to reduce resistance. Share holding schemes have been experimented in some cases, and apparently rather effective. (Economic Observer, Aug 21)

A Caijing article said that there are not enough guidelines and regulations to govern the profit made by central-government owned SOEs. There is no clear requirement and framework for SOEs to give dividends to the government on a regular and systemic basis. It is reported that 116 government-controlled SOEs are required to give dividends to the government for the first time in 14 years. The accumulation of profits may give incentives to corruption as well as reckless investment. It urged the government to expedite the legislation on state capital operating budget. (Caijing, Aug 17; see also SOE Magazine, Aug 11) The move is seen as a significant one as this will further regulate the system as well as increase fiscal strength of the government. There has been discussion to use the dividends given by SOEs on social welfare through the Social Welfare Fund.

No need to inject state capital in private enterprise, or it won’t be private enterprise any more

Referring to an initiative of Taizhou government, Zhejiang Province, which propose to inject state capital into 100 private enterprise in a way to restructure private enterprises in the area, a Global Times article criticised the initiative of meddling in the operation of private enterprises. It said ‘the government always treats enterprises as unsophisticated children and themselves as omniscient and omnipotent parents with power of life and death. This paternal mind-set has existed for thousands of years, and the government has become used to making decisions for people.’ The strong expansion of SOEs is not due to the enterprises themselves, but to the government. If an enterprise needs capital, it should go public. This is the only way for private enterprises to thrive in the long term. As for the private enterprises facing difficulties, the active involvement of the government may be helpful in the revitalization; however, the government must not involve itself with enterprises that have no operational problems or do not want government help. (Global Times, Aug 27)

A Chinese ‘Marshall Plan’

The Economic Observer reported that the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had held numerous meetings recently to mull over new means and markets to spur plummeting exports following the global financial crisis. China is considering altering its focus – from US and Europe to Africa, Asia and Latin America – and may attempt to “create” more external demand by extending soft loans to trading partners. China would now actively explore the full potential of its neighbours and developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America. It is argued that by providing funding to help poorer countries to develop and lift their standard of living, the plan would eventually create a market for Chinese goods. The aim is to create external demand. China is suggested to draw 500 billion US dollars from its huge two-trillion US dollars of foreign reserves, and set up a fund to extend loans to developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America. The move would bring about multiple benefits in the long run – apart from ramping up exports, it would also advance the globalization of the yuan, and allow China’s domestic demand to grow at its own natural rate without the intervention of fiscal measures. Yet, there are also technical concerns over the feasibility to withdraw from the foreign reserves for direct lending to a third country and give loans direct with foreign-currency denominated assets, as somehow forbidden in Chinese law. (Economic Observer, Aug 14)

Keep an eye on prices for creating a peaceful environment ahead of National Day celebration

In an August 27 online statement, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has asked local authorities to keep a lid on prices of key goods, including grains, in a move to control inflation in the run-up to Oct 1, the 60th anniversary of China. Local price authorities must closely monitor the market and take measures to curb any illegal price hikes. But analyst said the extent of upward pressure on prices is uncertain. However, it is reported that domestic food prices, which make up the bulk of the consumer price index that gauges China’s inflation, are rising faster than international prices, and inflation may emerge in the fourth quarter. For instance, official statistics show that pork prices, a major component of CPI, rose 15.8 percent in the nine weeks ending mid-August. (Caijing, Aug 27)  A news commentary raised concerns of curbing price for a festive occasion. It argued that this will make precedence of similar move in future, and more, it may have harmful impact on China’s price reform in the long term. It also pointed out that the prices of a number of public utilities have been at a low level. The directive may force them to delay their price reform plan. It argued that the success of price control measure is not whether prices can be controlled during certain day or period, but whether price level will be kept at a stable and healthy level in the long term. (Oriental Morning Post, Aug 31

CHINA – DIPLOMACY

 Japan’s new government wants to build closer ties with China

The landside victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the Japanese lower house election will not only bring a new prime minister of Japan, but also may indicate more constructive development of bilateral relations between the two country. Global Times hold optimism to the new administration of Japan. It pointed out some positive signs that under the DPJ, bilateral relations could achieve a degree of advancement. Hatoyama has been clear that if elected, he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine. However, Global Times also highlights some troubling sings. For instance, the new government appeared to show little interest on China issues, indicated by the little emphasis on Sino-Japanese issues in Hatoyama’s election campaign. It also raised concerns on growing suspicion of the Japanese public holds toward China. (Global Times, Sept 1).

After elected, Hatoyama said that it would change its foreign policy focus away from a close-ally of US and get closer ties with Asian neighbors. This has prompted discussions in western media whether Japan would develop closer ties with China, in particular, and how US would respond. United Morning Post said that the notion of closer ties to Asia is no more than a political gesture and a diplomatic strategy for a new government. Distant herself from US makes no good to Japan. Japan knows that the Chinese market is so important that it couldn’t take chance of losing it. Japan-US alliance will continue to be central in Japan’s foreign policy. Thus, the ‘being more independent from US and being closer to China and Asia’ notion may indeed mean that Japan wish to collaborate with China to dominate the power in Asia. (Nanfang Website, Sept 3; China News Net, Aug 30).

TAIWAN – POLITICS

Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan make a political storm

The Dalai Lama was invited by seven mayors from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to visit southern Kaohsiung county, which was badly hit by Typhoon Morakot. The Dalai Lama accepted the invitation. Attention turned to President Ma who had once turned down the Dalai Lama’s visit due to Beijing pressures. Ma said to the media that his government had agreed to the Dalai Lama’s visit to pray for the souls of the deceased and seek blessings for the survivors of the typhoon. His spokesman said the visit is based on humanitarian and religious considerations, which should not hurt cross-strait tie. Beijing condemned the visit a few times and admitted that it will unavoidably hurt Cross-strait relations. Yet, it emphasised that economic cooperations between Taiwan and the Mainland would continue.

China Daily described the invitation to Dalai Lama a ‘Post-disaster farce’. It said that people concerned about the hard-earned recent rapport across the Taiwan Straits may worry whether the fine momentum will suffer. Yet, it praised the Chinese government of ‘offering to provide whatever it could possibly deliver to assuage the pains of the typhoon victims’, while accusing the DPP of being more interested in turning disaster relief into a political circus. The victims of the typhoon are mere hostages of the DPP’s partisan interest to carry out political blackmail. If the whole thing is to be measured in terms of winners and losers, there is no bigger loser than them. It said the DPP hardliners do not mind exploiting people’s suffering for their political ends. (China Daily, Aug 31)

In Taiwan, there are mixed responses to Dalai Lama’s visit and its impacts on cross-strait relations. Local industries have expressed concern that Dalai Lama’s visit might have a negative influence on the warming cross-strait relations, cause a change in cross-strait policy and affect the performance of local industries. Taiwan Media appears to turn against DPP, accusing DPP of using Dalai Lama’s visit for their own political interest. Some pointed out that the Han Chinese killed in Taiwan’s worst disaster in history might be followers of Mahayana Buddhism, but practically all of the indigenous people who lost their lives were Catholics or animists. And Mahayana Buddhism doesn’t approve of a living Buddha. The invitation to Dalai Lama is no more than political calculation to attack KMT. (add China Times; Ming Pao, Sept 1)

China Post editorial said that Ma was in a no-win situation. He would be damned if he doesn’t agree. He will be damned if he does — by the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan is eager to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) to prevent Taiwan from being marginalized in an emerging free trade zone in Asia, known as the Ten-plus-One (China). The editorial said that the trap set up by DPP is to prevent the conclusion of the ECFA. Ma could only opt for the lesser evil of the two. The newspaper expressed concerns whether China would retaliate against Taiwan for the visit, as it said, ‘Beijing always reacts strongly, often irrationally, when the Dalai Lama meets a head of state or government in any world capital.(China Post, Aug 29). Financial analysts in Taiwan said that the visit might have an impact on cross-strait relations and financial cooperation, but will have little influence on local industries. For instance, some new regular direct flights between Taiwan and China started on schedule a day earlier. It is generally believed that the general trend of cross-strait economic and trade cooperation is unlikely to be reversed, China might cut the number of Chinese tourists and Chinese procurement delegations allowed to visit Taiwan and decrease or cancel orders placed with Taiwanese companies. (China Post, Sept 2)

Some analysts see the visit of Dalai Lama shifting the political attention from Ma administration to China’s reactions on the visit. Ming Pao said that the priority for both KMT and China is on damage control. China should not retreat from a ‘friendly’ approach to KMT and Ma as this will help DPP to regain public supports against China and eventually to KMT. (Ming Pao, Sept 2)

New strategy to balance power of green, blue and red camp

China Times commentary said that the incident of Dalai Lama’s visit to Taiwan indicates the 3 major forces in Taiwan’s politics, a strategic triangle of red, blue and green camps. It is argued the balance of power amongst them may not be bad for maintaining peace between mainland and Taiwan. If DPP is aware of its opposition to KMT may give mainland the opportunity to reduce their ‘powers’ in the triangle, while strengthening China’s, DPP should play a more strategic role that ensures China would not be the dominant power in the triangle. Weak DPP and KMT would not be good for the future of Taiwan. It urged DPP to rethink its strategy and more cooperation with KMT. (China Times, Aug 31)

The sentence of Chen Shuibin

Prior to the sentence handed down to Chen Shuibin, his family received theirs on September 1. Their sentence fuels speculations over the sentence of Chen, which is due to announce on September 11. It is widely speculated that Chen would file appeal and seek for bail-out. If he is allowed to bail, his move after the release on bail would have political influence to DPP’s strategy as well as Ma’s, as argued in a Ming Pao commentary. It may be a turning point to Taiwan politics. While admitted the wrongdoings, Chen has claimed that he was a victim of political and judicial repression. If Chen is granted bail-outs, many expect that he would return to DPP and run another campaign to mobilize supporters, on ground of political repression. It is unsure to what extent he may regain supports from his fellow DPP members. Chen’s political influence should not be under-estimated. His return may deepen the splits of DPP. If he does gain supports, he would attack on Ma’s incompetence in dealing with post-disaster relief work. The discredits to Ma’s administration may spur internal conflicts in KMT, giving DPP a chance to regain public supports and power. The appeal and a bail-out may be a turning point of the politics between DPP and KMT. (Ming Pao, Sept 2)

HONG KONG – POLITICS

No consultation of 2017 and 2020 election arrangement in upcoming CE consultation

In a meeting with academics, the HKSAR Chief Executive (CE) asserted that the consultation on constitutional reform in December would not deal with elections in 2017 and 2020, but proposals for 2012 will further democratise elections for Legco and the chief executive without the implementation of full universal suffrage. Many criticised Tsang of breaking his promise given in his re-election campaign. This has drawn debates amongst politicians and public. Political parties have planned to host meeting and organise a social movement to push for a roadmap and timetable of universal suffrage. (Ming Pao, Aug 26)

Ming Pao editorial said that a political storm would be anticipated. Democrats would accuse Tsang breaking his promise, and the public would place further doubts over the central government’s sincerity in promoting democracy in HK. It added that, there is little doubt the central government plays a central role in HK’s constitutional reform; but Tsang should do his best to convince the central government to give him the authority to discuss the ultimate plan of universal suffrage of Legco and CE. (Ming Pao, Aug 26) A Ming Pao commentary said that Donald Tsang’s assertion of not discussion 2012 and 2017 is expected as he signalled his helplessness in taking it forward in various occasions, given the displeased of the central government. Yet, it argued that the real battlefield of the constitutional reform is not only on the election of the Chief Executive, but far more important, how to disband the function constituency seats, as China has been fond of ‘small group’ elections. So, how to make a transition for a universal suffrage by 2020, still quite a lot of ‘special’ arrangements needed to be made and discussed. Thus, there is no way for a ultimate proposal and road map this year. (Ming Pao, Sept 1)

2. Plan to press Tsang to dissolve Legco and the legal basis of not discussing 2017 and 2010 election arrangement

Pan-democrats have said they will continue to push for universal suffrage in 2012 unless they can be reassured by a consultation exercise, to be launched before Christmas, that genuine universal suffrage will be implemented by 2017 for the election of the chief executive and in 2020 for the legislature. While the democrats didn’t get consensus on the ‘resign en mass’ proposal, Democratic Party (DP) announced a revised strategy on constitutional reform. They warn to block the government proposal and invoke Article 50 of the Basic Law, which states that the chief executive can dissolve Legco if lawmakers refuse to pass an important bill. If the CE does, a citywide by-election would be held, which the Democrats consider would be the same as a referendum. Many in the Pan-democrats camp see it a better alternative than the ‘resign en masse’ proposal. Democratic Party added that if the CE refuses to dissolve Legco, his failure to do so will be opened to judicial review. Legal experts said that while the plan could be used to put pressure on Mr Tsang to dissolve Legco, it is doubted whether a judicial review could be initiated on this ground. (SCMP, Aug 27)

SCMP said that (response to Democrat’s strategy) while good at attracting attention, distract from shaping a meaningful package, which genuinely makes progress towards universal and equal suffrage. The talk of mass resignations by legislators to force by-elections, or pressing of the chief executive to dissolve Legco so that fresh polls can be held are both misguided and likely to prove counterproductive. It criticised the Democrats of playing games with the constitution. The priority is to move HK forward with a meaningful and realistic package and the Democrats shouldn’t waste time and energy. (SCMP, Aug 31) A commentary of WenWeiPo strongly criticized Pan-democrats’ threat of dissolving the Legco. It said that the key issues that HK people concern is economic and social issues as this matter to the well-beings of the people much. It also cited a survey that showed that a majority of HK people accepted the timetable of universal suffrage as expressed by the People’s Congress. The commentary said the intention of Pan-democrats is clear, which aims to discredit the HK government and the welfare of HK people. (Wen Wei Po, Sept 2)

In response to the HK government’s assertion of lack legal basis to discuss electoral arrangement of 2017 and 2020 election, legal experts said that People’s Congress’s decision indeed didn’t specifically say that current administration couldn’t deal with the 2017 and 2010 ultimate reform proposal. They added that, even though the government did discuss it, it wouldn’t violate the NPC decision or any laws. In other words, the CE is with the capacity to deal with the issue, and should not confuse the public with the legal concerns. (Ming Pao, Aug 26)

Alan Hoo（胡漢清）, a senior counsel, a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and chairman of the Basic Law Institute, shared the view and join a chorus calling for the government to use a public consultation this year to canvas opinions on broader constitutional change. He said there is room in the Basic Law that allows him to discuss electoral arrangements of universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020. He urged Tsang to use the consultation for his policy address next month to spell out the government’s understanding of the relevant articles of the Basic Law. He also suggested declassifying and publishing the Basic Law drafting materials regarding Article 45 and making public the legal opinion of Secretary for Justice Wong Yan-lung to the unclear articles. (SCMP, Sept 2) Given Hoo’s close ties with top Beijing officials, it is unclear how much weight of his words may reflect the opinions of the Chinese government.